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Abstract 
This thesis explains how Sir Hersch Lauterpacht constructed his international legal theory in the 
universalisation process of the European law of nations. Introduction presents the general 
background of the universalisation process of the European law of nations. Chapter 1 discusses the 
situationality of Lauterpacht, which affected his life as an international lawyer, namely his Jewish 
background, the influence of Kelsen and the English tradition of international law. Lauterpacht' s 
nonnative conception of the international community in the inter-war period is explicated in 
Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I examine how Laute:rpacht dealt with legal problems in the outlawry of 
war from the inter-war period to the end of the Second World War. Chapter 4 holds Lauterpacht' s 
attempts to reconstruct the international community after World War II. Being opposed to political 
realism, Laute:rpacht employed the Grotian Tradition in order to prove the historical value of his 
idealism. He moulded the function of states into the framework of his normative conception of the 
international community as civitas maxima with regard to recognition, collective security and the 
international protection ofhuman rights. I demonstrate how Lauterpacht contributed to the work of 
the International Law Commission in Chapter 5 from 1952 to 1954. Chapter 6 examined the 
problems of the responsibility of international judges, namely their neutrality, legal reasoning, and 
the compatibility of'automatic' reservation with the ICJ Statute. The conclusion is an appreciation 
of legalism within the framework of the universalisation of international law in the era of 
decolonisation 
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Lauterpacht doctrine' in the case of Akehurst's text book A Modern Introduction to International 
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the number attached to BR which is seen in Bibliography. Thus, for example, 
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(1947) 24 BYIL 502. 'R' means the professional reports which Lauterpacht submitted to 
governments or international organisations. 'F' denotes 'Fmward' which he wrote for others' 
books. 
Xlll 
A.l. GENERAL 
It is scarcely necessary to point out that international law developed in EtrrOpe. William Hall, for 
example, declared that international law is 'a product of the special civilisation of modem EtrrOpe, 
and forms a highly artificial system of which the principles cannot be supposed to be understood or 
recognised by countries differently civilised.' 1 It is true that normative phenomena similar to 
international law were seen in such regions outside EtrrOpe as ancient China2 or the Far East3 
However, such normative phenomena among political entities in Asia did not affect international 
law as we understand it. It is the normative system called jus publicum europaeum (public law of 
Europe) or the European law of nations which developed into the international law universally used 
in our era. The history of international law shows how the European law of nations became 
universal beyond its geographicallimits.4 Geographically, it extended to other parts of the world 
with the era of colonialism. During the era of colonialism, European nations claimed the 
universality of European civilisation symbolised by international law. 
The encounter between Japan and the European powers in the late 19~1 century is a good 
example of how European nations claimed the universality of their civilisation.5 Japan had been 
closed to European nations under the Tokugawa shogunate regime for nearly 250 years. However, 
it was forced in 1858 by the United States, which recognised itself as a successor of European 
civilisation, to conclude the unequal treaty which recognised consular jurisdiction, and denied the 
sovereign right of Japan to decide customs duties, even though the Tokugawa shogunate 
government had less knowledge of the law of nations. In other words, Japan was compelled to 
1 Hall/1924/47. 
2 Iriye/1967-I. 
3 Onuma/2000. 
4 Schmitt/2003; Schwarz.enberger/1951/25-39. 
5 Ko:zai/1994/75. 
1 
accept the universal applicability of the European law of nations by concluding these unequal 
treaties. Other European powers, including the United Kingdom, also demanded that Japan 
conclude these unequal treaties. It is not surprising, therefore, that the main purpose of the foreign 
policy of Japan after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 was to revise these unequal treaties. In order to 
accomplish its foreign policy, Japan had to modernise. Unless Japan embraced what is known as 
westernisation, European powers would not recognise it as a civilised nation, which meant that they 
would not treat Japan as an equal. Only after Japan showed its military power and its compliance 
with the laws of war in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 to 1895 was it regarded by the European 
states as a civilised nation, and then succeeded in the revision of those unequal treaties.6 Thus, 
European civilisation, including international law, claimed its universality. It was after former 
colonies became newly independent states in the late 1950s that the European character of 
international law began seriously to be disputed.7 
The geographical extension of the European law of nations, however, could not help but affect 
the substance of the law itself The notion of occupation which Grotius introduced into international 
law by the analogy with Roman law in Mare Liberum, for example, cannot be explained in the 
absence of the conflicts among European nations with regard to the acquisition of their colonies.8 It 
is also proven that the concept of territorial sovereignty was established in the scramble for Africa9 
With regard to membership of the international community, Christianity had been the standard of 
any state entitled to become the subject of the European law of nations. This meant that non-
Christian countries were not the subject of law. However, the notion of civilization supplanted 
Christianity as the standard of the membership of the family of nations, because European nations 
had to recognise the legal capacity, though limited, ofnon-Christian nations such as Turkey, China 
or Japan, for the sake of security and trade. Thus, the universalisation of the European law of 
6 Hall/1924/49; Holland/1898/112-129. 
7Wllfred/Jenksl1958/63-172; Roling/1960; Abi-Saab/1960; Abi-Saab/1962; Carlston/1962; 
Anand/1962; Anand/1966; Prakash/Sinha/1965; Me Whinnney/1987. 
8 Taijyudou/1955. 
9 Anghie/1999. 
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nations is the process by which it gradually lost its European character in exchange for acquiring its 
universality. 
The universalisation process of the European law of nations, thus, has two meanings: (1) the 
geographical extension of the sphere of the application of the European law of nations, and (2) the 
transformation of the European law of nations to universal international law. It is no coincidence 
that legal writers started to use the tenn 'international law,' coined by Bentham, instead of the tenn 
'European law of nations' in the 19111 century. 10 The geographical extension of the European law of 
nations was over by the time European powers had almost completed the division of the world at 
the beginning of the 20th century. However, the European law of nations changed into the universal 
law of nations after it became applicable to civilised nations, irrespective of their non-European 
origin. This change of the substance of the European law of nations started from the end of the 
Concert ofEurope to the establishment of the League ofNations. 
In the 19d1 century, the balance of power was indispensable to the existence of the European 
law of nations. In the second edition of his famous treatise, Lassa Oppenheim drew the first lesson 
from the history of intemationallaw: 
'The first and principal moral is that a Law ofNations can exist only if there be an equilibrium, a balance of 
power, between the members of the Family ofNations. If the Powers cannot keep one another in check, no 
rules oflaw will have any force, since an over-powerful State will naturally try to act according to discretion 
and disobey the Jaw. As there is not and never can be a central political authority above the Sovereign States 
that could enforce the rules of the Law of Nations, a balance of power must prevent any member of the 
Family ofNations from becoming omnipotent' 11 
'The second moral is,' he continued, 'that International Law can develop progressively only when 
10 Grewe/2000/462-463. 
11 Oppenheim/1912a/80. 
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international politics, especially intervention, are made on the basis of real State interests' 12 In the 
view of Oppenheim, international law in the 19th centwy was based on power politics, of which the 
two elements are the balance of power and the quest for national interest 
However, the First World War was the result of the collapse of the balance of power. The 
causes of the First World War are too complex to mention in detail here. Suffice it to note that the 
Great War forced people to think the balance of power inappropriate as the basis of international 
relations. Oppenheim also thought so. Just before the end of the war, he predicted that the 
development of international law would follow it after the First World War. 
'[T]he outbreak of the present war is epoch-making, because it has become apparent that, whatever may be 
the war aims of the belligerents, at bottom this World War is a fight between the ideal of democracy and 
constitutional government on the one hand, and autocratic government and militarism on the other. 
Everywhere the conviction has become prevalent that things cannot remain as they were before the outbreak 
of the present war, and therefore the demand for a League of Nations, or - I had better say - for a new 
League ofNations to take the pi~ of that which has been in existence for about 400 years, has arisen.' 13 
The League of Nations, thus, appeared as 'the trilll11ph of liberalism on the international scene.' 14 If 
the League ofNations was thought to introduce liberalism to the international plane, it would not be 
surprising that international legal studies after the First World War were considerably affected by 
'the Spirit of Geneva' which 'comprises a desire for liberty and universality, a confidence in man, 
provided he submit to rules, an inexhaustible curiosity as to ideas and people, a compassion for all 
miseries combined with an urge to invent, to ameliorate, to administer with method.' 15 How did 
international legal studies change in the inter-war era? In order to ponder this question, it is 
noteworthy that Oppenheim expected a change in international legal studies in the second edition 
12 Jbid/80-81. 
13 Oppenheim/1919/11. 
14 Morgenthau/1946/41. 
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of his textbook: 'The fifth moral is that the progress of International Law depends to a great extent 
upon whether the legal school of International Jurists prevails over the diplomatic school.' This 
remark is a key to the above question, because 'the legal school of International Jurist' is another 
expression of liberalism in international legal studies. It presupposes the domestic analogy which 
expects 'International Law to develop more or less on the lines of Municipal Law, aiming at the 
codification of firm, decisive, and unequivocal rules of International Law, and working for the 
establishment of international Courts for the purpose of the administration of international justice.' 
Thus, Oppenheim was opposed to the diplomatic school which 'considers International Law to be, 
and prefers it to remain, rather a lxxly of elastic principles than of firm and precise rules.' There was 
no doubt for him 'that international Courts are urgently needed, and that the rules of International 
Law require now such an authoritative interpretation and administration as only an international 
Court can supply.' 16 
When the Permanent Court of International Justice was established within the scheme of the 
League, as Oppenheim predicted, it is no wonder that the legal school became influential in 
international legal studies in the era of the League. However, it is improper to group international 
lawyers without explicating the ethos of the legal school of international lawyers. It is legalism or 
the belief in legality. It is convenient to describe the detailed characteristics of legalism as the ethos 
of the legal school of international lawyers. 
Legalism is the common belief of lawyers that the ideal of the Rule of Law is politically 
legitimate. The crux oflegalism is expressed by Max Weber that 'today the most common form of 
legitimacy is the belief in legality, the compliance with enactments which are formally correct and 
which have been made in the accustomed manner.' 17 Neil MacCormick also defines legalism as 
'the stance in legal politics according to which matters oflegal regulation and controversy ought so 
far as possible to be conducted in accordance with predetermined rules of considerable generality 
15 Deffmz/1935/30. 
16 Oppenheim/1912a/80. 
17 Weber/1968/37. Emphasis original. 
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and clarity, in which legal relations comprise primarily rights, duties, and in which acts of 
government however teleologically must be subordinated to respect for rules and rights.' 18 In other 
words, legalism or the belief in legality is one of the answers to the question as to how a political 
authority legitimates its governance. Insofar as the authority complies with legal rules and 
principles, the exercise of its power is entitled to be recognised as legitimate. If the Rule of Law 
means that 'the government shall be ruled by the law and subject to it,' 19 legalism is nothing but the 
general attitude oflawyers to respect for the Rule ofLaw.20 
It cannot be denied, thus, that legalism is one of the political ideologies or preferences.21 Some 
lawyers may be opposed to the term 'ideology' because law is different from politics. However, the 
respect for the ideal of the Rule of Law is one of the answers to the question, what kind of 
governance is politically appropriate. This point is shown by the general attitude of lawyers to 
politics; lawyers tend to think that law prevails over politics. Judith Shklar pointed out this tendency 
oflawyers. 
'Politics is regarded not only as something apart from law, but as inferior to law. Law aims at justice, while 
politics looks only to expediency. The former is neutral and objective, the latter the uncontrolled child of 
competing interests and ideologies. Justice is thus not only the policy of legalism, it is treated as a policy 
superior to and unlike any other. '22 
This attitude of lawyers is just one example of how lawyers make their value-judgments with 
regard to politics. The belief in the superiority of law over politics itself is the matter of political 
morality. 
The legal school of international lawyers essentially accepts this premise as the Rule of Law in 
18 MacCormick/1994/500. 
19 Raz/1979/212. 
20 MacCOnnick/1990/541. 
21 Shklar/1964/1-28. 
22 lbid/111. 
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international relations. It is true that Weber and MacConnick discussed the political legitimacy of 
domestic governance, not the legitimacy of international governance. However, the legal school of 
international lawyers believes that the Rule of Law is also the legitimate form of governance in the 
international commtmity. Martti Koskenniemi made the following point: 
'Though international lawyers have received much of their professional vocabulruy from ancient somres -
Roman law and Christian ethics - in a relevant sense their profession is based on distinctly modernist ideas 
about social organization and political legitimacy. Central to these ideas is the belief that human society is an 
artificial creation and that its only legitimate organizing principle is the Rule of Law- ''the principle that the 
health of the political realm is only maintained by conscientious objection to the political".'23 
Goldstein also says, 
'Some actors favour law not only because it serves their interests but also because they believe decisions taken 
according to legal precepts are superior to other forms of governance. Belief in law as "good" is not evenly 
distributed in the population or across regions. Certainly lawyers more often believe in the use of law than 
other occupational groups, though it is hard to separate the normative from the material basis of their 
support. ,24 
This belief is very common to the legal school of international lawyers, whether positivist or 
naturalist. Oppenheim said, 
'I name these schools "diplomatic" and "legal" for want of better denomination. They must, however, not be 
confounded with the three schools of the "Naturalists," "Positivists," and "Grotians".'25 
23 Koskenniemi/1992/xi. 
24 Goldstein/2000/397. 
25 Oppenheim/1912a/80/n.2. 
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Since legalism is 'the common element in all the various and conflicting modes oflegal thinking,'26 
it is common to most 'mainstream' lawyers insofar as they believe that the Rule of Law is the only 
legitimate form of governance even in international relations. Positivists and naturalists discussed 
how they should construct legal justice. However, it is a different question from the belief that 
legality is politically legitimate. Insofar as they entertain this belief, they are common in legalism, 
although it is not deniable that there is still a difference between legal-formalism (positivism) and 
legal-moralism (naturalism) with regard to the question of the relation oflaw with morality. 
Even if the legal school of international lawyers believes that the Rule of Law is desirable in 
international relations, however, it is also true that the international community lacks the centralised 
authority to administer international law, which is the important condition of the Rule of Law in 
international relations. Hart pointed out that '[t]he absence of these institutions [international 
legislature, courts with compulsory jurisdiction, and centrally organized sanctions] means that the 
rules for states resemble that simple form of social structure, consisting only of primary rules of 
obligation. '27 It is essential, therefore, for the legal school to establish international institutions. In 
this context, the domestic analogy plays the decisive role for the institutionalisation of the 
international community. The legal school does not admit the difference between the domestic 
societies and the international community. It is so even if the international community has been 
unorganised, which simply means to the legal school that the international community is at the 
developing stage. If the international community were developed, it would seem to the legal school 
to be more similar to domestic societies. Therefore, the legal school of international lawyers wishes 
to establish the compulsory jurisdiction of the international courts in order to settle international 
disputes in accordance with international law. However, if international legal rules are not certain, 
the discretionary power of international judges might be very broad and sometimes arbitrary. 
Therefore, they emphasise the importance of the international law-making process. Furthermore, 
26 Shklar/1964/8-9. 
27 Hart/19941214. 
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they expect that international law should be enforced impartially and coherently, which means they 
presuppose the existence of the administrative body to enforce international law. In other words, the 
legal school wants to introduce the liberal structure of the modem state into the international 
community as a whole. 
The legal school, thus, claimed the Rule of Law in the international community. The Rule of 
Law seemed to the legal school of international lawyers to be the universal political principle of 
mankind, irrespective of whether people were European or not It was natural, thus, for the legal 
school to think that international law was universally normative. Legalism did not matter to the 
actual difference between the military or economic powers of states, because all states are equal 
before international law. Neither was the legal school of international lawyers concerned as to 
whether states were European or not, because it would be racial discrimination to distinguish 
between them. International law, thus, became universal insofar as the image of the world was 
normatively constructed. It should be noted, however, that the Rule of Law itself is a product of 
European political culture at the same time.28 It is the case that the Rule of Law is just one of several 
political traditions in Europe, because it is in Europe that some political ideologies such as 
communism or Nazism which were hostile to the ideal of the Rule of Law appeared?9 Nevertheless, 
the fact remains that it is in Western Europe that the ideal of the Rule of Law was born and prevails. 
Thus, legalism has two characteristics: its European origin and universalism. It is the key concept to 
understanding how the European law of nations was transformed into the universal law of nations. 
From such a viewpoint of universality, the League ofNations seemed to the legal school in the 
inter-war era to be one important step towards the organised community of states, which is the 
essential condition to the Rule ofLaw in international relations. Indeed, international law in the era 
of the League was clearly developed in accordance with the prediction ofOppenheim. The League 
of Nations system itself was based on domestic analogy.30 It was expected that all kinds of 
28 HUritington/1996/70. 
29 Shklar/1964/22. 
30 On the domestic analogy which plays an important role in the creation of the League ofNations, 
9 
international disputes should be settled in accordance with law lll1der the League ofNations System. 
The expectation embodied the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice and 
the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. International legislation such as 
the Conference on the Progressive Codification of International Law, held in 1930 under the 
auspices of the League of Nations, was also embodied as 'the Spirit of Geneva' In other words, 
international politics was legalised under the League of Nations system. Oppenheim's prediction 
seems to the legal school of international lawyers to have come true. 
However, when the Second World War occurred in 1939 after such crises as the Manchurian 
and Abyssinian incidents, nobody could deny that the Spirit of Geneva had already failed. The 
miscarriage of the Spirit of Geneva was true of international legal studies at that time. It became 
necessary to reconsider whether or not legalism was appropriate to international relations as the 
basis of the universality of international law. Some classical political realists argued for the 
inappropriateness of international legalism in the era of the League of Nations. E. H. Carr, for 
example, considered that international law is based on political decision: 
'Every system of law presupjX)seS an initial political decision, whether explicit or implied, whether achieved 
by voting or by bargaining or by force, as to the authority entitled to make and unmake law. Behind all law 
there is this necessary jX)litical background. '31 
From such a viewpoint, the legal school of international lawyers in the era of the League seemed to 
disregard this presupposition: 'Unwilling to recognise the political basis of every legal system, they 
dissolve politics into law. '32 Consequently, it seems to Carr to be inevitable that the legal school 
damaged the authority of international law through the mistaken idea that international law can 
see Suganami/1989n9-93. 
31 Carr/1945a/166. 
32 Jbid./186. 
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solve the conflict of interests in the political sphere.33 
The legal school of international lawyers, nevertheless, still exercised influence over the reality 
of international law and on the academic paradigm of international legal studies even after the 
Second World War. What role did the legal school of international lawyers play from the historical 
perspective of how the European law of nations became universal beyond its European origin? 
From such a viewpoint, it is worthwhile to examine the theory of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht who was 
'one of the most determined critics of the tenets of the diplomatic school. '34 
A.2. WHYIIERsCHLAUTERPACHf? 
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht was one of the great British international lawyers at his time. He occupied 
the Whewell Chair of International Law at the University of Cambridge (1938-1955), and later 
became the Judge of the International Court of Justice (1955-1960). His edition of Oppenheim 's is 
still regarded as one of the best English textbooks of international law. Although Jennings and 
Watts published the ninth edition of Oppenheim 's, Lauterpacht's edition is still valuable because 
Jennings and Watts have not yet published the part dealing with international organisations and its 
second voh.une with regard to the settlement of disputes and war. Furthermore, the trilogy of 
international judicial fimctions, namely Private Law Sources and Analogy of International Law, 
The Func_f!.qn of Law in the International Community and The Development of International Law 
by the International Court, remain essential reading for all international lawyers even after his death. 
His influence over international lawyers is shown by the fact that European Journal of 
International Law had a special issue about him under 'The European Tradition in International 
Law' on the centenary of his birth?5 Undoubtedly, we owe Lauterpacht much, as Manfred Lachs 
33 Jbid/187-188. 
34 Suganami/1989/17. 
35 the articles and notes on Hersch Lauterpacht published as 'The European Tradition in 
International Law' are: Koskennierni/1997c; Scobbie/1997; Herzog/1997; Jennings/1997; 
Schwebel/1997; the reprint ofKelsen/1961 and McNair/1961a; Elihu/Lauterpacht/1997. 
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admired Lauterpacht particularly in his book discussing the teachers in intemationallaw.36 
It should be noted, moreover, that Lauterpacht influenced the so-called English school of 
international relations as represented by Hedley Bull. In his famous article The Grotian Conception 
of International Society, Bull discussed the opposition between Grotius and Oppenheim with 
regard to the conception of international society. However, it was, in fact, Lauterpacht as neo-
Grotian whom Bull compared with Oppenheim, because Bull's understanding of Grotian 
conception that '[t]he central Grotian assumption is that of the solidarity, or potential solidarity, of 
the states comprising international society, with respect to the enforcement'37 was essentially based 
on Lauterpacht's understanding of Grotius in The Grotian Tradition in International Law.38 In this 
sense, Lauterpacht may be regarded as the solidarist origin of the English school of international 
relations.39 
There is no doubt, therefore, that the international legal theory of Lauterpacht is worth 
examining for explicating the role of legalism in the universalisation process of the European law 
of nations. However, it may be asked whether there is anything left to discuss concerning his 
international legal theory, because there are already many articles on this subject, not to mention his 
academic life. In particular, after Clarence Wilfred Jenks,40 Shabtai Rosenne,41 Gerald Fitzmaurice,42 
Martti Koskenniemi43 and lain Scobbie44 wrote excellent articles about Lauterpacht's theory of 
international law, there seems to be nothing left to discuss about his theory. Nevertheless, it is still 
worth discussing Lauterpacht 
First, it can be argued that the perspectives of Wilfred Jenks and Fitzmaurice as 
contemporaries ofLauterpacht are naturally different from the viewpoint of subsequent generations. 
36 Lachs/1987/115. 
37 Bull/2000/97. 
38 Dunn/1998/1 01. 
39 Knudsen/2000. 
40 Wilfred/Jenks/1960. 
41 Rosenne/1961. 
42 Fitzmaurice/1960/1979/and/1986/634-843. 
43 Koskenniemi/1997c/and/2001/353-412. 
44 Scobbie/1997. 
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They knew his personality and experienced the same difficulties which he faced. Therefore, 
Wilfred Jenks and Fitzmaurice did not need to mention the circumstances of their times, namely 
situationality, which affected the development of Lauterpacht's legal theory. However, it is 
impossible for the generation of their grandchildren to share the common basis with Lauterpacht, 
which Jenks and Fitzmaurice must have had for tu1derstanding his theory. Therefore, it is natural to 
assume that the perspective adopted in this thesis would become different from their views. In order 
to tu1derstand Lauterpacht's theory, indeed, it is necessary for subsequent generations to put 
Lauterpacht and his contemporaries in the stream of history. In other words, Lauterpacht, Wllfred 
Jenks and Fitzmaurice, have all already been part of the history of international law for this author 
even before he started to study international law as an tu1dergraduate. Ifhistory is not a self-evident 
fact, but 'a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an llllending 
dialogue between the present and past, '45 talking arout Lauterpacht is nothing but an llllending 
dialogue between our present consciousness and the spirit of an international lawyer playing an 
important role from the inter-war era to the post-colonial world. 
Second, Martti Koskenniemi is conscious of situationality in his article Lauterpacht: the 
Victorian Tradition in International Law, which examines Lauterpacht by reference not only to 
published papers but also llllpublished writings, including private letters, in the context of 
Jewishness and political liberalism in Europe. Indeed, at the beginning of his Gentle Civilizer of 
Nations which describes how European international lawyers made the paradigm of international 
legal studies from 1870 to 1960, Koskennierni explains his Victorian Tradition that '[i]t tried to put 
in a historical :frame the development of the idea and arguments of one of the twentieth century's 
most influential international lawyers. '46 However, Koskenniemi gives too much emphasis to the 
situationality of Lauterpacht. His scrutiny of Lauterpacht is certainly inspiring and attractive, but 
tends to be general and impressionistic criticism without explaining the detailed substance of 
Lauterpacht' s theory. Koskennierni, for example, does not mention how Lauterpacht helped Robert 
45 Carr/1961/24 
46 Koskennierni/2001/2. 
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Jackson with the legal justification of the non-belligerent policy of the United States before the 
Pearl Harbour. As will be explained later, Lauterpacht not only prepared for Jackson's famous 
address in Havana, 47 but also wrote a refutation ofBorchard's criticism on behalf of Jackson, 48 with 
regard to the legal justification of the non-belligerency of the Untied States. There is certainly a 
hidden story, which cannot be neglected for understanding the role which Lauterpacht played in 
international legal practice, under one sentence ofKoskenniemi that '[a]t the outset of the Second 
World War Lauterpacht' s views were strongly affected by the interest not to interpret the Lend 
Lease and US economic assistance to the Allies as a violation of neutrality. '49 Neither does 
Koskenniemi explain Lauterpacht's contribution to the preparation for the Nuremberg Trial except 
mentioning the personal help ofLauterpacht for Hartley Shawcross. Although it is true that 'the full 
story of Lauterpacht' s role in Nuremberg remains untold, '50 it had been already explicated that 
Lauterpacht played a significant role in the definition of war crimes, the creation of crime against 
humanity, and the problem of the plea of superior order through the International Commission for 
Penal Reconstruction and Development,51 or his personal influence over Jackson.52 In other words, 
Lauterpacht helped not only Shawcross but also Jackson in regard to the punishment of war 
criminals. These examples that Koskenniemi does not mention in Victorian Tradition shows the 
reason his article is not decisive as the research of the international legal theory of Lauterpacht It 
may be because the limitation of words does not allow Koskenniemi to examine the detail of 
Lauterpacht's theory, though he undoubtedly grasps the general image of Lauterpacht as an 
international lawyer. However, the international legal theory ofLauterpacht is too minute and, at the 
47 Jackson/19411351. Lauterpacht mentioned that he prepared for the address of Jackson. 
Lauterpacht!R2al1942/4/para.6. 
48 Lauterpacht!R2d/1942/13. 
49 Koskenniemi/20011380. 
50 Ibid/389. 
51 UNWCC/94-99/and/281-282. 
52 According to Nathan Feinberg, Jacob Robinson 'discovered' the fact that Lauterpacht suggested 
to Jackson the three types of crimes which would be inserted in Article 6 of London Charter. 
Feinberg/1968/340. However, I could not read Robinson's original article as it is written in Hebrew. 
Robinson/1961. However, Robinson wrote an English article describing the friendly relationship 
between Lauterpacht and Jackson. Robinson/197213. On Jacob Robinson, see Rosenne/1992/831-
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same time too massive, even for an intelligent lawyer to deal with its all aspects in just fifty pages. 
Third, considering the wide range ofl..auterpacht's theory, which covers almost the entire area 
of international law, it may be proper for a law scholar to deal with just one topic, or a few related 
ones, discussed by l..auterpacht Rosenne and Scobbie essentially examine l..auterpacht's theory of 
international judicial function. Their articles are brilliant examinations. They do not, however, 
necessarily describe the international legal theory ofl..auterpacht as a whole, although it is true that 
the theory of international judicial function lies at the centre of his legal theory of international law. 
However, it is necessary to examine other topics such as recognition in international law or the 
international protection of human rights for understanding the theory of international judicial 
function. The nonnative phenomena called international law is not so simple that even l..auterpacht, 
who undoubtedly tended to conceive international law from the viewpoint of judge, admitted the 
administrative, not judicial, organ of international law. l..auterpacht, indeed, seems to have 
conceived the idea of a Human Rights Council, which was stipulated under Articles 21-25 of his 
Dmft of the International Bill of Men of Rights, 53 not from the viewpoint of international judicial 
function, but from the viewpoint of international supervision.54 He explained the supervisory 
function of the Human Rights Council under his Draft Bill as follows: 
'That scheme [of the Hwnan Rights Council], while it does not exclude the jurisdiction of a court, is based 
primarily on the functioning an organ which, although including pe~mns of judicial experience, is non-judicial 
in character. That organ must be the pivot of the supervision of the observance of a Bill of Rights which 
embraces the large majority of members of the United Nations.'55 
It is undeniable that the idea of international supervision in his theory was premature. However, it is 
843. 
53 l..auterpacht!ILHR/318-320. 
51 On international supervision or international control, see Dupuy/1994; Cassase/2001/225-228; 
Morita/2000. 
55 I..auterpacht/ILHR/377-378. 
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also clear that the supervisory fi.mction of the Human Rights Council was regarded as different 
from the judicial :fimction of the Court. Although it is certainly important to scrutinise only one 
topic, such as international judicial fi.mction, for a deeper understanding ofLauterpacht's opinion, it 
is necessary to conceive such a topic in the context of the international legal theory of Lauterpacht 
as a whole. 
However, it should be noted, at the same time, that this thesis has no ambition to write the 
definitive article on the international legal theory of Lauterpacht, simply because such a task is 
beyond the ability of this author. Neither does he believe that this thesis will be a substitute for the 
articles on Lauterpacht previously written by many brilliant lawyers. Rather, the purpose of this 
thesis is to complement those previously written articles about Lauterpacht with an examination of 
his international legal theory in the historical context. This thesis undeniably owes much to the 
previous works of other law scholars. However, even this task necessarily needs not only a massive 
knowledge of international law, but also the ability to understand the atmosphere of the times and 
other disciplines such as jurisprudence, political theory, and history. It is clearly beyond the ability 
of this author to cover all topics which Lauterpacht discussed He has, therefore, confined himself 
to the topic which is thought to be important from the viewpoint of the role of Lauterpacht's 
legalism in the context of the universalisation of the European law of nations. 
Before explicating his theory, it is necessary to deal with some points covered in this thesis. 
The first point concerns the chronological development of his theory. It is possible, generally 
speaking, to divide his era into three periods. The first era is the inter-war period until the late 1930s. 
In this period, Lauterpacht essentially devoted himself to the problems of international judicial 
ftmctions including the interpretation of treaty. This period is represented by his trilogy of 
international judicial :fimctions, namely Analogies, Function and Development-!. The second era is 
the collapse of the League of Nations and the outbreak of the Second World War, from the late 
1930s to 1945. In that period, Lauterpacht was concerned about the legal problem of war, including 
the principle of nmHecognition, neutrality and the punishment of war criminals. Lauterpacht also 
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confessed his disappointment at the retrogression of international law and his hope in the 
reconstruction of the international community. The third era is that of the United Nations. During 
the third period, l.auterpacht established his academic authority. He was elected as Associe in 194 7, 
and as Member ofthe Institute of International Law in 1952. Moreover, he was more involved in 
international legal practice such as the International Law Commission and the International Court 
of Justice especially in the 1950s. It is impossible, however, to discuss some topics, such as 
international judicial function, without cross-referencing the divided periods, because l.auterpacht 
discussed them in each period Therefore, it is true that the chronology in this thesis cannot be 
maintained strictly for the purpose of explicating the international legal theory of l.auterpacht. 
Nevertheless, the thesis tries as far as possible to reflect l.auterpacht's chronological progression of 
thought and topics in the order of its chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the early background of 
l.auterpacht's theory as situationality as well as doctrinal influence over him. In chapter 2, 
l.auterpacht's construction of international law and the international community will be examined 
in the context of the universalisation ofEuropean civilisation in the inter-war period. Chapter 3 sets 
forth the legal problems in the process of outlawing war, which influenced the normative structure 
of international law, from the end ofthe era ofthe League ofNations in the 1930s to the end of the 
Second World War in the 1940s. Chapter 4 explicates the project of l.auterpacht with regard to the 
new world order after the Second World War with his proposal for the international protection of 
human rights. Chapter 5 examines those wmks dealing with the codification process of 
international law, especially within the International Law Commission. Chapter 6 argues his 
conception of the responsibility of judges to enhance the authority of the International Court of 
Justice. Conclusions indicates his legacy for international legal studies after his death in 1960. 
Second, the author has to mention the treatment ofl.auterpacht's editions of Oppenheim 'sin 
this thesis. There is a view that even l.auterpacht's edition of Oppenheim 's should not be regarded 
as his own view, because Lauterpacht's approach to international law is completely different from 
tl1c approach ofOppenheim. As Wllfred Jenks said, 
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'[I]ntellectually Oppenheim and he [Lauterpacht] had little in common except the range and thoroughness of 
their knowledge. Oppenheim was the last great master of the positivist schoo~ and was in many respects a 
more confirmed positivist than Phillimore, Hall or Westlake had been; Lauterpacht was among the leading 
challengers of all the basic assumptions of that school. The result was a compromise satisfactol)' to no one. 
Oppenheim remained indispensable by reason of its thoroughness and the meticulous care with which new 
developments were incorporated in successive editions, but there was an increasing gap between the views of 
the author, who had frequently expressed himself with considerable dogmatism, and the equally strongly held 
and now far more widely acceptable convictions of the editor. These divergences related not to details but to 
fimdamentals. '56 
lain Scobbie follows Wilfred Jenks, and ignores l.auterpacht's view expressed in Oppenheim 'sin 
constructing his theoretical position. 57 
It is true that l.auterpacht must have felt constrained from presenting his own original view in 
Oppenheim 's. Elihu Lauterpacht said that Hersch l.auterpacht considered whether or not to 
produce his own textbook instead of Oppenheim 's.58 However, the original text by Oppenheim was 
only one-third of the total content of the eighth edition of Volume 1 of Oppenheim 's.59 l.auterpacht 
also considerably re-wrote Volume 2 of Oppenheim 's after the Second World War.w Even though 
the structure of Oppenheim 's as a whole is still attributed to Oppenheim himself, it is undeniable 
that the parts Lauterpacht wrote or amended are nothing but the view of l.auterpacht 61 The te.ll..i 
written by l.auterpacht is essential in order to explicate how he constructed his international legal 
theory during the period of his editorship of Oppenheim 's as far as the texts that he wrote are 
56 Wllfred/Jenks/1960/67. 
57 Scobbie/1997 f264/n.1. 
58 Elihull.auterpacht/Note/CP-I/2-3. 
59 Oppenheim-l.auterpacht/1955/vi. 
ro Qwenheiin·Lauterpacht/1952Jv. 
61 Some reviewers of l.auterpacht's editiom of Oppenheim 's hoped that l.auterpacht should have 
left Oppenheim 's unchanged. H.A.SJ1938; B.E.K./1936-1938; Finch/1950; Young/1953. 
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identified, compared with other editors' versions of Oppenheim 's. There is, therefore, no reason to 
disregard Lauterpacht' s edition of Oppenheim 's in this thesis. 
This thesis examines how Lauterpacht contributed to the modem paradigm of international 
legal studies in the universalisation process of international law. It starts by explicating Jewishness 
as the situationality of Lauterpacht and the doctrinal influence of Kelsenian normativism and the 
English tradition of international law in order to understand the place of Lauterpacht in the 
historical context 
19 
1. THE EARI.J{ BACKGROUND OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 
It is necessary to discuss how Lauterpacht was educated before explicating his theory itself. Three 
elements affected Lauterpacht's theory: his Jewish origin, Kelsenian nonnativism and the English 
tradition of international law. In Lauterpacht's theory, these elements are amalgamated with each 
other. In particular, the doctrinal influence of Kelsenian nonnativism and the English tradition 
explains why Lautetpaeht had a special position in the British school of international law, 1 although 
he was typically seen as 'the Anglo-American school of international law' from the viewpoint of 
non-British international lawyers.2 Without the above three elements, the real meaning of 
Lauterpacht' s theory of international law cannot be understood properly. 
1.1. THE JEWISHNESS OF LAUTERPACHT AS SITUATIONALITY 
Lautetpaeht is always remembered as a British lawyer. Consequently, it is often forgotten that his 
Jewish origin in Eastern Galicia influenced not only his personal life but also his career as an 
international lawyer and his own idea of international law. Outi Korhonen refers to such an 
influence of a situation as 'situationality. '3 Korhonen's explanation of situationality is too pedantic. 
However, Rein Milllerson more lucidly explains 'situationality' that 'the past and present of a 
person who interprets and applies international law inevitably affects her interpretation. '4 Whether 
the concept of situationality is novel or not, it is a matter of course that the personal experience of 
the individual influences his/her idea and life. It is true ofLauterpacht as international lawyer. 
Hersch Lauterpacht was born on 16 August 1897 at Zolkiew (Zhovkva) in Eastern Galicia as 
1 Warbrick excluded Lauterpacht as well as Rosalyn Higgins from his conception of 'English 
approach' due to the fact that 'they were exposed to educational experiences outside English law 
schools.' Warbrick/1991149. 
2 See Schmitt/1938/21-26. 
3 Korhonen/1996n -9. 
4 Milllerson/2000/55. 
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the second son among three children. His birth year seems to symbolise his fate as a Jew. In the 
same year, the first Zionist Congress was held in Basel. The Congress meant the first political 
declaration of Zionism for Jewish people; it betokened 'the core of a Jewish world conspiracy'5 for 
anti-Semites on the other hand. In a sense, Lauterpacht was fated to be involved in the problem of 
anti-Semitism and totalitarianism from his birth. 
His father, Aaron Lauterpacht, was a middle class Jewish timber merchant. Although 'the 
financial condition of the family, though not precarious, was variable, '6 his father was very keen on 
education like other Jewish fathers in Galicia; his brother became a lawyer; his family moved to 
Lwow for the sake ofHersch's education in 1910.7 The movement of his family affected not only 
his secondary education but also his consciousness as a Jew. Although it is said that his parents 
were very orthodox,8 Lauterpachtjoined 'an organized group of young Jews whose object was self-
education in a group of subjects which included Zionist history and the geography of Israel '9 at the 
age of 15. When Lwow was first occupied by the Russian anny, and later reoccupied by the 
Austrian anny during the First World War, young Hersch was working in his father's factory, 
requisitioned by the Austrian Army. However, Lauterpacht was involved in Zionism even during 
the First World War: 
'In 1916, he revived in Lemberg the Zeire Zion movement and in 1917 he arranged a demonstration in 
celebration of the issue of the Balfour Declaration on Palestine. For this activity he was tried by a military 
court . . . and acquitted In 1918 he and a friend led a movement which succeeded in bringing about the 
formation of a Jewish Gymnasium . . . where Hebrew and Jewish history were taught and a Jewish 
atmosphere prevailed.' 10 
5 Arendt/1976/108. 
6 McNair/1961b/371. 
7 This city, which is fifteen miles from Zolkiew, was called Lemberg in Austrian-Hungarian Empire 
before World War I. Now it is caiied L'viv in Ukraine. 
8 Sec Koskennit:nll/2001/369. 
9 McNair/1961b/371. 
lOJbid. 
21 
It is not so clear from McNair's remark how exactly young Hersch participated in Zionism. It 
would be useful, however, to mention the general features of Galician Zionism. The origin of 
Galician Zionism is the Haskalah movement, which is the Hebrew name of the Jewish 
Enlightenment. The Jewish Enlightenment originated with 'the Jewish Socrates' Moses 
Mendelssohn ( 1729-1786), whose original aim was 'to create a hybrid culture which would 
incorporate the best of both worlds- Jewish and Western.' 11 The Jewish Enlightenment influenced 
the emancipation of the Jews in Germany and Austria in the middle of the 1 gm century. The 
emancipation of the Jews especially in Germany, however, resulted in their assimilation into the 
larger society of enlightened individuals. Indeed, German Jews tended to think Jewishness as 
religion rather than as ethnicity. The Haskalah movement, however, inspired in Galician Jews a 
legacy of Jewishness rather than individualism during the awakening of nationalism and political 
anti-Sernitism. They felt it necessary to see themselves as 'the nation' rather than a religious group 
in order to keep their identity. 12 The identity of Lauterpacht as a Jew should be understood in this 
context. 
In the dynamic awakening of nationalism, it was natural for Zionists to devote themselves to 
Jewish education especially in Galicia where the Jews had been keen on education since their 
emancipation; for them, Zionism was the re-identification process of Jewishness. The First World 
War, furthermore, gave Zionists a chance to educate their eo-religious children, because the war had 
prevented Jewish children from having a normal education. This aspiration to Zionist education in 
Galicia produced the first autonomous youth movement in the history of Zionism. The Zeire Zion, 
which Lauterpacht is thought to have joined, was one of the autonomous Zionism movements of 
the young Jews. Although this young Jewish movement is often confused with the left-wing 
Zionist Russian-Polish political movement of the same name, it was the Galician group of 
11 Taylor/1974/23. 
12 Lucas/1974/17. 
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secondary school students whose plll'}X>se was purely educational.13 It is not certain which Zeire 
Zion movements young Hersch participated in. However, being adolescent at that time and more 
interested in education than politics, Lauterpacht seems to have participated in 'an organization of 
youths engaged in the study of Judaism and contemporary Jewish problems' 14 rather than in the 
Russian-Polish political Zeire Zion movement 
The ideal of the Zeire Zion was also influenced by the Jewish Enlightenment. Martin Buber 
(1878-1965), one of the leaders of the Zeire Zion, later to become a professor of social philosophy 
at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, showed the young Jews the way to bridge the gap between 
Jewish values and universalism: 'Be a man, but in a Jewish way.' Zionism appears to the young 
Jews 'not as a particularist movement of interest only to Jews but as a movement of potential 
importance for all mankind.' 15 In a sense, the young Zionist movement in Galicia expressed 'the 
will of young Jews to devise radical world outlooks in order to deal with the new historical situation, 
and to devise new identities which would enable them to find their way both as Jews and as citizens 
of the modern world.' 16 Such a young Zionist movement in Galicia clearly influenced 
Lauterpacht's humanistic and educational commitment to Zionism, as evidenced by the 
establishment of World Union of Jewish Students. 
It is not certain why Lauterpacht decided to study law; perllaps because his brother was a 
lawyer in Lwow; perhaps because legal profession was 'the only road to a Jew who refused to 
convert.' 17 Lauterpacht at first wished to study law at the University of Lwow. Indeed, according to 
the editor of Glos Prawa, in which he published his article Succession of States with Respect to 
Private Law Obligations in Polish, Lauterpacht had 'spent the first two years oflegal studies at the 
Jan Kazimierz University in Lwow.' 18 However, in November 1918, the Polish anny occupied 
Lwow and soon the Lwow pogrom took place; the Jews were thought to be on the side of 
13 Patai/19711896-897. 
14 Mendelsohn/1981/81. 
15 Ibid/82. 
16 Ibid186. 
17 Beller/1989/37. 
23 
Ukrainian forces in the Polish-Ukrainian war. The University ofLwow was also under the control 
of the Polish government and renamed after the Polish King Jan Kazimierz. Consequently, the 
University of Lwow became more anti-Semitic than before. The University applied the numerus 
clausus to ensure Polish students occupied not less than 50 percent of the total number of 
University students. 19 
In 1918, Lauterpacht finally decided to move to the University of Vienna, although the 
university also applied the numerus clausus to Jewish students in order to limit them to 25 percent 
oflaw students at that time.20 His involvement in Zionism continued in Vienna. It is not difficult to 
understand that Jewish students needed to help each other due to the lack of commodities and the 
anti-Semitic atmosphere in Vienna Lauterpacht 'became president ofthe Hochschule Ausschuss, 
which was concerned with the welfare, material and otherwise, of some eight to ten thousand 
Jewish school-children and students and was their representative in dealing with the educational 
authorities. '21 
In 1923, after a short visit to Berlin, 22 Lauterpacht became a research student at the London 
School of Economics and Political Sciences under the supervision of Amold McNair, who later 
became his academic patron. However, Lauterpacht still continued to participate in the educational 
aspect of Zionism even after his settlement in the United Kingdom. His frustration with the 
numerus clausus drove him to institute the organisation for Jewish students. His main concern was 
how Jewish students could protect their right to higher education, considering the difficult situation 
that anti-Semitism was widespread throughout Europe. In 1924, Lauterpacht as Chairman of the 
Provisional Executive Committee, finally succeeded in establishing the World Union of Jewish 
18 Elihu/Lauterpacht/Note/CP-III/121. 
19 On the history of the University ofLwow, see http://www.franko.lviv.ua/general/abouthtml 
20 See Beller/1989/34ffable-2. 
21 McNair/1961a/4. 
22 According to the biographical notice of the Hague Academy, Lauterpacht was at the University 
of Berlin for a while. See, for example, Lauterpacht/1947-I/3. Elihu Lauterpacht makes it certain 
that his parents got married in Berlin at an interview with me on 3rd July 2001. 
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Students (WUJS).23 The first Congress of WUJS was held in Antwerp on 30 April 1924 for four 
days. Nearly 2000 people joined the Conference. 76 delegates from 17 countries discussed the 
Jewish students' problem. At that Congress, Lauterpacht was elected as the Chairman ofWUJS. 
Albert Einstein accepted the offer from Lauterpacht to become President of the Union in 1925. 
WUJS had the three aims at that time. The first was to foster 'cultural and national eo-
operation between all the Jewish students through the world.' Lauterpacht especially hoped for 
reconciliation between Western Jewish students and Eastern Jewish students. The second aim was 
to lobby support 'in the work of upbuilding the Hebrew University and the University Library in 
Jerusalem and, if possible, in establishing a Jewish University in Europe.' Lauterpacht joined the 
opening ceremony of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1925. When he joined the twenty-
fifth anniversary of the Hebrew University on 7 May 1950, Lauterpacht also remembered his 
presence in the opening ceremony as the Chairman ofWUJS?4 The third task of the WUJS was to 
seek 'economic relief for those students who are compelled by conditions in their own countries to 
emigrate in order to study at foreign universities.' Lauterpacht himself experienced a financial 
hardship in his LLD. era; he was supported by his father in Lwow and his wife's family in 
Palestine. Indeed, financially WUJS helped many Jewish students in Eastern Europe to 'emigrate' 
to Western Europe. By mid-1925, one thousand Eastern European Jewish students were successful 
in their academic 'immigration' to Italy. However, even Lauterpacht was forced to admit that the 
academic 'immigration' to France failed, and that the situation of his fellow Eastern European 
Jewish students was still bleak. In 1930, the second Congress was held, though it was unsuccessful 
in reinvigorating WUJS. The situation of Nazism becoming powerful not only in Gennany but 
throughout Europe forced WUJS to become inactive. It is not certain when Lauterpacht retired 
from the Chainnan of WUJS. However, another person was elected as Chairman at the third 
23 On the role ofLauterpacht in the establishment ofWorld Union of Jewish Student, see Kalman, 
'The History of WUJS', http://www.wujs.org.il/about/organisation/orghistshtrnl. Although Lord 
McNair, Elihu Lauterpacht and Koskenniemi referred that organisation as 'World Federation of 
Jewish Students,' the official name of this Jewish student organisation is World Union of Jewish 
Students. 
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Congress in 1933. It is thought that Lauterpacht became too busy reading international law to 
participate in WUJS or Zionism itself; he was appointed as Reader at the University of London in 
1932. 
The activity of WUJS shows that Lauterpacht's interest in Zionism was educational and 
cultural rather than political. Lauterpacht was not an active political Zionist, but he was definitively 
a Zionist and his identity was always Jewish. Indeed, he is said to have visited the summer schools 
of the Inter-University Federation of Jewish Students. He was seen to talk to Jewish students in 
Polish in the Jewish Students' Centre in Warsaw in 1935.25 Furthermore, he maintained contact 
with the Hebrew University. Feinberg said that 'Lauterpacht was deeply attached to Palestine and 
to Israel all his life, and followed the progress of the Hebrew University and of its Law Faculty ever 
since its establishment in 1949.'26 Indeed, the chair of international law at the Hebrew University 
would be named after Lauterpacht in memory of his contribution to the Hebrew University. 
Therefore, it is not appropriate for Koskenniemi to say that 'he [Lautetpacht] allowed his Zionism 
to lapse.'27 It is thought that for Lauterpacht, Zionism was nothing but the re-identification process 
of Jewishness, which is the crux of the Jewish Enlightenment 
It is also true, however, that the Jewish consciousness of Lautetpacht appears less in the 
writing of international law.28 The exception is his thesis submitted to the University of Vienna 
After he became a Doctor of law, Lauterpacht chose the department of political science within the 
Law School at the University ofVienna At that time, Leo Strisower and Alexander Hold-Femeck 
taught international law in the department of political science. Lauterpacht submitted Das 
volkerrechtliche Mandat in der Satzund des Volkerbunde? as his doctoral dissertation. His hope 
24 Lauterpacht/1950b/CP-II/159. 
25 D./Stone/1982/109. 
26 Feinberg/1961/vii. 
27 Koskenniemi/2001/371. 
28 According to Koskenniemi, Lautetpacht wrote a paper on the persecution of the Jews in 
Germany in 1933 other thgm papers published in Collected Papers, however it has not been 
published yef Koskenniemi/2001/371-372/n89. 
29 Lauterpacht/1921/CP-lli/29-84. It is ascertained by Kelsen that the original text was missing 
from the archives of the University ofVienna Kelsen/1961/2. However, the copy was fortunately 
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for Zionism seems to have motivated him to choose this topic; it seemed to be the legal autonomy 
of Palestine that Lauterpacht wished to defend from power politics. 
One of the legal questions of the Mandate system was whether the Mandatory has sovereignty 
over the Mandated territories. This question was very serious for Lauterpacht as a 'Zionist.' If the 
Mandatory has the sovereignty over the Mandated tenitory, Palestine would face the danger of 
being annexed to the Mandatory as was South-West Afiica after the dissolution of the League of 
Nations. Furthermore, it should be recognised that this danger was not academically absurd even 
during the inter-war era Carl Schmitt, for example, insisted in his Veifassungslehre that the 
Mandated tenitories are only protectorates or colonies of the Mandatories, because the League of 
Nations is an organisation of sovereign states, not a 'federation' state which has tenitorial 
sovereignty. 30 
In his thesis, Lauterpacht constructed his argumentation based on the purpose of the Mandate 
system as a whole. He especially emphasised the term that 'this tutelage should be exercised by 
them [nations] as Mandatories on behalf of the League' in Article 22, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. 
He said 'the purpose of the Mandate is tutelage, not in the sense of a limitation of the 
acknowledged sovereignty of the Mandatories, but as the exercise, on behalf of the League of 
Nations, of some sovereign rights over the Mandate tenitory and its population.' He continued as 
follows: 
'Therefore sovereignty lies with the League ofNations and is derived from it This assertion is based, however, 
only on legal-logical reasoning. An explicit and formal transfer of sovereign rights to the League ofNations 
can not be found either in the Covenant of the League ofNations or in the Peace Treaties. By virtue of Article 
119 of the Treaty of Versailles sovereignty over the German overseas possessions is transferred to the Allied 
and Associated Powers. Between this Article and Article 22 there is a gap which can be filled only by 
assuming a tacit transfer by the Principal Powers to the League of Nations. From this tacit transfer the League 
found in the house ofLauterpacht, and translated to English text. 
30 Schmitt/1928/384. 
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ofNations derives its legal title to sovereignty.'31 
Lauterpacht kept to his view on this point in Analogies: 'The League became mandant [sic] and 
sovereign over the mandated territories at the moment the Council approved the draft mandates laid 
before it'32 It is doubtful whether the authority of the League ofNations should have been called 
'sovereignty.' However, apart from this doubt, it is sufficient to indicate the persuasiveness of his 
teleological intetpretation that the International Court of Justice denied the sovereignty of the 
Mandatory in the International Status of the South-West Africa case.33 He received the degree of 
Doctor ofPolitical Science on 15th July 1922. 
Apart from the above thesis, it is only as professional legal advice to the Jewish Agency for 
Palestine and the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees that Lauterpacht published his 
opinion on international legal questions which the Jews faced during this era Lauterpacht no doubt 
tried not to express his Jewishness in the writing of international law. It may be partly because of 
the general tendency of the Jews, partly due to the demand for neutrality as the ethics of lawyers. 
However, this fact does not mean that Lautetpacht abandoned his Jewishness. He rather seems to 
have tried to sublimate his Jewishness to universal value as the young Zionism movement had 
tried. 
The synthesis between Jewishness and universal values is not unreasonable at least insofar as 
Europe is concerned. Jewishness implied European internationalism at that time. The Jews as a 
national group did not have their own nation-state in Europe. They were always in a minority and 
outsiders in European nation-states, even though individually they tried to be assimilated into the 
' 
m~ority. Even Hans Kelsen, for example, who had already converted, was advised to give up his 
academic career due to his origin.34 However, the Jews lived all over Europe. Their solidarity easily 
crossed over the political boundaries of nation-states. Their isolation in nation-states and their own 
31 Lauterpacht/1921/CP-III/68. 
32 Lauterpacht/ Analogies/198. 
33 ICJReps/1950/132-133. 
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solidarity in Europe allowed them to have the international status in Europe. Hannah Arendt 
swnmarised this point as follows: 
'Representatives of the nation, whether Jacobines from Robespierre to Clemenceau, or representatives of 
Central European reactionary governments from Mettemich to Bismarck, had one thing in common: they 
were all sincerely concerned with the "balance of power'' in Europe. They tried, of course, to shift this balance 
to the advantage of their respective countries, but they never dreamed of seizing a monopoly over the 
continent or of annihilating their neighbours completely. The Jews could not only be used in the interest of this 
precarious balance, they even became a kind of symbol of the common interest of the European nations. '35 
Therefore, it can be said that the Jewish problem meant a problem for 'the common interest of 
European nations' at the same time. 
However, it was the balance of power which aggravated the First World War. The beginning 
of the First World War itself occurred within the balance of power. The Austrian government did 
not think that its use of force against Serbia would cause a long and miserable war. It just wished to 
show its prestige in Balkans. Neither did any government predict so. Most governments thought 
that the Austrian use of force was simply a battle in the Balkans. However, the tragedy lies in the 
fact that the mechanism of the balance of power in 1914 already became too automatic to control 
for any governments.36 Consequently, the collapse of the balance of war transformed the Austrian-
Serbian war into the First World War as a total war. 
The total war which annihilates the enemy, furthermore, caused the inter-European status of 
Jews to become meaningless. 'As soon as "victory or death" became a determining policy, and war 
actually aimed at the complete annihilation of the enemy, the Jews could no longer be of any use. '37 
Furthermore, since the European monarchies such as Austro-Hungary, Germany and Russia, on 
34 Beller/1989/205. 
35 Arendt/1976/22. 
36 Kosaka/1978/311. 
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which the protection of the Jews has traditionally been dependent, decayed at the end of the Great 
War, the Jews' position became more tmStable in such new Central European nation-states as 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. As a result, the status of the Jews in the new nation-states, 
especially in Poland, became just one topic of the protection of minorities under international law. 
Indeed, in a letter to Lloyd George, Clemenceau said that 'in view of the historical development of 
the Jewish question and the great animosity aroused by it, special protection is necessary for the 
Jews in Poland. '38 
The conclusion of the minority treaties means that 'the common interest of European nations' 
needed to be guaranteed by international law. However, it is this point which becomes a serious 
problem for international law. If Oppenheim is correct in saying that 'a Law of Nations can exist 
only if there be an equilibrium, a balance of power between the Family ofNations,'39 why does 
international law function properly in the situation where the essential condition had already 
disappeared? Oppenheim, however, already prepared for the alternative to the balance of power. It 
is 'a central political authority above the Sovereign State that could enforce the rules of Law of 
Nations'40 which international law necessitates in the situation where the balance of power was 
thought to be inappropriate as the fundamental principle of international relations. 
This point explains Lauterpacht's belief in internationalism. It is due to the 'inter-European' 
status of the Jews that Lauterpacht became an internationalist who denies the supremacy of state 
sovereignty. He knew from his experience that the Jews could not rely on sovereign states, 
especially in Central Europe. However, neither could he trust the balance of power, which 
guaranteed the inter-European status of the Jews, after the First World War. In his revision of 
Oppenheim 's, Lauterpacht deleted the explanation of the balance of power as the first moral 
principle.41 On the contrary, he chose the international authority such as the League ofNations. The 
37 Arendt/1976/21. 
38 Lloyd/George/1938/1386-1387. 
39 Oppenheim/1912a/80. 
40 Ibid 
41 It is noteworthy that instead of the balance of power, Lauterpacht adopted 'the victory 
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sole problem for him is whether the League of Nations can fimction as 'a central political authority 
above the Sovereign State that could enforce the rules of the Law of Nations.' It is one of the 
reasons Lauterpacht insisted the 'sovereignty' of the League over the Mandate, including Palestine. 
Furthermore, the atmosphere at the time seems to affect Lauterpacht's idea It is in the 1920s 
that he started to study international law. This means that ymmg Hersch must have found his ideal 
in international law with no hesitation in the optimistic atmosphere of the 1920s. Since the League 
of Nations System generally worked in the 1920s, it is no wonder that Lauterpacht saw the 1920s 
as the most progressive era of international law. Indeed, he said: 
'[f]he Covenant as laid down in 1919 stands for radical changes, express and implied, in the structure of 
international law. In comparison with these changes, the normal development of international law must appear 
to be trifling.'42 
In this sense, his internationalism is the product of his own experience in the inter-war era. His 
harsh criticism of voluntarisrn should be understood in this context As Koskennierni points out, 
Lauterpacht tried to show that 'pre-war doctrines had failed because they had been too close to state 
policy, in a sense, not Utopian. '43 
Nor is it difficult to imagine that his enthusiasm for the international protection of human 
rights was influenced by his own personal and professional experiences as a Jew.44 However, he 
seems to have tried to sublimate his Jewishness to the universal value; the problem of the protection 
of the Jews for Lauterpacht is one of how individuals should be protected from the arbitrary will of 
sovereign states. Lauterpacht clearly showed this point in the article about the question of the 
everywhere of constitutional government over autocratic government, or, what is the same thing, of 
democracy over autocracy' as the first moral principle of international law. Oppenheirn-
Lauterpacht/1937 /80. 
42 Lauterpacht/l936d/CP-Wl46. 
43 Koskennierni/1992/xvii. 
44 His family in Lwow was killed in a Nazi concentration camp. Only one niece survived. 
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retroactivity of the Allied legislation repealing the discriminatory laws of Nazi Germany. 45 The crux 
of this problem seemed to him to be 'a question of restoring compulsorily to individuals or holding 
them against their will to a nationality of which they have been divested (or, at least, of which an 
attempt was made to divest them) and which has justly become abhorrent to them. '46 For him, this 
problem was how individuals should be protected, not how Jews should be, from the arbitrary 
decision of states to deprive them of nationality. It may be said that Lautetpacht sublimated his 
Jewishness to internationalism which lies the centre ofhis approach to international law. 
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that his theory was mainly based on the experience of 
the inter-war era This point shows the problems of his theory of international law at the same time. 
It is no wonder that he may have considered the United Nations System from the viewpoint he held 
in the inter-war era In this sense, Lauterpacht's theory of international law is seen as a typical type 
of'the legal school of International Jurists' in the inter-war era What now needs to be examined is 
how Lauterpacht developed his theory of international law, whose basis is Kelsenian normativism 
and the English tradition of international law. 
1.2. THE DOCIRINAL INFLUENCES OVER THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
THEORY OFLAUTERPACHT 
1.2.1. KEI..SENIAN NORMATIVISM 
When Lauterpacht read law at the University ofVienna, Hans Kelsen (1886-1973) was Professor 
of General Theory of States and Austrian Constitutional Law.47 Kelsen was very prominent from 
that time. He was also a judge of the Austrian Constitutional Court from 1920 to 1929 after he 
45 Lauterpacht/1949a/CP-III/383-404. It should be pointed out, furthermore, that the article 'The 
Nationality of Denationalized Persons' in was also originally written for the Intergovernmental 
Cohlfilittee fotRefugee-in 1946.-Elihu!Lauterpacht/Note/CP-111/383. 
46 Lauterpacht/1949a/CP-III/402. 
47 On the life ofKe1sen in Vienna, see Petterson/1952; Gross/1973; Jabloner/1998. 
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himself drafted the Austrian Constitution in 1920. It is well known that Kelsen and his Pure Theory 
of Law had a great influence on I...auterpacht 48 It is not difficult to imagine that Lauteipacht had 
attended Kelsen's lectures at the University of Vienna from the fact that he referred to the 'History 
ofNeo-Kantian Philosophy, Problems of Pure Jurisprudence and the Doctrine oflnteipretation,' all 
which seem to be Kelsen's lectures, as the regular courses in his note on the legal education at the 
University of Vienna 49 On the other hand, Kelsen himself remarked about Lauteipacht, 'how much 
I was impressed by the extraordinary intellectual capacity and the truly scientific mind of this 
young man. '50 
It should be noted, however, that Laute~pacht did not adopt the Pure Theory of Law. He was 
opposed to the separation thesis of law from morality, which symbolises the 'purity' of the Pure 
Theory. The separation thesis of law from morality seemed to him unable to explain 'a process of 
incoiporation of natural law by positive law.' l..aute~pacht continued as follows: 
'Positive law refers to and incorporates, in various fonns, extra-legal rules which, but for the fear of flouting 
suspiciously general disapproval, we might find it quite convenient to call by the name of natural law. This 
process of delegation will be found in the codes of many a country expressly refening the judge, in the 
absence of applicable provisions of the law, to natural justice, to principles of good fuith, or to general 
principles oflaw. '51 
Therefore, it cannot be said that l..aute~pacht was a Pure Theorist Nevertheless, his opposition to 
the separation thesis of law from morality does not mean that he rejected Kelsen's theory. On the 
contrary, l..auteipacht accepted the crux of the Pure Theory of Law, namely normativism. 
What is normativism? Guastini explains the tenets of normativism as follows. First, 
48 The influence of Kelsen over l..aute~pacht in the context of the concept of the international 
collll1)unity and judicial fimctions will be discussed later. Scobbie/1997; Carty/1998. 
49 Laute~pacht/1927b/45. 
50 Kelsen/1961/2. 
51 l..aute~pacht/1933b/CP-111425. 
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normativism sees law as a set of norms, which are different from facts. In other words, norms 
belong not to the world of 'be' but to the world of 'ought.' Secondly, from the viewpoint of 
normativity, legal science is a science of norms which are in the world of 'ought' Therefore, 
normativism is the theory that legal science must be expressed in normative or deontic language. 52 
In other words, normativism changes everything into norms on the deontic plane. A person, for 
example, is regarded as the unity of rights and obligation, namely legal personality, from the 
viewpoint of normativism. Even state sovereignty can be changed into 'the bundle of jurisdiction' 
from the viewpoint of normativism. The world itself can be explained in the term oflegal norms. 
The term 'Kelsenian normativism', therefore, is used for describing almost the same content 
as the Pure Theory of Law. However, it is not the Pure Theory itself Although the purity of the 
Pure Theory is dependent on the separation thesis of law from morality, normativism does not 
necessarily eliminate morality or natural law. Even naturalists, regarded as a target by Kelsen, can 
accept Kelsenian normativism without the separation thesis oflaw from morality. This point is seen 
in the following remark ofLautetpacht: 
'He [Kelsen] finds himself in company which he may otheiWise not find congenial .... He has only to admit-
as every positivist lawyer ought to do in justice to himself- that positive law has always incorporated and does 
incorporate ideas of natural law and justice. '53 
The problem here is to what extent Lauterpacht adopted Kelsenian normativism in his theory of 
international law. 
1.2.1.1. THE PERSONIFICATION OFINTERNATIONALLEGAL0RDER 
The personification of legal order is a good example of how Lauterpacht adopted Kelsenian 
52 Guastini/1998/317. 
53 Lauterpacht/1933b/CP-II/429. 
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normativism. Normativism conceives of everything from the normative viewpoint 1bis point is 
clear with regard to the subject of law. Kelsenian normativism distinguishes legal personality from 
human beings. The 'juristic person', such as a corporation or state, is not a htunan being, but 
conceived of as a 'person' in law, the holder of rights and obligations. The same logic is applicable 
to a 'physical person.' Although a 'physical person' is a human being, it is by law that his/her legal 
personality is given; slaves are htunan beings, but they do not have legal personality. In this sense, 
legal personality, whether 'juristic person' or 'physical person,' is nothing but the bW1dle of rights 
and obligations: 
'What we have in both cases- in that of the physical and in that of the juristic person- is legal obligations and 
legal rights that have human behavior as their content and constitute a unity. A legal person is the unity of a 
complex oflegal obligations and legal rights.' 
As a result, from the viewpoint of normativism, even a 'physical person' is 'not a htunan being, but 
the personified W1ity of the legal norms that obligate or authorize one and the same htunan being. '54 
The state is also conceived from the viewpoint of normativism; the state is the personification 
of a legal order. Kelsen defined the state as a centralised coercive order legitimated by law: 
'It is usual to characterize the state as a political organization. But this merely expresses the idea that the state is 
a coercive order. For the specifically "political" element of this organization consists in the coercive acts which 
the legal order attaches to certain conditions stipulated by it As a political organization, the state is a legal 
order.'55 
Furthermore, the state is relatively centralised in the sense that it has organs that individuals 
actually act in the name of the state. Then, the question who is the state organ occurs. It is law that 
54 Kelsen/1970/173-174. 
55 Jbid/286. 
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detennines the answer to the question, which activity of certain individuals is attributed to the state. 
It is by the law of deciding the attribution that the state is regarded as a 'juristic person.' In this sense, 
the state is the personification of the legal order itself. Kelsen explained this point as follows: 
'Since the attribution of a fimction determined by the legal order and performed by a certain human being to 
the state as a person is only a way of expressing the idea that a fimction is referred to the unity of the legal 
order which determines this fimction, any fimction determined by the legal order may be attributed to the state 
as the personification of this legal order. '56 
The identification of the state with law presupposes that the existence of a legal order meant to 
Kelsen the existence of a society itself. However, a society is not necessarily the state. The state is 
one type of society; whether the society should be called the state or not is dependent on the degree 
of the centralisation of the society. If there is an effective legal order backed by sanctions, the 
society exists. This argument is directly applied to international law. For Kelsen, the existence of 
international law relies on the effectiveness of international legal order as the coercive order. It 
suffices here to point out that Kelsen thought that self-help such as reprisal and war is the sanction 
of international law.57 Thus, Kelsen recognised the existence of the international community, 
although it is not the world state but is more similar to a primitive society with regard to the 
centralisation of society. 
Consequently, Kelsen conceived the international community as the personification of 
international legal order: 
'[l]f it is the "state" that is back of the national legal order, if it is the state that is thought of as the sustainer or 
guarantor of this legal order, the state which is the community constituted by the national legal order, then 
back of international law is the international community constituted by this order just as the state stands 
56 Ibid.f292. 
57 Ibid/320-322; Kelsen/1942!27-55. 
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behind "its" law. And this international legal community can be called the sustainer, guarantor, or source of 
international law in just the same sense as the state can be called the sustainer, guarantor, or source of national 
law.'58 
Therefore, the supremacy of the state sovereignty is denied: '[J]ust as single individuals are, here, 
subjected to an order, an authority regulating their mutual conduct, so are states, there; and the 
authority to which the states are subjected in intemationallaw is really sovereign. '59 
The state, thus, is recognised as a juristic person in international law. This means that the state 
is also recognised as the normative unity of obligations and rights in international law: 'Just as the 
corporation constituted by a statute is subject to the national legal order which imposes obligations 
and confers rights upon it as a juristic person, so the state may be considered as being subject to the 
international legal order which imposes obligations and confers right upon the state as a juristic 
person. '60 However, this point does not mean that only the state is the subject of international law, 
because the state is 'an auxiliary construction of legal thinking.'61 It is human beings who actually 
act in the name of the state. In this sense, it is human activity that legal norms regulate. There is no 
difference for Kelsen between international law and domestic law with regard to the regulation of 
human activity. The only difference between international law and domestic laws is the technique 
ofhow legal obligations are imposed on individuals as the organ of the state: 
'The legal norm specifies who is to do something or refrain from doing it and it specifies what is to be done or 
not done. In general, the norms of intemationallaw specifY only the material element, not as do the norms of 
national law, the personal element as well. lnternational Law leaves the determination of the personal element 
to the national legal order. '62 
58 Kelsen/1942181. 
59 Ibid/80. 
60 Keisenii970I290. 
61 Ibid/292. 
62 Kelsen/1942187. 
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However, this point does not mean that it is impossible for international law to impose rights and 
obligations on individuals directly. On the contrary, Kelsen said that 'the direct obligating of 
individuals by international law .. .is possible, just as is the direct authorization of individuals by 
international law. '63 
Lauterpacht fully adopted the above characteristics of Kelsenian normativism in the 
conception of the international community. He did not change, throughout his life, the view that the 
individuals as the organ of the state are the real bearers of international obligations, and persistently 
rejected the view that only the state is the subject of international law. Lauterpacht also tried to base 
the source of international law on the concept of the international community as civitas maxima. 
'That ultimate source [of law] is the assumption that the impersonal will of the international 
community- as formulated by treaties voluntarily concluded by its members, by custom created by 
their implied consent, and by general principles of law expressive of the fact that the international 
legal community is a community under law- must be obeyed. '64 Lauterpacht called this hypothesis 
voluntas civitatis maximae est servanda 65 
However, why did Lauterpacht hypothesise voluntas civitatis maximae est servanda? One of 
the main reasons is the same as why he denied voluntarism; the will of states by itself cannot 
explain the binding force of international law; he thought that voluntarism finally denied the legal 
nature of international law. Lauterpacht, therefore, had to find more persuasive explanation on the 
basis of obligation of international law than the will of states. However, unlike Kelsen or Verdross, 
Lauterpacht did not think pacta sunt servanda the ultimate source of international law. It is not only 
because he was not a Pure Theorist of Law, but also because Lauterpacht considered pacta sunt 
servanda cannot explain obligations of international law which come other than from the will of 
states, such as general principles oflaw. 
63 Ibid./96. 
64 Lauterpacht/General-Part/CP-I/92. 
65 Lauterpacht/Function/421-422. 
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On the other hand, since he believed that the initial hypothesis of municipal law is that the will 
of the State must be obeyed, Lauterpacht had no hesitation in applying this hypothesis to 
international law. Therefore, he said that '[t]here is no reason why the original hypothesis in 
international law should not be that the will of the international community must be obeyed. '66 
Lauterpacht fully recognised that there is no political authority superior to sovereign states. 
Nevertheless, he contended that 'O]aw may be a command without being the command of an 
organized political authority. '67 He continued: 
'Once it is recognized that, for juristic perception, the State is identical with the Jaw, and that the juxtaposition 
or opposition of the two is only a convenient mode of ex'}Jression, then there is no difficulty in accepting the 
view that the law may be a command merely by virtue of its external nature. '68 
The above passage clearly shows that Lauterpacht identified the will of the international 
community with international law. Furthermore, following Kelsen's doctrine of the identification of 
States and law, Lauterpacht described the superior authority of the international community over 
states as the civitas maxima, which is the 'super-state oflaw which states, though the recognition of 
the binding force of international law qua law, have already recognized as existing over and above 
the national sovereignties. '(f) In sum, his conception of the international community is nothing but 
the personification of international law from the viewpoint of Kelsenian normativism. Indeed, 
Lauterpacht recognised the doctrine of the identification of state with law: 
'If the State is only an expression of the unity of the legal system and if international law is recognized - as 
admittedly it is- as a body of rules oflaw binding upon States independently of their will, then, from a purely 
legal point of view, there is already in existence a State over and above the national sovereignties .... A truly 
66 Ibid/421. 
67 Ibid/419-420. 
68 Ibid/420. 
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legal treatment of the conception of the civitas maxima will be greatly facilitated by the realization of the 
essential identity oflaw and State.'70 
Therefore, the supreme basis of the binding force of international law is the existence of 
international law as a fact: '[I]he realization of the essential identity, for the purposes of legal 
science, of the law and the State will facilitate the adoption of the view that the international State 
has already been created by the acceptance of the rule of international law.'71 In other words, 
Lauterpacht just said that international law has binding force because international law does bind 
states in international relations. He never changed his view throughout his life. Lauterpacht insisted 
in his draft for the 9th edition of Oppenheim 's: 
'The fact that a rule is sanctioned by or brought into operation through consent, is not inconsistent with its 
essential quality as evidencing the general will of the international community of which consenting States are 
members. Thus it must be considered to be the general will of the international community that its members 
should regulate their legal relations through treaties constituting a source oflegal obligations.' 72 
However, his effort to base international law on the international community was in vain in the 
sense of self-validation. Lauterpacht legitimated the authority of international law by the very 
existence of international law itsel£ It is the weak point of normativism, which was criticised as the 
tautology of the fact that it should be valid if a norm is actually valid.73 In a sense, this tautology is 
the result that Lauterpacht applied Kelsenian normativism to international law. 
69 Ibid/422. 
70 Lauterpacht/1933b/CP-II/419. 
71 Lauterpacht/Function/422/n.l. 
72 Lauterpacht/General-Part/CP-1193-94. 
73 Schmitt/1928/9. 
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1.2.1.2. THE GRADUALCONCRETIZATION OF LAW 
The gradual concretization of law is another good example explaining how Lauterpacht adopted 
Kelsenian normativism. Kelsen explained that the validity oflegal norms is derived from the higher 
norms, and finally from the Basic Norm. However, there are two types of reasons for the validity of 
legal norms: the static aspect and the dynamic aspect. The static aspect of legal validity is 
dependent on the content of norms. Kelsen said that 'their validity can be traced back to a norm 
under whose content the content of the norms in question can be subsumed as the particular under 
the general. '74 Therefore, it is from the content of norms that the legal validity is deduced logically. 
On the other hand, the dynamic aspect of the legal validity explains the derogation of the law-
creating authority in a legal system. Kelsen explained that 'the presupposed basic nom1 contains 
nothing but the determination of a norm-creating fact, the authorization of a norm-creating 
authority or (which amounts to the same) a rule that stipulates how the general and individual 
norms of the order based on the basic norms ought to be created. '75 It is the dynamic aspect that 
Kelsen emphasised: 
'A legal nonn is not valid because it has a certain content, that is, because its content is logically deducible 
from a presupposed basic nonn, but because it is created in a certain way - ultimately in a way determined by 
a presupposed basic nonn. For this reason alone does the legal nonn belong to the legal order whose nonns 
are created according to this basic nonn. Therefore any kind of content might be law.' 76 
Kelsen introduced the gradual concretization of law into the dynamics of a legal order. The 
application of general norms is always done by the creation of individual norms. Even legislation is 
just only relative law-creating. It applies the legal norms embodied in the constitution. It is true of 
74 Kelsen/1970/195. 
75 Ibid/196. 
76 Ibid/198. 
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the task of the judiciary. Kelsen said that 'the courts apply the general legal norms by creating 
individual norms whose content is detennined by the general norms which authorize a concrete 
sanction. '77 The application of general (higher) norms is the creation of individual Oower) nonns 
itself It is the theory of the gradual concretization of law. 
There are two consequences of the gradual concretization oflaw. The first is the denial of the 
distinction between public law and private law. Even the conclusion of a private contract is the 
application of the general legal nonn which makes the contract legally valid. It is only the 
difference between public law and private law which is the method of creating norms. Legal 
transaction is the norm-creating process between parties. On the other hand, legislation is the nonn-
creating process by the competent organ: 
'A typical example of a private-law relationship is the one established by a legal transaction, especially the 
contract (that is, the individual nonn created by the contract), by which the contracting parties are legally 
obligated to a mutual behavior. Whereas here the subjects participate in the creation of the nonn that obligates 
them - this is, indeed, the essence of contractual law creation - the subject obligated by the administrative 
order under public law has no part in the creation of the nonn that obligates him.' 78 
Kelsen continued as follows: 
'If the decisive difference between private and public law is comprehended as the difference between two 
methods of creating law; if the so-called public acts of the state are recognized as legal acts just as the private 
legal transaction; if, most of all, it is understood that the acts constituting the law-creating fucts are in both 
cases only the continuations of the process of the creation of the so-called will of the state, and that in the 
administrative order just as much as in the private legal transaction only the individualization of general 
nonns are effected- then it will not seem so paradoxical that the Pure Theory of Law, from its universalistic 
77 lbidl 237. 
78 lbid/281. 
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viewpoint, always directed toward the whole of the legal order (the so-called will of the state), sees in the 
private legal transaction just as much as in an administrative order an act of the state, that is, a fact of law of 
law-making attributable to the unity of the legal order.' 79 
Lauterpacht again adopted the gradual concretization theory of law. It is clear that Lautetpacht 
fotmd that international treaties are essentially contractual: 
'The legal nature of private law contracts and international law treaties is essentially the same. The 
autonomous will of the parties is, both in contract and in treaty, the constitutive condition of a legal relation 
which, from the moment of its creation, becomes independent of the discretionary will of one of the parties. '80 
However, the contractual nature of international treaties does not deny the status of treaties as the 
source oflaw: 'All international treaties are sources oflaw for the parties who conclude them, none 
is a source oflaw for non-signatories. ' 81 
It is true, therefore, that Lautetpacht did not distinguish between the source of obligation and 
the source oflaw; for him law is nothing but the bundle oflegal obligations. On this point, Scobbie 
criticises Lautetpacht for the elimination of the conceptual distinction between obligation and law. 
Lautetpacht seems to Scobbie not to have understood the fact that state parties can modifY their 
legal relationship by making treaties, and derogate from general international law. According to 
Scobbie, this is the reason why Lautetpacht failed to escape from the dilemma of the 
Koskenniemi's utopia/apology opposition. Scobbie says: 
'The influence of gradual concretization entails not only that treaties are a source of law, but also that they 
must be interpreted in accordance with the parties' intentions. This appears to set up the opposition which 
79 Ibid!281-282. 
80 Lautetpacht/ Analogies/156. 
81 Ibid/158. 
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Koskenniemi has labelled "apology" and "utopia". '82 
However, it should be noted that the utopia/apology opposition itself is very doubtful in the sense 
that Koskenniemi fails to explain the concept of objectivity which means the balance between 
concreteness and normativity. Scobbie himselfhas pointed out that: 
'The underlying problem here is Koskenniemi's quest for "objectivity," which is dependent on his bivalent 
truth theory which presupposes that a given proposition is either true or false: if bivalence is inadequate even 
for relatively simple logics which manipulate univocal terms, a fortiori it is an inadequate array for law. '83 
Moreover, it is worthwhile revisiting the conceptual distinction between obligation and law 
itself Fitzmaurice distinguished between the source of obligation and the source of law. He said 
that law is 'rules of general validity for and application to the subjects of the legal system, not 
arising from particular obligations or undertaking on their part '84 In other words, he discussed law 
from the viewpoint of applicability. When he said that international treaties are the source of 
obligation, Fitzmaurice just meant that an international treaty does not bind non-parties unless the 
treaty is regarded as customary law at the same time: 'If the treaty rule does eventually pass into 
general law, its formal source as law ... is clearly custom or practice - i.e. its adoption into general 
customary law. '85 If so, the distinction is useful only so far as the question on the opposability of 
treaties to third parties is concerned; apart from this question, the conceptual distinction between 
law and obligation is simply a question of terminology. Rosalyn Higgins says as follows: 
'What it seems to boil down to is that, in the Fitzmaurice view, if obligations are binding only upon parties 
who agree to them, and no others (because they are new, albeit contained in a treaty), they are not law. The 
82 Scobbie/1997 !285 
fl3 Scobbie/1990/349. 
84 Fitzmaurice/1958/157/n.2. 
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argument has now become one of definition. '86 
On the other hand, law meant to Lauterpacht nothing but the source of legal obligations. It is 
because Lautetpacht adopted the Kelsenian normative concept oflaw, namely the view that law is a 
norm system composed of obligations which reflect rights. From the obligation-centred viewpoint, 
the applicability of treaties becomes the sphere of validity. There is no difference with regard to the 
quality or level of legal obligations between treaties and custom; if there is, the difference between 
them would be the relative degree of normativity. Insofar as the applicability of treaties is 
concerned, however, Lautetpacht dealt too strictly with law-making treaties. He emphasised the 
relativity of the difference between contractual treaties and law-making treaties. The only difference 
between them for Lautetpacht is the more permanent and general applicability of the so-called law-
making treaties: 
'The above-mentioned distinction [between contractual treaties and law-making treaties] is useful if meant to 
emphasise the fact that some treaties are of more pennanent and general application than others, and that they 
resemble therefore an act of legislation. Apart from this, however, it is obvious that its value is a relative one. '87 
Lautetpacht did not recognise the higher normativity of law-making treaties over the normativity of 
contractual treaties unless he introduced the conceptual origin ofjus cogens into the Law of 
Treaties. 
The second result of the gradual concretization of law is that judicial discretion is admitted. 
The judiciary does not only apply the general norms but also creates the individual norm from the 
viewpoint of normative hierarchy. Kelsen said, 
85 Ibid/160. 
86 Higgins/1994/33-34. See Milllersonl2000/211/n.4. 
87 Lauterpacht/ Analogies/157. 
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'When settling a dispute between two parties or when sentencing an accused person to a punishment, a court 
applies, it is true, a general norm of statutoty or customruy law. But simultaneously the court creates an 
individual norm providing that a definite sanction shall be executed against a definitive individual. This 
individual norm is related to the general norms as a statute is related to the constitutions. The judicial ftmction 
is thus, like legislation, both creation and application oflaw. '88 
The creation of individual nonns by judges implies that they necessarily use the judicial discretion. 
Lauterpacht explained that 'within the orbit of the statute there exists a multitude of possible 
decisions to be arrived at by the exercise of judicial discretion within the four corners of the law. '89 
Lauterpacht's theory of the international judicial fimction, especially the law-making fimction 
of the international tribunals, is based on the gradual concretization of law. This point is seen in the 
following remark: 
'When applying the necessarily abstract rule of law to concrete cases, they uudicial tribunals] create the actual 
legal rule for the individual case before them. The actual operation of the law in society is a process of gradual 
ctystallization of the abstract legal rules beginning with the constitution of the state, as the most ftmdamental 
and abstract body of rules, and ending with the concrete shaping of the individual legal relation by a judgment 
of a court or by an adjudication or decision of an administrative authority or by an agreement of the interested 
parti. ' es. 
'There are,' he continued, 'obvious limits to this law-making activity of judges, but these 
limitations do not materially alter the fact that courts do not slavishly administer abstract rules 
without being able to exercise creative discretion. It is irrelevant whether this exercise of discretion 
is done by recourse to conceptions of justice, or general principles of law, or the law of nature, or 
public policy. . .. These considerations apply with special force to the fimctioning of international 
88 Kelsen/1945/134. 
89 Lauterpacht/1933b/CP-II/411. 
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tribunals. ,\(j Lauterpacht did not change this basic view of the gradual concretization of law 
throughout his academic life. In DevelopmenJ-ll, Lauterpacht mentioned that 'judicial discretion as 
governed by law' is the proper judicial activity: 'Subject to that overriding primacy of the existing 
law, ... the necessity of a choice between conflicting legal claims is of the very essence of the 
judicial function, whether within the State or in the international sphere. '91 This point will be 
discussed later in the context of judicial function in chapter 6. 
1.2.2. THE ENGUSH TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Although Kelsen affected the legal thought ofLauterpacht in the era ofVienna, it is impossible to 
discuss Lauterpacht without mentioning the influence of the English tradition of international law 
over him. This section will examine how English tradition of international law affects Lauterpacht. 
It is sometimes said that Alberico Gentili (1552-1608) was one of the founding fathers of 
international legal studies in England.92 Gentili was born at Sanginesio in Northern Italy. Although 
he read Roman law at the University of Perugia, Gentili, and his father and brother, escaped from 
Italy for fear of the Inquisition. After a short stay in Austria and Germany, although promised a 
professorship at the University ofHeidelberg, Gentili came to London, and soon became a fellow 
of New Inn Hall in Oxford, and taught civil law in St John's College and New College. He 
became famous for his legal opinion in the Mendoza case and for De Legationibus Libri Tres 
(1585). While he left for Germany in 1586, Gentili returned to England one year later, and was 
appointed Regius Professor of Civil Law at the University of Oxford. In the year of the Great 
Armada, 1588, he delivered a lecture on the law of war, which became a part of his main work De 
Jure Belli Libri Tres (1589). However, he was not satisfied with purely academic posts. He joined 
Gray's Inn in 1600, and started to work as a barrister in London. Furthermore, in 1605, he become 
90 Lauterpacht/1930al144-145. 
91 Latiterpacht/Development;.W399. 
92 On the life of Alberico Gentili, see Wheaton/1845/50-54; Holland/1898/1-39; Nysl1924/lla-37a; 
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the counsel for Spain in the Cotut of Admiralty with the pennission of King James I. At that time, 
Spain was at war with Netherlands, and Britain was neutral. He died in 1608 in London. After his 
death, his brother Scipione Gentili, who was also a famous civilian lawyer, published Hispanicae 
Advocationis Libri Duo (1613). The life of Gentili shows the very characteristics of the English 
tradition of international law: (1) the reception of foreign lawyers, (2) the development of 
international law from civil law practice in England. 
Firstly, English academic society tends to welcome foreign but eligible scholars, whatever 
their origin. It is true of the English academia of international legal studies. Wilfred Jenks pointed 
out that '[i]t is typical of the British tradition of and approach to international law that they have 
constantly, from Gentili onwards, enriched themselves by extending a warm hospitality to 
intellectual currents from elsewhere. '93 This academic hospitality is valuable compared with the 
academia of other nations. Indeed, many 'British' international lawyers are originally from foreign 
lands. The success ofLassa Oppenheim as a 'British' international lawyer fully tells this point.94 In 
particular in the inter-war period, many Jewish international lawyers escaped from Nazi Germany 
to England. These lawyers include Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy (1874-1936),95 Wolfgang 
Gaston Friedrnann (1907-1972),96 Frederick Alexander Mann (1907-1991),97 and George 
Schwarzenberger (1908-1991 ).98 
Secondly, international legal studies in England directly developed from civil law practice. 
McNair pointed out as follows: 
'[T]he "reception" of international law in England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centwies is primary due to 
Phillipson/1933/9a-51 a; Lacks/1987 /50-52. 
93 Wilfred/Jenks/1960/2. 
94 See Whittuck/1920-21. 
95 See BYIIJvol.18/1937/158. 
96 Although being famous as a professor of international law at the University of Columbia in the 
United States, Friedrnann held British nationality throughout his life after his settlement in England 
in 193 3. Obata/200 1. Also see Sovern/1971. 
97 See Collins/1992. 
98 See Mendelson/1992. 
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two factors: (i) its real or supposed identification with the "civil law," as that term was then W1derstood, 
namely, the common stock of legal principles regarded in Western Europe as its heritage from Rome, 
because mainly based on, or derived from, the law of Rome; the "common law of nations" as Senior has 
called it, whose Roman origin or background endowed it with the character of universality and so enhanced 
its authority: (ii) the professional and literruy labours of the civilian lawyer in England '99 
Indeed, the fact that Gentili became a practitioner indicates the important aspect of the English 
tradition that even academic lawyers tend to prefer practice. This point includes the following two 
meanings as well; academic lawyers' respect for practitioners, and their readiness to participate in 
legal practice; practitioners contribute academically to the development of international legal 
studies. 
It is Doctors' Commons that contributed to such a development of international legal practice 
and studies in England. Doctors' Commons was the society for civilian lawyers who practised as 
advocates in the Ecclesiastical and Admiralty Courts with the degree of Doctor from Oxford and 
Cambridge.100 Some civil lawyers who contributed significantly to the development of international 
law belonged to this society. Richard Zouche (1590-1661) was a member of Doctors' Commons, 
and became the president of the High Court of Admiralty in 1660, while he succeeded to the 
Regius Chair of Civil Law at the University of Oxford in 1620.101 William Scott (1745-1836), later 
Lord Stowell, is famous for his judgments in the High Court of Admiralty. Robert Phillimore 
(1810-1885), author of Commentaries on International Law, also practised as an advocate of 
Doctors' Commons from 1839. Travers Twiss (1809-1897), Professor of International Law at 
King's College, London (1852-1855), and later Regius Professor of Civil Law in the University of 
Oxford (1855-1870), gave legal opinions to the British government as the Queen's Advocate, 
though Doctors' Commons came to the end when he retired. The history of international law in 
99 McNair/1974/221. 
100 Squibb/1977. 
101 On Richard Zouche, see Nussbaum/1947/118-122. 
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England, thus, shows that English international lawyers are 'in the Temple rather than the 
schools.' 102 Indeed, it is only from the middle of the 19d' century that the academic post of 
international legal studies, which was independent of civil law, was created in Universities in 
England. The Chichele Chair of International Law and Diplomacy at the University of Oxford was 
created in 1859, and occupied by Mountague Bemard (1820-1882). William Harcourt (1827-1904) 
became the first Whewell Professor of International Law at the University of Cambridge in 1869, 
while the chair itself was founded in 1867. The academic career of Henry Maine (1822-1888) 
symbolises the development of international law from civil law in England; he was Regius 
Professor of Civil Law from 1847 to 1854, and became Whewell Professor of International Law 
from 1887 to his death in 1888 at the University of Cambridge. 
Moreover, the history of the development of international legal studies in England from civil 
law practice shows that legal pragmatism is the essence of the English tradition of international law. 
English international lawyers have a belief that law is nothing but legal practice. This belief seems 
to be very much a matter of course. However it should be noted that this point is very different from 
the Continental tradition, in which international law was the subject of theologians and 
philosophers.103 The belief in 'the legal' leads English international lawyers to the general tendency 
to be cautious about the intervention of non-lawyers or academic theorists into the legal subject It is 
noteworthy that in De Jure Belli Libri Tres, Gentili tried to eliminate the influence of theology from 
international law: 'Let the theologians keep silence about a matter which is outside of their 
province.' 104 
However, it also cannot be denied that a 'theory' affected the English tradition of international 
law from the late eighteenth century. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) influenced modem 
international legal studies by his utilitarian positivism and the coining of the term 'international 
101 Warbrick/1991/53. 
103 Nussbaum/1947/233-234. 
104 Gentili/1933/57. 
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law.' 105 The change of tenninology modifies the theory itself Indeed, the use of the tenn 
'international' symbolises the change of the theory of international legal studies in the two 
meanings. Firstly, the old tenn 'law of nations' or jus nature et gentium seemed to Bentham to 
confuse 'internal' law and 'international' law: 
'The word international, it must be acknowledged, is a new one; though, it is hoped, sufficiently analogous 
and intelligible. It is calculated to express, in a more significant way, the branch of law which goes commonly 
under the name of the law of nations: an appellation so uncharacteristic, that, were it not for the force of 
custom, it would seem rather to refer to internal jurisprudence. The chancellor D' Aguesseau has already made, 
I find, a similar remarlc he says that what is commonly called droit des gens, ought rather to be termed droit 
entre les gens.' 106 
In this sense, Bentham tried to criticise Blackstone's famous theme that 'the law of nations 
(whenever any question arises which is properly the object of its jurisdiction) is here adopted in its 
full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land' 107 by the invention of 
his new term 'international law.' The adoption of the term 'international' is clearly linked to the 
rationalisation of international law by denying natural law tradition in England.108 Secondly, the 
concept of 'international law' is universal rather than European. The new states in the American 
Continent emerged from the end of the eighteenth century, and non-Christian states such as Turkey 
and Japan started to participate in the family of nations from the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Consequently, the old concept of jus gentium or 'European law of nations' was becoming 
inappropriate for describing the legal relations of sovereign states. In this sense, the adoption of the 
term 'international law' shows that international lawyers tried to deal with the expanding process of 
105 See Schwarzenberger/1948. 
105 Bentham/1948/426/n.l. 
107 Blackstone/2001/53. 
108 Nussbaum/1947/136. 
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the international community. 109 
In the middle of the 19d1 century, although positivism flourished in Europe, it was not 
necessarily true in Britain until the late 19th century. Both natural law tradition and positivism were 
seen in the literature of international law. Although he borrowed the tenn 'international law' and 
'international jurisprudence' from Bentham, Robert Phillimore emphasised the divine law nature of 
internationallaw.110 On the other hand, John Austin (1790-1859), who is one ofthe successors of 
Bentham, defined international law as positive morality which is law improperly so-called by 
applying his command theory: 
'The so-called law of nations consists of opinions or sentiments current among nations genetally. It therefore is 
not law properly so called.' 111 
Although Austin denied the classification of international law as law properly so-called, he did not 
reject the objective existence of international order and obligation.112 Indeed, Austin said as follows: 
'[T]he law obtaining between nations is law (improperly so called) set by general opinion. The duties which it 
imposes are enforced by moral sanctions: by fear on the part of nations, or by fear on the part of sovereigns, of 
provoking general hostility, and incurring its probable evils, in case they shall violate maxims generally 
received and respected.' 113 
Austin became very influential not only injurisprudence but also in international legal studies after 
his death. While he was an American lawyer, but influential over the English tradition of 
international law, Henry Wheaton ( 1785-1848), for example, introduced the theory of Austin 
109 Grewe/2000/462-463. 
110 Phillimore/1854/56. 
Ill Aust:in/1995/124. 
112 Koskenniemi/1989/1 02. 
113 Austin/1995/171. 
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positively in the definition of international law with no criticism. 114 Thomas Holland (1835-1926) 
also accepted Austinian Jurisprudence: 
'Convenient therefore as is on many accounts the phrase "International Law," to express those rules of 
conduct in accordance with which, either in consequence of their express consent, or in pursuance of the usage 
of the civilised world, nations are expected to act, it is impossible to regard these rules as being in reality 
anything more than the moral code of nations.' 115 
Thus, the Austinian command theory forced even English international lawyers to reconsider the 
legal nature of internationallaw.116 
However, there was 'a certain dissatisfaction with the positivism of the last centwy' 117 all over 
Europe after the First World War. The realistic view of international law based on the balance of 
power seemed to international lawyers to have become bankrupt at the outbreak of the war. 
Especially in Britain there was a strong stream oflawyers back to the natural law tradition.118 It was 
in such an atmosphere that Lauterpacht started to study international law at London School of 
Economic and Political Sciences, although international legal education in England was not 
sufficient at that time.119 
Lauterpacht was educated in Austria in law in a different academic atmosphere to that 
prevailing in England. International lawyers in Austria and Germany conceived international law 
from a philosophical perspective: 'The history of international law in Gennany during that period is 
a narrative about philosophy as the founding discipline for reflecting about statehood and what lies 
114 Wheaton/1857/18-19. 
115 Holland/1924/134-135. 
116 See Maine/1915/Lectures/ll/and/lll; Hall/1924/13-16; Westlake/1904/8-9; Oppenheim/1912a/4-
15. 
117 Nussbaum/194 7/27 4. 
118 Grewe/2000/603. 
119 Peaice Higgins·openly showed his deep concern about the future ofthe English academia of 
international law: '[T]he credit of British scholarship is at stake if we cannot maintain an adequate 
supply to continue the succession.' Pearce/Higgins/1923/508. 
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beyond.' 120 How did Lauterpacht succeed to the English tradition which was vety different from the 
Austro-German positive theoty of international law? When he was at the LSE, Lauterpacht was 
vety influenced by two international lawyers, who represent the English tradition of international 
law: John Westlake and Arnold McNair. From Westlake, Lauterpacht learnt legal-moralism, which 
is the attitude aimed at moralising states by international law. From McNair, Lauterpacht was 
taught legal pragmatism. In this sense, Lauterpacht succeeded to the English tradition from 
Westlake and McNair. 
John Westlake (1828-1913) was Whewell Professor oflntemational Law at the University of 
Cambridge from 1888 to 1908.121 However, before holding the Whewell Chair, he was already 
famous for the Treatise on Private International Law, which was the first English book to 
systemise private international law. Furthermore, he founded the world's first academic journal of 
international law, Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Compare (1862) and Institut de 
Droit International (1873) with Gustav Rolin-Jaequemyns (1835-1902) and Tobias Asser (1838-
1913).122 These activities show the process that international legal studies was becoming 
independent of civil law or philosophy in the middle of the nineteenth centuty. In this sense, 
Westlake was one of the fathers of modem international legal studies. 
Lauterpacht was impressed by the Whewell Lecture of Westlake (1888). In the lecture, 
Westlake said as follows: 
'The strong insistence with which most writers on the subject have dwelt on the artificial entity of the state, 
the shrup con~ which, oflate more especially, they have drawn between a state and its subjects, may easily 
have an evil in:fluence on a student oflntemational Law, and on the public so far as it is affected by the tone of 
thought among such students. It may weaken the sense that the action of a state is the action of those within it 
who help to guide it, whether in a public capacity or even by merely expressing an opinion ... The influence 
12° Koskenniemi/2001/182. 
121 See Westlakel1914a 
122 See Koskenniemi/200 1/Ch.1. 
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of the same tone of thought will again be evil if it allows us to forget that not only is the action of our state that 
of ourselves, but that those towards who it is taken are also men like ourselves, though they may be veiled 
from our eyes by the interposition of another artificial entity.' 123 
Lauterpacht appreciated Westlake's view: 'It is unusual to find in a modem leading international 
lawyer this insistence on personal responsibility.' 124 Later, Lauterpacht developed the problem of 
the responsibility of government officials into the criminal responsibility of the individuals. In this 
sense, the above remark ofWestlake became the basis ofLauterpacht' s legal-moralism. 
Apart from Westlake, Arnold Duncan McNair (1885-1975), later Baron McNair of Gleniffer, 
was the person who decisively affected the life of Lauterpacht as a British international lawyer. 
McNair read law at Gonville and Caius College in Cambridge from 1906 to 1909. After graduation, 
he had practised as a solicitor in London until he retwned to Cambridge as a fellow of Gonville and 
Caius College in 1913. At that time, he taught not intemationallaw but English contract law. 125 His 
interest in English contract law and the experience as a solicitor are the origins of the common law 
approach of McNair. His so-called common law approach shows itself in Essays and Lectures 
upon Some Legal Efficts of War (1920), later The Legal Efficts ofWar. 
McNair succeeded to the English tradition of international law. First, he was taught Roman 
law by William Buckland (1850-1946), who was Regius Professor of Civil Law at the University 
ofCambridge.126 McNair wrote Roman Law and Common Law (1936) with Buckland. Secondly, 
McNair had the solid belief that international law is as much law as English law is. There was no 
reason for him to treat international law differently from English law, because he did not doubt that 
law is nothing but practice: 'I suspect this attribution of international law to an academic rather than 
to a practical source to be mistaken and incapable of substantiation.' 127 This belief led him to 
123 Westlake/1914b/41 0-411. 
124 Lauterpacht/1925/CP-II/391. 
125 Fitzmallrice/194'/-75/xiii. Also see Jennings/1998/1307 -1312. 
126 Brooke/1993/226. 
127 McNair/1974/369. 
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pragmatism and domestic analogy. 
His pragmatism includes the contempt for 'theory' and the quest for 'hard law.' McNair did 
not hide his contempt for 'theory' when he said about the relationship between international law 
and municipal law that ' [ s ]uch controversies as that between the monist and the dualist theories, 
into which the late Professor Oppenheim in vain tried to lead us, have found no abiding-place in 
our literature.' 128 Indeed, English international lawyers still tend to emphasise the practical aspect of 
the relation between international law and domestic law more than the theoretical aspect of 
controversy between monism and dualism, although the theoretical aspect of the controversy itself 
is now seen even in the English text books of international law. Michael Akehurst ( 1940-1989), for 
example, did not mention the controversy between monism and dualism at all in his last edition of 
A Modem Introduction to International Law. Although the controversy is now discussed in the 
seventh revised edition by Peter Malanczuk, Malanczuk himself says that '[a]uthors with a 
common law background tended to pay lesser attention to these theoretical issues and preferred a 
more empirical approach seeking practical solutions in a given case.' 129 This tendency is also seen 
in the so-called 'theories of co-ordination,' which shows the preference of English lawyers for 
practice over theory.130 
However, it should be pointed out that his pragmatism is one of the answers to the Austinian 
theoretical question, 'Is international law really law?' Fitzmaurice summarised the answer of 
McNair to the question as follows: 
'[H]e [McNair] nevertheless felt. .. that what international law suffered from was a lack ot: so to speak, 
"edge", of sufficiently clearcut definitions and established certainties. What he wanted to find in it were those 
elements of what he called "hard law" that could give it these qualities.' 131 
128 Ibid/147. 
129 Malanczuk/1997/63..:64. 
130 Fitzmaurice/1957/68-94; Brownlie/1998a/34. 
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Tills quest for 'hard law' becomes the publication of the Annual Digest of Public Internalional Law 
Cases, later International Law Reports. Indeed, the Annual Digest was the brainchild of McNair, 
although it is Lauterpacht who brought it up. 132 In the preface of the Annual Digest 1925-1926, 
McNair and Lauterpacht said as follows: 
'The work, of which this book is the first fiuit, was prompted by the suspicion that there is more international 
law already in existence and daily accwnulating ''than this world dreams of' and by the conviction that it is 
more international that this world wants. As the work has progressed that suspicion has ripened into a 
certainty.' 133 
Such is also seen in Internalional Law Opinions as a result of his effort to trace the development 
process of international law in England. For him, the opinions of the Law Officers are very similar 
to judgments, even though they are not law itself, but 'material source.' 134 
McNair influenced Lauterpacht on the matter of legal pragmatism as the English tradition of 
international law. First, McNair's quest for 'hard law' affected Lauterpacht. The influence of 
McNair over Lauterpacht is not only Lauterpacht's edition of 24 volumes of International Law 
Reports. It is also seen in Recognition in International Law. According to Elihu Lauterpacht, this 
book is based on the investigation that his father had made in the late 1920s into the opinion of the 
Law Officers of the Crown.135 Although the construction of the duty of recognition was very 
131 Fitzmaurice/1974b/XI. 
132 Elihu/Lauterpacht/ILR/vol.49!1976/v. 
133 McNair-Lauterpacht/ AD/vol.3/1929/ix. 
134 McNair/1956/xviii-xix. 
135 Elihu/Lauterpacht/Note/CP-III/113. 1bis investigation seems to have been under the guidance of 
McNair as Lauterpacht's supervisor. Robert Jennings recalls the international law teaching of 
McNair as follows: '[I]n the early thirties he was beginning his work on the materials in the Public 
Record Office ... He made available to his seminar pupils lists of P.RO. references for particular 
topics, which he suggested they shquld follow up on day excursions to London, not to help provide 
material for his own work but for them to work up into an article of their-own if they were 
ambitious enough to do so.' Jennings/1998/1311. It seems to be reasonable to think that McNair 
gave Lauterpacht the same instruction. 
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Kelsenian, 136 the materials used in Recognition were English practice of international law itself 
It may have been less easy for Lauteipacht to assimilate to English legal academia without 
McNair. Lauterpacht got an academic post at LSE with the recommendation of McNair and 
Norman Bentwich.137 Since then, Lauterpacht followed McNair in regard to Oppenheim 's 
editorship in 1935 after helping McNair's edition of Oppenheim 's, 138 Whewell professorship at the 
University of Cambridge after McNair retired for becoming the vice-chancellor of the University of 
Liverpool, the judgeship of the International Court of Justice in 1955. Due to the strong 
recommendation ofMcNair, Lauterpacht prepared for being called to the bar in 1936, although he 
was bored with English contract law.139 Lauterpacht's examination paper became the article 
Contract to break Contract which was finally developed into the conceptual origin of jus cogens in 
international law. Since then, Lauterpacht was qualified as practitioner. Indeed, later he would be 
consulted by many governments, including the British government. Although he must have 
considered himself a scholar rather than practitioner, 140 it is undeniable that Lauterpacht succeeded 
to the English tradition of international law with regard to legal pragmatism. 
136 See below 4.3.1.1. 
137 D./Stone/1982/103. 
138 Oppenheim-McNair/1926/vii; Oppenheim-McNair /1928/vii. 
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140 See Sinclair/2002/60-61. 
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2. 1IHE ILJEGALI§TIC CONSTRlUCflON 01F11HDE liNTIERNATIONAL 
COMMlUNITY J!N TlHIE OOER=WAR lPJERIOD 
2J.. GENJERAJLJBACKGROUND 
The universalisation of the European law of nations was accompanied by the expansion of the 
international community. However, international lawyers from the 19d1 century to the early 20d1 
century doubted whether non-European people could understand the European law of nations. It is 
the reason why some international lawyers of the period spent considerable time discussing 
membership ofthe international community. The international community in the early 19d1 century 
was called the Family ofNations, being the society of European nations and Christian nations in 
the American Continent The concept of the Family ofNations had been based on Christianity until 
Turkey was admitted to 'a participation in the advantages of the public law of Europe and the 
system of concert attached to it' under Article 7 of the Treaty of Paris in 1856. Indeed, Lawrence's 
edition of Wheaton 's Elemenls of lnJernational Law published in 1857 does not admit the existence 
of the universal law of nations: 
'Is there a unifonn law of nations? There certainly is not the same one for all the nations and states of the 
world. The public law, with slight exceptions, has always been, and still is, limited to the civilized and 
Christian people of Europe or to those ofEuropean origin.' 1 
As non-Christian nations, such as Turkey and Japan, started to join the Family of Nations, the 
criterion of membership of the Family of Nations changed from Christianity to civilisation. 
However, the term 'civilisation' denoted nothing but European civilisation in the late 19d1 century. 
While recognising civilisation as the standard for membership of the international community, 
1 Wheaton/1857/16. 
59 
William Hall still distinguished non-European nations from European civilised nations with regard 
to the admission of the membership: 
'[S]tates outside European civilisation must fonnally enter into the circle of law-governed cmmtries. They 
must do something with acquiescence of the latter, or of some of them, which ammmts to an acceptance of the 
law in its entirely beyond all possibility of misconstruction. '2 
Further, Hall continued as follows: 
'When a new state comes into existence its position is regulated by like considerations. If by its origin it 
inherits European civilisation, the presumption is so high that it intends to conform to law that the first act 
purporting to be a state act which is done by it, unaccompanied by warning of intention not to conform, must 
be taken as indicating an intention to conform, and brings it consequently within the sphere of law. If on the 
other hand it falls by its origin into the class of states outside European civilisation, it can of course only leave 
them by a fonnal act of the kind already mentioned. '3 
Thus, some international lawyers in the late 1 cJ' century constructed the conception of the 
international commmrity according to the standards of European civilisation. James Lorimer, for 
example, no doubt measured the degree of civilisation by European standard. He said as follows: 
'As a political phenomenon, humanity, in its present condition, divides itself into three concentric zones or 
spheres - that of civilised humanity, that of barbarous humanity, and that of savage humanity. To these, 
whether arising from peculiarities of race or from various stages of development in the same race, belong, of 
righl, at the hands of civilised nations, three stage of recognition- plenruy political recognition, partial political 
recognition, and natural or mere human recognition .... The sphere of plenary political recognition extends to 
2 Hall/1924/47. 
3 Ibid./48. 
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all the existing States of Europe, with their colonial dependencies, in so far as these are people by persons of 
European birth or descent; and to the States of North and South America which have vindicated their 
independence ofthe European States of which they were colonies. The sphere of partial political recognition 
extends to Turlcey ... , and ... to Persia and the other separate States of Central Asia, to China, Siam, and Japan. 
The sphere of natural, or mere human recognition, extends to the residue of mankind; though here we ought, 
peffiaps, to distinguish between the progressive and non-progressive races. '4 
The concept of civilisation, however, gradually came to denote not only Europe when Japan 
appeared as a Great Power in the Far East. Japan defeated Russia in 1905 with the backup of the 
United Kingdom and the United States. In the First World War, furthermore, Japan expelled the 
German army from German-leased tenitories in China Consequently, Japan was recognised as a 
Great Power in the era of the League of Nations, and started to assert its own civilisation. Article 9 
of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, for example, stipulated that 'the 
whole body also should represent the main fonns of civilization and the principal legal system of 
the world.' Mineichiro Adachi, who later became President of the Permanent Court, proposed this 
article in the Advisory Committee of Jurists in order to secure the seat of Japanese judge in the 
Permanent Court: 'All kinds of civilisation must be taken into account, among them the civilisation 
of the Far East, of which Japan was perhaps the principal representative. '5 Answering Adachi, 
Baron Descamps suggested the clause, 'the main fonns of civilization and the principal legal 
system in the world'6 which in his view ensures the representation of the Great Powers.7 In other 
words, the tenns 'the main fonns of civilisation and the principal legal system of the world' were 
another expression of the Great Powers at that time, whether Europe or non-Europe. In a sense, this 
clause indicates one example of the transformation ofthe European law of nations to the universal 
law of nations. The Report of the Advisory Committee says as follows: 
4 Lorimer/1883/1 01-102. Empahsis original. 
5 Proci~s-Verbaux/136. 
6 Ibid./356. 
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'It was not enough therefore, to recommend the representation of the great legal systems of the world; the 
various forms of civilisation must also be represented. This is an essential condition, if the Permanent Court of 
International Justice is to be a real World Court for the Society of all Nations. '8 
The concept of civilisation, however, started to lose its meaning after it ceased to denote 
European civilisation essentially. The international community in the era of the League ofNations 
became universal in the sense that it included not only European nations but also non-European 
ones. The League ofNations was open not only to Japan, which had already been accepted as a 
'civilized nation,' but also other Asian nations which had not necessarily been thought of as 
'civilised' from a European perspective. The concept of civilisation was significant only insofar as 
it prevented what European nations recognised as semi-civilised or barbarian people from 
becoming members of the international community. When even non-European nations became the 
members of the international community through joining the League of Nations, all members of 
the League were supposed to be 'civilised.' Thus, the concept of civilisation under Article 9 ofthe 
Permanent Court's Statute became meaningless insofar as it was not clear 'how this rule can be 
effectively carried out, except by the good will of the electors, as the extent of its application is 
rather vague and uncertain.'9 It was only in the context ofthe Mandate system that the concept of 
civilisation was useful in the era of the League. It legally justified members of the League 
dominating the former Ottoman-Turkey territories and the former German colonies in Central 
Africa and the South Pacific in the name of 'a sacred trust of civilization' under Article 22 of the 
Covenant of the League. 
The changes in the consciousness of international lawyers in the inter-war era is clearly shown 
by the revised editions of Oppenheim 's with regard to the admission of non-European nations, 
7 lbid./371. 
8 Ibid/710. 
9 De/Bustamante/1925/115. 
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except Japan, to the international community. In the second edition of his textbook published in 
1912, Oppenheim said: 
'The position of such States as Persia, Siam, China, Morocco, Abyssinia, and the like, is doubtful. These States 
are certainly civilised States, and Abyssinia is even a Christian State. However, their civilisation has not yet 
reached that condition which is necessary to enable their Governments and their population in every respect to 
Wlderstand and to cany out the command of the rules of International Law .... AU of them make efforts to 
educate their populations, to introduce modem institutions, and thereby to raise their civilisation to the level of 
that of the Western. They will certainly succeed in this respect in the near future. But as yet they have not 
accomplished this task, and consequently they are not yet able to be received into the Family ofNations as full 
members.' 10 
Ronald Roxburgh, editor of the third edition of Oppenheim 's published in 1920, revised the above 
remarks by changing the verbs of the above sentences from the present tense to the past tense, and 
from the perfect to the pluperfect, and by adding some new observations on the situation affected 
by the First World War: 
'Before the World War the position of such States as Persia, Siam China, Abyssinia, and the like, wru doubtful. 
... [T)heir civilisation had not yet reached that condition which wru necessary to enable their Governments 
and their population in every respect to Wlderstand and to cany out the command of the rules of International 
Law .... In the World War China and Siam took part on the side of the Allied and Associated Powers, and 
were represented at the Peace Conference at Paris. At the conclusion of the World War, Persia, Siam and 
China became members of the League ofNations. Abyssinia was not invited to accede to the Covenant of the 
League, and its position would seem to be WlChanged' 11 
----~----
10 Oppenheim/1912a/33-34. 
11 Oppenheim-Roxburgh/1920/35. Emphasis added. 
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Amold McNair, editor of the fourth edition of Oppenheim 's, added the following new sentence: 
'Abyssinia, China, Persia, and Siam are now all members of the League ofNations. The membership of these 
four States is a fuct of considerable political significance, and it is impossible to deny that they are now 
International Persons and members of the Family ofNations.' 12 
In the fifth edition of Oppenheim 's, Hersch Lauterpacht, the third editor of Oppenheim 's, wrote the 
following sentences in 1937: 
'After the World War the Capitulations and some other restrictions upon the territorial sovereignty of most of 
these States were abolished. These and other non-Christian States have been admitted to membership of the 
League ofNations and it is impossible to deny that they are full members of the Family ofNations. Religion 
or the controversial test of degree of civilisation have ceased to be, as such, a condition of recognition of 
Statehood.' 13 
In the sixth edition of Oppenheim 's, furthermore, Lauterpacht added the sentence indicating that 
other non-European nations, such as Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Syria, become the 
members of the United Nations after the Second World War: 'In general, the question of the 
membership of the "Family ofNations," as distinguished from the position of a State as a subject of 
International Law, is now a matter of purely historical interest' 14 During the Second World War, 
Lauterpacht already declared that '[i]nternational law today knows of no distinction between 
civilized and uncivilized States or between States within and outside the international community 
of civilized States.' 15 Thus, the concept of civilisation had been radically transformed in 
international law. 
12 Oppenheim-McNair/1928/41. 
13 Oppenheim-Laurerpacht/1937 /46. 
14 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht/1947/47. 
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Another reason for the concept of civilisation being deleted from international law is the legal 
school of international lawyers' conception of international law from the deontic viewpoint of 
nonnativism. Wilhelm Grewe said: 
'Heterogeneous intellectual and ideological motives merged in this new tmiversalist conception. Those 
international lawyers whose philosophy was rooted in positivism rejected the link between international law 
and the idea of civilisation because it would introduce an extra-juridical element into that law.' 16 
Nonnativism played an important role in this tmiversalisation process of the Etrropean law of 
nations. Insofar as the concept of civilisation was regarded as 'an extra-juridical' or political one, it 
was natural that the legal school of international lawyers should try to delete the non-juristic idea of 
civilisation from international law. Instead of the concept of civilisation which had been the basis of 
the Etrropean law of nations in the 19111 centuty, international lawyers in the inter-war era 
nonnatively searched for the basis of the binding force of international law. It was the maxim pacta 
sunt servanda as the basic norm for Kelsen. 17 It was morality for James Brierly.18 For Lauterpacht, it 
was voluntas civitatis maximae est servanda. 19 Although they formulated the basis of international 
law in their own way, the common element is that their formulations were normative and abstract 
in the sense that international law was presumed to be universally binding on all nations, whatever 
the reality of states was. Thus, the nonnative construction of the Etrropean law of nations became 
the basis of the tmiversality of international law. 
The concept of civilisation, therefore, gradually faded from international law in the inter-war 
era One of the results of the disappearance of the concept of civilisation is that all states are 
assumed to be civilised in the sense that they will voluntarily comply with international law. 
15 Lauterpacht/1944d/413/n.66. 
16 Grewe/2000/584. 
17 Ke!Sen/1970/216. 
18 Brierly/1958/65. 
19 Lauterpacht/Function/421-422. 
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Although he discussed the international connnunity in 1955, the following remark of Bin Cheng is 
also applicable to the inter-war period in which the international connnunity gradually became 
universal: 'If the present international society is almost universal in scope and includes States with 
different civilisations and legal systems, this is because it is assumed that members of the 
international society have all attained the requisite standard of civilisation, and that they accept the 
basic concepts of justice, law and equity which are and have been at the foundation of international 
law. '20 Thus, the concept of civilisation was transformed into the normative cognisance of 
international law. 
It does not mean, however, that even the universalism of international law in the inter-war era 
succeeded in deleting the European character from international law. The centre of world politics 
was still in Europe. The League ofNations had its headquarters in Geneva The Permanent Court 
was in The Hague. Edouard Herriot, the socialist French Prime Minister, expressed the Eurocentric 
consciousness of the League: 'If I have devoted my energies ... to the League ofNations, I have 
done so because in this great institution I have seen the first draft of the United States ofEurope.'21 
Thus, the international community in the inter-war era was conceived as European society of 
nations even if it gradually became universal. It is true of international law. The international 
lawyers who claimed the universality of international law in the inter-war era were not so sensitive 
to their hidden Euro-centrism. They tended to think that the legal debates in Geneva and in The 
Hague truly reflected the universal image of international law. In this sense, the universalism in the 
inter-war era concealed the European centrality of world politics and European legal consciousness 
of international law. 
It is true of Lauterpacht's international legal theory. Although he claimed the universality of 
international law, Lauterpacht constructed his universal theory from the synthesis viewpoint 
between Kelsenian normativism and the English tradition In the context of the universalisation of 
the European law of nations, normativism played a decisive role in the universality of international 
2° Cheng'1955/187. 
21 Cited from Gathome-Hardy/1950/337. 
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law. This chapter discusses the problems of Lauterpacht's normative construction of international 
law, and the results of the disappearance of the concept of civilisation in international law. 
2.2. THE UNIVERSALITY OF la conscience juridique des peuples civilises 
The academic career of Lauterpacht, educated in Vienna and London, enabled him to deny the 
difference between the Anglo-American school and the Continental school of international law. He 
was used to 'international legal studies as philosophy' in Vienna, and now fully understood 
'international law as practice' in Britain. Therefore, the supposed difference of the two schools 
seemed to him to be due to 'the fact that, for historical reasons, the preoccupation on the Continent 
with the problems of legal philosophy, especially with regard to the purpose of the law and the 
nature of the judicial function, has been more intensive than in this country [the United Kingdom] 
and, until recently, in the United States. '22 If the difference between the two schools is the matter of 
academic experience for lawyers, the only solution is that both English lawyers and Continental 
lawyers pay more attention to each other. Indeed, Lauterpacht persuaded Charles Manning, who 
was one of the fathers of the so-called English school of international relations, to translate a 
German textbook of international law in 1930.23 Thus, Manning published an English translation of 
Julius Hatschek's textbook, Volkerrecht als System rechtlich bedeutsamer Staatsakte?4 
It should be noted, however, that there was undoubtedly a belief in the universality of 
international law beneath his denial of the difference between two schools. Lauterpacht was afraid 
that the existence of the two schools questioned 'that ultimate uniformity of the sense of right and 
justice which is the foundation of the legal ordering of the relations between States. '25 Wtlfred Jenks 
would be right in defining 'that ultimate uniformity of the sense of right and justice' as 'the moral 
22 Lauterpachtll931a/CP-W472-473. 
23 Suganami/2001i93. 
24 Hatschek/1930. 
25 Lauterpachtl1931a/CP-W483. 
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basis of alllaw.'26 Thus, Lauterpacht's claim of the universality of international law is based on 
universal human rationality. In this sense, Lauterpacht' s conception of universal intemationallaw is 
essentially naturalistic. 
Lauterpacht's naturalistic conception of universal international law is typically European at the 
same time. It is a matter of course that the international community was composed essentially of 
the European nations in the inter-war period. Therefore, it is also a matter of course that the 
perspective of international lawyers in that period was essentially Eurocentric. Nevertheless, it is 
worth while pointing out that Lauterpacht constructed the universality of international law with a 
European legal conscience. From such a 'European' viewpoint, Lauterpacht was able to claim the 
universality of international law, overriding the difference between the Anglo-American School and 
the Continental School. 
This point is well seen in Analogies, because private law analogy was nothing but the 
application of natural law. The naturalistic tendency of the English tradition seemed to Lauterpacht 
to confirm the development of the European law of nations: '[l]he great respect for Roman law 
and the acknowledgement of its importance as a subsidiary source of international law have 
become one of the characteristic features of British international jurisprudence. '27 This tradition 
seemed to Lauterpacht not to have changed in the 19"' century in England: 'The attitude of the 
nineteenth centwy English writers does not differ appreciably from that adopted by the above-
mentioned representatives of the Oxford school. '28 Furthermore, he saw the reason why English 
international lawyers tend to affirm civil law as the source of international law: 
'The reason for this affinnative attitude to Roman law so far as international law is concerned lies ... in the fact 
that English writers on international law ... had never lost sight of what may be called the natural law 
26 Wilfred/Jenks/1960/1. 
27 Lauterpacht/ Analogies/24. 
28 Jbid/26. 
68 
foundation of international law. '29 
Lauterpacht noticed the question of private law analogy when he started to study the Mandate 
system at the University of Vienna, because the Mandate system borrowed the concept and fonns 
from private law: 
'It takes as its starting point Jellinek's proposition that "analogies from a self-contained legal system must not 
be advanced as jus cogens in a totally different system." Nonetheless, the concepts and fonns of private law 
are incorporated into international law. How do scholars cope with this difficulty?'30 
Although Analogies is the definitive answer to the question, Lauterpacht also partly answered this 
question as well in the thesis submitted to the University of Vienna, which showed his respect for 
Austro-Gennan positivism. In the thesis, he said that 'private law analogy' was hannful to the 
scientific development of positive international law by emphasising the different character of 
international law from domestic law. His denial of private law analogy in the thesis shows his 
loyalty to Austro-German positivism, a pivot of which is to reject the domestic analogy. However, 
his loyalty seems to be more apparent than real, because Lauterpacht, at the same time, strongly 
affirmed 'private law formulation of concepts as a matter of legal construction.' What is the 
difference between 'private law analogy' and 'private law formulation of concepts' in his view? He 
defined 'private law analogy' as 'the (analogous) application in international law of private law 
legal principles' on the one hand, and 'private law formulation of concepts' as 'the application of 
private law concepts in internationallaw.'31 However, these definitions would be meaningless if the 
difference between 'private law analogy' and 'private law formulation of concepts' remains as the 
difference between 'private legal principle' and 'private law concepts.' It seems impossible to 
29 Ibid/27/n.S. 
30 l.auterpacht/1921/CP-III/53. 
31 Ibid/52Jn.1. 
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separate 'concepts' from 'principles' insofar as both are composed oflanguages.32 Rather, the main 
difference between them seems to be that 'private law analogy' denies the special character of 
international law, while 'private law formulation of concepts' admits it. The reason why 
Lauterpacht denied 'private law analogy' was because it 'endangers the independence of 
international law and fails to recognize its peculiarity. '33 On the other hand, he explained 'private 
law formulation of concepts' as follows: 'Rules governing inter-State relationships, which are in 
fact laid down by treaty or custom are, for the sake of order and categorization and for easier 
understanding and interpretation, attributed ex post facto to an already existing and well-developed 
private law concept '34 However, even if the difference between 'private law analogy' and 'private 
law formulation of concepts' depends on whether the independence of international law is 
recognised or not, the separation between the two methods is too formalistic to be appropriate. 
Indeed, Lauterpacht admitted the relative difference between them: 
'[T]his method of concept formulation is not essentially different from private law analogy. Even though, in 
origin, it is a question purely of form, it leads easily to analogy in substance. '35 
Insofar as 'the application of private law concepts' was defined as the process that 'positive 
international law itself adopts concepts and institutions which have already specific implications in 
one or more legal systems, '36 the application of private law concepts, which Lauterpacht affirmed in 
his thesis, was nothing but the process of private law analogy to international law which McNair 
admitted in the International Status of South-West Africa case by saying that 'the true view of the 
duty of international tribunals in this matter is to regard any features or terminology which are 
reminiscent of the rules and institutions of private law as an indication of policy and principles 
32 On the linguistic relation between concepts, rules and principles, see Thirlway/20021290-298. 
33 Lauterpacht/1921/CP-III/51. 
34 lbid/57. 
35 Ibid./58. 
36 Ibid/59. 
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rather than as directly importing these rules and institutions. '37 
Lauterpacht improved his theory of the development of international law by private law 
analogy in Analogies. It is sometimes said that Lauterpacht's Analogies proved how municipal law 
thinking had affected the development of intemationallaw.38 However, such an appreciation would 
be misleading if what Lauterpacht called 'private law' were understood as municipal laws such as 
English law or German law. Lauterpacht himself cautioned against the tendency of international 
lawyers to refer to their own municipal laws in constructing international legal theory: 
'The recourse, in the domain of international public Jaw, to private Jaw sources is no doubt fraught with 
dangers .... There is, firstly, the tendency on the part of many writers to resort to notions peculiar to their own 
municipal law or to some other system of private Jaw regardless of the fact that conceptions of that kind 
cannot, owing to their technical character or the altogether special reason of their creation, claim that degree 
of cogency which is conditioned by the actual universality of a legal rule, from the point of view either of 
juristic logic or oflegal justice, and which alone may reasonably serve as a basis of analogy. '39 
The conception of private law which Lauterpacht argued was more vague and uncertain. 
Indeed, he did not give us the exact definition of private law. It includes not only 'Roman law as 
embodying the principles of the law of nature and right reason'40 but also 'the principles of legal 
justice common to all law. '41 However, Lauterpacht seems to have thought that private law denoted 
the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations under Article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice. He explained that 'general principles of law, recognised by 
civilised States and adopted by customary and conventional international law as a source of 
decision in international disputes, are for the most part identical with generally recognised 
37 ICJReps/1950/148. 
38 Onuma/1991/75-76; Serita/1996/227. 
39 Lauterpacht/ Analogies/85. 
40 Ibid/33. 
41 Ibid/84. 
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principles of private law. '42 Therefore, it seems proper to think that, in Lauterpacht' s view, private 
law is the same as the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations. Indeed, he clearly 
said as follows: 'This book [Analogies] is, in a sense, a commentary on Article 38 (3) of the Statute 
[of the Permanent Court of International Justice] and a respectful acknowledgement of the great 
service rendered to the cause of international law by the Committee of Jurist assembled in 1920 at 
the Hague. '43 Therefore, it is useful to mention the drafting process of Article 38 (3) of the Statute of 
the Permanent Court in order to explicate Lauterpacht's conception of private law. 
The general principles of law appeared in the discussion regarding to non-liquet in the 
Advisory Committee of Jurists. In the discussion, it is the President of the Committee, Baron 
Descamps, who proposed 'the rules of international law as recognised by the legal conscience of 
civilised nations '44 to the Advisory Committee of Jurists. Answering a question whether the judge 
could pronounce non-liquet in the case that neither law nor custom exist, Descamps explained that 
'[T]he judge must then apply general principles of law. But he must be saved from the temptation of applying 
these principles as he pleased.' 
Then, he continued that 'the judge render decisions in keeping with the dictates of the legal 
conscience of civilised people.'45 The Committee adopted the amendment text ofRoot-Phillimore, 
which stipulated 'the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.' Descamps agreed 
with the amendment text ofRoot-Phillimore.46 
It is true that the Advisory Committee clearly avoided the conclusion as to what 'the general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations' are. De Lapradelle, a member of the Committee, 
said that it is preferable 'to keep to a simple phrase: such, for example, as ''the general principles of 
42 lbid/viii. 
43 lbid./vili-ix. 
41 Proces-W!rbaux/306. 
45 lbid/318-319. 
46 lbid./331. 
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law," without indicating exactly the sources from which these principles should be derived. '47 Such 
an attitude of the Advisory Committee was sagacious in the sense that it avoided limiting the 
meaning of Article 38 (3) of the Pennanent Court's Statute; whether or not the Committee defined 
the general principles of law, it would be inescapable that the controversy between lawyers about 
the concept of the general principles of law happened. It is not necessary here to explicate the 
endless controversies about what the general principles of law are,48 because insofar as the purpose 
of this thesis is to explicate the view of l..autetpacht, it suffices to mention that he was included in 
the group which intetpreted the general principles of law as 'la conscience jwidique des peuples 
civilises. '49 
l..autetpacht clearly conceived such a conception of private law as 'la conscience jwidique des 
peuples civilises. '50 Indeed, he said that 'the approximation to corresponding general principles of 
private law is, as a rule, tantamount to the realisation of a principle of justice and equity hitherto 
obscured by the part which force plays in international relations. '51 He kept to such a conception of 
private law throughout his life. In his draft of the 9d1 edition of Oppenheim 's, l..autetpacht said as 
follows: 
'They [general principles of law] are principles anived at by way of a comparison, generalization and 
synthesis of rules of law in its various branches - private and public, constitutional, administrative, and 
procedural- common to various system of national law. They are the modem jus gentiwn in its wider sense. 
In the sense here suggested, they are no more than a modem fonnulation of the law of nature which played a 
decisive part in the fonnative period of international law and which underlay much of its subsequent 
47 lbid/336. 
48 On the controversy, see Tunkin/1958/23-26. 
49 Bin Cheng argued that the translation of' la conscience jwidique des peuples civilises' into 'legal 
conscience of civilised people' is wrong because in French the term 'conscience' does not include 
the sense of what is morally right or wrong, though in English the same term denotes the sense of 
moral rightness. Therefore, Cheng recommends us to use the term 'the sense common to all 
civilised peoples of what is juridically right or wrong,' or as 'the opinion jwis communis of 
civilised mankind.' Cheng/1987 /'t-9. 
50 l..autetpacht/ Analogies/68/n.2. Also see J JB./Scott/1928/219. 
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development ... It [the law of nature) was primarily a generalization of the legal experience of mankind.'52 
lbis remark highlights two points. First, the conception of private law or general principles of law 
in Lauterpacht's view is too broad to define exactly. Consequently, his conception of the general 
principles is close to legal thinking or 'the opinion jwis communis of civilised mankind.' Second, 
Lauterpacht unconsciously universalised the European legal conscience when he referred to the 
law of nature as 'a generalization of the legal experience of mankind,' because the natural law 
tradition is nothing but European legal culture. In this sense, Koskenniemi is correct in pointing out 
that Lauterpacht typified 'the reconstructive scholarship of the inter-war period' who 'simply 
generalized the legal experience of European societies into the international level, bringing into 
existence a universal international law through private law analogies, conceiving the Covenant of 
the League of Nations as a constitution of the world and by allocating to the juristic class the 
fi.mction of"filling the gaps" in an otherwise primitive-looking legal system. '53 
Thus the view of Lauterpacht with regard to private law analogy was naturalistic in the sense 
that private law amounted to the general principles of law, which he recognised as 'a modem 
fonnulation of the law of nature.' However, it is clear that Lauterpacht did not advocate the old 
tradition of natural law. 54 He recognised the possible arbitrariness and abuse of natural law, although 
he emphasised the natural law theory as the basis of human rights later.55 Nussbaum explained the 
revival of natural law theory in the inter-war era as follows: 
'The new invocation of the natural law simply expressed the growing awareness of the fact that treaties and 
custom cannot tell the whole story of international law, and that a decision on controversial issues can be 
found only by a process of reasoning which, in addition to the given positive material, includes within certain 
51 Lauterpacht/ Analogies/303. 
52 Lauterpacht/General-Part/CP-J/74-75. 
53 Koskenniernit2003/1 09. 
54 Rosenne/1961/829/n.19. 
55 LauterpachVTILHR/10Q-113. 
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limits considerations of justice and equity. Even in the interpretation of a treaty - no less than in the 
interpretation of a private contract - such considerations are indispensable indeed, though in any case they 
must be controlled by juristic principles. '56 
Tills explanation by Nussbaurn is correct even as the explanation of Lauterpacht's private law 
analogy. In other words, private law analogy in Lautetpacht's view is nothing but 'the role of 
"reason" in the treatment of the positive material. '57 Thus, the application of the general principles 
of law as 'a modem fonnulation ofthe law of nature' is turned into legal reasoning. 58 Tills implies 
that Lauterpacht constructed private law analogy from the viewpoint of international judge. 1bis 
viewpoint of international judge is the another feature of Analogies that connects it to Function and 
Development-!. 
2.3. THE CENTRALITY OF THE INTERNATIONALJUDICIARYIN THE 
INTERNATIONALCOMMUNI1Y 
The existence of international judges had been hypothetical rather than actual in international 
relations, when CJrotius59 or Vattel60 claimed the utility of the judicial settlement of international 
dispute. However, international adjudication system has developed since the Alabama case in 1872. 
The 1899 Peace Conference was successful in adopting Hague Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Dispute, which established the Pennanent Court of Arbitration under 
Articles 41-50. Finally, the Pennanent Court of International Justice was established in 1921 in 
accordance with Article 14 of the Covenant of the League. Thus, international judges gradually 
appeared on international scene. The development of international adjudication system since the 
56 Nussbamn/1947/275. 
57 Ibid 
58 Degan/1997/15. 
59 Grotius/1925/561-563. 
60 VatteV1916/223-224. 
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19d1 century unavoidably affected the paradigm of international lawyers. In particular, the 
establishment of the Pennanent Court in the inter-war period was decisive. The international 
community was for the first time given the permanent judicial organ vvhich could have compulsory 
jurisdiction if states accept it under the Optional Clause. The legal school of international lawyers 
could not claim the centrality of international judges in the international community unless the 
Permanent Court was established. As Ludwik Ehrlich suggested, the inter-war period was the 
beginning of the era whereby 'judge or scholar relies now, in addition to conventions, on judicial 
precedent as a means of determining whether there is a general practice accepted by law, what 
general premises of legal thinking may be applied as recognized by civilized nations, and what 
rules follow from principles recognized as prevailing. '61 
However, the legal school of international lawyers, and their critics as well, often confused the 
two meanings of the centrality of international judges. The first meaning of the centrality of 
international judges is the place of international adjudication within international legal system. It is 
the question whether or not we can identify the case law of international courts and tribunals with 
international law itself, even though the international community is not given the international 
judiciary which has the compulsory jurisdiction. The second meaning of the centrality of 
international judges is about the role of international adjudication as the peaceful settlement of 
international dispute in the context of international politics. This aspect of the centrality of 
international judges is a question whether or not international adjudication is the most appropriate 
method of settling international disputes. These aspects of the centrality of international judiciary in 
the international community are often confused in the name of the Rule of Law. However, they are 
different questions, because the fonner belongs to a matter oflaw, how international lawyers should 
conceive international law, while the latter is a political question, how international adjudication 
plays a role in international relations. Thus, here, it is important to distinguish between the two 
questions. The former question will be discussed as 'lawyer's perspective.' The latter will be 
61 Ehrlich/1962-I/256. 
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discussed as the problem oflegalism. 
2.3.1. THE LAWYER'S PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The common feature of his trilogy of international judicial functions is that Lauterpacht adopted 
'the lawyer's perspective' which is coined by Joseph Raz as the unconscious attitude oflawyers to 
accept the basic intuition that '[t]he law has to do with those considerations which it is appropriate 
for courts to rely upon in justifYing their decisions.'62 In other words, the crux of 'the lawyers' 
perspective' is the identification of the theory of law with the theory of adjudication: 
'From the lawyer's perspective all the considerations pertaining to judicial reasoning are equally relevant. A 
lawyer has to concern himself not only with legislation and precedent but also with other considerations 
relevant to judicial reasoning. A lawyer, therefore, fortified in virtue ofBI [Basic Intuition] with the knowledge 
that the law has to do with judicial reasoning finds no reason from the perspective of his own professional 
preoccupations to stop short of identifYing the theory oflaw with a theory of adjudication. '63 
Indeed, Lauterpacht adopted this lawyer's perspective in Analogies, when he said that 'there is no 
better opportunity for testing the value of certain doctrines and conceptions of international law 
than those cases of international arbitration in which recourse to these conceptions and doctrines 
has become relevant '64 Then, he discussed how international judges had used private law analogy 
in the interpretation of international law. In this sense, the subtitle of Analogies 'With Special 
Reference to International Arbitration' embodies his lawyer's perspective of international law. 
This lawyer's perspective also appears in Function and Development-] In Function, which 
shows that it is possible for tribunals and courts to function at the centre of the international legal 
system, Lauterpacht referred to the place of courts in a legal system as follows: 
62 Raz/1982/111. 
63 Ibid/116. 
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'Whatever may be the nature of such rules the vety fact that there are no impartial tribunals to adjudicate 
upon their operation seriously impairs their character as rules of law. There is substance in the view that the 
existence of a sufficient body of clear rules of conduct is not at all essential to the existence of law, and that the 
decisive test is whether there exists a judge competent to decide upon disputed rights and to command 
peace.'65 
This point is related to the problems of the determinacy oflaw. Without judges, law continues to be 
indetenninate: 
'[O]nly through final ascertainment by agencies other than the parties to the disputes can the law be rendered 
certain; it is not rendered so by the ipse dixit of an interested party. Such certainty is of the essence of law. The 
object of law to secure order must be defeated if a controversial rule of conduct may remain permanently a 
matter of dispute. It must so remain as long as no agencies exist capable of determining existing legal rights 
with finality and without appeal. '66 
In Development-!, Lauterpacht again clearly expressed his lawyers' perspective: 
'What are rules of international law? They are rules which, in the opinion of a sound and learned international 
lawyer, the Court will apply. '67 
Thus, the lawyer's perspective is coherently seen in his trilogy of international judicial function. In 
64 Lauterpacht/Analogies/38. 
65 Lauterpacht!FlUlction/424. 
66 Jbid./425. 
67 Lauteipacht/Development-I/10. In Development-II, Laute1pacht slightly changed this remark: 
'For what are rules of international law tor the purpose of judicial settlement? They are rules which, 
according to legal opinion, based - among other thing - on the study of the work of the Court, the 
latter will apply.' Lauteipacht/Development-II/21. 
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other words, he constructed his international legal theory from the viewpoint of judges68 or the 
'internal viewpoint of law' which is described by Hart as 'the view of those who do not merely 
record and predict behaviour conforming to rules, but use the rules as standards for the appraisal of 
their own and others' behaviour. •ffJ 
The prerequisite of the lawyers' perspective is to think that law is the social practice of 
normative argumentation with reference to rules, principles and previous decisions. The crux of the 
lawyers' perspective is the normative conception of law. This point explains why Lauterpacht is 
recently discussed in comparison with Ronald Dworkin. Koskenniemi, for example, points out that 
'Function of Law puts forward an image of judges as "Herculean" gap-fillers by recourse to general 
principles and the law's moral purposes that is practically identical to today's Anglo-American 
jurisprudential orthodoxy. '70 It was of course impossible for Lauterpacht to know Dworkin; 
Lauterpacht had already died 3 years before Dworkin discussed judicial discretion in his first 
article.71 Nor does Dworkin discuss international law. Therefore, there is clearly no academic 
connection between Lauterpacht and Dworkin. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that there is 
certainly a similarity between them. It is Kelsen who connects between Lauterpacht and Dworkin 
with regard to lawyer's perspective. 
According to Raz, Kelsen adopted lawyer's perspective without being aware of this. Raz 
explains this point as follows: 
'Kelsen indicates his belief that the analysis oflegal concepts and the detennination of the content of any legal 
system depends in no way at all on the effects the law has on the society or the economy, nor does it involve 
examination of people's motivation in obeying the law or in breaking it. The picture of law dictated by the 
methodology of the Pure Theory is of law in the books, of an analysis of law using as the mw material only 
68 Also see Lauterpacht/1937-IV/CP-I /247. 
ffJ Hart/1994/98. Emphasis original. 
7° Koskennierni/1997d228. Fufthetmore, Koskennierni points out the very similarity between 
Lauterpacht's theory and Dworkin's as constructivism. Koskennierni/1989/35-40. 
71 Dworkin/1963. 
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law reports and statute books. Now the only possible justification for legal studies to ignore the social realities 
behind the law is a conception of law and legal studies which concentrates on the lawyer's perspective.' 72 
On the other hand, Dworkin seems to Raz to typifY American theorists who 'jmnped to the 
conclusion that all the considerations which courts may use are legal.' Raz continues that Dworkin 
assmnes that 'all the considerations which courts legitimately use are legal considerations.'73 
Dworkin certainly conceives law as normative argumentation from the internal viewpoint of judge. 
'Legal practice, unlike many other social phenomena, is argumentative. Every actor in the practice 
tmderstands that what it pennits or requires depends on the truth of certain propositions that are given sense 
only by and within the practice; the practice consists in large part in deploying and arguing about these 
• • ,74 propositions. 
Although he admits that there are two points of view for studying legal argumentation, namely the 
external viewpoint of historian or sociologist and the internal viewpoint of those who make legal 
claim, Dworkin declares that he adopts 'the internal, participant's point of view.' He goes on, 
'We will study formal legal argument from the judge's viewpoint, not because only judges are important or 
because we tmderstand everything about them by noticing what they say, but because judicial argument about 
claims of law is a useful paradigm for exploring the central, prepositional aspect oflegal practice.' 75 
Lauterpacht is between Kelsen and Dworkin, because while adopting Kelsenian norrnativism, 
Lauterpacht was opposed to the separation thesis of law from morality which proves the purity of 
Pure Theory of Law. Thus, unlike Kelsen, Lautetpacht did not need to be bothered about the 
72 Raz/1982/114. 
73 lbid/116. 
74 Dworkin/1986/13. 
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question how judges should distinguish between legal considerations and moral considerations, 
because all considerations judges take into account as 'law' is law for Lautetpacht This explains 
the reason Lautetpacht emphasised the case law of the international courts and tribunals. The case 
law is a set of the experiences that lawyers argue about what is 'law' from the internal point of view. 
Therefore, the question what international law is for Lautetpaeht is naturally converted into the 
question oflegal intetpretation, how judges intetpret international law: 
'[T]he decisions of the Court are, as a matter both of legal principles and of actual experience, one of the 
weighty factors which will influence its future decisions. They are evidence of what the Court considers to be 
the law; they show what the Court will do in fact; for most practical purposes they show, therefore with, what 
international law is.' 76 
It is so because international courts and tribunals can function as the forum for legal argumentation 
even in the less organised society of states. The parties plead their legal arguments before the bench, 
and judges justify their decisions by legal reasoning. Nolxxly can deny that the argumentation 
practice in international tribunals is nothing but the job of international lawyers. In such an 
argumentative practice, the role of judges is decisive, because they have the duty to find the 
applicable rules of law insofar as they have jurisdiction. It is so even if the Court does not have 
compulsory jurisdiction. Legal practitioners consider legal questions from the perspective of judges 
on the assumption that the Court is seized of the case. In this sense, it is no coincident that the Legal 
Advisors of the Foreign Office adopt the lawyer's perspective of international law. Indeed, William 
Beckett said that the judgements or advisory opinions of the Permanent Court were 'the most 
authoritative pronouncements on questions of international law and procedure that can be made 
while the family of nations remains as at present constituted.'n Following Beckett, Fitzmaurice also 
75 lbid./14. 
76 Lauterpacht/Development-I/11. 
77 W ./Beckett/1930/1. 
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said as follows: 
'[T]hey [the decisions ofintemational tribW1als] have a more direct and immediate impact on the realities of 
international life, the attitude of States, and the mind of judges and arl:Jitrators in later cases. A decision is a fact . 
. . . For the reasons it would seem that ... it must be regarded as having a special status that differentiates it from 
other material sources, and causes it to be at least a quasi-formal source.' 78 
In this sense, international law should be regarded as 'those which an impartial judge would apply 
to the problem if it were brought before him'79 from the lawyer's perspective. As Thirlway pointed 
out, 'the court remains in the backgrmmd as, literally, the final arbiter and therefore the final 
yardstick of what is legal. '80 This statement by Thirlway shows the crux of the lawyers' perspective 
of international law, namely the centrality of international judges in international legal system. 
2.3.2. l?EACE THROUGH LAW? 
However, it would be a different story if it were thought that international judges should be in the 
center of international politics. In other words, a problem easily occurs when international lawyers 
overestimate the function of international adjudication as the forum of legal argumentation to 
regulate international politics. In the inter-war period, the legal school of international lawyers, 
which believes that law prevails over politics even in the international sphere, claimed the famous 
slogan 'all-in-arbitration' which reflected a widespread feeling that 'the way to establish an 
international "rule of law'' and avoid future wars was for states to submit all international disputes 
of every kind to an international arbitral tribunal having power to decide them at its discretion on 
78 Fitzmalirice/1958/172-173. Emphasis original. 
79 Thirlway/20021305. 
80 lbid/306/n.104. 
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grmmds either of strict law or of equity and common sense. '81 It is the crux of the problem for the 
international law of Geneva in the inter-war period. Lauterpacht' s Function defends such a slogan 
'all-in-arbitration' by claiming that all international disputes are justiciable. It is certainly true that 
international disputes are always legal disputes from the lawyers' perspective, because any kind of 
social relations can be conceived as the normative relationships of rights and obligations. 
However, the justiciability of international disputes does not mean that international judges 
can regulate the political decisions of states. In a sense, the question of whether the parties actually 
decide to use the Court as the method of dispute settlement is a highly political matter. It does not 
mean, of course, that the Court cannot answer legal questions pertaining to an international dispute, 
even if one party does not wish to solve it by using the peaceful settlement process of international 
law. Insofar as the Court has jurisdiction, it can clarifY legal aspects of a dispute. However, the legal 
answer given by the Court may not directly solve a political controversy between parties in the 
situation that the enforceability of judgment is limited. It is dependent upon the willingness of states 
to accept the judgment, even if it is contrary to their claim. In this sense, international adjudication 
functions only in the limited sphere that state parties politically agree to solve the dispute by 
adjudication 
The agreement that the parties choose international adjudication for solving the problem 
between them belongs to the sphere of political choice in the sense that the parties find it 
appropriate to ask international judges to settle the dispute between them by taking all elements into 
consideration. It is undeniable that, without such political agreement, international judges becomes 
'an array of wigs and gowns vociferating in emptiness. '82 The conclusion of a compromis itself is 
essentially political, although the compromis is legally regulated once it is concluded. In this sense, 
international adjudication, where international law functions as nonnative argwnentation, 
presupposes the agreement that the judicial settlement is politically desirable to the parties. Carr set 
it out as follows: 
81 Carr/1945a/183. 
82 Zimmern/1936/125. 
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'The judicial settlement of disputes presupposes the existence oflaw and the recognition that it is binding; and 
the agreement which makes the law and which treats it as binding is a political fact The applicability of 
judicial procedure depends therefore on explicit or implicit political agreement. '83 
Thus, the international courts and tribunals do not work if the international community is politically 
unstable. It was particularly true of the inter-war period. The average number of cases and advisory 
opinions which were submitted to the Pennanent Court from 1922 to 1932 was 4.45 cases and 2.27 
advisory opinions per year. However, from 1933 to 1939, only 2.28 new cases and 0.28 advisory 
opinions were counted per year.84 
Lauterpacht certainly noticed that political agreements were a prerequisite to judicial 
settlement after his careful examination of the distinction between political disputes and legal 
disputes.85 He concluded that '[i]t is not the nature of an individual dispute which makes it unfit for· 
judicial settlement, but the unwillingness of a State to have it settled by the application of law. '86 
However, as Carr appropriately pointed out, Lauterpacht stopped analysing this problem. It was 
clearly insufficient for Lauterpacht to treat such unwillingness of states as 'perverse and 
undeserving of the attention of an international lawyer. '87 Lauterpacht presupposed that it is a matter 
of course that states were subject to the authority of international courts. However, the reason why 
states use the judicial settlement is because they find it appropriate to ask judges to settle disputes. If 
the actual willingness of states to use the Court belongs to the question of politics, the attitude to 
criticise 'the unwillingness of a state to have it settled by the application of law' is also a matter of 
political morality. It is from the viewpoint that law should prevail over politics that Lauterpacht 
could criticise the unwillingness of states to obey the authority of international law. Indeed, 
83 Carr/1945a/180. 
84 see Hudson/1943n79. 
85 On the summary of his examination of the distinction between legal dispute and political dispute, 
see Oppenheim-Lauterpacht/1935/4/n.1. 
86 Lauterpacht/Function/369. 
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Lauterpacht said, 
'The op!X>5ition, on the part of many international lawyers of authority, to the lll1iversal application of judicial 
settlement, and their insistence on the necessity for retaining in some form the traditional classification of 
disputes, come from the conviction that law must not be treated as a panacea able to secure peace in all 
circwnstances. . .. But it is essential that international lawyers should develop an attitude of criticism with 
regard to the very effective ... argument that law is not a panacea. '88 
Then, Lauterpacht continued as follows: 
'[I]f pacifism is identical with the insistence on the reign of law in international relations, then it may be 
doubted whether a jurist conscious of the true nature of his task may hope to achieve a rigid separation of this 
nature .... Peace is pre-eminently a legal postulate. Juridically it is a metaphor for the postulate of the unity of 
the legal system. Juridical logic inevitably leads to condemnation, as a matter of law, of anarchy and private 
force. It is one of the lll1Satisfactory features of modem international law that it has neglected to find a legal 
folll1dation for the so-called pacifism. '89 
However, the crux of the problem he posed is whether or not such an evangelic attitude of 'Peace 
Through Law' as political morality is really appropriate to international relations. Lauterpacht 
seems to have desired the Rule of Law in the international community too much to consider this 
question. 
The actual willingness of the state to abide by international law is the political basis of 
international law, even if there is a normative basis of international law, such as the maxim voluntas 
civitatis maximae est servanda in the view of Lauterpacht, which explains why states should obey 
t.'7 Carr/1945a/189/n.3. 
88 Lauterpacht/Function/4 3 7. 
89 Ibid/438. 
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international law. Lauterpacht was certainly correct in criticising voluntarism, because the consent 
of states cannot explain the binding force of international law. However, it is also true that the 
compliance with international law is based on the willingness of governments. If the leaders of a 
state have no intention of complying with international obligation for the sake of the national 
interest of the state, it is difficult to expect that the state which such leaders govern will abide by 
international law. Either is it too simple to think that international obligation can be imposed upon 
the state which is reluctant to abide by international law. If such a state has the military power to 
defeat other states, fi.nthermore, it is not difficult to imagine that the state also finds it easy to defeat 
the authority of international law which restricts the freedom of the state to increase its national 
interest This problem actually occurred in the 1930s. 
2.4. THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE lfNTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY 
There is no era in which international law was more overestimated than the era of the League of 
Nations. The international community was universally organised as the League of Nations. The 
establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice encouraged people to believe that the 
Rule of Law in the international community came true as the compulsory peaceful settlement of 
international disputes and as the outlawry of war. Such an expectation reached a climax, when the 
Great Powers concluded the Kellogg-Briand Pact which stipulates the renouncement of war as an 
instrument of national policy under Article 1, and the peaceful settlement of international disputes 
under Article 2. However, it should be noted that the Kellogg-Briand Pact lacks the enforcement 
provision and the comprornissory clause. The Pact presumes the willingness of the contracting 
parties to comply with the Pact voluntarily. And, more fundamentally, it was presumed that the 
interpretation of the Pact was unified among the contracting parties. However, these assumptions 
were easily broken in the Manchurian affair. In other words, it was recognised as a matter of course 
in the inter-war era that states naturally obey international law, because the compliance with 
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international law was thought politically and morally correct too much. 
However, this presumption gradually collapsed from the early 1930s. The Manchuria affair 
was thought to be the turning point of the inter-war period in the sense that ' [ f]or the first time not 
only the action of the Council and Assembly, but the fundamental moral and political conception 
on which the Covenant was based were exposed to a powerful and determined attack '90 The 
Assembly of League ofNations adopted the resolution to request Japan to withdraw the Kwantung 
army from the occupied territory after the Lytton commission examined the affair.91 However, 
Japan decided to withdraw from the League instead of accepting the resolution in 1933. In the same 
year, Nazi Germany also decide to cease to be a member of the League. In 1935, Italy invaded 
Abyssinia The League of Nations decided to impose economic sanctions upon Italy. However, 
since the United Kingdom and France were reluctant about sanctions, Italy was not prevented from 
annexing Abyssinia 
Thus, it was unavoidable that the international law of the League had no power to keep peace in 
the situation that the Axis nations did not accept its authority, and that the members of the League 
had no determined will to protect the League system even at the sacrifice of their interest. The 
problem for international lawyers in the inter-war era was that the belief that voluntary compliance 
with international law is politically legitimate collapsed However, it should be noted that there was 
a difference between Nazi Germany on the one hand, and Italy and Japan on the other hand, with 
regard to their attitude toward international law. Concerning the attitude ofNazi Germany toward 
international law, Hitler had no intention of complying with international law from the start. For 
example, he said quite openly, 'I shall shrink from nothing. No so-called international law, no 
agreements will prevent me from making use of any advantage that offers. '92 On another occasion, 
Hitler also confessed his unwillingness to keep international treaties: 
90 Walters/1952/465. 
91 AJIIJSupplement/vol.27 /1933/119. 
92 Raushning/1939/21. 
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'I am willing to sign anything. I will do anything to facilitate the success of my policy. I am prepared to 
guarantee all frontiers and to make non-aggression pacts and fiiendly alliances with anybody. It would be 
sheer stupidity to refuse to make use of such measures merely because one might possibly be driven into a 
position where a solemn promise would have to be broken. There has never been a sworn treaty which has 
not sooner or later been broken or become untenable. There is no such thing as an everlasting treaty. Anyone 
whose conscience is so tender that he will not sign a treaty unless he can feel sure he can keep it in all and any 
circumstances is a fool. Why should one not please others and facilitate matters for oneself by signing pacts if 
the others believe that something is thereby accomplished or regulated? Why should I not make an 
agreement in good faith to-day and unhesitatingly break it to-morrow if the future of the German people 
demands it?'93 
Indeed, the subsequent practice ofNazi Germany proved that Hitler confessed his true intuition by 
concluding non-aggression treaties. Nazi Germany concluded non-aggression treaties with 
Poland, 94 Denmark,95 and the Soviet Union, 96 which it later invaded 
On the other hand, the attitude of Italy and Japan to international law was slightly different 
from the attitude ofNazi Gennany. George Schwarzenberger pointed out that: 
'Italy and Japan base their political ideologies on the conception of the State, and the sovereign State is the 
corner-stone of the classical and individualistic system of International Law. They, therefore, show mruked 
tendencies to go back to the pre-1914 state oflntemational Law which would have given them all the scope 
and freedom they desired. '97 
93 Raushning/1939/114. 
94 Declaration of Non-Aggression between Germany and Poland, 26 January 1934, Grenville-
Wasserstein/200 1/207-208. 
95 German-Danish Treaty of Non-Aggression, signed on 31 May 1939, Documents-on-
International-Affai.rs/193 9-1946/256-25 7. 
96 Treaty ofNon-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union, Moscow, 23 August 1939, 
Grenville-Wasserstein/2001/229-230. 
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Indeed, Japan adhered to the old conception of the European law of nations before 1919 that freely 
allowed states to use anned force. Though not a lawyer, Helen Mears correctly pointed out how 
Japan adhered to the European law of nations before 1919: 
'In adapting themselves to Western practice, the Japanese leaders had their own experience to guide them, and 
they also meticulously studied the histoty of the empire-building activities of the Western Powers in general. 
They saw, or thought they saw, that Western principles - whether in the field of international law or the field of 
humanitarian concern for people's welfare- were, in practice, merely techniques developed by the strongest 
Powers to promote their own interests at the expense of weaker Powers. Looking about them it seemed 
obvious to the Japanese that annexing territoty, or gaining commercial and financial advantages by force, were 
considered legitimate activities as long as they were "done legal [sic]"- according to the rules worked out by 
the tn<Yor Powers. The legal techniques seemed clear enough: a Power strong enough to do so applied force to 
a "backward" area to secure "legitimate" demands (for diplomatic or commercial-financial relations). ... 
According to the accepted code of international relations, as the Japanese saw it in practice, a nation 
which had achieved a position of power was accorded a privileged status in its relations to less powerful 
nations. It was recognized that a Great Power had "commitments" abroad which it was entitled to "defund" by 
force if necessary; it was accepted as "legal" that a Great Power had "special interests" in neighbouring less 
powerful areas, and that these "special interests" ... gave the Great Power a legitimate right to "maintain law 
and order" in the government of those areas. It was accepted as "legally" correct for the Great Power to desire 
a ''friendly" government in such near-by - or distant - regions, and when conditions made it necessary to 
''protect nationals" or "maintain security," it was considered legitimate to help to establish such a fiiendly 
government, by means offmancial-commercial pressures, or by diplomatic procedures if possible; by force if 
''vital fordefence".' 98 
Japan understood the Kellogg-Briand Pact in the same way. In the view of Japan, the Kellogg-
97 Schwarzenberger/1943/14. 
98 Mears/1948/202-203. 
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Briand Pact accepted that the parities could decide whether or not the use of force was the self-
defence. Japan claimed as follows: 
'The special position of Japan in Manchuria "to which so much mystel)' is attached," is a vel)' simple matter. 
It is nothing but the aggregate of Japan's exceptional treaty rights (plus the natural consequences of her 
propinquity, geographical situation, and historical associations) and vital and justified measures of self-
protection as the standard principle laid down in the Caro/ine case, that eve!)' act of self-defence must depend 
for its justification on the importance of the interests to be defended, or the imminence of the danger and on 
the necessity of the act ... The statements at the time of the negotiations which led up to the signature of the 
Briand-Kellogg Treaty for the outlaW!)' of war, made by Mr. Kellogg himself (Note of Jtme 23, 1928) in the 
Senate of the United States; by the British Foreign Secreta!)' of the date (Notes ofMay and July, 1928) and by 
the French and German Governments, clearly reserved the right of self-defence, and more contradict the 
observations made by Mr. Kellogg that "eve!)' nation ... is alone competent to decide whether circumstances 
require recourse to war in self-defence," which the British and French notes expressly corroborate. '99 
It was certainly arguable for Japan to claim the self-judgement nature of the self-defence by 
reference to the reservations or interpretations of other parties to the Pact In his circular note of 23 
June 1928, Kellogg clearly said as follows: 
'There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or impairs in any way the right of 
self-defence. That right is inherent in eve!)' sovereign state, and is implicit in eve!)' treaty. Eve!)' nation is free 
at all times, and regardless of treaty provisions, to defend its territol)' from attack or invasion, and it alone is 
competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defence.' 
99 Cited from Brown/1933/100-101. According to Shinohara, this interpretation was made by 
Thomas Baty who was British legal advisor to the Foreign Ministry of Japan at that time. 
Shinohara/2003/167. 
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The Senate ofthe United State intetpreted the self-:iudgment right of self-defence in 1929 as Japan 
pleaded so in 1933. The Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate said as follows: 
'The committee reports the above treaty [the Kellogg-Briand Pact] with the understanding that the right of 
self-defence is in no way cw1ailed or impaired by the terms or conditions of the treaty. Each nation is free at all 
times and regardless of the treaty provisions to defend itself: and is the sole judge of what constitutes the right 
of self-defence and the necessity and extent of the same.' 
Moreover, the Foreign Relations Committee claimed that '[u]nder the right of self-defence allowed 
by the treaty must necessarily be included the right to maintain the Monroe doctrine which is a part 
of our system of national defence.' 100 The British government, more or less, had the same 
intetpretation of the self-defence. Austen Chamberlain, the Foreign Secretary at that time, also 
made the following statement 
'The language of Article I, as to the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, renders it desirable 
that I should remind your Excellency that there are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of 
which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government have been at 
pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suffered. Their protection 
against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defence. It must be clearly understood that His 
Majesty's Govemment in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not 
prejudice their freedom of action in this respect. The Government of the United States have comparable 
interests any disregard of which by a foreign Power they have declared that they would regard as an 
unfiiendly act. His Majesty's Government believe, therefore, that in defining their position they are expressing 
the intention and meaning of the United States Government' 101 
lOO DW1928/6. 
101 Ibid/5-6. 
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Therefore, the legal question of the Manchurian affair was not that Japan disregarded the Kellogg-
Briand Pact.102 The Japanese interpretation of self-defence was certainly opposable, due to the 
principle of reciprocity, to other parities who made the self-judgment reservations of self -defence to 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, although it was legally possible for the parties to the Pact, such as the 
Soviet Union, Egypt and Persia, who did not accept any reservations to the Pact, to reject the 
Japan's invocation of self-defence103 If Japan could not authoritatively decide 'what constitutes the 
right of the self-defence and the necessity and extent of the same' by itself, the United States also 
would have not been entitled to claim that it was the sole judge of the right of self-defence, 
including Monroe doctrine. Neither could the United Kingdom claim that it would use the self-
defence for the protection of the region of a special and vital interest for the peace and security of 
the United Kingdom. In this sense, as Brown pointed out, 'the fact is that Japan, in common with 
other signatories, adhered to the Pact because of the very interpretations given by Mr. Kellogg, and 
particularly by his unreserved recognition of an undefined and unrestricted right of self -defence.' 104 
After its withdrawal from the League in March, 1933, however, Japan still had a chance to 
reconcile with other nations. Japan settled the Manchurian affair by concluding Tangku Truce with 
the Nanking government of China in May, 1933. However, the Japanese government which was 
under the significant influence of Imperial Army after the coup d' etat on 26 February 1936 was 
deeply involved into the armed conflict with China In order to establish the regional hegemony in 
the Far East, Japan joined the Axis nations group ofNazi Germany and Italy in 1936 by concluding 
the Anti-Comintern Agreement with Germany. 105 Finally, the three nations concluded the Three 
102 The real problem for Japan in the Manchurian affair was the political insensibility of the Imperial 
Army, and of the opportunistic politicians and the mass-media which unwarrantedly stimulated 
Japanese people, to the interests of western nations in China, particularly the United States and the 
United Kingdom, and to the public opinion of the world which preferred political stability at tlmt 
time. However, it is a completely different story from the legal question of the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
and the right of self-defence in the 1930s. 
103 DW1928/6. 
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Powers Pact. 1<Xi The Axis nations were united in opposition to the international legal order of 
Geneva 
The international community started to disintegrate, thus, as the Axis nations clearly showed 
their tmwillingness to accept the authority of international law of Geneva Hannah Arendt correctly 
pointed out as follows: 
'If it is true that the link between totalitarian countries and the civilised world was broken through the 
monstrous crimes of totalitarian regimes, it is also true that this criminality was not due to simple 
aggressiveness, ruthlessness, warfare and treachery, but to a conscious break of that consensus iuris which, 
according to Cicero, constitutes a ''people," and which, as international law, in modem time has constituted the 
civilized world insofar as it remains the foundation-stone of international relations even under the conditions 
ofwar.' 107 
Therefore, the collapse of the belief in legality led to the disintegration of the international 
community. Furthermore, the disintegration of the international community in the inter-war period 
was regarded by some lawyers as the result of the disappearance of the concept of civilisation from 
international law, because the lawlessness of totalitarianism was conceived as nothing but the 
disappearance of the standard of 'civilisation' from the international community. As Carr pointed 
out, ' [a] state which does not conform to certain standards of behaviour towards its own citizens 
and, more particularly, towards foreigners will be branded as "tmcivilized".'108 In this sense, H. A 
Smith seems to be more persuasive: 
'[I]n practice we no longer insist that States shall conform to any common standard of justice, religious 
toleration and internal government Whatever atrocities may be committed in foreign countries, we now say 
J<Xi See /bid/241-242. 
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that they are no concern of ours. Conduct which in the nineteenth century would have placed a government 
outside the pale of civilised society is now deemed to be no obstacle to diplomatic fiiendship. This means, in 
effect, that we have now abandoned the old distinction between civilised and uncivilised States.' 109 
Then, the following question occurs: 'Should nations which had for centuries been important 
members of the international legal community now be excluded because their domestic political 
regimes no longer corresponded to the criteria of Western civilisation?' 110 
Lauterpacht's answer to this question is to deal with the Axis nations as law-breakers. In the 
Manchurian affair, Lauterpacht was strongly opposed to Japan. One of the reasons is because he 
seems to have been consulted by the Chinese government about the Manchurian affair. 111 
Lauterpacht completely rejected the argument of Japan that it had to protect its nationals against the 
boycott committed by Chinese people tmder the guidance of the National Party of China, because 
the boycott under the guidance of a political party was neither illegal, nor attributable to the state, 
even though the party dominated the state.112 Furthermore, he considered that Japan was in 
contravention of the Covenant even if Japan and China did not declare state ofwar.113 Lauterpacht 
clearly claimed the sanction tmder Article 16 of the Covenant against Japan. 
With regard to the Abyssinian crisis, Lauterpacht argued that the Abyssinian delegation to the 
League of Nations was entitled to be admitted even after Italy had conquered Abyssinia He 
confessed his concern that the authority of international law and the League would be damaged, if 
the member states of the League recognise the Italian Annexation of Abyssinia or if Abyssinian 
government refused to appear in the League.114 However, the situation around the Abyssinian affair 
was contrary to Lauterpacht' s hope. The United Kingdom claimed that each member of the League 
could decide the question of recognition of the Italian regime in Abyssinia Indeed, Neville 
lW Smith/1938/183. 
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Chamberlain answered the question of Atlee whether the United Kingdom would act in conformity 
with the resolutions of the League Assembly relating to the non-recognition of the conquests 
effected in violation of the League Covenant: 
'His Majesty's Government have in no way changed their view of the importance of the principles enunciated 
in the Assembly Resolutions ... but in their application to any case His Majesty's Government must be entitled 
to take into account the attitude of other Members of the League and the facts of the international situation.' 115 
In fact, twenty nine members of the League recognised the Italian annexation of Abyssinia, 
whether de facto or de jure, until June, 1938.116 The United Kingdom gave de facto recognition to 
the Italian annexation of Abyssinia in December 1936,117 and de jure recognition by concluding a 
treaty with Italy on 16 April1938. 118 Although it is true that the British government considered that 
it was relieved of all commitments to Italy after Italy declared war against the United Kingdom, 
which automatically meant the withdrawal of de jure recognition of the Italian annexation. 119 
However, the fact remains that the principle of non-recognition was considerably damaged in the 
Abyssinian affair. 
When invited to deliver an address to the Cambridge University League ofNations Union on 
16 November 1938, even Lauterpacht could not help but admit that the League of Nations had 
completely failed to keep international peace. In that address, he did not conceal his disappointment 
114 Lauterpacht/1937b/CP-Ill/591. 
115 Commonslvol.334/col.l099. 
116 The member states of the League which recognised the Italian annexation of Abyssinia before 
June, 1938 were as follows: Hungary/November/1936; Albania/November/1936; 
Switzerland/December/1936; Chile/Decernber/1936; Britain/December/1936; 
France/December/1936; Honduras/March/1937; Poland/May/1937; Yugoslavia/November/193 7; 
Ecuador/December/1937; Latvia/January/1938; Netherlands/March/1938; Bulgaria/March/1938; 
Belgium/March/1938; Rumania/ April/1938; Greece/ April/1938; Turkey/ April/1938; 
Czechoslovakia/ April/1938; Finland/ April/1938; Lithuania/May/1938; Panama/May/1938; 
Eire/May/1938; Estonia/May/1938; Peru/May/1938; Sweden/May/1938; Norway/May/1938; 
Uruguay/May/1938; Denmark/May/1938; Argentina/June/1938. Commons/vol.337 /col.1890. 
117 Commons/voL333/cols.617-618. Also see ADR/vol.8/1935-1937/120-122 
118 See ADR/vol.9/1938-1939/99-1 01. 
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at the failure of the League ofNations with regard to collective security: 'In its principal object the 
League has failed, and in comparison with the extent and the persistency of that failure its successes, 
both administrative and political, fade into insignificance.' He continued as follows: 
'The frustration of the overriding object of the Covenant has gone so far that it is no longer merely a political 
fact constituting a regrettable departure from the law. That failure has now become part of the law; or, to put it 
indifferent words, the Covenant of the League is now, in law, no longer what it was in 1919.'120 
In this sense, he admitted the legal outcome of the non-fulfilment of the Convention upon collective 
security. It was clear even to Lauterpacht that the provisions on the collective security of the League 
had become a dead letter. 
Even though he did not conceal his disappointment at the collapse of the League, Lauterpacht 
still adhered to its ideal. His attachment to 'the Spirit of Geneva' is clearly seen in the distinction 
between 'the duty to enforce the peace' and 'the duty to observe the peace.' According to him, the 
former is about collective security, while the latter concerns the prohibition of unlawful war: 
'What was and is still revolutionary in the Covenant is not only the duty to repress unlawful recourse to war 
but also the obligations not to go to war in disregard of is provisions .... While the duty to enforce the peace 
has thus lapsed, at least temporarily, the obligation to observe the peace is still a prominent feature of the 
Covenant and is of undiminished vitality.' 121 
This argument shows that Lautetpacht tried to save the Covenant as a normative justification from 
the reality of the collapse of the League. The obligation to use force under collective security passed 
away, but the obligations not to use illegal force was still alive, so that '[t]he Covenant is still a valid 
119 Commons/vol.362/col.814. Also see ADR/vol.9/1938-1939/93. 
120 Lauterpacht/1938c/CP-llll576. 
121 Ibid/579. 
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and solenm legal authorization to repress aggression- a JX>Wer from which restraining and coercive 
action may well spring.' 122 Therefore, in Lauterpacht's view, the Covenant now justifies the resort 
to war against aggressive states. Since he gave more emphasis to the normativity of the Covenant 
than its effectiveness, Lauterpacht failed to examine the question whether or not liberalism was an 
appropriate idea in international relations. For him, the collapse of the League was just a nightmare 
in 'a period in which progress in things essential has been arrested and the clock turned back.' 123 In 
a sense, Lauterpacht retreated to the normative phase of law from the factual aspect of the 
effectiveness of law. However, his retreat to the normative phase oflaw itself is clearly a failure of 
the international law of Geneva 
It was proved, thus, that the legal school as represented by Lauterpacht overestimated the 
function of international law to control world politics. This overestimation was so influential that it 
seems undeniable that the international law of Geneva disappointed not only laymen but also their 
academic fellows, once it was found that it was powerless to regulate the crisis in the 1930s. Hans 
Morgenthau was the representative of the scholars who were disappointed at international law. 
'The breakdown of the main bulk of post-world war international law has altogether destroyed public 
confidence in a science which, unmoved by what experience may show, invariably follows its preconceived 
pattem This breakdown implies the practical refutation of the ideas which have determined the development 
of international law in the last half-century.' 124 
It is no exaggeration to say that the legal school of international lawyers, including Lauterpacht, 
was responsible for disappointing them, because they misled people, as well as themselves, about 
the potential of international law to solve international problems. Payson Wild pointed out that 
'international law has suffered at the hands of some of its over-zealous friends who have claimed 
122 !bid 
123 Ibid/587. 
124 Morgenthau/1940/260. 
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too much.' He continued as follows: 
'Supporters of the proposition that it either regulates or can regulate every dispute between nations only 
overstate the case and set up the law as an easy target for its foes. The impression gained all too frequently 
from standard texts to the effect that the world of states is a tidy one, regulated by precise rules, is fulse, and 
one, which, unfortunately, in time often makes for disillusionment and cynicism.' 
In Wild's view, Lauterpacht typified such 'over-zealous friends.' 125 
The negative impression that international law was irrelevant to international problems 
became the source of the realism of international politics especially in the United States. On the 
other hand, the international lawyers who took the failure of international law to prevent the Second 
World War seriously would pay too much attention to negotiation, where political considerations 
naturally play the greater role than law. The so-called policy-orientated approach proposed by 
McDougal and Lasswell is a typical example which the disappointment with the legal school of 
international lawyers in the inter-war era produced. However, the result of their approach is the 
politicisation of international law which paradoxically loses the relevancy of international law, 
although the policy-orientated lawyers wish to make international law relevant to world politics. 
Political decision makers seem not to use 'policy-oriented lawyers' who find it difficult not only to 
persuade judges but also to communicate with other lawyers by using their own idiosyncratic terms. 
Koskennierni says as follows: 
'[F]or such decision-makers the policy-approach seems like a useless exercise in academic theory. What they 
are interested in is not which decision will fulfil which values but which rules are valid and which are not As 
the policy-approach provides no answer to this question, it undermines its own claim for instrumental 
usefulness.' 126 
125 WJld/1938/480. 
126 Koskennierni/1989/174-175. 
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A more serious problem for the legal school is to treat their enemies as law-breakers or criminals in 
war. The treatment of Ge1n1any after the First World War was, as Shklar pointed out, the result of 
legalistic idea that 'make the "righteous" state feel its "due" was a matter of justice, and so 
prevented all possible compromise.' 127 Indeed, on 4 October 1918, the French government declared 
as follows: 
'Conduct which is equally contraty to international law and the fimdamental principle of all human 
civilization will not go unpunished .... [11he authors and directors of these crimes will be held responsible 
morally, judicially and financially. They will seek in vain to escape the inexorable expiation with awaits 
them.' 128 
However, only a few scholars noticed this actual danger of legalism in the inter-war period. A V 
Lundstedt was one ofthe scholars who criticised international legalism from this perspective in the 
inter-war period. 
' ... Oppenheim, the great master oflntemational Law, says that the ''wronged" state has to take the law into its 
own hands and enforce it by means of self-help and the aid of sympathizing states. However, nothing prevents 
both ofthe dispute parties, in the character of the ''wronged" party, from getting sympathy from others. Then it 
may be seen which side gains the victoty. In fact, one can not learn how the question "Who is right, who is 
wrong?" stands, until one party lies bleeding to death and powerless. Then, and not until then, does one know 
that this party was in the wrong, and that the other party and its allies have done nothing but vindicate its 
rights! Now, what can the talk about a law of nations of this kind be, if not a manifestation of the fact that there 
is no law but that of the victor, who would be "legally'' entitled to be judge and executor in his own case? In 
other words, the science of the law of nations can produce no evidence to show that this "law'' is anything but 
127 Shklar/1964/142. 
128 Cited from Jmgensen/2000/5. 
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the "order" that is prnctised by beasts of prey.' 129 
Thus, for Lundstedt, 'the World War gave us a good picture of how the absolute rights of states 
were asserted, without being checked by any consideration for the weal of other peoples, for the 
weal of mankind.' 130 The same problem actually occurred when the Second World War took place. 
International legalism allows people to confuse the idea of the victory of war with the 
accomplishment of justice. The result of war is essentially dependent upon the military powers of 
belligerents. The fact that 'war is nothing but a duel on a large scale' 131 does not change at all from 
the era of Clausewitz. The victory of the Allied nations in the Second World War came from the 
fact that the Allied nations, particularly the Untied States, possessed greater military power than the 
Axis nations. However, legalism permits the people of the victorious nations to consider that they 
can defeat their enemy because they are legally and morally right, even though the legal problem of 
jus ad bellum has nothing to do with the result of war. This confusion between the military power 
and legal justice, or the hypocrisy of the victorious belligerent, easily justifies the use of force as the 
punishment of the defeated nations which are conceived as law-breakers or aggressors. 
After the Second World War, George Kennan ascertained this point as 'the carrying over into 
the affairs of states of the concepts of right and wrong, the assumption that state behavior is a fit 
subject for moral judgement.' He went to say that 
'Whoever says there is a law must of course be indignant against the lawbreaker and feel a moral superiority 
to him. And when such indignation spills over into militruy contest, it knows no bounds short of the reduction 
of the lawbreaker to the point of complete submissiveness - namely unconditional surrender. It is a curious 
thing, but it is true, that the legalistic approach to world affairs, rooted as it unquestionably is in a desire to do 
away with war and violence, makes violence more enduring, more terrible, and more destructive to political 
129 Lundstedt/1932-1933/334. Emphasis original. 
130 lbid.,/335. 
131 Calusewitz/1993/83. 
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stability than did the older motives of national interest A war fought in the name of high moral principle finds 
no early end short of some form of total domination.' 132 
Thus, the allied nations justified their own mass-destruction such as the target area bombing or the 
use of atomic bombs, although they punished the military officers and soldiers of the defeated 
nations as war criminals. 133 It is not difficult for the legal school of internatinallawyers to conceal 
such a double standard of the Allied nations in the name of the international community. 
These problems are the events which happened during the universalisation process of the 
European law of nations, of which the political basis changed from the balance of power to 
liberalism. As the Great War was over, the international community started to lose its homogeneity 
as the basis of the European law of nations, which was civilisation until the First World War 
occurred. The Asian nations such as Japan or China came on to the stage of European politics. In 
particular, Japan was recognised as a Great Power and given a seat on the Council of the League. 
Consequently, the concept of civilisation lost its meaning in international law, because it was 
useless after the non-European nations joined the international community as represented by the 
League of Nations, apart from justifying colonialism in the name of 'a sacred trust of civilisation.' 
Thus, the European law of nations was conceived as the universal law of nations, even though the 
structure of international politics did not change. 
In the universalisation process of the European law of nations, international lawyers in the 
inter-war era started to seek the universal foundation of international law, because the basis of 
international law had already disappeared. They found it in normativism including the Pure Theory 
of Law and the return to natural law theory. Lauterpacht was a typical member of such a group of 
international lawyers. He thought that it was a matter of course that sovereign states should obey 
international law from the normative viewpoint Therefore, he naturally presumed that the state has 
132 Kennan/1951/1 00-101. 
133 On the typical excuse of an American politician with regard to this matter, see 
Stimson/19471189. 
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a willingness to abide by international law. 'Ought' easily becomes 'Be' from the viewpoint of 
nonnativism. It is from such a viewpoint that Lauterpacht asstuned that all states had no choice but 
to obey international law. However, the fact was that totalitarian states such as Nazi Germany, 
which apparently had no intention of admitting the authority of the international law of Geneva, 
acquired the military power to defeat other members of the League. Japan and Italy had originally 
co-operated with the League of Nations. However, as they tried to establish their regional 
hegemony, they left the League. In this sense, Lauterpacht's formulation voluntru civitatis maximae 
est servanda as the normative basis of the binding force of international law was clearly 
inappropriate to explain the international legal phenomenon in the inter-war era The international 
community, which Lauterpacht considered as the nonnative hypothesis of the binding force of 
international law, disintegrated completely. It is no wonder, however, that he did not admit that the 
international community had disintegrated, because his conception of the international community 
was nothing but the personification of international law from the normative viewpoint. The 
international community had to exist as well as international law, even if it had already actually 
dissolved Thus, the problem for Lauterpacht was how he should defend his ideal in the period 
which he regarded as retrogression. This question will be discussed in the following chapters. 
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3. lLEGAIL PROBLEM§ JIN THE OUTLAWRY 1PROCJE§§ OlF WAR 
Although it was an extra-legal feature in the 19a1 century, war became unlawful in the inter-war era 
through the Covenant of the League ofNations, the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Geneva 
Protocol and the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (the Kellogg-Briand Pact or the Paris 
Pact). The legal school of international lawyers in the League era generally welcomed the outlawry 
of war. However, this process produced serious legal problems pertaining to war, including 
neutrality, the punishment of war criminals and the applicability of the law of war. What does 'war' 
mean in the process of the outlawry of war? Do neutral states still have an obligation to treat all 
belligerents equally, even though one of them wages illegal war under jus ad helium? How should 
the government officials of aggressive states be punished? As many international lawyers at that 
time grappled with these questions, Lauterpacht tried to answer these questions. This chapter 
explicates his answer to these riddles. 
3.1. THE CHANGE IN mE CONCEPT OF WAR 
The legal regulation of jus ad helium has been one of the main ambitions of international lawyers. 
Indeed, it is noteworthy that Grotius distinguished between just war and unjust war. He defines self-
defence, the recovery of property and punishment as the causes of just war. If there is no justifiable 
cause for war, such a war is as unjust as a 'war of savages' or 'war of robbers.' 1 However, as 
Brierly points out, the distinction between just war and unjust war had 'never become part of actual 
international law. '2 It is because the fact still remains that there is no central authority to decide the 
justness of war in the international community. Consequently, international lawyers had recognised 
war as legal or extra-legal rather than illegal until the Kellogg-Briand Pact came into force. 
I Grotius/1925/547-548. 
2 Brierly/1963/33. 
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There were two views with regard to the concept of war in the 19th century. The first view is 
here called the legal process theory of war. According to this view, war is something like 'a 
procedure which was provided for and regulated by international law for the enforcement oflegally 
protected claims and interests.'3 Robert Phillimore said that '[w]ar is the exercise of the 
international right of action, to which, from the nature of the thing and the absence of any common 
superior tribunal, nations are compelled to have recourse, in order to assert and vindicate their 
rights. '4 Holland also conceived war as 'the litigation of nations. '5 The second view is called the 
extra-legal condition theory of war or 'the state of war doctrine. '6 According to this view, in the 
situation where each belligerent state claims the legality of its own use of force without a decision 
of supra-national authority, international lawyers could not help but recognise war as a state or 
condition of affairs in which the laws of war are applied. In other words, they set aside the legality 
of having resort to war. Westlake, for example, said that 'war is a state or condition.' He continued 
as follows: 
'As such war is not set up by any mere act of force, whether an act of reprisal, embargo or pacific blockade, or 
an act of self-defence, or one of unlawful violence. It can be set up only by the will to do so, but that will may 
be unilateral because the state of peace requires the concurrent wills of two governments to live together in it, 
and is replaced by the state of war as soon as one of those wills is withdrawn.' 7 
Oppenheim also explained war as 'a fact recognised, and with regard to many points regulated, but 
not established, by International Law. '8 
However, these views were not so different from each other before war became illegal.9 It is 
3 Grewe/2000/532. 
4 Phillimore/1857/99. 
5 Holland/1924/404. 
6 Brownlie/1 963/26-28. 
7 Westlake/1907/2. 
8 Oppenheim/1912b/60. 
9 Roscher/2002/294. 
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certainly true that the view of Phillimore was a kind of just-war theory. He defined the purpose of 
war as 'the reparation of injury, the re-establislnnent of right, the restoration of order into the mutual 
relations of States, and security against future derangement of these relations.' 10 However, in the 
absence of an authority to decide on the legality of war, 'the exercise of international right of action' 
results in the same conclusion as the extra-legal condition view of war. 11 Each belligerent can make 
a unilateral claim for the justness of war. However, no authority can decide which belligerent is 
right Consequently, it was impossible to accuse a state of unjust cause for war, even according to 
the legal process doctrine. 12 Although he admitted war as a legal remedy in principle, Hall 
confessed that 'in most of the disputes which arise between states the grounds of quarrel ... are too 
complex to be judged with any certainty by reference to them.' He then continued that 'it would be 
idle for it [a combatant state] to affect to impart the character of a penalty of war, when it is 
powerless to enforce its decision.' Therefore, Hall drew the following conclusion concerning the 
concept of war: 
'International law h~ no alternative but to accept war, independently of the justice of its origin, as a relation 
which the parties to it may set up if they choose, and to busy itself only in regulating the effects of the relation. 
Hence both parties to every war are regarded ~ being in an identical legal position, and consequently ~ being 
possessed of equal right' 13 
Thus, whether from the legal process view or the state of war doctrine, war was regarded as extra-
legal rather than illegal before the First World War. 
This point, furthermore, shows that the legal effect of war is nearly the same, whether war is 
conceived as legal or as extra-legal. In other words, both views accepted the non-discriminative 
application of the law of war, which means that jus in bello should be applied equally to all 
10 Phillimore/1857/100. 
11 Yanagihara/200 1/4-6. 
12 Sogawa/1953/196. 
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belligerents, whether the recourse to war is legal or extra-legalllllder jus ad bell urn. McNair, who 
thought war extra-legal, also says as follows: 
'Whether or not the initiation of a war was a breach oflaw, the rules which regulated it, once it had broken out, 
were the same for both or all parties. And, ... the rules which governed the attitude of states not participating in 
a war towards the belligerents- the law of neutrality- were the same, regardless of the rights and wrongs of 
the war. A rigid impartiality in their conduct towards the belligerents was required by the law.' 14 
However, war was becoming illegal in the inter-war era. It is noteworthy that Article 227 of 
the Treaty of Versailles stipulates the prosecution of former German Kaiser Wuliarn II for 'a 
supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.' Moreover, the Covenant 
of the League of Nations imposed some limitations on the right of states to have recourse to war. 
Although the limitation of the recourse to war was surely not enough, because the Covenant 
prohibits resorting to war lUlder limited conditions such as the 'cooling-down' period of three 
months, it is undeniable that the states made efforts to prohibit war as a whole in the 1920s. The 
Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923 stipulated that '[t]he High Contracting Parties solemnly 
declare that aggressive war is an international crime and severally undertake that no one of them 
will be guilty of its commission' lUlder Article 1. The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes of 1924 also stipulated in its preamble that 'a war of aggression constitutes a 
violation of this solidarity and an international crime.' Article 2 of the Geneva Protocol furthermore 
says that '[t]he signatory States agree in no case to resort to war either with one another or against a 
State which, if the occasion arises, accepts all the obligations hereinafter set out, except in case of 
resistance to acts of aggression or when acting in agreement with the Council or the Assembly of 
the League of Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant and of the present 
Protocol.' However, these treaties did not come into force. 
13 Halll1924/81-82. 
14 McNair/1974/104. 
106 
The efforts to outlaw war culminated in the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928. Although many 
governments had reservations concerning the right of self-defence, Article 1 of the Pact declared 
that '[t]he high contracting parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that 
they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an 
instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.' Many international lawyers held 
hopes for and confidence in the outlawry of war. Such confidence among lawyers in international 
law is well expressed by Manley Hudson in the Budapest Conference of the International Law 
Association in 1934: 
'[I]n the past, we have proceeded on the theory that war- international war- was outside the reach of 
International Law; that did not mean that war was invested with a character of legality; it meant, rather, that 
war was invested with a character of extra-legality, and on the basis of the extra-legal fact of war, we built, 
especially during the nineteenth century, a great superstructure of neutral rights and belligerent rights. Our 
generation has definitely set its hand to the task ofbringing war within the ambit oflaw. We propose to say that 
no longer is war to remain wholly extra-legal, and that now, under some circumstances, it may be illegal.' 15 
However, as war was conceived as illegal, the concept of war caused some confusion, because 
war had usually been regarded as a special situation in which the law of war became operative. 
Indeed, before the war outlawry movement, the international legal system was divided into two 
main autonomous parts: the law of peace and the law of war. In this dichotomy in the international 
legal system, war was 'a state or condition of affairs, not a mere series of acts of force.' 16 Therefore, 
it was possible for some lawyers to think that war as the condition in which jus in bello had been 
operative was abolished by the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 17 In other words, the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
denied the extra-legal condition doctrine of war. This point produced two results. 
15 RILA/vol.38/1935/13-14. 
16 McNair/1974/38. 
17 With regard to the compatibility of the state of war with the Charter of the United Nations, see 
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First, the traditional dichotomy in the international legal system is no longer appropriate, 
because war as a legal institution was considered to be abolished.18 Second, the law of war which 
has been renamed as international humanitarian law or the law of armed conflicts becomes 'the lex 
specialis, governing questions such as the legality of particular weapons or methods ofwarfare,' 19 
although some lawyers seriously doubted the law of war, because the legal institution of war as the 
precondition of the applicability of the law of war was no longer permitted to exist.20 In a sense, the 
applicability of the law of armed conflicts became dependent not on the existence of de jure war 
but on the factual existence of armed conflicts. Greenwood says, 
'The creation of a state of war no longer triggers the operation of all the different bodies of rules which used to 
apply only in wartime. For the purpose of bringing into operation the rules regulating the conduct of hostilities, 
it no longer matters whether those hostilities are characterised as war. It is the factual concept of armed conflict 
rather than the technical concept of war which makes those rules applicable. '21 
Thus, the concept of war as a legal condition becomes more or less insignificant insofar as the law 
of armed conflicts, including the law of neutrality, are applied irrespective of the existence of a state 
of war in a technical sense, although it is difficult to maintain the traditional dichotomy of the 
international legal system. 
However, the abolition of the legal state of war was not enough to regulate the use of force, 
because a use of force not producing a state of war was interpreted as permissible under either the 
Covenant or the Paris Pact. Japan, for example, used armed force in Manchuria and China without 
declaring war. Nor did the Republic of China declare war. Both 'belligerents' tried to escape from 
the state of war in a technical sense. On the one hand, it was necessary for Japan not to declare war 
Elihu!Lauterpacht/1968. 
18 Ishimoto/1998/16. 
19 Greenwood/1999/248. 
20 See, for example, the discussion in the International Law Commission on whether the 
Commission should choose the law of war as the topic. YBILC/1949/51-53. 
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in order to avoid being accused of breaching the related Articles of the Covenant. China, on the 
other hand, feared a lack of support from the United States due to the law of neutrality if it declared 
war. Consequently, it became necessary to grasp war as an act of the state. Quincy Wright said, 
'The characterization legal or illegal can properly be applied only to acts which proceed from responsible 
beings, not to events which exist from uncontrollable natural causes. Thus we are presented with the paradox 
that war in the legal sense is an event neither legal nor illegal, while war in the material sense is an act at least 
capable oflegal characterization. '22 
Therefore, as war became illegal, it became necessary to distinguish between the two types of 
concept of war, namely those conditions under which the law of war is applicable, and as an act of 
state which is later conceived as a use of force. 
Hersch Lauterpacht's view of the concept of war should be understood in the context of this 
outlawry process of war. Although he also recognised war as the condition under which the law of 
war was applicable, it is noteworthy that he thought that it was war as an act of state that was 
prohibited. In other words, Lauterpacht did not believe that war as a condition was abolished. 
Indeed, he claimed that the armed conflict between Japan and China without a declaration of war 
could be regarded as a state of war by the third states or the Assembly of the League even if de 
facto belligerents had no animus belligerendi.23 Later, Lauterpacht tried to refute the view that jus in 
bello was abolished or discriminatively applicable to the case of aggression. In his view,jus in bello 
is equally applicable to aggressor states regardless of the breach of jus ad bellum due to the 
autonomy of jus in bello from jus ad bellum?4 
On the other hand, Lauterpacht regarded that war as act of the state had been outlawed. 
According to Lauterpacht, war before the Paris Pact had two different functions as 'a means of self-
21 Greenwood/1987/303-304. 
22 Q./Wright/1924/'163. 
23 Lauterpacht/1934b/51-55 
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help for giving effect to claims based or alleged to be based on International Law' and as 'a legally 
recognised instnnnent for challenging and changing rights based on existing International Law. '25 
These two functions of war stemmed mainly from the fact that there is no supra-national 
centralised authority to administer international law. On the one hand, the function of war as a legal 
remedy against international wrongs means that states had to protect their own interests by 
themselves in any situation where they could not expect an international authority to enforce the 
law. On the other hand, the function of war to change law is due to no international legislature. In 
this sense, war was nothing but the result of the defect of international law as 'law,' namely the 
unorganised structure of the international community. Lauterpacht said that '[p ]rior to the Pact the 
main defect of International Law as a body of law consisted not so much in the absence of an 
international legislature or executive as in the admissibility of war as a regular legal institution. '26 
However, if the two functions of war before the Paris Pact were due to the unorganised 
structure of the international community, did the Pact really abolish the war as an international legal 
process? His answer is a normative one: 
'The Pact of Paris altered that state of the law. War cannot now legally, as it could be prior to the conclusion of 
the Pact, be resorted to either as a legal remedy or as an instrument for changing the law. '27 
In Lauterpacht's view, therefore, the Pact was meaningful at least among the parties in the sense 
that the Pact limited the justification of war as self-defence on the normative phase oflaw. However, 
from the viewpoint of effectiveness, it is clear that the Pact was not enough without the 
international community providing an alternative procedure to war, such as a legislative process or 
remedy process. Lauterpacht noticed this point, when he wrote that '[i]n the long run the progress 
achieved by it [the Paris Pact] will probably tend to become unreal unless, in addition to the 
24 Lauterpacht/1953a/99-1 OO/and/1953b/233. 
25 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht/1935/147-148. 
26 Ibid/167. 
110 
necessary clarification of its terms and the adoption of obligations for its enforcement, it is 
supplemented by the gradual evolution of institutions for the discharge of a fimction which has 
hitherto been fulfilled by war. '28 For Lauterpacht, therefore, the Paris Pact was just the starting point 
of the outlawry process of war in the context of the institutionalisation of the international 
community. 
This view of Lautetpacht, however, seems still to be unfulfilled, because there remains no 
alternative procedure to the two fimctions of war among the international community. Neither can 
we expect that the international community will be provided with an effective legal process of 
international legislation or the remedy of international rights in the near future. If so, how can we 
say that the Kellogg-Briand Pact renounces war as legal process, even accepting that the Pact limits 
types of legal justification for war? Indeed, Ryoichi Taoka pointed out that the Paris Pact had no 
legal binding force due to the impossibility of the performance of obligation, which was logically 
deduced from the fact that the Pact did not provide an alternative process to war.29 
It should be noted, furthermore, that Lautetpacht did not consider the Paris Pact to have 
abolished all kinds of war, only war as an 'instnunent of national policy.' In other words, the Pact 
seemed to him to renounce only 'the right of war both as a legal instnunent of self-help against an 
international wrong and as an act of national sovereignty for the purpose of changing existing 
rights.'30 He admitted that the use of force still remained lawful (a) as 'a means of legally 
permissible self-defence; (b) as a measure of collective action for the enforcement of international 
obligations by virtue of existing instnnnents like the Covenant of the League and the Treaty of 
Locarno; (c) as between signatories of the Pact and non-signatories; (d) as against a signatory who 
has broken the Pact by restoring to war in violation of its provisions. ' 31 However, these permissible 
types of the use of force showed the collapse ofLautetpacht's theory that the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
27 !bid 
28 Ibidlvii. 
29 Taoka/1973/141-144. 
30 Oppenheim-Lautetpacht/1935/153. 
31 !bid 
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prohibited both functions of war, because the justi:fiability of the use of force as a COlll1ter-measure 
to a breach of the Pact means that states are allowed to use 'the right of war as a legal instrument of 
self-help against an international wrong', which Lauterpacht considered the Kellogg-Briand Pact to 
have abolished Thus, although the significance of the Paris Pact is not so small in the normative 
phase of the outlawry process of war, it is going too far to say that the Pact was sufficient to 
renolll1ce 'the right of war both as a legal instrument of self-help against an international wrong and 
as an act of national sovereignty for the purpose of changing existing rights.' 
Nevertheless, Lauterpacht thought that the Kellogg-Briand Pact had changed the normative 
structure of international law. In the Preface of the fifth edition of Volume 2 of Oppenheim 's, he 
said that 'the Treaty [the Paris Pact] must be considered to have effected a fundamental change in 
the system of International Law. '32 This point cannot be understood without the legal consequences 
of a breach of the Pact In other words, the Paris Pact seemed to him to have caused the normative 
change in the international community. With regard to the legal questions of war, norrnativism is 
again the key to lU1derstanding Lauterpacht' s international legal theoty. Such a tendency was not 
only seen from Lauterpacht's point of view, but also in many international lawyers' writings. The 
International Law Association in particular discussed the legal consequences of any breach of the 
Paris Pact, and adopted the Budapest Articles oflnterpretation of the Paris Pact in 1934.33 American 
international lawyers also adopted the Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of States in Case of 
Aggression.34 Many international lawyers in the inter-war period, therefore, held the view that the 
Paris Pact undoubtedly changed the normative structure of international law, even if the Pact was 
too ineffective to regulate the use of force. The problem is what exactly 'a fundamental change in 
the system oflnternational Law' means. This question itself is too large to answer here.35 However, 
the principle of non-recognition, the change in the status of neutrality, and the punishment of war 
32 !bid/vi. 
33 RILA/vol.38/1935/l. 
34 AJllJSupplement/vol.33/1939/823. 
35 On the change in the structure of the international community, see Friedmann/1964; 
Ishimoto/1998. 
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criminals are examples ofthe fi.mdamental change in the nonnative structure of international law at 
least in the context of the outlawty process of war. How did Hersch Lauterpacht consider these 
questions? These questions are discussed below. 
3.2. 1'm: JP>ru:NCllPJLE OF NON-lRJECOGNJITION 
3.2.1. THE RELEVANCY OF THE lPRINCIPLE OF NON-REcoGNITION 
It is said that one of the most important legal results of the outlawty of war is the principle of non-
recognition, which obliges states not to recognise the situation caused by internationally illegal acts. 
This principle was discussed with especial attention to the creation ofManchukuo. Henry Stimson, 
Secretary of State of the United States at that time, sent Japan and China a note known as the 
Stimson Doctrine on 7 January 1932. The text of the note is as follows: 
'In view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government 
deems it to be its duty to notifY both the Government of the Chinese Republic and the Imperial Japanese 
Government that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty 
or agreement entered into between these governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of 
the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence or 
the tenitorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to 
China, commonly known as the Open Door Policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, 
treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the 
PactofParisofAugust27, 1928.'36 
It should be noted, however, that the Stimson Doctrine was not the first case of the application of 
36 Cited from Wright/19321342. 
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the principle of non-recognition. As Stimson himself noted, '[t]he idea of using a notice of non-
recognition as a warning to an aggressive power of course was not new. '37 The United States 
dispatched the following statement of non-recognition to Japan on 11 May 1915, when Japan 
presented the Chinese government ofYiian Shin-k' ai with the so-called 'Twenty-One Demands.' 
'In view of the circwnstances of the negotiations which have taken place and which are now pending between 
the Government of Japan and the Government of China, and of the agreements which have been reached as 
the result thereof, the Government has the honor to notifY the Imperial Japanese Government that it cannot 
recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between 
the Governments of Japan and China, impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, 
the political and territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China 
commonly known as the open door policy. '38 
Lauterpacht also pointed out that '[t]he diplomatic history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
supplies numerous examples of refusal of recognition on the grounds of the inconsistency of the 
new title with an existing obligation. '39 He has given us some examples of non-recognition in the 
late 1 cJ' century and the early 20~1 century, such as the refusal of France to recognise the British-
German treaty regarding the British protectorate over Zanzibar, which was contrary to the British-
French Treaty of1862.40 Nor did France recognise the British occupation of Egypt until the Anglo-
French Treaty of 1904. In 1908, the British government refused to recognise the Belgian 
acquisition of Congo and the Austrian annexation ofBosnia and Herzegovina. These cases showed 
37 Stimson/1936/93. 
38 Cited form Langer/1947/54. 
39 Lauterpacht/Recognition/414. Most of the text of Lauterpacht's article 'The Principle of Non-
Recognition in International Law' was incorporated into his Recognition. Therefore, the texts in 
Recognition are essentially used as a matter of convenience here insofar as they are the same as 
'Non-Recognition.' However, his evaluation of non-recognition in the Manchuria affair in 'Non-
Recognition' was deleted in Recognition, so that the texts of'Non-Recognition' are also referred to 
in the context of the Manchurian affair. 
40 !bid 
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that the non-recognition policy had not been so exceptional. Nevertheless, the reason the Stimson 
note was thought to be significant in international law is because it was regarded as a sanction to 
any breach of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In other words, the significance of the Stimson doctrine was 
conceived in the context of the outlawry process of war. Quincy Wright, for example, appreciated 
that the Stimson notes could cause a revolution in international law. 
'[T]hese notes may mark important progress toward realizing the following propositions in international law: 
(I) De facto occupation of tenitory gives no title, (2) treaties contrary to the rights of third states are void, and 
(3) treaties in the making of which non-pacific means have been employed are void. These propositions do 
not on their face seem very novel. Authority can be found in textbooks for them all, except possibly the third. 
Yet in the practice of states, all have frequently been neglected, at least according to the interpretation of the 
man in the street '41 
However, the principle of non-recognition was too ineffective to be regarded as a sanction. 
Non-recognition could not forestall the establishment of Manchukuo. Neither did it restrain Italy 
from annexing Abyssinia Although Stimson himself was proud that his doctrine forced the 
Japanese army to withdraw from Shanghai,42 such an estimation of the effectiveness of the 
principle of non-recognition was based on a misunderstanding of the Shanghai affair. The purpose 
of Japanese military activity in Shanghai was different from the intention of the K wantung army in 
Manchuria In the Shanghai affair, the aim of the Japanese army was to secure a quick victory with 
the approval of the Western nations by protecting not only Japan's interests but also the interests of 
the Western nations in the leased territories in Shanghai, although the K wantung army in 
Manchuria was determined to establish regional hegemony in the northern part of the Far East, 
even if other nations did not admit it. Christopher Thorne pointed out that 'the contrast with the 
value placed upon Manchuria, and with the aims adopted there, was a distinct one which entirely 
41 Q./Wright/1932/344. 
42 Stimson/1933/394. 
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invalidates the later arguments of Cecil and others, ... that Western finnness alone caused the 
Japanese to withdraw from Shanghai, and could easily have brought about a similar retreat in 
Manchuria '43 In this sense, Stimson overestimated the effectiveness of his own doctrine as a 
sanction. On the contrary, the fact is, as McNair said, that 'when a new situation has been produced 
by force or in violation of a treaty, non-recognition alone not followed by action is a policy of very 
limited value and effect. '44 Therefore, more decisive action was necessary if members of the 
League wanted to use the principle of non-recognition as a sanction. 
Politicians of the Western nations, nevertheless, had no intention of applying Article 16 of the 
Covenant to Japan with regard to the Manchurian affair, because they worried that economic 
sanctions against Japan might lead to war between Japan and the Western nations. On the other 
hand, the policy of non-recognition seemed to the governments of the United Kingdom and the 
United States to be the more convenient and harmless method of imposing their will on Japan. 
Ronald Lindsay, British Ambassador to the United States at that time, reported to the British 
government that '[t]he extreme reluctance of recourse to physical measures merely emphasizes the 
desire of the United States Government to utilise to the utmost the moral principle, which they 
regard as one of great efficacy and importance and as destined perhaps to fill a large place in 
international law. '45 Indeed, Henry Stimson himself regarded his note as a substitute for sanctions.46 
Therefore, there was a reason for Chinese newspapers to think that the Stimson note amounted to 
wastepaper without any substantial value, since the United States had no intention to save China 
with actual commitment.47 In this sense, as John Moore said, the chiefweakness of the doctrine of 
non-recognition as a sanction 'lies in the fact that those who employ it often must content 
themselves with futile words or must fight, while the adoption of the latter alternative would 
43 Thome/1973/205-206. 
44 McNair/1933/71. 
45 DB FPI l9l9-1939/21xl/vol.9/no.577 /621. 
46 Stimson/1936/92. 
47 Shirai/19741144. 
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necessarily be a confession of failure. '48 With regard to the Abyssinian affair, as noted above, the 
principle of non-recognition was completely disregarded by the League members themselves.49 
The annexation of Albania by Italy in April, 1939, furthermore, did not force any states, including 
the United States, to enforce the policy of non-recognition. Therefore, Briggs's statement that 'the 
policy of non-recognition as practised today is of slight value either as a sanction or as evidence that 
the rule that conquest confers valid title has been superseded'50 is persuasive. 
Although it was clear that the principle of non-recognition was insignificant as a sanction, 
Lauterpacht tried to rescue the normative value of the principle of non-recognition from its 
ineffectiveness. For him, the principle of non-recognition was the direct result of the principle ex 
injuria jus non oritur: 
'Non-recognition is not a sanction in the nature of punishment aiming at bending the will of the wrongdoer by 
the oveiWhelming pressure of its immediate effects. Its principal function must more accurately be conceived 
as an instrument for upholding the challenged authority of international law. '51 
Therefore, the character of non-recognition as sanction was indirect rather than direct in the sense 
that it is 'one of upholding the authority of international law against successful assertions of illegal 
force.' 52 Thus, the argumentation of Lauterpacht in his article Non-Recognition moved from the 
actual crisis in Manchuria to the normative phase of international law. In this sense, it is 
understandable that Hatsue Shinohara, who studies the American reformers of international law in 
the inter-war period as represented by Quincy Wright, gains the impression that Lauterpacht and 
Wright discuss 'law and fact' philosophically, in a metaphysical phase far removed from the actual 
48 Moore/1937/436. 
49 See above 2.4. 
50 Briggs/1940/81. 
51 Lauterpacht/1942/149. 
52 Ibid/154. 
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crisis in Manchuria in their book Legal Problems in the Far Eastern Coriflict.53 Thus, Lautetpacht 
escaped from the messy actual world to the clean nonnative world. 
3.2.2. 1'HE LEGAL BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NoN-REcOGNITION 
While leaving to politicians the actual relevance of the principle of non-recognition to international 
politics, international lawyers in the 1930s tried to find the nonnative basis of non-recognition. The 
International Law Association, for example, declared the Stimson Doctrine as a legal consequence 
of the breach of the Paris Pact under Article 5 of the Budapest Articles: 'The signatory States are not 
entitled to recognise as acquired de jure any territorial or other advantages acquired de facto by 
means of a violation of the Pact. '54 Gerald Fitzmaurice as a legal advisor to the Foreign Office also 
believed non-recognition to be one of the legal results of such multilateral treaties as the Covenant 
of the League, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty. With regard to the Manchurian 
affair, Fitzmaurice thought that Japan was acting contrary to the obligation of peaceful settlement 
under Article 12 of the Covenant and under Article 2 of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 'even assuming 
that Japan has not technically had "recourse to war'' within the meaning of Article 1 of the Pact. '55 
'Finally Mr. Stimson suggests that the signatories to the above agreements should place it on record that they 
will not recognise any situation anived at in violation of Japan's obligation .... [A]U he suggested was that the 
signatories to the Covenant, Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty should DQW place on record that they 
could not regard any situation anived at in violation of those covenants as valid. It is perfectly clear that 
assuming a situation in violation of those covenants had been created by Japan, the other signatories to the 
treaties in question would be entitled to declare that they did not regard it as valid. Moreover, I think that they 
would in fact be obliged to regard the situation as invalid. No doubt as between each signatory and the 
53 Shinohara/2003/23&. 23 7. 
54 RILA/vol.38/1935/67. 
55 Carty-Smith/2000/117. Also see McNair/1974/109. 
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offending state the former mJJld, if it pleased, recognise the situation, but such a recognition on the part of the 
former would, I think, be a violation of its obligations ~ the other signatories, which would in a sense 
range it on the side of the offending state as a species of"accessory after the fuct''. '56 
However, Lauteipacht did not think so. He doubted that Japan had breached Article 2 of the Pact 
He said that 'as to Article 2 [of the Pact], it must be borne in mind that although measures of force 
short of war are compulsive means, they are still pacific means.' He continued as follows: 
'There ought to be no doubt that if the Paris Pact permits without restriction recourse to measures of force 
short of war, it is open to the same serious objections as the corresponding provisions of the Covenant, and that 
its ptnpOSe may be frequently fiustrated by the simple device of abstention from a declaration of war. On the 
other hand, the total elimination of recourse to force short of war may be difficult of achievement in practice 
and, probably, in law, so long as the signatories of the Pact are free to refuse to other signatories the benefit of 
impartial adjudication of their legal claims, and so long as there is no provision for collective enforcement of 
judicial or arbitral pronouncements .... In all these cases [the Chinese Eastern Railway affair between Russia 
and China, the Manchurian affair and the Leticia affair between Colombia and Peru] one or both parties to the 
dispute were reminded by other signatories of their obligations under the Pact, but there appears to have been 
no direct authoritative finding or express governmental assertion on the part of third States that the Pact had 
been violated. '57 
Lautetpacht, moreover, thought that the Paris Pact did not impose a legal obligation of non-
recognition on states. If the Pact imposes such an obligation, it would mean, according to him, that 
'[a] State singing a treaty does not automatically undertake a legal obligation to contribute to its 
enforcement by a refusal of recognition or otherwise. '58 He thought that such an obligation not to 
56 Carty-Smith/2000/117 -118. Emphasis original. 
57 Oppenheim-Lautetpacht/1935/156-157. 
58 Lautetpacht/Recognition/417. 
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recognise, if existing llllder the Paris Pact, was a just moral one. In a sense, the Budapest Articles 
seemed to him to be claiming that 'llllder the guise of interpretation it aims at supplementing the 
Treaty by increasing its effectiveness beyond the intention of the Parties. '59 Insofar as the principle 
of non-recognition was concerned, he challenged the Budapest Articles oflnterpretation as follows: 
'It could be argued that the doctrine of non-recognition follows from the renunciation of war inasmuch as 
recognition of title acquired as the result of a violation of the Treaty would mean abetting the State violating 
the Treaty which in turn would be tantamount to a breach of the Pact on the part of the recognising State. 
There may be some force in such an argument, but the argument is apparently too ingenious to cany 
conviction on a matter of grave importance. '60 
His opinion seems to be correct, because there is no evidence that the parties to the Pact had the 
intention of imposing the obligation of non-recognition on themselves. Rather, France61 and the 
United States62 had reservations, namely that other parties would be released from their obligation 
to the Pact if one nation violated its pledge not to engage in war. 
On the other hand, Lauterpacht appreciated the statements of the Collllcil and Assembly of the 
League ofNations. On 16 January 1932, the Collllcil ofthe League deduced the principle of non-
recognition from Article 10 of the Covenant to the effect that 'no infringement of the territorial 
integrity and no change in the political independence of any member of the League brought about 
in disregard of this article ought to be recognized as valid and effectual by the members of the 
League of Nations.' On 11 March 1932, the Assembly of the League adopted the resolution that 'it 
is incwnbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty, or 
agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of 
Nations or to the Pact of Paris.' According to Lauterpacht, these resolutions were the source of the 
59 Lauterpacht/1934a/182. 
60 Ibid/188. 
61 DW1928/2. 
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obligation not to recognise the illegal situation in Manchuria 'A definite step towards transfonning 
the policy of non-recognition into an obligation of non-recognition was made by the Council and 
the Assembly ofthe League ofNations in connection with the invasion ofManchuria by Japan.' 
Furthermore, he continued that 'the refusal to recognise a conquest accomplished in violation of the 
Covenant would seem to have constituted the very minimum of the obligation to respect and to 
preserve the teni.torial integrity and political independence of other members of the League of 
Nations. '63 However, if so, the principle of non-recognition would be applied only to the member 
states of the League. Lauterpacht, therefore, indicated the principle ex injuria jus non oritur as the 
universal legal basis of the principle of non-recognition. 'This construction of non-recognition is 
based on the view that acts contrary to international law are invalid and cannot become a source of 
legal rights for the wrongdoer.'64 This principle is for Lauterpacht nothing but the general principle 
of law. Thus, Lautetpacht found the significance of the principle of non-recognition in the 
normative phase. It is undeniable, nevertheless, that Lautetpacht had to treat the question of the 
ineffectiveness of the principle as the question of the curability of illegality in the normative phase 
agam. 
3.2.3. THE VALIDATION OF ILLEGALITY 
Although the principle ex injuria jus non oritur is applicable in the international sphere in his view, 
Lautetpacht also had to admit the limitation of the principle ex irifuria jus non oritur, because of the 
lack of authority to enforce the principle. Consequently, the principle ex factis jus oritur clashes 
with the principle ex injuria jus non oritur. Lautetpacht did not deny this clash of principles. 'This 
antimony of law and fact is an abiding problem of jurisprudence. '65 However, his normativism 
allowed him to opt for a balance in favour of the principle ex injuria jus non oritur. The principle ex 
62 Jb;d/8. 
63 Lauterpacht/Recognition/417. 
64 lbid/420. 
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injuria jus non oritur is essentially operative unless the principle ex factis jus oritur is applied by 
prescription, the consent of the injured party and recognition. He stated that 'unless law is to 
become a convenient code for malefactors, it must steer a middle course between the law-creating 
influence of facts and the principle, which is the essence of law, that its validity is impervious to 
individual act oflawlessness. '66 Some lawyers tend to emphasise that Lauterpacht accepted that the 
illegality and nullity of the original act is curable by the application of the principle ex factis jus 
oritur.67 It is true that Lauterpacht examined the three possible ways to cure illegality, namely (a) 
prescription, (b) the consent of the damaged state and (c) the recognition of third states. It should be 
noted, however, that he interpreted strictly the validation of illegality by the application of the 
principle ex factis jus oritur. 
With regard to prescription, Lauterpacht was reluctant to accept the operation of the rule. He 
said as follows: 
'[llhe patent illegality of the purported acquisition, combined with continued protests on the part of the 
dispossessed State, are sufficient to rule out the legalization. in that manner, of the original illegality. Moreover, 
assuming that the principle of prescription is applicable in any given case, it must comply at least with the 
requirement of the lapse of a substantial period of time. To invoke the institution of prescription in municipal 
law as a reason for the immediate recognition or validity of internationally unlawful act is to use the term 
''prescription" in a sense unknown to any system oflaw.' 
He then concluded that 'the reference to prescription must be regarded as having been used in a 
popular rather than a legal sense. '68 Lauterpacht, therefore, was too cautious to admit the cure of 
illegality by prescription. 
With regard to the consent of the injured state, it is true that Lauterpacht admitted that the 
65 I..auterpacht/Recognition/427. 
66 !bid 
67 Hamamoto/1998/71; Dinstein/2001/lSS.Also see Oppenheim-Jennings!Watts'l992/186-187. 
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consent of the ~ured state might validate the illegality as far as a bilateral treaty and a customary 
rule exclusively concern the interest of the injured state. However, he did not accept that the consent 
of the injured state can cure the original illegality in the case of a breach of multilateral treaties.69 
Lauterpacht, therefore, understood the consent of the ~ured state as being the same as the question 
of the recognition of third states. The consent of the ~ured state is different from the question of 
the recognition of third states from the viewpoint of the waiver of right It is true that, as the non-
recognition of the Western nations to the Russian annexation of the Baltic States shows,70 third 
states do not de jure recognise the transfer of territorial sovereignty by disputing the validity of the 
consent of the ~ured state on grounds of duress, even if the government of the injured state gives 
its consent to the aggressor. However, in such a case, the subject of the dispute between the 
aggressor and the non-recognising states is the validity of the consent of the injured state itself In 
this sense, the legal significance of the consent of the injured state is different from that of the 
recognition of third states, although Lauterpacht did not notice the difference, because he saw the 
question of the consent of injured states from the viewpoint of recognition. 
Insofar as the recognition of other states is concerned, Lauterpacht seems to accept the 
validation of the illegal act. He described the function of recognition as a quasi-legislative act, 
which gives 'legal force to a situation which is in the eyes of the law a mere nullity.' He explained it 
as follows: 'The tetm "quasi-legislative" is here used because, while there is in the international 
sphere no legislation in the strict meaning of the term, there are cases in which, because of the 
absence of a legislature proper, a State or a number of States must fulfil the functions ordinarily 
reserved to legislation.' Then, he continued: 
'There is nothing obnoxious to legal principle in the idea of legalizing in this way the results of wrongful 
conduct Such legislation consists, upon analysis, in the waiver by each of the recognising States of its right, 
68 Lauterpacht/R.ecognition/428. 
69 !bid 
70 See Harnamoto/1998/74-77. 
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grmmded in customary international law or in a treaty, to treat the new title as invalid.' 71 
The observations of Lauterpacht about the function of recognition as 'a quasi-legislative act', 
however, seem to forget the relative nature of recognition, which establishes only the legal 
relationship between the recognising state and the recognised state. In other words, even if 
recognition can cure the illegality of the act of the recognised state, the quasi-legislative effect of 
recognition is limited to the bilateral relationship between the recognising state and the recognised 
state. Therefore, the quasi-legislative effect of recognition may cause a situation such that an 
activity of a state is legal to the recognising state, while the activity is still illegal to the non-
recognising state. It is so even if the majority of states 'legalise' the illegal situation by recognition 
in the name of the international community as a whole. 
It seems to be easy to understand this situation, if the quasi-legislative effect of recognition is 
explained in terms not of validity but of opposability, though it should be taken into consideration 
that such a conception did not appear clearly in his theory. Degan explains the concept of 
opposability as follows: 
'Opposability is a notion which does not imply a duty to an active action of a third State. But it implies at least 
its duty to respect all legal consequences of such an act passively. On the other hand, it is said that an act is not 
opposable to a third State, in a situation when it does not contest its validity, but is entitled to decline all its legal 
effects in its own regard.' 72 
According to Degan, recognition is a typical unilateral act which should be understood in terms of 
opposability. He says as follows: 
'If a State recognizes an act of another State which is only partly lawful, or which is unlawful, that act does not 
71 Lauterpacht/Recognition/429. 
72 Degan/1997/342. Also see Starke/1968-1969; Shearer/1994/80-81. 
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become legitimized by recognition. Apart from waiver of its own rights, another State, by recognition, only 
renounces its claim of non-opposability to itself Such an illegal act becomes by recognition opposable to a 
recognizing State, and that State becomes bound to respect the consequences of the recognized situation.' 73 
Consequently, recognition does not legalise the activity which is contrary to international law. 
Rather, recognition is the expression of the will of the recognising state to accept the opposability of 
the situation, irrespective of the question oflegality. 
If the concept of opposability is used in the context of the clash between the principle ex factis 
jus oritur and the principle ex injuria jus non oritur, it appears that Lauterpacht unintentionally 
distinguished between the validation of the originally illegal act and the opposability of illegal acts 
against each state. Indeed, he regarded the legal effect of recognition not to be to legalise the illegal 
act but to accept the effect ofthe illegal act. He said, '[t]here is no question here of legalizing the 
illegal act; the question is one of disregarding the effects of the illegality. '74 If recognition as the 
application of the principle ex factis jus oritur is the matter of 'disregarding the effects of the 
illegality' in tenns of opposability, it is not difficult to avoid the nonnative conflict between the two 
principles. On the one hand, the principle ex injuria jus non oritur is related to the question of the 
legality that causes universal legal effects to oblige other states to respect the situation without 
recognition or acquiescence. On the other hand, the application of the principle ex factis jus oritur 
does not create the legal effect of the illegal situation unless other states recognise the situation. In 
this sense, Lauterpacht considered that '[t]he fimdamental principle ex injuria jus non oritur is 
unaffected by the far-reaching qualification expressed in the rival maxim ex factis jus oritur. '75 
Therefore, in Lauterpacht's view, the principle ex injuria jus non oritur is always operative in the 
normative sphere. 
This point also explains the reason why Lauterpacht considered the question whether states 
73 Ibid./345. 
74 Lauterpacht'Recognition/429. 
75 Ibid/426. 
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should recognise the illegal situation as the question of political decision rather than as the matter of 
law. The principle ex injuria jus non oritw always prevents the wrongdoer from acquiring the legal 
right in the normative sphere oflaw: 
'The results of an illegal act are a legal nullity; they are legally non-existent The wrongdoer acquires no right 
underit'76 
Therefore, the question whether or not a state should recognise the illegal situation seems to 
Laute:rpacht to be a matter of political decision: 
'When they [facts] are unlawful, and in particular when their illegality consists in acts of aggression against the 
very life of other members of the community in deliberate disregard of fundamental legal obligations of 
conduct, a heavy and most responsible blU"den of proof fulls upon those embarking upon the legalization of the 
effects of illegality. Recognition of the effects of illegality may be a wise weapon of international policy or a 
bitter pill of unavoidable political necessity. Its merits in any particular case are not a matter for legal 
judgement so long as it is clear that in the opinion of those taking the decision non-recognition of the fiuits of 
lawlessness is and remains an essential principle oflaw' 77 
Although he criticised the easy policy of the abandonment of non-recognition from the normative 
viewpoint, it is also seen that Laute:rpacht tried to justify even the British breach of the obligation of 
non-recognition under the resolutions of the League, which he thought obligatory, in the name of 
the general interest of the international community. Thus, in the context of the British recognition of 
the Italian annexation of Abyssinia, he stated, 
'The decision of Great Britain and of other countries to recognize, in 1938, the annexation of Abyssinia by 
76 lbid/429. 
77 lbid/430. 
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Italy . . . must be judged by considerations of this nature. In so far as in the intention of its authors the 
recognition was contemplated as the first and indispensable condition of pacification of Europe and of the 
world, it is arguable that such recognition could be regarded as having been conceded in the general interest It 
was an act ofintemationaJ policy which, although open to criticism by reference to its political wisdom and to 
its readiness to assume the probability of a radical change in the future conduct of the State responsible for the 
original illegality, could be questioned on legal grounds only on account of any disregard of the obligation of 
non-recognition binding upon members of the League.' 78 
However, the policy of the British government with reference to the Abyssinian crisis, including the 
abandonment of the policy of non-recognition, was to keep British control of the Mediterranean by 
protecting the British fleet rather than by protecting the general interest of the international 
community by avoiding a war with Italy. Gathorne-Hardy explained the fear of the British 
government in the Abyssinian crisis as follows: 
'Ifltaly were faced with defeat, she would rather go down fighting the champions of the League than face the 
ignominy of a second Adowa, brought about by a shortage of supplies. And, when she turned to look for the 
League's forces in the field, she would find only those of Great Britain. "We alone have taken these militaiy 
precautions. There is the British fleet in the Mediterranean, there are the British reinforcements in Egypt, in 
Malta and Aden. Not a ship, not a machine, not a man has been moved by any member State." The hollow 
pretence, as Sir Samuel [Hoare] viewed it, of collective resistance would be exposed when the struggle turned 
into a duel between just two nations.' 79 
Thus, the policy of the British government in the Abyssinian affair was far from Lauterpacht's 
political justification of the abandonment of the policy of non-recognition in the name of the 
general interest of the international community. Rather, the United Kingdom intentionally 
78 lbid/430/n.l. 
79 Gathorne-Hardy/1950/414. 
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abandoned Abyssinia Such logic which conceals the national interest of the Allied nations in the 
name of the international community is also seen in the justi:fiability of the non-belligerency of the 
United States and in the punishment of war criminals. 
3.3. '1rHIE JfU§TIF][ABJDLlTI{ OF NON-lBJELUGJERENCY 
Before the establishment of the League of Nations, neutral states had been strictly required to 
comply with the law of neutrality. It fi.mctioned as the containment of war between belligerents. 
However, as war was becoming illegal, the status of neutrality was revisited in the context of the 
collective security of the League ofNations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact In other words, although 
the law of neutrality obliges neutral states to be impartial between belligerents, collective security, at 
least theoretically, requires all states to join in sanctions against aggressive states. Did neutral states 
still have an obligation to be impartial between belligerents, even in the case of aggression during 
the Second World War? 
It should be noted that this question is essentially about the justification of non-belligerency. 
However, in order to discuss this question, we should discuss the Covenant and the Paris Pact 
separately, because the effects of these treaties are different from each other. With regard to the 
Covenant, the question is 'the compatibility of neutrality with obligations of assistance in 
international treaties. '80 As Lauterpacht said, 
'There is little doubt that international law in the hundred years preceding the Covenant rejected the idea of 
qualified neutrality. However, rules of neutrality, like other rules of international law, can be modified by 
agreement. There is nothing to prevent a State from giving up in a treaty some of its rights, including the right 
to be treated in an impartial manner when engaged in a war undertaken in breach of the terms of the treaty. 
The Covenant constitutes such a treaty. '81 
80 Lauterpacht/1936a/144. 
81 /bid./142. 
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However, on the other hand, he did not consider that the Paris Pact constituted such a treaty which 
modified the law of neutrality. 
'[T]he Treaty [the Paris Pact] has not directly affected the law of neutrality. It has not imposed upon the 
signatories the obligation to abandon all or some duties of neutrality to the disadvantage of the State breaking 
the Treaty. It is controversial whether it has conferred upon them the right to modifY the laws of neutrality in 
that direction.' 
Nevertheless, he suggested that the Paris Pact could justify 'qualified neutrality' 'There is room for 
the view that the degree and the extent of the violation of the Treaty and of the resulting danger to 
international society at large are relevant factors in a situation in which the parties have failed to 
make expressive provision for the cogent implications of the Treaty. '82 
In a sense, the difference between the Covenant and the Paris Pact with regard to the legal 
effect on the status of neutrality is that the fanner changed the obligations of neutral states, while 
the latter justifies the breach of their obligations as counter-measure. This logical difference 
between two treaties was surely significant, especially with regard to the actual controversy over 
the status of neutrality, namely the legality of the non-belligerency of the United States, including 
the Lend-Lease Act, from September, 1940 to December 8, 1941. The modification ofthe law of 
neutrality by the Covenant could not justify the non-belligerency of the United States, which was 
short of an act of war but clearly a breach of the law of neutrality, because the United States was not 
a member of the League of Nations. Lauterpacht apparently tried to justify the non-belligerency 
policy of the United States with Robert Jackson when he visited the United States from October to 
December 1941. Later, he submitted his memoranda on the non-belligerency of the United States 
to Stephan Gaselee of the Foreign Office.83 
82 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht/1952'64 3-644. 
83 F0/371130678. 
129 
Lauterpacht submitted two attempts to justify US non-belligerency. The first one was to treat 
German U-boat activity as a form of piracy: '[T]his insistence on the piratical nature of the German 
conduct of hostilities at sea, far from constituting mere abuse of an unfriendly State or mere 
corruption of legal language, is in accordance with the terminology used by international lawyers 
and in the governmental and judicial practice of most States, in particular of the United States.' 
Because German submarine activity amounted to piracy, the United States could exercise 'the 
traditional right of effective annament against criminal sets of piracy.' 84 However, this view of 
Lauterpacht was less persuasive, because he disregarded an important element of piracy, animus 
furandi, which distinguishes between piracy and war.85 Gaselee rejected the justification to treat U-
boat attacks as piracy on the grounds that '[this memorandum] does I think demonstrate that 
"animus furandi" is not an essential element in piracy, but I do not feel that it establishes that the 
word can legitimately be used to describe operations by warship of a recognised belligerent which 
are conducted in accordance with instruction received form the authorities of the belligerent 
State.'86 
Another of Lauterpacht's attempts to justify US non-belligerency defends the address of 
Robert Jackson, the Attorney General of the United States at that time, in Havana on 27 March 
1941 with regard to the Lend-Lease Act. In order to understand his justification, it is necessary to 
examine Jackson's address and the criticism of Edwin Borchard. In that address, Jackson used 
three types of justification of the Lend-Lease Act. First, he denied the obligation of neutral states to 
be absolutely impartial between belligerents from the 11' century to 19111 century with the theory of 
just war: '[T]here has seldom, if ever, been a long period of time during the past three centuries 
when states, for their own self-defence or from other motives, have been completely impartial in 
relation to the belligerents. '87 In other words, the binomial opposition between absolute neutrality 
and belligerency seemed to him not to explain state practice in history, rather, 'a third category in 
84 J ..auterpacht/R2b/194/J?.. 
85 See Schmitt/1994/53-54. 
86 F0/371/30678. 
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which certain acts of partiality are legal even under the law of neutrality' seemed to him to have 
existed as 'discriminating, qualified neutrality.' 88 Moreover, the Paris Pact and other treaties 
prohibiting aggression seemed to Jackson to have 'destroyed the historical and juridical foundations 
of the doctrine of neutrality conceived as an attitude of absolute impartiality in relation to 
aggressive war.' Then, Jackson continued to justify the Lend-Lease Act by the application of the 
principle ex injuria jus non oritur: 
'[The Kellogg-Briand Pact] did not impose upon the signatories the duty of discriminating against an 
aggressor, but it conferred upon them the right to act in that manner. This right they are indisputably entitled to 
exercise as guardians both of their own interests and of the wider international community. It follows that the 
state which has gone to war in violation of its obligations acquires no right to equality of treatment from other 
states, unless treaty obligations require different handling of affuirs. It derives no rights from its illegality. '89 
The third type of justification is simply self -defence: 
'There can be no doubt that the political, territorial, economic, and cultural integrity of the Western 
Hemisphere is menaced by totalitarian activities now going on outside this hemisphere. In this situation the 
principle of self-defence may most properly be invoked, and we in the Americas are invoking it in relation to 
the facts as we know them and as we, in our best judgement, can foresee them in the future. '90 
It should be noted, however, that this invocation of self-defence is based on the Monroe doctrine. 
Edwin Borchard criticised this address by Jackson. According to Borchard, Jackson could 
conclude 'either (a) that as a neutral a virtuous state may discriminate against a belligerent whose 
war the neutral considers unjust, or to use the modem lingo, is an "aggressor," or (b) that as a "non-
87 Jackson/1941al351. 
88/bid. 
89 Ibid/354. Emphasis original. 
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belligerent" it is not bmmd by the obligations of neutrality which imply certain rules of law, 
including impartiality and abstention. '91 In either case, the discriminatory neutrality which Jackson 
claimed seemed to Borchard to be nothing but a political excuse. He said that 'the legal fact seems 
to be that non-belligerency is a name used as a modern excuse for violating the laws of neutrality 
and in the hope that warlike acts can be committed while escaping the consequences of 
belligerency;'92 In other words, Borchard thought that the United States was 'in a state of limited 
war.' 
Robert Jackson himself did not notice Borchard's criticism, and he pretended that the criticism 
did not matter at all even after he knew: 'I have just read the Borchard article. So far as I am 
personally concerned, it does not worry me, for it is the sort of job that will not stand the test of 
time. '93 However, Lauterpacht was very concerned about Bore hard's criticism, because he had 
assisted in the preparation of Jackson's address.94 In the memorandum submitted to Jackson, 
Lauterpacht simply repeated the justification of the non-belligerent policy of the United States as 
the punishment of piracy, self-defence and counter-measure in the style of the refutation of 
Borchard's view. However, it is still useful to read the third memorandum, because of 
Lauterpacht' s conception of' qualified neutrality.' 
In that memorandum, Lauterpacht found that '[t]hat practice of qualified neutrality, i.e., of 
assistance to one belligerent, in pursuance of a treaty of defensive alliance, was a distinguishing 
feature of the eighteenth century. '95 This point shows why Lauterpacht did not use the term 'non-
belligerency,' because he wanted to link the non-belligerency of the United States to traditional 
state practice known as qualified neutrality. However, he should have distinguished between non-
belligerency and qualified neutrality. Ake Harnrnarskjold, for example, used the term 'non-
belligerency' in order to emphasise that 'the status of non-belligerency under the Kellogg-Briand 
90 lbid/357. 
91 Borchard/19411621. 
92 Ihid/624. 
93 Jackson/1941b. 
94 Lauterpacht/R2a/1942/4/para.6. 
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Pact is not necessarily identical with the status of neutrality in pre-war international law. '96 Stephan 
Neff also thinks that 'imperfect neutrality' is the status which allows neutral states 'to fulfil pre-war 
aid arrangements to belligerents without forfeiting their neutral status,' while non-belligerency in 
the Second World War was just a voluntary JX>licy of neutral states in the sense that it was not 
instituted pursuant to pre-war legal obligation. 97 Lauterpacht must also have understood the 
difference between qualified (or imperfect) neutrality and non-belligerency, because he noted that 
while the Covenant changed the obligations of neutral states in so far as they were members of the 
League, the Pact did not change the obligations of neutral states which were parties to the Pact. The 
Pact could justify the non-belligerency JX>licy of the United States against Germany as the counter-
measure to the breach of the Pact However, it is a different justification from the qualified 
neutrality that neutral states are obliged to assist one belligerent under a pre-war treaty. 
It should be noted that the conception of qualified neutrality for Lauterpacht is based on the 
right ofneutrals. In the memorandum submitted to Jackson, he said that 'every State has a right to 
find that a violation of the law has taken place and to resort to or insist on such measures of redress 
and retaliation as international law permits' unless a judicial organ decides the problem.98 
Lauterpacht once more repeated the thesis of qualified neutrality as Grotian Tradition. He defended 
'the right of neutrals to form a judgement on the legal justice of the war waged by belligerents and 
to adopt discriminatory treatment in accordance with that judgement. '99 These statements show that 
Lauterpacht considered the question of qualified neutrality as a kind of collective security within a 
decentralised world. In the situation where no central authority with a right to decide on the legality 
of war exists, every neutral state should have the fi.mction to decide which belligerent is just 
Otherwise, the just-war theory would not wotk in the sense that it cannot be determined which 
belligerent is right or wrong, and the concept of war would revert to the era of the non-
95 Lauterpacht!R2d/1942/13. 
96 RILA/vol.38/1935/31. 
97 Neff/2000/188. 
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discriminative war. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Lauterpacht considered such a right to decide as having not 
only a legal character but also a moral nature: 
'There is no merit in the suggestion that moral judgement can proceed only from persons or collectivities 
saintly and immaculate in their past or present conduct Neither is it }XlSSible to acquiesce in the view that there 
is about international relations a mystical quality of fatalism and inscrutability and infinite complication which 
renders them impervious to ethical judgement and intelligence. These are not considerations alien to the 
subject under discussion or international law in general. For ultimately international law must be based on the 
moral judgement and moral responsibility.' 100 
Thus, his theory of qualified neutrality clearly proves the correctness ofKennan's explanation that 
legalistic ideas are inevitably associated with moralistic ones. 101 This problem of legalism appears 
more clearly in the context of the next section on the punishment of war criminals. 
3.4. THE PuNisHMENT OF WAR CruMINALS 
3.4.1. GENERAL0BSERVATIONS 
As the atrocities committed by Nazi Gennany in occupied territory became clear, the Allied nations 
decided the punislnnent of government officials of the Third Reich after the end of the war. In 
November 1943, the three main powers of the Allied nations, the United Kingdom, the United 
States and the Soviet Union, issued the Moscow Declaration that 'those German officers and men 
and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in 
the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their 
100 Lautetpacht/R2d/1942/16. 
101 Kennan/195111 00. 
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abomillable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws 
of these liberated countries and of the Free Governments which will be erected therein.' IfNazism 
was understood as 'the reversion of enlightened civilization to barbarism in reality,' 102 the 
determination to punish Nazis no doubt seemed to the Allied nations to be the reaction of modem 
civilisation. The Opening Address ofFran~is de Menthon in the Nuremberg Trial clearly indicated 
this belief commonly held by the Allied nations: 
'As Mr. Justice Jackson said so eloquently at the opening of this trial: "Civilisation would not survive if these 
crimes were to be committed again," and he added: "The true plaintiff in this Court is civilisation." Civilisation 
requires from you, after this unleashing of barbarism, a verdict which will also be a sort of supreme warning at 
the hour when humanity appears still, at times, to enter the path of the organisation of peace only with 
apprehension and hesitation' 103 
This Opening Address of de Menthon shows that international law applied to the Nuremberg Trial 
was for the Allied nations nothing but the legal expression of modem civilisation. It should be noted, 
however, that such a concept of international law as 'civilisation' is understood from the viewpoint 
of the legal school of international lawyers. The traditional diplomatic school of international 
lawyers was unable to understand what kind of 'international law' which the prosecutors at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo argued about Edwin Borchard, for example, said about the Nuremberg 
Trial as follows: 
'[I]t was not an old or a new international law which was applied, but a new municipal law, a criminal law 
which was not theretofore known .... It must be, therefore, that the victors have simply availed themselves of 
their power as victors to judge the vanquished, and for that reason it seems unlikely, in spite of Justice 
Jackson's predictions, that the judgement, however just, will commend itself as an authority in international 
102 Horkheimer-Adomo/2002/xi:x. 
103 TGMWC/Part 4/377. 
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law.'Hl4 
In this sense, no case demonstrates better than the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials the characteristics 
and limitations oflegalism in international relations. With regard to this point, Judith Shklar said: 
'If one sees law and politics not as divorced but as parts of a single continuum, one can see how high a degree 
oflegalism the [Nuremberg] Trial involved if measured on a scale of degrees oflegalism. It did this because of 
its inner structure and its aim. What makes the Nuremberg Trial so remarkable is that, in the absence of strict 
legal justification, it was a great legalistic act, the most legalistic of all possible policies, and, as such, a 
powetful inspiration to the legalistic ethos.' 105 
However, even the legal school found it less than easy to pursue their policy of justice. There 
were too many obstacles to the punishment of the government officials of the Third Reich and 
Japan as war criminals, even from the viewpoint oflegalism. It is true that as war was made illegal 
after the First World War, the concept of war crimes began to include breaches of jus contra bellum. 
The attempt to accuse William ll of 'the supreme offence against international morality and the 
sanctity of treaties' is one example of the conceptual expansion of war crimes and international 
criminal responsibility, although the Allied nations were unable to punish him, since the Dutch 
government refused to extradite him to the Allied nations because 'the crimes of which he was 
accused were not contemplated in the Dutch Constitution.'106 It should be noted, nevertheless, that 
the crimes against peace were not the automatic result of the outlawry of war. 
First, the Kellogg-Briand Pact neither defines aggression nor mentions the criminality of the 
aggressive war. It is because Kellogg rejected the French suggestion that the Paris Pact should 
provide only for the renunciation of wars of aggression. For Kellogg, the definition of aggression 
104 Borchard/1947/107. 
105 Shklar/1964/170. 
106 Cassese/2003/328. 
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was too difficult to be satisfactory, and abuse of the tenn may result :from an unsatisfactory 
definition of aggression. In this sense, Kellogg agreed with Austen Chamberlain, the British 
Foreign Secretary at that time, who said, 'I therefore remain opposed to this attempt to define the 
aggressor because I believe that it will be a trap for the innocent and a signpost for the guilty.' 107 
However, the fact still remains that the absence of a definition of aggression is fatal for any attempt 
to attribute the crime against peace to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, even if the Pact condemns 'recourse 
to war for the solution of international controversies' and renounces 'it as an instnunent of national 
policy.' As Schmitt pointed out, the mere renunciation of war is not naturally the criminalisation of 
the situation of war. 108 The definition of crime is necessary to punish the person who is thought to 
commit the crime. If the contracting parties to the Pact gave up defining aggression., it would 
naturally follow that they had no intention to criminalise aggression at the time of signature. 
Second, the Kellogg-Briand Pact does not mention individual responsibility for aggressive 
war at all. Therefore, it was legally impossible to draw individual responsibility :from the Pact. Ipsen 
stated as follows: 
'With regard to the Pact of Paris, resort to war wac> illegal in international law at that time. Such a breach wac>-
and could only be - committed by the state resorting to war, and this state, a<> a subject of international law, 
wac> resJX>nsible under this law for the wrongful act At the time of the Tokyo trial, this international 
responsibility wac> clearly a state resJX>nsibility, not an individual resJX>nsibility.' 109 
Yasuaki Onuma also mentions the following: 
'It is true that one of these, the illegality of war, had been established in international law by the time of the 
outbreak of the war. However, this is not true in the case of leader's resJX>nsibility. Therefore, crimes against 
107 Kcllogg/1928/259. 
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peace, which is a synthesis of these two, must be considered a new category of crime that came into existence 
only at the end of World War ll.' IJD 
The legal difficulty of new types of war crime was not only restricted to the crime against 
peace. The crime against humanity was also a new concept of international crime, 111 although the 
Allied nations pretended that crimes against humanity had existed as well as crimes against peace 
before the outbreak of the Second World War. One of the American representatives on the United 
Nations War Crimes Commission claimed 'the application of laws of humanity' stipulated in the 
Martens clause of the Fourth Hague Convention on Land Warfare. 112 Furthennore, the tenn 'crimes 
against humanity,' according to the United Nations War Crimes Commission, had been used in 
declarations by the governments of France, the United Kingdom and Russia with regard to the 
massacres of the Annenian population in Turkey for describing 'inhuman acts committed by a 
government against its own subjects' in a non-technical sense.113 Nevertheless, the history of 'the 
Road to Nuremberg' itself shows that the crime against humanity was created in order to accuse the 
Nazis of the Holocaust. It does not mean, of course, that Nazis such as Julius Streicher, who was 
sentenced to death by hanging only for crimes against humanity, should have been acquitted due to 
the principle nullum crimen sine lege. The Holocaust is morally evil enough to be punished. 
However, even the wickedness of the Nazis with regard to the Holocaust cannot conceal the fact 
that the concept of crimes against humanity was created in order to punish them during the Second 
World War. As noted below, even Lauterpacht admitted that the crime against humanity is of a 
novel character.114 
It was necessary, therefore, for the Allied nations to fill gaps between existing law and their 
policy by making new law in order to proceed to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials. It is noteworthy 
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that Lauterpacht contributed to this gap-filling process and the Nuremberg Trial itself, though it is 
true that 'the full story ofLauterpacht's role in Nuremberg remains untold.' 115 It is partly because 
his contribution was rather unofficial and supportive. Robert Jackson personally consulted 
Lauterpacht about international law. As mentioned above, Lauterpacht prepared Jackson's address 
in Havana on the non-belligerency of the United States. Moreover, Lauterpacht made a draft for 
Jackson to refute the criticism of Borchard with regard to that address, although Jackson himself 
hesitated to publish it. Jackson is furthermore said to have deepened his belief that aggressive war is 
illegal after talking to Lauterpacht.116 It is also said that it was Lauterpacht who inspired Jackson to 
incorporate three types of crimes into Article 6 of the London Charter, including the term 'crime 
against humanity.' 117 Indeed, Lauterpacht is thought to be 'a standard authority' of international law 
which Jackson mentioned in his report to the President of the United States.118 These instances 
indicate that the influence ofLauterpacht over Jackson, who was one of the most influential figures 
in the Nuremberg Trial as a representative of the United States in the drafting conference of London 
Charter and as the American chief prosecutor in the Nuremberg Trial, was too great to be negligible. 
It is also true that Lauterpacht certainly served for the British War Crimes Executive from 1945 to 
1946. However, his role in the BWCE too seems to have been supportive rather than leading. 
Lauterpacht prepared for the legal aspect of the first draft of the Opening Speech for Shawcross as 
the British chief prosecutor in the Nuremberg,119 but Lauterpacht himself did not appear on the 
115 Koskenniemi/2001/389. 
116 Tusa-Tusa/1983/82. 
117 Robinson/1972/3; Tusa-Tusa/1983/87; Bassiouni/1992/17. 
118 Feinberg/1968/340. In his report to the President of the United States, Jackson said as follows: 
'But International Law as taught in the Nineteenth and the early party of the Twentieth Century 
generally declared that war-making was not illegal and is no crime at law. Summarized by a 
standard authority, its attitude was that "both parties to every war are regarded as being in an 
identical legal position, and consequently as being possessed of equal rights." This, however, was a 
departure from the· doctrine taught by Grotius, the father of International Law, that there is a 
distinction between the just and unjust war - the war of defense and the war of aggression.' 
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which are recorded here in, and as a mark of esteem from Hartley Shawcross.' Also see Tusa-
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stage of the Nuremberg Trial. Nevertheless, it is possible to trace, to a certain degree, his 
contribution to the Nuremberg Trial. It may now be proper for us to discuss the International 
Commission for Penal Reconstruction and Development, which is sometimes called the 
Cambridge group. 
3.4.2. THE RoAD ro NUJREMBERG 
On 14 November 1941, the Department of Criminal Science at Cambridge University held a 
conference with jurists from other countries, appointed by their governments. It was the 
International Commission for Penal Reconstruction and Development. The Commission itself was 
established as an academic study group. However, because some members came from the Nine 
Powers, the British government later approved the funding of the Commission as a semi-official 
group. In a sense, the Commission is the first step on 'the Road to Nuremberg.' The United Nations 
War Crimes Commission testifies that '[i]t also contributed to the creation in official and semi-
official circles of an atmosphere favourable to the conception of the punishment of war 
criminals.' 120 Lauterpacht no doubt contributed to creating such an atmosphere. 
At that conference in November, 1941, the Commission set up a committee for the study of 
principles and rules of 'Crimes against International Public Order' under the chairmanship of 
Arnold McNair. Lauterpacht played an important role in 'the Committee concerned with Crimes 
against International Public Order.' By 15 July 1942, the Committee reached three conclusions. 
First, it is appropriate to establish the international criminal court, though the majority of war 
criminals would come within the jurisdiction of municipal courts. Second, the Armistice terms 
should contain stipulations concerning the surrender of war criminals. The third conclusion was 
that the Allied nations should publicly warn neutral states of the inadvisability of granting asylum to 
war criminals.121 The Committee then established three sub-committees for the finther study as 
120 UNWCC/99. 
121 Jbid/96. 
140 
follows: (1) the scope of war crimes, how far they come within the competence of municipal courts, 
and what crimes could not be covered by such cotnis, (2) the plea of superior orders, and (3) the 
problem of the extradition of war criminals.122 Lauterpacht joined the first and second sub-
committees. The Commission itself did not produce any definite recommendation. However, the 
main research carried out by Lauterpacht on the Committee was published as The Law qf Nations 
and the Punishment of War Crimes in 1944.123 Moreover, the Public Record Office keeps a 
memorandum by Lauterpacht, which seems to have been submitted to the first sub-committee, 
with regard to the note of de Bear, President of the Military Court of Belgium at that time.124 
Therefore, it is possible to find his Committee works among these papers. 
3.4.1.1. THE DEFINITION OF WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
One of Lauterpacht's contributions to the Committee was to make clear the definition of war 
crimes: 'War crimes may properly be defined as such offences against the law of war as are 
criminal in the ordinary and accepted sense of fundamental rules of warfare and of general 
principles of criminal law by reason of their heinousness and their brutality, their ruthless disregard 
of the sanctity of human life and personality, or their wanton interference with rights of property 
unrelated to reasonably conceived requirements of military necessity.' 125 This definition was 
approved as the basis of future discussion by the Committee, which means the definition became 
the basis of a further survey of the issue of the punishment of war criminals. 
In the context of the definition of war crimes, Lauterpacht proposed the original idea of crimes 
against humanity as the 'Ordering of and participation by officials in measures of racial segregation 
and extennination against the Jewish section of the population.' He continued to comment on tlus 
122 !bid 
123 He said that '(t]hls article has grown out of a Memorandum submitted in July 1942 to the 
Committee concerned with Crimes against International Public Order.' Lauterpacht/1944b/58/n.1. 
124 Lauterpacht/R3. 
125 UNWCC/95. Lauterpacht/1944b/79. 
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new type of war crime. 
'This particular war crime is of a novel character. But so is in the annals of militruy occupation the deliberate 
and proclaimed policy of Germany to achieve through segregation, accompanied by denial of adequate food 
and medical services, the extennination of the Jewish population in the territories under her control. For this 
reason the policy of racial segregation directed against the Jews appears as a specific war crime in the 
memoranda submitted by the various members of the Committee. The number of persons associated with the 
policy of extermination to a degree sufficient to warrant prosecution before tribunals must necessarily be 
limited. However, the cruelty and the moral and physical suffering inflicted upon a substantial section of the 
population of the occupied territories as the result of that policy of extennination are [sic] such that its 
execution ought to be specifically branded as a war crime so serious as to justify inclusion among the crimes 
in respect of which the handing over of the principal persons responsible must be insisted upon as a condition 
of the armistice.' 126 
Lauterpacht' s memorandum showed that the original idea of crimes against humanity was 
discussed in the context of war crimes. 
Thus, Article 6 (c) of the London Charter defines crimes against humanity in the context of 
war crimes as follows: 
'Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extennination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. Leaders, organisers, 
instigators and accomplices participating in the fonnulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to 
commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts perfonned by any persons in execution of such 
126 Lauterpacht/R3/2. 
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plan.' 
It should be noted that the terms 'in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal' in Article 6 (c) allowed the Nuremberg Tribunal to declare that it 'cannot make a general 
declaration that the acts before 1939 were crimes against humanity within the meaning of the 
[London] Charter, but from the beginning of the war in 1939 war crimes were committed on a vast 
scale, which were also crimes against hliD1anity.' 127 In a sense, the Tribunal followed the original 
idea of crimes against humanity. 128 However, it is also tmdeniable that the judgement demolished 
the raison d'etre of Article 6 (c), as Donnediu de Vabres, the French Justice of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, later confessed that 'the category of crimes against hliD1anity which the Charter had let 
enter by a very small door evaporated by virtue of the Tribunal's judgement' 129 Therefore, it is 
understandable that the Control Cotmcil for Germany deleted the terms from its Law No.1 0.130 
3.4.1.2. THE PLEA OF SUPERIOR ORDER 
Another important contribution by Lauterpacht to 'the Road to Nuremberg' is his revision of the 
plea of superior order, which could have become the most effective defence for the defendants, for 
the preparation for the punishment of war criminals. Even Lord Wright, Chairman of the United 
Nations War Crimes Commission, admitted that the plea of superior order would have made it 
meaningless to punish the government officials of the Third Reich as war criminals, if the plea was 
accepted as well as the defence of the immunity of heads of states.131 One of the reasons those 
127 ADR/vol.1311946/213. 
128 See Schwelb/1946/207. 
129 Cited from Arendt/1994/257. 
130 The text of Law No.lO is as follows: 'Crimes against Humanity: atrocities and offences, 
including but not limited to murder, extennination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, 
rape or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, 
racial or religious· grmmds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country where 
perpetrated.' 
131 Lord/Wright/1946/45. 
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concerned with the Nuremberg Trial were worried about the plea of superior order was the 
acceptance of this plea by the British Manual of Military Law and the United States Rules of Land 
Warfare. The British Manual mentioned that '[i]t is important to note that members of the armed 
forces who commit violations of the recognised rules of warfare such as are ordered by their 
Government, or by their commanders, are not war criminals and cannot therefore be punished by 
the enemy.' 132 The American Manual (para347) also said that '[i]ndividuals of the armed forces 
will not be punished for these offences (i.e. violations of the laws of war) in case they are 
committed under the orders or sanctions of their government or commanders.' 133 With regard to the 
British Manual, this stipulation was inserted by Lassa Oppenheim, who wrote in his treatise as 
follows: 
'Violations of rules regarding warfare are war crimes only when committed without an order of the belligerent 
Government concerned. If members of the anned forces commit violations by order of their Government, 
they are not war criminals and may not be punished by the enemy. . . In case members of forces commit 
violations ordered by their commanders, the members may not be punished, for the commanders are alone 
responsible, and the latter may, therefore, be punished as war criminals on their capture by the enemy.' 134 
However, the fact is that it was already proven at the end of the First World War that 
Oppenheim' s remark about the plea of superior order was backed up by no evidence at all. M organ, 
who was vice-chairman of the British Government War Crimes Committee of 1918-1919 known 
as the Biikenhead Committee, said about the plea of superior order: 
'I examined exhaustively all the authorities in English, American, French, and Gennan Law, both "civil" and 
military, and, what is more important, all the leading textbooks of those four countries on International Law. 
132 War/Office/1914/302/parct443. 
133 Cited from UNWCC/95. 
134 Oppenheim/1912b/31 0. Emphasis original. 
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The only "authority" I could find was Professor Oppenheim's own book on "International Law." ... I was 
able to report to the [Birkenhead] Committee in my "Opinion" that I could find nothing in them which would 
give the slightest support to Professor Oppenheim's contention. That "Opinion" was adopted by the 
Committee who unanimously reported that "the statement (by Professor Oppenheim) in the 'Manual of 
Military Law' lacks authoritj' and that "We cannot accept the doctrine that it is the duty of a soldier never to 
question an order which he receives." They also unanimously recommend that no plea of superior order 
should be accepted in the trial of German war criminals if it could be proved that ''the act charged was 
flagrantly and obviously contrary to the laws and customs of war''.' 135 
In 1922, Lord Cave also denied the authority of the plea of superior order in the Manual.136 
Nevertheless, the statement of the plea of superior order remained in the British Manual of 
Military Law and in Oppenheim 's even after the First World War. Consequently, the Supreme 
Cotut of Gennany in Leipzig, which had to punish Gennan war criminals instead of surrendering 
the German accused to the Allied nations under Articles 228-230 of the Treaty of Versailles, 
accepted, by referring to the British Manual, the plea of superior order in the Dover Castle case, 
where the accused was charged with the torpedo-attack against the English hospital ship Dover 
Castle. 
'It is a military principle that the subordinate is bound to obey the orders ofhis superiors ... .Its 
consequence is that, when the execution of a service order involves an offence against the 
criminal law, the superior giving the order is alone responsible .. .It also accords with the legal 
principles of all other civilised states (see, for example, as regards England, the Manual of 
Military Law (1914), chapter XJv, Art443 .. . ) ... So far as he did that, he was free from 
criminal responsibility.' 137 
135 Morgan/1948/12-13. Emphasis original. 
136 Lord/Cave/19221xxiii. 
137 AD/vol.2/1923-1924/430. Emphasis added. 
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The same situation could have happened at Nuremberg, because any defendants had been thought 
to claim that they acted under the orders of Hitler, and in fact they claimed so. Therefore, it is not so 
surprising that Lauterpacht paid much attention to the question of the plea of superior order in the 
paper submitted to 'the Committee concerned with Crimes against International Public Order.' 
However, Lauterpacht himself had not amended the statement of the plea of superior order in the 
fifth edition of Oppenheim 's, although he maintained the footnote added by McNair that '[i]t is 
difficult to say that recent events have qualified it [the plea of superior order] as a rule of customary 
International Law.' 138 In this sense, it is not so admirable for him to say that 'writers on international 
law have almost universally rejected the doctrine of superior order as an absolute justification of 
war crimes' by referring to his own sixth edition of Oppenheim 's in 1940.139 
With regard to the reformulation of the plea of superior order, Lauterpacht followed the 
judgement of the German Supreme Court in the Llandovery Castle case, where two subordinate 
officers in a German submarine were charged with firing on people who had escaped from the 
English hospital ship Llandovery Castle, attacked by the submarine. In this case, the German 
Supreme Court maintained that the plea of superior order is inapplicable 'if such an order is 
universally known to everybody, including the accused, to be without any doubt whatever against 
the law.' 140 Lauterpacht adopted the existence of mens rea as the condition of responsibility: 
'[TJhere can be no accountability, or there must be diminished liability, if the accused acted in the legitimate 
belief that he was proceeding in accordance with law, both municipal and international. ... [T]he clear illegal 
nature of the orders - illegal by reference to generally acknowledged principles of international law so 
identified with cogent dictates of humanity as to be obvious to any person of ordinary understanding- renders 
the filet of superior order irrelevant' 
138 Oppenheim-Lautcrpacht/1935/454/n.l. 
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He then continued that 'such a degree of compulsion as must be deemed to·exist in the case of a 
soldier or officer exposing himself to immediate danger of death as the result of a refusal to obey an 
order excludes pro tanto the accountability of the accused - unless, indeed, we adopted the view, 
which cannot lightly be dismissed, that the person threatened with such summary punishment is not 
entitled to save his own life at the expense of the victim or, in particular, of many victims.' 
Consequently, according to Lauterpacht, judges are able to reject the plea of superior order against 
'a person obeying an obviously unlawful order, the refusal to obey which would not put him in 
immediate jeopardy,' though applying the plea to 'a person obeying, in an isolated case, an illegal 
order which is not on the face of it unlawful and disobedience to which would expose him to the 
full rigours of summary military discipline. ' 141 
His above reformulation of the defence of superior order was persuasive enough to make the 
United Kingdom and the United States change their own military law manuals, as the United 
Nations War Crinles Commission acknowledged. 142 The Allied nations, furthermore, adopted his 
formulation as the basis of Article 8 of the London Charter that '[t]he fact that the Defendant acted 
pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may 
be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.' In 
fact, the Nuremberg Tribunal dealt strictly with the plea of superior order as a justification of the 
mitigation: 
'That a soldier was ordered to kill or torture in violation of the international law of war has never been 
recognized as a defence to such acts of brutality, though, . . . the order may be urged in mitigation of the 
punishment The true test, which is found in the criminal law of most nations, is not the existence of the order, 
but whether moral choice was in fact possible ... ' 143 
141 Lauterpacht/1944b/73. 
142 UNWCC/276/n.l. 
143 ADR/vol.13/1946!2:i2. 
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3.43. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
The efforts of Allied lawyers, including Lauterpacht, to make the Nuremberg Trials as far as 
possible a genuine judicial procedure surely shows their legalistic policy which attempts to judge 
the justness of war as the expression of the sovereignty of states with international law. Lauterpacht 
said: 
'[W]e shall be justified in giving - and bound to give - full weight to any possible legal limitations upon the 
right of the victor to punish enemy nationals accused of war crimes and to any safeguards calculated to ensure 
the proper exercise of that right For the cause of international law demands not only the punishment of 
persons guilty of war crimes. It requires that such punishment shall take place in accordance with international 
Indeed, considering the fact that most accused who sentenced by the Tribunal at Nuremberg 'were 
found guilty, in addition to other crimes, of ordinary war crimes as defined in the Charter in full 
confonnity with existing law,' Lauterpacht interpreted the Nuremberg Trial as follows: 
'In the light of that fact the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg must be viewed primarily as a 
tribunal constituted for the punishment of war crimes proper. This was done through the joint exercise, by the 
four States which established the Tribunal, of a right which each of them was entitled to exercise separately on 
its own responsibility in accordance with International Law.' 145 
Nevertheless, there remain two problems with regard to the legitimacy of the International Military 
Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo. The first is the question on the power of the Allied nations to 
144 Lauterpacht/1944b/59. 
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punish war criminals. The second question concerns the applicability of the principle nullum 
crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege. 
3.4.3.1. 1'HE RIGHT OFVICfORIOUS lBELLIGERENTS TO PUNISH WAR CRIMINALS 
With regard to the power of the Allied nations to punish war criminals, Lauterpacht accepted the 
right ofbelligerents under international law by saying that 'a belligerent is entitled to punish for war 
crimes those members of the anned forces of the opponent who fall into his hands.' 146 Later, in his 
seventh edition of Oppenheim 's, Lauterpachtjustified the right of victorious belligerents as follows: 
'The right of the belligerent to punish, during the war, such war criminals as fall into his hands is a well-
recognised principle of International Law. It is a right of which he may effectively avail himself after he has 
occupied all or part of enemy territory, and is thus in the position to seize war criminals who happen to be there. 
He may, as a condition of the armistice, impose upon the authorities of the defeated State the duty to hand over 
persons charged with having committed war crimes, regardless of whether such persons are present in the 
territory actually occupied by him or in the territory which, at the successful end of hostilities, he is in a 
position to occupy. For in both cases the accused are, in effect, in his power. And although normally the Treaty 
of Peace brings to an end the right to prosecute war criminals, no rule of International Law prevents the 
victorious belligerent from imposing upon the defeated State the duty, as one of the provisions of the armistice 
of the Peace Treaty, to surrender for trial persons accused of war crimes. In this, as in other matter, the will of 
the victor is the law of the Treaty. It is not to be expected that he will concede to the defeated State the 
corresponding right to punish any war criminals of the victorious belligerent' 147 
In this sense, Lauterpacht admitted that it is the victor's justice that the victorious belligerent be 
allowed in law to punish war criminals of the defeated belligerent. 
146 Lauterpacht/1944b/61. 
147 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht/1952/587-588. 
149 
It is llllderstandable that Lauterpacht emphasised the sovereign powers of the Allied nations as 
opposed to Gennany. Indeed, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg declared that '[t]he 
making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the COlllltries to which 
the Gennan Reich unconditionally surrendered; and the undoubted right of these countries to 
legislate for the occupied tenitories has been recognized by the civilized world.' 148 
However, the more dangerous this reasoning is, the more the Tribunal emphasised the 
sovereign power of a nation in the occupied territories, because it made it possible for Gennan 
officers to justifY what they did in the occupied tenitories. If the Allied nations were permitted to do 
so by their sovereign powers in their occupied territories, why would Gennany not have been 
allowed to do in the occupied territories as the Allies were doing? It should be noted that when he 
said that '[t]he victor will always be the judge, and the vanquished the accused,' Goering simply 
'implicitly argued that Allied leaders would too be in the dock if they had lost instead.' 149 The 
danger of this reasoning shows that such a sovereign power of the belligerents cannot legitimate the 
law made by the belligerents, because the power in the time of war is simply military capacity, 
which 'means destroying an enemy physically or subordinating him to one's will by the threat of 
destruction.' 150 The authority of the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, thus, 
cannot be legitimised by the mere fact that the Allied nations occupied Gennany as the victorious 
belligerent In his dissenting opinion which was individually published after the Tokyo Trial, Justice 
Pal of the IMT at Tokyo said as follows: 
'It is obvious that mere conquest, defeat and surrender, conditional or unconditional, do not vest the conqueror 
with any sovereignty of the defeated state. The legal position of the victor prior to subjugation is the same as 
that of a militaty occupant Whatever he does in respect of the vanquished state he does so in the capacity of a 
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military occupant A militruy occupant is not a sovereign of the occupied tenitol)'.' 151 
It seems inevitable, therefore, that the IMT at Nuremberg should continue in order to distinguish 
itself from the exercise of the power ofNazi Gennany in the occupied territories as follows: 
'The Charter is not an arbitnuy exercise of power on the part of the victorious nations, but in the view of the 
Tribtmal, as will be shown, it is the expression of international law existing at the time of its creation; and to 
that extent is itself a contribution to international law.' 152 
Thus, the IMT at Nuremberg tried to legitimise its authority by reference to international law. 
Lauterpacht also needed to move his attention away from the sovereign power of the Allies to 
the way they exercised their power in accordance with law. This movement of his attention is seen 
in his last edition of the second volume of Oppenheim 's. Lauterpacht suggested the creation of the 
International Criminal Cmut from the viewpoint of the legitimacy of military tribunals: 
'The inadequacy, partly unavoidable, of purely national tribtmals as an organ for the punishment of war crimes 
as well as the objections to an international or quasi-international tribunal set by the victors, who consider 
themselves immune from the jurisdiction of the court thus established, necessarily raise and prompt an 
affirmative answer to the question of the desirability of an impartial international organ, constituted in advance, 
for the trial, after the cessation ofhostilities, of persons accused of war crimes.' 153 
However, even he knew that his proposal was too utopian. Consequently, Lauterpacht hoped that 
'the victorious belligerent may achieve a substantial approximation to justice by maklng full 
provision for a fair Trial of the surrendered enemy nationals, and by offering to try before his 
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tribtmals such members of his own anned forces as are accused of war crimes.' 154 In other words, 
he thought that the authority of the militazy tribunal would be legitimate insofar as it complied with 
procedural rules with regard to the punishment of enemy nationals, and if the Allied nations 
furthermore punished the soldiers of their countries. It is enough to point out, however, that the 
Allied nations neither punished their militazy men and politicians, nor felt guilty, with regard to the 
mass killing of civilians by air-targeted bombardment of major German and Japanese cities, 155 
including the use of the atomic bombs.156 After indicating that Kaiser Wtlhelm IT's policy of 
indiscriminate murder to shorten the First World War had been considered to be a crime, Justice Pal 
at IMT in the Far East said as follows: 
'It would be sufficient for my present purpose to say that if any indiscriminate destruction of civilian life and 
property is still illegitimate in warfare, then, in the Pacific war, this decision to use the atom bomb is the only 
near approach to the directives of the German Emperor during the first world war and of the Nazi leaders 
during the second world war. Nothing like this could be traced to the credit of the present accused [ofTokyo 
Trial].' 157 
Thus, the fact that the Allied nations did not punish their own soldiers casts sufficient doubt on the 
legitimacy of the right of victorious belligerents to punish the war criminals of their enemies. 
3.4.3.2. THE PRINCWLE nuDum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege 
Due process is necessary for tribtmals to legitimise their own authority. Without due process, a 
judicial trial would become a political trial. It is, therefore, understandable that Lauterpacht was 
154 Jbid./588. 
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careful to devote much attention to 'a fair Trial of the surrendered enemy nationals.' The 
compliance with judicial procedure is the crux of the legitimacy of International Military Tribunals. 
This attitude, however, is the typical attitude oflawyers criticised by Shklar: 
'Fonnal justice can, moreover, render such laws respectable in the eyes of liberals anxious to avoid conflict. 
''He had his day in court; he was not really persecuted," they can argue, and congratulate themselves on the 
procedural perfection of fonnal justice.' 158 
The difficulty ofLauterpacht's legalism is shown by the problem of the principle nullum crimen 
sine lege in the context of due process, which casts doubt on the legitimacy of Military Tribunals. 
While admitting that the principle nullum crimen sine lege is 'not a limitation of sovereignty, 
but is in general a principle of justice,' the Nuremberg Tribunal declared that 'the maxim has no 
application to the present facts.' According to the judgement, it is because 'in such circumstances 
the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it 
would be unjust ifhis wrong were allowed to go unpunished.' 159 However, it should be noted that 
the Tribunal confused the question whether or not the notion of crimes legally exists and the 
question whether the accused had acknowledged the unjustness of the impugned activity. Whether 
or not the accused acknowledged the immoral nature of the activity, the question is whether or not 
international law at that time stipulated aggression as international crime, the result of which is the 
criminal responsibility of the government officials. 
There is some evidence that aggression had not been regarded as an international crime under 
positive international law before the Allies decided to punish the government officials of Nazi 
Germany and of Imperial Japan. It should be noted that the British government was reluctant to 
158 Shklar/1964/146. Emphasis original. 
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agree to the proposal of the United States concerning the military trials. One of the reasons the 
British government was opposed to the proposal of the United States was that the British 
government did not think that aggression was an international crime in the aide memo ire which the 
British government submitted to Rosenman, Jackson's predecessor for the negotiation with the 
governments concerned. 
'Reference has been made above to Hitler's conduct leading up to the war as one of the crimes on which the 
Allies would rely. They should be included in this the unprovoked attacks which, since the original declaration 
of war, he has made on various countries. These are not war crimes in the ordinary sense, nor is it at all clear 
that they can properly be described as crimes under intemationallaw. These would, however, necessarily have 
to be part of the charge and if the tribunal had - as presumably they would have - to proceed according to 
international law, an argument, which might be a formidable argument, would be open to the accused that this 
part of the indictment should be struck out It may well be thought by some that these acts ought to be 
regarded as crimes under international law. Under the procedure suggested this would be a matter for the 
tribunal, and would at any rate give the accused the opportunity of basing arguments on what has happened in 
the past and what has been done by various countries in declaring war which resulted in acquiring new 
territory, which certainly were not regarded at the time as crimes against international law.' 160 
The preparatory works of the London Charter, moreover, prove that the legal definition of crimes 
did not exist at least at the outbreak of the Second World War. At the London Conference, Andre 
Gros, who was a member of the French Delegation and later became a Judge of the ICJ, confessed 
his opinion as follows: 
'[D]eclaring those acts are criminal violations of intemationallaw, which is shocking. It is creation by four 
people who are just four individuals- defined by those four people as criminal violation of international law. 
160 Cited from Shawcross/196911 01. 
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Those acts have been known for years before and have not been declared criminal violations of international 
law. It is ex fXJSf facto legislation.' 161 
It should be noted, finthennore, that it was Gros's view which prevailed at the time. In 1936, for 
example, John Fischer Williams said: 
'We can conceive -learned and hwnane men have done so- that it may be just to amend the Jaw by making 
punishable the conduct of individuals who in places of authority have been responsible for the ent:Jy of their 
nation on a war that is illegal, but international Jaw does not at present admit - and it is devoutly to be hoped 
that it never will admit- the idea of the punishment of a nation. Collective penal responsibility for misdoing is 
a tenet of primitive Jaw for which international law, even if it be a young law, has no place.'162 
Therefore, the doubt whether or not the Nuremberg and Tokyo Militarily Tribtmals violated the 
principle nullwn crimen sine lege is surely the Achilles heel for lawyers wishing to legitimise the 
authority of these Tribunals. 
Indeed, lawyers who deny the authority of the International Militruy Tribtmals adhere to one 
question whether or not the Tribunals did violate the principle nul/wn crimen sine lege. They 
presume that the principle nullum crimen sine lege is so absolute that it is the breach of the principle 
that deprives International Militruy Tribtmals of their legitimacy. Helmut Quartisch, tor example, 
says: 
'To deprive, however, him [the culprit as loser] of the protection of the principle "nullun crimen" hands him 
over the arbitrariness of the victors, because the victor describes the new crime and determines the new 
punishment The claimed 'justice" cannot be then "general" justice which the illegal consciousness of the 
defeated one is also included to; that presupposed the existence, approval or at least acceptance of the full 
161 http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalonlimtjacksonjack44.htm 
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element of a crime before the deed ahead. That 'justice" is only die Gerechtigkeit des Siegers [the Justice of 
the Victor (in Gennan) ], "victor's justice" [in English].' 163 
However, the appropriate formulation of the question of the legitimacy of the Tribunals at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo seems to be rather how the Tribunals could legally justifY the inapplicability 
of the principle nullum crimen sine. Despite not being a lawyer, Hannah Arendt, in the context of 
the Eichmann Trial, incisively pointed out this question as follows: 
'The question is not whether these laws were retroactive, which, of course, they had to be, but whether they 
were adequate, that is, whether they applied only to crimes previously unknown. This prerequisite for 
retroactive legislation had been seriously marred in the Charter ... , and it may be for this reason that the 
discussion of these matters has remained somewhat confused.' 164 
The real problem is whether or not it is still possible to justifY the breach of the principle nullum 
crimen sine lege, even though the Nuremberg Tribunal breached the principle. 
If it is necessary to reformulate Arendt' s remark in legal terminology, the following remark of 
Lon Fuller would be appropriate: 
'If ... we are to appraise retroactive laws intelligently, we must place them in the context of a system of rules 
that are generally prospective. Curiously, in this context situations can arise in which granting retroactive effect 
to legal rules not only becomes tolerable, but may actually be essential to advance the cause of legality. Like 
every other human undertaking, the effort to meet the often complex demands of the internal morality of law 
163 Translated by the author. The original text is as follows: "Thm aber den Schutz des Prinzips 
,,nullun crimen" zu entziehen, liefert ihn der Wilki.ir des Siegers aus, well der Sieger das neue 
Verbrechen beschreibt und die neue Strafe festsetzt. Die beanspruchte ,Gerechtigkeif' kann dann 
keine ,allgemeine", auch des UnrechtsbewuBstein des Besiegten einschlieBende Gerechtigkeit 
sein; das setzte Existenz, Billigung oder doch wenigstens Hinnahme des vollen Straftatbestandes 
vor der Tat voraus. Die ,Gereehtigkeit" ist nur die Gerechtigkeit des Siegers, 'victor's justice'." 
Quaritsch/Nachwort/Schmitt/1994/169. 
156 
may suffer various kinds of shipwreck. It is when things go wrong that the retroactive statute often becomes 
indispensable as a curative measure; though the proper movement of law is fmward in time, we sometimes 
have to stop and turn about to pick up the pieces.' 165 
After admitting that the Tokyo Tribunal applied retroactive law, Bert Roling, a Justice of the IMT at 
Tokyo, also pointed out: 
'The prohibition of ex post facto law has two aspects, one related to the principle of liberty and another related 
to the principle of justice . ... [I]fthe law failed to prohibit an act because the legislator had made a mistake, or 
was not in a position to imagine specific events which later occurred, the situation should be quite different ... 
Was it unjust to punish those scoundrels, even with the penalty of death? They had been well aware of the 
hideousness of their behaviour. They could not claim that criminal prosecution and severe punishment would 
violate rules of justice.' 166 
Therefore, Roling concluded that the London and Tokyo Charters were legitimised from the 
viewpoint of 'justice' even if they were ex post facto law. 167 
Lauterpacht, however, seems not to have been bothered by such a question at all. The 
International Military Trial was legitimate for him from the very outset of 'the Road to 
Nuremberg.' It was too natural for him to deny that government officials should be responsible for 
their own actives in the name of sovereign states. Consequently, he had no reason to doubt the 
official statement of the Nuremberg Tribunal. But, this point itself shows that Lauterpacht made the 
same mistake as traditional positivists did He and the latter assumed that the prohibition of 
retroactive law was the decisive question for evaluating the Nuremberg Trial since legality is 
always politically legitimate. Consequently, for Lauterpacht and the traditional positivists, whether 
164 Arendt/1994/254-255. 
165 Fuller/1969/53. 
166 Roling-Cassese/1993/68-69. 
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for or against the Nuremberg Trial, the discussion only dealt with the issue whether or not the 
Tribtmal had breached the principle nullum crimen sine lege. Such a debate between them is 
pointless and futile. On the one hand, the argument oflawyers who deny that the Tribunal breached 
the principle nullum crimen sine lege is deceptive with reference to the history of the preparatory 
works of the International Military Tribunals. Lawyers who reject the legitimacy of the IMT due to 
the breach of the principle nullum crimen sine lege, on the other hand, fail to grasp the flexibility of 
the principles oflegality. 
In a sense, Lautetpacht's commitment to the Nuremberg Trial is a good example of his legal-
moralism. The Nuremberg Trial meant to him no more than the resurrection of human rationality. 
The criminal responsibility of individuals is surely the key concept of legalisation of international 
politics. Lautetpacht again and again claimed that international law would be ineffective unless 
government officials were held responsible for acts carried out on behalf of states. After the 
Nuremberg Trial, Lautetpacht confidently declared: 
'[I]t is futile to maintain that if a cabinet minister, fully endowed with government authority, orders the 
massacre of the nationals of a foreign State, the subject of international responsibility is his States only, and not 
he himself. The futility of that attitude has often been emphasised by the parallel doctrine that States, because 
of their sovereignty, cannot be subject to criminal responsibility. Both these views must now be regarded as 
exploded.' 168 
However, if the Nuremberg Trial is viewed thus, it should be noted that there are more serious 
defects of Lautetpacht's ideal than the shortcomings of the Nuremberg Trials which positivists 
argue. First, the judgements of International Military Tribtmals at Nuremberg and Tokyo had been 
unable to have any effect on the realisation of Lautetpacht's ideal for moralising international 
politics through law. It is surely true that these judgements became the starting point of the 
~-----:o--------------------------~----
167 lbid/85-89. Also see Cassese/2003/71-72. 
168 Lautetpacht/ILHR/43. 
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codification work of the United Nations such as the Nuremberg Principles and the 1948 Genocide 
Convention. It is certainly wrong to underestimate such codification works. However, it is also a 
mistake to overestimate the effectiveness of these norms. The international community had been 
satisfied with the creation of legal norms, which is just a starting point for the moralising of 
international politics through law. Indeed, there had been no international criminal trial for nearly 
forty-five years after the International Military Trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo, despite the fact that 
armed conflicts happened everywhere and that millions of civilians suffered from inhumane 
violence. It was only after the tremendous humanitarian catastrophes in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda that Lauterpacht's forgotten ideal was resurrected. 
Second, Lauterpacht's ideal, as far as the punishment of war crimes is concerned, suffers from 
the limitation that it is possible only if the punishment of war criminals is in conformity with, or at 
least not contrary to, the interests of states who try to punish them. The United States, for example, 
is extremely reluctant to punish its own soldiers, even if they commit war crimes. This point is 
shown not only by the fact that the United States government was reluctant to punish Lieutenant 
Calley and Captain Medina with regard to the My Lai massacre in the Vietnamese War, but also by 
its ambivalent attitude to the International Criminal Court. With regard to the My Lai case, 169 
although it is true that Lieutenant Calley and Captain Medina were punished by the American 
Military Court, 170 President Nixon granted them amnesty. 171 With regard to the policy of the United 
States against the International Criminal Court, suffices it to note that the United States forces other 
nations to admit that the ICC has no jurisdiction for the war crimes of American soldiers.172 
American Servicemembers 'Protection Act, 173 which prohibits any cooperation of the United States 
government and its judiciary with the ICC, is the manifestation of the will of the United States 
which does not allow their officials to be punished as war criminals. Considering the apparent 
169 On the general story of the My Lai case, see Bilton-Sirn/1992. 
170 See Goldstein-Marshall-Schwartz/1976. 
171 Fujita/1995/177. 
172 Fujiwara/2002/188-189. 
173 http://www.usaforicc.org/ ASPA.htm 
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reluctance of the United States to punish its soldiers as war criminals and the positive policy of the 
United States to punish its enemies, it is difficult to deny the allegation that the United States uses 
international criminal law only for protecting and enhancing its own interest. This point indicates a 
limitation oflegalism which claims the Rule of Law in the unorganised international community in 
which powers are distributed to sovereign states who favour their own interests. As Bull said, 
'The world after the First World War heard about the war guilt of the Kaiser, and after the Second World War 
witnessed the trial and punishment of German and Japanese leaders and soldiers for war crimes and crimes 
against he peace. It did not witness the trial and punishment of American, British and Soviet leaders and 
soldiers who prima facie might have been as much or as little guilty of disregarding their human obligations 
... This is not to say that the idea of the trial and punishment of war criminals by international procedure is an 
unjust or unwise one, only that it operates in a selective way. That these men and not others were brought to 
trial by the victors was an accident of power politics.' 174 
This limitation of the punishment of war criminals may be inevitable, but is enough to expose the 
naivety of international legalism, which claims that the punishment of war criminals is the victory 
oflaw over arbitrary politics in the name of the international community. 
174 Bull/1995/85-86. 
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~. 1'li:m lRJECON§TRUCTION OJF '"][']t-IE ITNTEJRNATIONAL COMMUNITY A§ 
Civims MaximaAFfER mE §ECOND WORLD WAR 
Needless to say, the Second World War damaged the League of Nations system and the authority 
of international law. The League of Nations could not prevent the Second World War. The 
belligerents, whether the Allies or the Axis Powers, did not fully comply with the rules of the laws 
of war. However, as the victory of the Allied nations became clear, international lawyers started to 
discuss how the international community should be reconstructed after the end of hostilities. 
Lauterpacht was also concerned about questions on the reconstruction of the international 
community. 
This chapter discusses Lauterpacht's hope for international law to assert its authority, and 
considers the kind of new post-war world order he proposed. With regard to the question of the 
authority of international law, the chapter explicates the discussion between the schools of power 
politics, such as the international legal theory school of the Axis nations and political realism, and 
his antagonism to political realism. Being opposed to the schools of power politics, on the other 
hand, Lauterpacht tried to re-construct his liberal theory as the Grotian tradition of intemationallaw. 
Concerning the new world order, Lauterpacht proposed the concept of the international community 
as civitas maxima, which is the association of democratic nations with the international protection 
of human rights. The section is divided into two subsections. The first subsection examines the 
association of democratic states. In the section, I discuss his fimctional theory of states as organs of 
the international community in the context of recognition, and the problem of Kantian 
republicanism. Finally, I examine his proposal of the international protection of human rights in the 
context of the international community as civitas maxima. 
~.1. 'JfHE §HAIDOW OF POWJER J?OlLITJIC§ 
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From the collapse of the League ofNations in the late 1930s to the Second World War, Lauterpacht 
could not help but face the challenge of power politics to liberal legalism. The international lawyers 
of the Axis nations claimed their own international legal theories which justified the foreign policy 
of their nations. Although the international legal theories of the Axis nations were swept away after 
their defeat, part of these theories was inherited by political realists. Lauterpacht thought that these 
new theories of power politics were contrary to the progressive development of human history. Nor 
did he conceal his displeasure at the theories of power politics. 
His belief in the progressiveness ofhuman history is one of the characteristics ofhis theory of 
international law. Lauterpacht believed that human rationality expressed as international law would 
finally defeat such irrationality as totalitarianism. Here, his legalism was nothing but the result of 
this belief in the human progress. As Shklar pointed out, ' [ t]he faith in progress as a law of history 
is, indeed, the last of the many fatal contributions of liberalism to legalistic ideology.' 1 In this sense, 
it is no wonder that the 'Spirit of Geneva' was still the ideal for Lauterpacht. Indeed, he re-
interpreted the history of international law, showing his liberalism, in the Grotian tradition of 
international law. 
4.1.1. THE lrNTERNATIONALLEGAL THEORIES OF THE AxiS NATIONS 
As the international community disintegrated, the paradigm of international legal studies was 
seriously confused from the late inter-war period to World War II. On the one hand, there was the 
legal school of international lawyers, including Lauterpacht, \\>ho tried to protect the authority of the 
League of Nations, and on the other a group antagonistic to international legalism composed of 
Axis international lawyers \\>ho were hostile to the League ofNations. They tried to establish the 
international legal theory which justified their nations' policy. The notorious example of the 
international legal theory of the Axis nations is the Nazi theory of international law.2 Generally 
1 Shklar/1964/139. 
2 See Preuss/1935; Gott/1938; HerzJ1939; Nussbaum/1947/278-280; Vagts/1990; 
162 
speaking, German lawyers even in the period of the Weimar Republic were more or less hostile to 
the League ofNations, as they generally tended to view the Versailles system as legitimising the 
Anglo-French domination of the world at the cost of Germany.3 However, it was after Hitler 
acquired power that German international legal theory became definitively hostile to the 
international law of Geneva It was transformed to the National Socialist theory which justified 
Nazism after the Nazi party had started to influence the management of German universities, 
among its priorities the purging of liberal theorists and Jewish lawyers.4 
Carl Schmitt may represent such a movement of German international lawyers in the inter-
war period It is true that Schmitt was hostile to the League of Nations from the outset of the 
Weimar Republic, due to his own friend/foe theory of 'the political. '5 However, he had been just as 
authoritative and conservative a lawyer before the Nazi party gained power. Indeed, he had been 
opposed to Nazism prior to 1933. It was only after becoming a member of the Nazi party in May 
1933 that he inclined towards Nazi philosophy. A story often cited to show his inclination to 
Nazism concerns Schmitt, alone among the staff of the law faculty, not signing the protest against 
the purge ofHans Kelsen from the University of Cologne. From that period, Schmitt wrote almost 
forty articles on Nazi jurisprudence. These articles, worthy ofthe notorious nickname 'The Crown 
Lawyer of the Third Reich,' certainly show his definitive inclination to Nazism.6 However, by the 
end of 1936 at the latest, Schmitt had lost his influence within the Nazi party, because of S.S. 
criticism of him in an S.S. journal. From then, he confined himself to the problem of international 
law in order to protect himself from the Nazis. Schmitt developed his own Grossraum (greater 
region) theory, not only as his academic activity but also as a justification of Nazi domination of 
Fassbender/2002. 
3 Koskenniemi/2001/236-238. 
4 On professors of international law purged by the Nazi government, see Vagts/1990n03-
702/Appendix-A 
5 Schmitt/1996/55-57. 
6 See Schmitt/2000. 
7 See Scheurman/19991141-173; Balakrishnan/2000/226-251; Carty/1995/and/2001; Stirk/1999; 
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Japanese international lawyers also tried to create an international legal theory which aimed at 
justifying Japanese domination in the Far East8 In 1941, the Japanese Association of International 
Law established study groups to look at international legal problems which would occur in 'the 
Great East Asia eo-Prosperity Sphere.' Kaoru Yasui, Assistant Professor at The Imperial University 
of Tokyo at time, was the typical figure of international legal theory of the Great East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere. He argued that the traditional international law of East Asia, which had been 
established from the European perspective, should be completely criticised from the viewpoint of 
the liberation of Asian peoples from European domination, and that the new international law of the 
Great East Asia would govern the internal and external relations of the Great East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere of which Japan was at the centre as the leading nation.9 Under the auspices of the 
Japanese Association of International Law, in order to establish the new theory of international law 
of Great East Asia, Yasui studied Schmitt's Grossraum theory, for which he had considerable 
appreciation,10 and the Nazi racial theory of international law as expounded by Friedrich Giese and 
Eberhard MenzeL who seemed even to Yasui to be academically shallow.11 
It is not certain whether or not Lauterpacht knew the international legal theories of the Axis 
nations. It seems to be appropriate here to disregard the question whether he was aware of the 
Japanese theories of international law of the Great East Asia, because first of all Japanese lawyers 
did not publish their international legal theories in English, nor in other European languages, 
including German, during the Second World War, and secondly there is no evidence that 
Lauterpacht could read Japanese. However, it is a different story when we attend to Nazi 
international law theory. Gennan, at least, was one of his native languages. Indeed, Lauterpacht 
wrote many reviews of German books on international law before 1939. He must, however, have 
disregarded the Nazi theory of international law. In a lecture at the meeting of the Royal Institute of 
Gattini/2002. 
8 See Matsui/2002Jand/2003. 
9 Yasui/194212-3. 
10 Ibid/4. 
11 Ibid/121. 
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International Affairs on 27 May 1941, he emphasised that the decade preceding the Second World 
War should be regarded as a period of retrogression, and warned of the Nazi jurisprudence of 
international law as follows: 
'Neither ought we to exhibit undue haste in adapting international law to some of the mani:fustations of 
totalitarian and dictatorial regimes. It is too early to assume their permanency in their present fonn; and it is an 
excess of optimism to believe that in case of their survival international law will be able to develop at all.' 12 
Lauterpacht's prediction was correct, because such theories held by Axis international lawyers 
were completely swept away by the defeat of the Axis nations in the Second World War. After the 
War, almost all Nazi legal theorists were expelled from Gennan acadernia It was true of Schrnitt. 
He was in an American military gaol from 1945 to 1947. Even after his release, Schrnitt was 
prohibited from teaching at Gennan universities. 13 Yasui was also forced to resign Tokyo 
University because of his voluntary assistance to Japanese militarism. Although he became a 
professor at a private university in Tokyo, concentrating on the development of Marx-Leninisrn 
theory of international law after his ideological conversion, Yasui completely lost his influence over 
Japanese academics in the field of international law, and is still criticised as an ideological lawyer 
who lost the neutral spirit of a lawyer's professional ethics.14 
4.1.2. PoLmcALREALISM 
It is undeniable, nevertheless, that the original works of Carl Schrnitt exerted influence over a 
second group of scholars opposed to the legal school of international lawyers. As Williarn 
Scheunnan pointed out, there is a similarity between Schrnitt and political (classical) realists such 
12 Lauterpacht/1941a!CP-ll/36. 
13 Balalcrishnan/2000/260. 
14 Murase/1997/737-738. 
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as Edward Carr and Hans Morgenthau.15 Although there was no academic connection between 
Schmitt and Carr, Morgenthau admitted that his theory of power politics was influenced by 
Schmitt16 and Carr. 17 
The basic assumption of political realism is that the task of government is to protect the 
national interest If legalism damages national interest by making diplomacy inflexible, it is enough 
reason for political realists to reject legalism,18 because, in their view, it is more moralistic for 
government officials to protect the national interest than to comply with international obligations in 
the case that obligations are contrary to national interest As Carr said, 
'The first obligation of the modem national government, which no other obligation will be allowed to 
ovenide, is to its own people. It would be absurd to lament this state of affairs as proof of increased human 
wickedness; it might equally well be regarded as proof of a sharpened social conscience. But whatever view 
we take of it, it would be folly to neglect the overwhelming evidence that modem national governments 
cannot and will not observe international treaties or rules of international law when these become 
burdensome or dangerous to the welfare or sectuity of their own nation.' 19 
In the view of political realists, it is the professional ethics of government officials to protect 
national interest George Kennan also says, 
'Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primruy obligation is to the interests of the national :;ociety it 
represents, not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience. No more than 
the attorney vis-a-vis the client, nor the doctor vis-a-vis the patient, can government attempt to insert itself into 
15 Scheunnan/1999/152. See Pichler/1998; Koskenniemi/2000/17-34/and/20011413-474. 
16 Morgenthau/1978/67-68. 
17 Boyle/1985f299/n.37. 
18 Morgenthau/1993/13-16. 
19 Carr/1945b/31. 
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the conscience of those interests it represents. '20 
Therefore, political realists saw international law from the viewpoint of government officials who 
serve national interest. From such a viewpoint, although it was natural for them to deny legalism 
because it dissolves politics into law, they did not reject international law itsel£21 Carr explicated the 
weakness of legal utopianism in his Twenty Years' Crisis. However, he did not reject international 
law. What he rejected was 'a strong inclination to treat law as something independent of, and 
ethically superior to, politics.'22 Morgenthau also did not deny the usefulness of international law. 
What Morgenthau denied was the international lawyers 'who would substitute for power politics 
another type of foreign policy based on international law and which consequently would replace 
the "old" diplomacy by a "new'' one, the diplomat of national power by the advocate of 
international law. '23 George Kennan also affirms international law insofar as it is confined to 'the 
unobtrusive, almost feminine, function of the gentle civilizer of national self-interest. '24 Their 
common element was that they tried to protect diplomacy from the interference oflegalism. 
Among political realists, Carr in particular severely criticised Lauterpacht for his legalism. 
Carr, for example, disapproved of Lautetpacht as a typical person of 'pacta-sunt-servanda-ism', 
which regards the sanctity of treaties as supreme?5 Carr' s criticism of Lautetpacht looks somewhat 
pointless from the viewpoint of international legal studies, because tl1e remark made by 
Lautetpacht to which Carr referred was, in fact, the view of Anzilotti.26 Lautetpacht proposed the 
maxim voluntas civitatis maximae est servanda as the initial hypothesis of international law instead 
of the principle pacta sunt servanda, because he found a vestige of voluntarism in the principle 
2° Kennan/1985/206. Emphasis original. 
21 Alderson-Hurrell/2000b/35. 
22 Carr/1945a/159. 
23 Morgenthau/1946b/l 067. 
24 Kennan/1951154. 
25 Carr/1946b/176/n.l. 
26 Lautetpacht/Function/418. 
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pacta sunt servanda.27 However, it is lUldeniable that Lauterpacht's attitude to the sanctity of 
international treaties was a kind of 'pacta-sunt-servanda-ism.' Insofar as Lauterpacht emphasised 
the sanctity of treaties within the framework of Kelsenian normativism, there is no difference 
between the principle pacta sunt servanda and the maxim voluntas civitatis maximae est servanda 
with regard to what Carr criticised as 'pacta-sunt-servanda-ism.' The only difference is that, in 
Lauterpacht's view, the maxim voluntas civitatis maximae est servanda can avoid the 
misunderstanding that the folllldation of international law only refers to the agreement of states. 
However, such a difference did not matter to Carr. 
Carr also criticised Lauterpacht's belief that 'conflicts of interests are due, not to economic 
necessities, but to the imperfections of international legal organisation.'28 In Carr's view, 
Lauterpacht's opinion avoided 'the fallacy, implicit in the Geneva Protocol and the General Act, 
that an international legal order based on the recognition, interpretation and enforcement of existing 
rights is an adequate provision for the peaceful settlement of international disputes,' However, Carr 
thought that Lauterpacht was guilty of a far graver error: 
'Perceiving that provision must be made for the modification of existing rights, they [Lauterpacht and 
Kelsen] force this essentially political fimction into a legal mould and entrust its exercise to a tribunal. 
Unwilling to recognize the political basis of every legal system, they dissolve politics into law. '29 
Carr's criticism of Lauterpacht's legalism is also encolllltered in the context of peaceful change. 
Lauterpacht was of the opinion that peaceful change as an effective institution of international law 
means 'the acceptance by States of a legal duty to acquiesce in changes in the law decreed by a 
competent international organ. '30 In other words, peaceful change was nothing but the problem of 
international legislation to Lauterpacht. Lauterpacht's view, however, seemed to Carr llllrealistic in 
27 Jbid./420-422. 
28 Jbid.f250. 
29 Carr/1946a/186. 
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the sense that Lauterpacht expected that the hypothetical 'world super-state' would solve actual 
problems. Carr emphasised diplomacy or negotiation, instead of international legislation, for 
solving the actual problem of peaceful change: 
'The legislative process, though recognizing the role of power and well adapted to meet many demands for 
change in national politics, is inapplicable to international demands for change, since it presupposes the 
existence of a legislative authority whose decrees are binding on all members of the commllllity without their 
specific assent. There remains the bargaining process, which is applied to some demands for change within 
the state and is alone applicable to demands for international change, since states ... insist on the ultimate right 
to accept or reject any solution offered. '31 
Although he did not forget the role of morality in peaceful change, Carr emphasised a greater role 
played by power than morality, since it is inescapable that diplomacy reflects the relation of power 
between states. Thus, the purpose of political realism is to revive the notion of power in 
international relations, which legalism deleted through law in the name of peace. In this sense, 
political realists' image of international law is more traditional than the legal school's image of 
international law. Morgenthau, for example, clearly sympathised with the tradition theory of 
international law before 1919, when he said that '[t]he relationship between the balance of power 
and international law, which was known to many of the classical writers of international law and 
was still emphasised in the first editions ofOppenheim's treatise, has again found its deserved place 
in a theory of international politics. '32 Indeed, in Politics among Nations, Morgenthau said, 
'International law owes its existence and operation to two factors, both decentralized in character: identical or 
complementruy interests of individual states and the distribution of power among them. Where there is 
30 I..auterpacht/1937a/141. 
31 Carr/1946a/198. 
32 Morgenthau/1967/xii. 
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neither community of interest nor balance of power, there is no international law. '33 
Thus, the essence of the international legal theory of Morgenthau is the revival of Oppenheim's 
first and second moral principles which Lauterpacht deleted from his editions of Oppenheim 's. As 
discussed above, Oppenheim thought that the balance of power and the national interest were 
essential to international law. 
'The first and principal moral is that a Law ofNations can exist only if there be an equilibrium, a balance of 
power, between the members of the Family ofNations. If the Powers cannot keep one another in check, no 
rules of law will have any force, since an over-powerful State will naturally try to act according to discretion 
and disobey the law. As there is not and never can be a central political authority above the Sovereign States 
that could enforce the rules of Law of Nations, a balance of power must prevent any member of the Family of 
Nations from becoming omnipotent. The history of the times ofLouis XIV and Napoleon I. shows clearly the 
soundness of this principle.'34 
Oppenheim continued, 
'The second moral is that International Law can develop progressively only when international politics, 
especially intervention, are made on the basis of real State interests. Dynastic wars belong to the past, as do 
interventions in fuvour oflegitimacy. It is neither to be feared, nor to be hoped, that they should occur again in 
the future. But if they did, they would hamper the development of the Law of Nations in the future as they 
have done in the past. '35 
In a sense, the disagreement between Lauterpacht and Morgenthau symbolises the internal tension 
33 Morgenthau/1993/255-256. 
34 Oppenheim/1912a/80. 
35 Jbid./80-81 
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in the international legal theory of Oppenheim. Though maintaining the balance of power and the 
quest for national interest as the first and second moral principles of international law, Oppenheim 
named 'the victory everywhere of constitutional government over autocratic government, or, what 
is the same thing, of democracy over autocracy' as the third moral principle of the progress of 
international law in the third edition of his textbook.36 Although Roxburgh edited the third edition of 
Oppenheim 's, it is generally thought that Oppenheim introduced this moral principle into the third 
edition.37 1l1e internal tension between power politics and liberal democracy clearly featured in 
Oppenheim' s international legal theory. On the one hand, the principle of liberal democracy was 
developed by Lauterpacht who replaced the principles of power politics with the victory of liberal 
democracy over autocracy as the first moral principle of international law in his fifth edition of 
Oppenheim 's.38 As Lauterpacht changed the substance of Oppenheim 's by deleting the element of 
power politics, international lawyers started to abandon Oppenheim's original paradigm. On the 
other hand, Morgenthau succeeded to the principles of power politics in international law from 
Oppenheim. In this sense, it is no coincidence that, as Kingsbury indicates, 'Oppenheim's approach 
is still prevalent in a strong realist strand of international relations theory. '39 Thus, political realists as 
represented by Carr, Morgenthau, and Kennan, on the one hand, and the legal school as represented 
by Lauterpacht were irreconcilable with regard to the concept of international law. This point is also 
seen in Lauterpacht' s criticism of political realism. 
4.1.3. LAUTERPACHT'S REFUTATION OF POLITICAL REALISM 
Lauterpacht had noticed that he was criticised by political realists. In particular, it is clear that he 
read Carr's Twenty Years' Crisis, because he left a refutation note ofCarr's realism, though he did 
not published it at that particular time. However, Lauterpacht did not try to refute the criticism 
36 Oppenheim-Roxburgh/1920/95. 
37 Schmoeckel/20001704; Kingsbury/2002/414/n.54. 
38 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht/1937/80. 
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levelled at Carr on the matter of international law. Essentially he refuted Carr's conception of 
international morality expressed in Chapter 9 of his Twenty Thars' Crisis.40 In Chapter 9 of Twenty 
Thars' Crisis, Carr claimed that international morality is the morality of states as opposed to the 
morality of individuals. Lauterpacht believed that the advocacy of state morality amounts to the 
denial of morality applicable to states. He said that 'there is very little difference between denying 
that there exists an international morality and maintaining that there exists an international morality 
different from private morality. '41 The advocacy of the morality of state seemed to Lauterpacht to 
be no more than raison d'etat, which was most easily defined by Harold Nicolson as '[t]he 
diplomatic and political theory under which the interests of the State take precedence over all 
private morality. '42 
However, Lauterpacht's criticism ofCarr's conception of international morality is ineffective, 
because he criticised Carr from the viewpoint of 'critical morality,' though Carr essentially 
discussed international 'positive morality.' It is useful to refer to the distinction between 'positive 
morality' and 'critical morality' which is explained by Hart. According to Hart, positive morality is 
'the morality actually accepted and shared by a given social group.' On the other hand, he 
described critical morality as 'the general moral principles used in the criticism of actual social 
institutions including positive morality. ' 43 This distinction is useful in order to ponder Lauterpacht' s 
criticism ofCarr's conception of international morality. 
Carr's concept of international morality is positive rather than critical. Carr explained the 
necessity to obsetve international positive morality by saying that 'he [the student of international 
politics] will be well advised to keep his feet on the ground and rigorously maintain contact 
between his ambitions for the future and the realities of the present.' Carr continued as follows: 
39 EClllgsbury/2002/415. 
40 Lauterpacht/1941b/CP-ll/67-92. 
41 lbid/77. 
42 Nicolson/1950/241. 
43 Hart/1963/20. Also see MacCormick/1981/45-54. 
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'The anthropologist who investigates the mornl codes and behaviour of a cannibal tribe probably starts from 
the presupposition that cannibalism is undesirable, and is conscious of the desire that it should be abolished. 
But he may well be sceptical of the value of denunciations of cannibalism, and will in any case not mistake 
such denunciations for a scientific study of the subject. The same clarity of thought has not always 
distinguished students of international morality, who have generally preferred the role of the missionary to 
that of the scientist '44 
Carr then described how ordinary people actually think about international morality. In his view, 
'most people, while believing that states ought to act morally, do not expect of them the same kind 
of moral behaviour which they expect of themselves and one another. '45 It is because the primary 
function of the state is to protect the interests of nationals and of the state. Consequently, '[t]he good 
of the state comes more easily to be regarded as a moral end in itself '46 Thus, Carr described raison 
d 'et at as positive morality without criticising it in Twenty Years ' Crisis. 
On the other hand, lauterpacht' s morality is critical rather than positive. It is true that he 
denied the positive character of the morality of state when he said that 'a survey of the foreign 
policy of modern States will show that the immorality of international conduct is something in the 
nature of a myth. '47 However, the reason Lauterpacht denied state morality is his conviction that 
raison d'etat is immoral: 
'A moral person does not use the screen of the association as a justification of immoral conduct. An immornl 
person may do it and often does i~ but there is no reason to regard him as the typical phenomenon or - still 
worse- to picture it as the normal incident of the existence of groups. '48 
44 Carr/1945a/136. 
45 1bid/I43. 
46 Jbid/145"146. 
47 lauterpacht/1941 b/CP-W73. 
48 Jbid/81. 
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This passage shows that Lauterpacht condemned the concept of the morality of states from his 
viewpoint of critical morality, because he a priori distinguished between a moral person and an 
immoral person without referring to the standard of positive morality. In other words, Lauterpacht 
criticised the justifiability of raison d'etaJ in the nonnative phase. 
As the victory of the Allied nations became apparent, Lauterpacht believed that the successful 
claim of raison d 'etat was temporary and short-lived: 
'There was a feeling of embarrassment at the thought that during a transient period of retrogression so many 
should have yielded so readily to the temporruy triumphs of force as to embrace or treat seriously a 
recrudescence of realism which political science and ethics had agreed with regarding as utterly discredited. 
In the second year of the Second World War this kind of realism had become largely a matter of the past '49 
However, his prediction was too optimistic. At a meeting of the Carlyle Club on 10 October 1953, 
Lauterpacht again had to refute the criticism aimed at liberalism by political realists. Although he 
refrained from publishing his refutation of Carr' s concept of morality, Lauterpacht did not this time 
conceal his displeasure at political realism. He accused political realists of being intellectually 
dishonest: 
'For what is the method of the typical realist who confronts us in argument? He says: "I am a realist; I am a 
sound person; I am a practical man; I look to realities; I see things as they are and not as I would like them to 
be." To his opponents he says: "You are a Utopian; you are a dreamer; you see people and events as what you 
think they ought to be and not as what they are." That attitude of the realist is upon analysis an exclusive 
claim to wisdom. It is an assertion of victory even before the argument has started. It is an attempt to reduce 
the opponent, at the very outset, to a lower intellectual status and to gain the confidence of the others. '50 
49 Lauterpacht!BR38/1941/CP-IW593. 
50 Lauterpacht/1953c/CP-II/53. 
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The disagreement between Lauterpacht and political realists is fundamental, because their 
disagreements stem from their different interpretations of the image ofhuman nature.51 Lauterpacht 
criticised the pessimistic attitude of political realists with regard to the progress of human 
rationality: 
'He [a political realist] has no fuith in the capacity ofhwnan beings when acting collectively, especially in 
relation to other collectivities, to act intelligently and to learn from experience ... In this sphere he questions 
the power of man to learn from experience and to advance to progress. '52 
However, being an optimistic believer in human rationality, Lauterpacht could not understand why 
political realists are 'despairing liberals all. '53 Neither could he have recognised that the image of 
law and politics held by political realists is the scanty image of his legalism. It is no wonder, 
therefore, that Lauterpacht was embarrassed at 'a recrudescence of realism' even eight years after 
the end of the Second World War. However, it was Lauterpacht's weakness that he failed to 
understand why political realists such as Morgenthau abandoned international law, because his lack 
of understanding of political realism made Lauterpacht's international legal theory more utopian 
and unrealistic in the Cold War period. Without understanding the relationship between power 
politics and international law, Lauterpacht followed Hugo Grotius, whom Imrnanuel Kant 
described as one of the 'sorry comforters as they are.'54 
4.2. 'fHE MANIFESTO OlFTHE GROTIAN 1'RAJDIDON liN liNTERNATIONAlL 1LAW 
There was certainly a reason why Lauterpacht regarded The Grotian Tradition in International Law 
51 Morgenthau/1952/961-962. 
52 Lauterpacht/1953c!CP-II/61. 
53 Shklar/1964/125. 
54 In Kant's view, Grotius was quoted in justification of military aggression, even though his 
philosophically or diplomatically formulated codes did not and could not have the slightest legal 
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as his most important article, 55 because the universal authority of international law had already been 
damaged by World War II. Power politics again emerged. Therefore, Lautetpaeht felt necessary to 
re-establish the authority of the international law which he knew and believed in. Lauterpacht chose 
Grotius as the basis ofhis universal international law. Indeed, all the pivots ofLauterpacht's theory 
of international law are seen in The Grotian Tradition. He described the following eleven principles 
as Grotian tradition: (1) the subjection of the totality of international relations to the rule oflaw, (2) 
the acceptance of the Law of Nature as an independent source, (3) the affirmation of the social 
nature of man as the basis of the law of nature, (4) the recognition of the essential identity of States 
and individuals, (5) the rejection of 'reason of States', (6) the distinction between just and unjust 
war, (7) the doctrine of qualified neutrality, (8) the binding force of promises, (9) the fimdamental 
rights and freedoms of the individual, (1 0) the idea of peace, and (11) the tradition of idealism and 
progress. 
These principles are the crux of Lautetpaeht's theory, sometimes called 'Neo-Grotian 
theory, ' 56 rather than the theory of Grotius. Indeed, Lauterpacht is often criticised for his misreading 
of Grotius. Yasuaki Onuma, for example, says that '[a]mong these [eleven principles], some 
principles are clearly inappropriate in understanding Grotius, such as the essential identity of states 
and individuals, and the :fimdamental rights and freedoms of the individuals. '57 This point is 
especially shown by the fourth principle of 'the recognition of the essential identity of States and 
individuals.' Lauterpacht explained this principle as follows: 
'This analogy of States and individuals has proved a beneficent weapon in the annoury of international 
progress. It is not the result of any anthropomorphic or organic conception of the State as being- biologically, 
as it were- assimilated to individuals, as being an individual person ''writ large." The analogy- nay, the 
essential identity - of rules governing the conduct of States and of individuals is not asserted for the reason 
force. Pufendorfand Vattel were also described as 'sorry comforters.' Kant/1991/ 103. 
55 McNair/1961b/379; Elihu!Lauterpacht/Note/CP-W307. 
56 Rosenne/1961/829; Bull/2000/95-124; Hussain/19841126-134. 
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that States are like individuals; it is due to the fact that States are composed of individual human beings; it 
results from the fact that behind the mystical, impersonal, and therefore necessarily irresponsible personality 
of the metaphysical State there are the actual subjects of the rights and duties, namely, individual human 
beings.'58 
However, this explanation of the fourth principle is misleading as an interpretation of Grotius, 
because the notion of state in Grotius's theory is very different from the conception of state which 
Lauterpacht held Masaharu Yanagihara explains Grotius' s conception of state as follows: 
'Grotius's conception of association is multi-layered, consisting of marriages, households, private bodies 
(collegia), cities, provinces, municipalities, states, alliances, and the society of nations. Even the state, which 
Grotius considers the most perfect society, is definitely not the modem sovereign state, with which 
independent powers with the authority to rule over others and the means of enforcement cannot in theory 
coexist. The power of a head of a household over his wire, children, and slaves is called imperium, as is the 
imperium of a state over its subjects. The distinction between the various associations mentioned is not an 
essential one, but is only a matter of degree. '59 
In other words, Grotius could not have held the modernistic view of states, although Lauterpacht , 
looking at the matter in his own modem way, miSlUlderstood Grotius' s concept of the state. 
Monarchs were regarded as states themselves in the 111 century from the patrimonial point of view. 
As Benedict Kingsbury says, 'he [Grotius] does not systematically distinguish the legal personality 
of the sovereign state from that of the ruler or other governing power within the state. '60 In this 
sense, the modem concept of state as social organisation did not exist in the 111 century. 
Lauterpacht intentionally disregarded the change in the concept of states from patrimonial in the 
57 Onuma/1993c/362. 
58 Lauterpacht/1946b/CP-W336. 
59 Yanagihara/1993/157. 
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1 1'' centmy to social organisation in the 20d' century, when he said that 'whatever may be the form 
of the govemment of the State, those who rule it and act on its behalf are individual hwnan beings, 
and it is to them only that, upon final analysis, rules oflaw are addressed. '61 
The fourth principle is just one example of the problems of Lauterpacht's interpretation of 
Grotius; the same attitude is also seen in The Grotian Tradition as a whole. The mc9or problem of 
Lauterpacht' s interpretation of Grotius is that Lauterpacht seems not to have paid much attention to 
differences between historical periods and changes evident in such terminology as 'state,' 'society,' 
or 'war,' used in the modem em as well as in the times of Grotius. Lauterpacht' s adherence to the 
Grotian Tmdition, therefore, avoids with difficulty being criticised as no more than 'facile 
references to Grotius. '62 As far as Lauterpacht is concerned, nevertheless, the problem is not 
whether or not his interpretation of Grotius is correct, but how he interpreted Grotius in order to 
propose a prescription for the era of crisis. In this sense, the above eleven principles are still 
interesting for an understanding of his own theory of intemationallaw rather than of the theory of 
Grotius itself 
It should be pointed out that Lauterpacht's interpretation of Grotius is generally coloured by 
his reconciliation ofKelsenian nonnativism with the English tmdition; there is a similarity between 
Lauterpacht's explanation of the fourth principle of Grotian Tmdition and Kelsenian nonnativism. 
The view ofKelsen on this point is as follows: 
'The state, which represents the specific subject of international law, is, insofar as its behavior is the substance 
of rights and duties, a being no different from individuals, the specific subjects of national law. Only 
individuals can have rights and duties, for the substance of rights and duties can only be the behavior of 
individuals. The fact that international law obligates and authorizes states does not mean that it does not 
obligate and authorize individuals, but only that it obligates and authorizes individuals whose acts are 
60 KingsbUI)'/1996/48. 
61 Lauterpacht/1946b/CP-W338. 
62 T!fanaka/1993/307. 
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inte1preted as the acts of a state. '63 
As already noted, the same point is also seen in Westlake's teaching that 'those towards whom it is 
taken are also men like ourselves, though they may be veiled from our eyes by the interposition of 
another artificial entity. '64 From his early academic career, Lauterpacht claimed that 'behind the 
personified institutions called States there are in every case individual human beings to whom the 
precepts of international law are addressed.'65 In this sense, Lauterpacht's effort to revive Grotian 
Tradition is not the resurrection of Grotius himself It should be understood as the evangelistic 
manifesto of Lauterpacht to moralise international relations. The following remark of Lauterpacht 
clearly shows his intention: 
'What Grotius did was to endow international law with tmprecedented dignity and authority by making it 
part not only of a general system of jurisprudence but also of a tmiversal moral code. To many, indeed, it may 
appear that De Jure Belli ac Pacis is more a system of ethics applied to States than a system of law. This 
would not inevitably imply a condemnation of the wotk For it may be held that at that time- as, indeed, at 
any time- it was important that the relations of States should be conceived and taught as part of ethics as well 
as part oflaw. Grotius's great merit is that he performed both tasks in one wotk '66 
The problem, however, is whether it is practically possible for Lauterpacht to claim a universal 
moral code in the international community in the mid-20rt1 centwy as Grotius did in the mid-I Jh 
centwy. It is because the preconditions of the universal moral code, which, in the opinion of 
Lauterpacht, Grotius discussed, had already disappeared even before the Second World War. The 
universal moral conduct of Grotius was in fact based on the universalism of Christianity. It is 
sometimes forgotten, but should be remembered, that Hugo Grotius was a pious Protestant who 
63 Kelsen/1942183. 
64 Westlake/1914/411. 
65 Lauterpacht/ Analogies/306. 
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wished to reunifY Christian churches.67 At the time of the Reformation, the Pope was criticised as 
the Antichrist by Protestants, because Luther and Calvin descnbed him so.68 Despite being a 
Protestant, however, Grotius tried to prove that the Pope was not Antichrist, since he thought that 
the prevalent view of Protestants to see the Pope as Antichrist prevented the reunion of Christianity 
between Protestants and Catholic Church.69 He did not stop publishing religious works, even 
though he knew that such religious activity could compromise his position in Holland, as well as 
impeding his qualification as Swedish Ambassador to France.70 When Grotius claimed the 
universal moral code, the moral code in Europe was essentially Christianity, even though the 
society of European nations was becoming secularised. Needless to say, such religious universality 
of Christianity, which Grotius desired at the cost ofhis diplomatic career, could not be expected in 
world politics of the mid-20d1 century. 
It should be noted, moreover, that there was the aristocratic solidarity of European nations in 
the 111 century, along with the secularisation process of European society. If monarchs were states 
themselves, international morality was nothing but 'the concern of a personal sovereign.' 
Morgenthau described the basis of the universal moral code of European sovereigns as follows: 
'The prince and the aristocratic rulers of a particular nation were in constant, intimate contact with the princes 
and aristocratic rulers of other nations. They were joined together by family ties, a common language 
(French), common cultural values, a common style of life, and common moral convictions about what a 
gentleman was and was not allowed to do in his relations with another gentleman, whether ofhis own or of a 
foreign nation. The princes competing for power considered themselves to be competitors in a game whose 
rules were accepted by all the other competitors. The members of their diplomatic and militaiy services 
looked upon themselves as employees who served their employer either by virtue of the accident of birth or 
66 Lauterpacht/1946b/CP-II/363. 
67 Nussbaum/1947 /105; Haggenmacher/1985/151. 
68 Van/den/Berg/1994/170-171. 
69 Yanagihara/2000/86-89. 
70 Nellen/1994/134-142. 
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because of the promise of pay, influence, and glory.' 71 
The aristocratic solidarity of Europe is shown by the fact that it was not unusual for a person to 
work for a foreign nation as a diplomat or a politician. Just as Bismarck was asked to serve in the 
Russian diplomatic service by Czar Alexander I in 1862 when he became Prime Minister of 
Prussia, Grotius also received offers from the Danish and Spanish Kings, and, in 1634, finally 
accepted the offer to be Swedish Ambassador to France from Oxenstierna, Prime Minister of 
Sweden at that time, in accordance with the will of the late King Gustavus Adolphus.72 However, 
when l.auterpacht wrote The Grotian Tradition, such aristocratic solidarity had disappeared as 
European dynasties declined after World War I. Today government officials are 'legally and 
morally responsible for their official acts, not to a monarch (that is, a specific individual), but to a 
collectivity (that is, a parliamentary majority, or the people as a whole).'73 Thus, as the concept of 
states transformed from the patrimonial concept of monarchs to the artificial concept of social 
organisation, the aristocratic basis of international morality disappeared. Morgenthau continued as 
follows: 
'When we say that George Ill of England was subject to certain moral restraints in his dealings with Louis 
XVI of France or Catherine the Great of Russia, we are referring to something real, something that can be 
identified with the conscience and the action of certain specific individuals. When we say that the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, or even Great Britain alone, has moral obligations toward the United States or 
France, we are making use of a fiction. By virtue of this fiction international law deals with nations as though 
they were individual persons, but nothing in the sphere of moral obligations corresponds to this legal 
concept'74 
71 Morgenthau/1993/236. 
72 Nussbaum/19471100. 
73 Morgenthau/1993/23 7. 
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Therefore, it is impossible to return to the universalism ofGrotius's theory in modern times when 
the basis of his universalism has disappeared. Thus when he tried to construct his universalism as 
Grotian Tradition, it became clear that Lauterpacht needed something as the universal basis of 
international law and morality. For him it was the solidarity of liberal democmtic countries. Indeed, 
Lauterpacht tried to re-construct the international community as civitas maxima on the basis of 
liberal democmcy and human rights. This point will be discussed in the next section. 
4.3. 'THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS CIVITAS MAxiMA 
Even during the Second World War, Lauterpacht had developed his idea on how the international 
community should be organised after the League of Nations. In the early spring of 1940, he 
discussed a plan of possible world federation. 75 In that paper, he pointed out the two indispensable 
elements of World Federation. The first element was abandonment of sovereignty of the member 
states of the world fedemtion. However, he thought that it was impmctical to urge states to 
renounce their sovereignty. He mther emphasised the regulation of the sovereign power of states 
mder international law. Indeed, it was possible for Lauterpacht to re-construct the role of sovereign 
state as an organ of the international community. Insofar as the state functioned as an organ of the 
international community, he preferred a plan of a new international organisation to a plan of a world 
federation. The second element, namely the recognition of the legal capacity of individuals under 
the law of fedemtion, seemed to him to be more important than the first element of world federation. 
These two characteristics were essential in that they were central to his perspective of the 
international organisations. It is, therefore, important to discuss these elements in order to 
understand his criticism of the United Nations. 
74 Ibid/238. 
75 The paper bears no date. However Elihu Lauterpacht suggests that it was prepared in the early 
spring of 1940. Elihu!Lauterpacht/Note/CP-IIJ/5. 
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41.3.1. THE AssOCIATION OF IDlEMOCRATIC STATES 
With regard to the first element, it should be noted that the sovereignty of states is not absolute for 
Lauterpacht. He understood sovereignty from the nonnative point of view, namely that sovereignty 
is nothing but 'a delegated bundle of rights' under international law. Consequently, it seemed to 
him not to be legally impossible for states to abandon their sovereignty as 'a power which is 
derived from a higher source and therefore divisible, modifiable and elastic.' Indeed, the 
abandonment of the sovereign rights of the member states is indispensable to the formation of 
fedemtion. Otherwise, the organisation would be a confedemtion of states mther than a federal state. 
Therefore, he pointed out that 'the phenomenon of fedemtion has done almost as much to displace 
sovereignty from the high seat of exclusive and indivisible authority. '76 
Nevertheless, Lauterpacht considered it impmctical to force states to renounce their 
sovereignty and to become equal, despite differences in power, though he admitted that it is 
necessary to regulate the sovereign right of states: 
'In so far as international sovereignty of States has proved incompatible with other essential postulates of that 
civilization ... it is rational and imperative to urge its further drastic limitation. But the facile dichotomy 
expressed in such a phrase as ''unless the State destroys sovereignty, sovereignty will destroy the State," does 
not do justice to the realities and the complexities of the case. The abolition of the international personality 
and of the concomitant rights of sovereignty of States is impracticable not only for the fully adequate reason 
that, within the foreseeable future, it is not likely to prove acceptable to the overwhelming majority of persons 
within the State in question.' 77 
Therefore, he rejected the proposal for a world federation. He preferred a confederation of states to 
a world federation insofar as the regulation of state sovereignty is possible from the viewpoint of 
76 Lauterpacht/1940a/CP-IW9. 
77 Ibid./13. 
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the international connmmity. In this sense, Laute:rpacht was not a denier of state sovereignty. The 
problem for him was not whether state sovereignty can be abolished, but how states function as 
organs of international law. This point is well identified in the context of the recognition of state or 
government 
4.3.1.1. THE FuNCfiON OF THE STATE AS THE ORGAN OFTHE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN THE 
CONTEXT OF REcOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
4.3.1.1.1. THELEGALISTICTHEORYOFREcoGNITION 
Laute:rpacht viewed sovereign states from the perspective of the international community. In his 
view, a sovereign state should be regarded as an organ of the international community which 
creates and applies international law. This view is here referred to as the decentralisation theory of 
the international community. This theory is one feature ofKelsenian normativism. It explains how 
international law is created, applied and enforced systematically even in the undeveloped or 
primitive structure of the international community. It is useful to refer to Kelsen's explanation of the 
decentralisation theory of the international community in order to understand Lauterpacht's theory. 
Hans Kelsen used the concept of measuring the degree of the institutionalisation of society in 
two ways, namely in a static sense and a dynamic sense. The centralisation/decentralisation in a 
static sense, on the one hand, is concerned with 'the territorial sphere of validity of the norms that 
constitute a legal order', which is 'the territorial extent throughout which the norm is valid. '78 In 
other words, the territorial sphere of law is nothing but the sphere of legal validity. Therefore, the 
static concept of the centralisation/decentralisation explains the relationship between the sphere of 
the validity of general law and the sphere of the validity of particular law. In the case of 
international law, it explains the relationship between general international law and particular 
78 Kelsen/19421107. 
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international law, which arnmmts to the relationship between central law and local law in the sphere 
of national law. 
On the other hand, centralisation/decentralisation in a dynamic sense concerns 'the methods of 
nonn-making, especially with the organs creating and executing the norms. '79 The theory which 
sees the state as the organ of the international community is decentralisation in a dynamic sense. 
The typical example is seen in the remark that 'a state which, authorized by international law, 
applies against another state which has violated international law the sanction provided by 
international law - in other words resorts to reprisals or wages war - acts as an organ of the 
international legal community.' Kelsen continued, 
'Put in another way, it is the international legal community itself that reacts against the violator of the law 
through the medium of the state resorting to reprisals or waging a just war. If forcible interference in the 
sphere of interests of a subject is permitted by the order only as a reaction against a delict, then the use of 
force is resenred to the community, is a monopoly of the community. '80 
States act as organs of the international community not only in the sanction process, but also in the 
nonn-creating process or the nonn-application process. Thus, Kelsen viewed this aspect of 
international law from the point of view of the international community. It is undeniable that the 
decentralised structure of the international community is very 'primitive' in the sense that it is 
unorganised.81 However, it is still a legal order making states act as its organ. In Kelsen's view, 
therefore, the decentralisation theory of the international community guarantees the legal nature of 
international law by considering states as the organs of the international community. 
Although refuting Kelsen's view of the international community as being similar to a 
79 Ibid./1 09. 
80 Ibid/57-58. 
81 See Carnpbell/1988. 
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primitive society, 82 Lauterpacht followed Kelsen with reference to the decentralisation theory of the 
international cornrnunity.83 In Recognition, Lauterpacht tried to conceive the fi.mction of states to 
recognise state or governrnenf'l as the function of the organs of the international community by 
connecting the three elements of recognition, namely the duty of the recognising state, the 
discretion of recognising states and the legal effect of state recognition. The fact that a political 
authority exists in a certain area produces a legal obligation for other states to recognise the 
authority as a state. However, the determination of the fact itself is within the discretion of 
recognising states. The discretion is not a political but a judicial one regulated by the legal 
obligation to recognise the territorial authority as a state.85 The legal effect of the recognition of 
states, furthermore, is to give a recognised state international legal personality. In this sense, 
Lauterpacht tried to synthesise the declaratory theory and the constitutive one: 'Although 
recognition is thus declaratory of an existing fact, such declaration, made in the impartial fulfilment 
of a legal duty, is constitutive, as between the recognizing State and the community so recognized, 
of international rights and duties associated with full statehood. '86 The recognising state which has 
legal discretion to decide whether or not it should recognise a political territorial entity as a 
sovereign state, functions as an organ of the international community by connecting the legal 
obligation of the recognition of states under the declaratory theory with its legal effect of creating 
international legal personality of the recognised state under the constitutive theory. 
But Lauterpacht was not satisfied even with the duty of recognition, because he understood 
the reality of a state often using recognition to protect its own national interest under the guise of the 
82 Lauterpacht!Function/433-434. 
83 See Lauterpacht!Recognition/172Jn.1. 
84 It is true that Lauterpacht distinguished between the recognition of state and the recognition of 
government However, as Warbrick explained, the distinction between them depends on the view 
that the legal effect of recognition of states is constitutive. Warbrick/1981 b/569. The discussion on 
recognition in this section is not about the legal effect of recognition, but the decentralised fi.mction 
of states as organs of the international community, whatever the legal effect of recognition. 
Th_erefore, there is no reason to distinguish between the recognition of state and the recognition of 
govemriient in this section. 
85 Lauterpacht/Recognition/24. 
86 Ibid/6. 
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international community. As John Dugard points out, the duty of recognition was 'an interim 
measure, pending the collectivization of recognition'87 for Lauterpacht. Thus, in order to solve the 
problem of politics in recognition with finality, Lauterpacht proposed the collectivisation of the 
recognition process: 
'Situations will arise in which a State may see in the manner of the exercise of the function of recognition an 
opportunity for securing for itself benefits from the parent State or from the community asking for 
recognition. The consideration of such benefits cannot be regarded as legitimate, but it cannot always be 
absent from the decision of the recognizing State. It would be futile to deny either the existence of this aspect 
of the problem or the fact that it is due to an obvious imperfection of international organization. The solution, 
which is equally obvious, of that difficulty would seem to lie in transferring that function to an international 
organ not impeded by a conflict between interest and duty. '88 
Thus, his proposal for the collectivisation of the recognition process shows that Lauterpacht 
discussed the problem of recognition in the context of the institutionalisation of the international 
community. 
It is arguable whether Lauterpacht' s observation of recognition was not lex lata but lex forenda. 
Josef Kunz, who thought the recognising state had no legal obligation other than discretion of 
recognition, claimed that Lauterpacht's view of recognition was nothing but his 'ethical 
consideration' from the viewpoint of Kelsenian normativism.89 Kunz's argument is persuasive, 
because Lauterpacht's theory of recognition typified his normativisrn in the sense that the act of 
recognition should be regarded only as the creation or application of international law on behalf of 
the international community. Lauterpacht did not admit the political character of recognition at all. 
This point is reflected by his claim of the duty of recognition. It is again useful to refer to Kelsen's 
87 Dugard/1987 /10. 
88 Lauterpacht/Recognition/67. 
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view of recognition in order to tmderstand the implication of Lauterpacht' s argumentation of the 
duty of recognition, because Kelsen also constructed the theory of recognition from the viewpoint 
of the decentralisation theory of the international community. 
'The decision whether in a concrete instance a state -a "new" state- has come into existence or not, whether 
an old state has ceased to exist or not- the decision of these questions general international law leaves to the 
state themselves, that is, to the organs representing them, the governments which are interested in the 
decisions. That is the legal import of the acts called "recognition" of a government. In them the 
decentralization of the application of the law so characteristic of international law is expressed most 
significantly. '90 
However, Kelsen, unlike Lauterpacht, did not deny that sovereign states pursue their own national 
interests in the context of recognition. Kelsen distinguished between the political act of recognition 
and the legal act of recognition. On the one hand, the political act of recognition is that 'the 
recognizing state is willing to enter into political and other relations with the recognized state or 
government, relations of the kind which nonnally exist between members of the family of nations,' 
although the political act of recognition, in Kelsen's view, is declaratory in the sense that it does not 
have the legal effect of creating an international legal personality for the recognised state.91 On the 
other hand, the legal act of recognition is explained from the viewpoint of the decentralisation 
theory of the international commtmity. It is the legal act of the state as the organ of the international 
community to establish a fact. By the legal act of recognition, a cornrntmity becomes a 'state' vis-a-
vis the recognising state. However, Kelsen did not admit the duty of recognition. He said, 
'Existing states are only empowered- they are not obliged- to perform the act of recognition. Refusal to 
recognize the existence of a new state is no violation of general international law and thus constitutes no 
90 Kelsen/19421119. 
91 Kelsen/1941/605-606. 
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violation of the right of any other community. '92 
Thus, Kelsen constructed the legal rules of recognition as the power-confening rule.93 Lauterpacht 
also interpreted the legal rules of recognition as the power-conferring rule, because the recognition 
of a state creates the international legal personality of the recognized state. However, the difference 
between Kelsen and Lauterpacht lies in whether or not they consider the recognising states to be 
obliged to exercise the power of creating an international legal personality or of ascertaining the fact 
that a government is effective, which is given by the international community. In this sense, the 
duty of recognition is the key to understanding the difference between them. 
The significance of the duty of recognition is to delete any political consideration from the 
sphere of recognition. Kelsen admitted the role of political considerations in the theory of 
recognition by separating the political act of recognition from the legal act of recognition. However, 
Lauterpacht went too far even from Kelsen. After re-constructing Kelsen' s theory of recognition 
from only the viewpoint of the legal act of recognition, Lauterpacht tried to eliminate the political 
aspect of recognition. The following remark shows how Lauterpacht wished to delete political 
considerations in recognition process from his pure legal theory of recognition. 'The dual position 
of the recognising State as an organ administering international law and as a guardian of its own 
interest must reveal itself in a distuibing fashion whenever there is an occasion for successfully 
using the weapon of recognition for the purpose of achieving political advantages. '94 By creating 
the legal duty of recognition, Lauterpacht rejected the state as 'as a guardian of its own interest' in 
the highly political sphere that sovereign states have to decide whether they should establish an 
official relationship, including diplomatic relations, with a recognised state or a recognised 
government 
The essential problem of his legalistic theory of recognition is that Lauterpacht assumed that 
92 Ibid/610. 
93 In Hart's view, Kelsen's general theory oflaw is to unify the legal system by conceiving all legal 
rules as power-conferring rule. Hart/1994/35-38. 
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political considerations could be eliminated completely from the recognition process. This 
assumption is related not only to the duty of recognition that many lawyers denied,95 but also to the 
collectivisation of recognition. It is certainly difficult to deny that there is a merit in the 
collectivisation of recognition process. The collectivisation of recognition process would avoid the 
relative natme of recognition which Crawford regards as one of the difficulties with the constitutive 
theory. 96 It is also desirable for states to have a common policy of recognition in order to deal with 
international crises such as the disintegration of a state. However, the problem is that it is 
impractical to expect that states would abandon their power of recognition at the cost of their 
interests. Although some lawyers claim that admission to membership of the United Nations 
should be regarded as the collective recognition of states,97 the act which may be regarded as the 
recognition of state or government is neither the recommendation of the Security Council nor the 
General Assembly resolution, but the individual voting attitude of a member state.98 In a sense, 
Lauterpacht pursued the impractical goal of eliminating political considerations from the 
recognition process for the legal purity of recognition by claiming the duty of recognition, and by 
the proposal of creating an international organisation for the recognition process. 
The second problem is that his legalistic theory necessarily narrows the margin of appreciation 
of the recognising state by deleting considerations indispensable to recognition other than legal 
ones. This point is shown by the change of British policy on the recognition of governments in 
1980. It is well known that the Foreign Office of the United Kingdom was influenced by 
Lauterpacht's theory ofthe duty of recognising effective governments.99 Indeed, in his review of 
Lauterpacht's Recognition, William Eric Beckett, the Legal Advisor to the Foreign Office at that 
time, said as follows: 
94 Lauterpacht/Recognition/67. 
95 Cohn/1948/406; Kunz/1950/718; Mugerwa/1968/277; Jessup/1971/217; Warbrick/1981a/241. 
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'In the reviewer's opinion Professor Lauterpacht makes a very fair case for showing that the Jaw is in 
accordance with this thesis. The reviewer also think that, taking a broad view, the acceptance of Professor 
Lauterpacht's thesis relieves governments offar more political embarrassments than it creates.' 100 
It is no wonder, thus, that the Foreign Office asked Lauterpacht to write a short article about the 
British de jure recognition of the communist government of China in The Times, 101 when the British 
government granted de jure recognition to the communist government of China in 1950. Then, in 
1951, Herbert Morrison, the British Foreign Secretary at that time, announced: 
'The question of the recognition of a State or Government should be distinguished from the question of 
entering into diplomatic relations with it, which is entirely discretionary. On the other hand. it is international 
law which defines the conditions under which a Government should be recognised de jure or de facto and it 
is a matter of judgment in each particular case whether a regime fulfils the conditions. The conditions under 
international law for the recognition of a new regime as the de facto Government of a State are that the new 
regime has in tact effective control over most of the State's tenit01y and that this control seems likely to 
continue. The conditions for the recognition of a new regime as the de jure Government of a State are that the 
new regime should not merely have effective control over most of the State's tenitory, but that it should. in 
fact, be firmly established. His M~esty's Government consider that recognition should be accorded when the 
conditions specified by international law are, in tact, fulfilled and that recognition should not be given when 
these considerations are not fulfilled. The recognition of Government de jure or de facto should not depend 
on whether the character of the regime is such as to command His M~esty' s Government's approval.' 102 
99 Jessup/1971!217; Warbrick/1981b/570-571; Dugard/1987!2/n.5; Talmon/1992.1239. 
100 E./194 7/508. Emphasis original. Also see Fitzmaurice-Vallat/1968!285. 
101 Lauterpacht/1950j/CP-III; see Elihu!Lauterpacht/Note/CPIII/115. Akehurst considered that the 
reason the British government adopted 'the Lauterpacht doctrine' was because 'it was useful means 
of fending oif criticism from the USA about British recognition of coil1111unist governments in 
China and elsewhere.' Akehurst/1987 /63. 
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Since then, the British government has recognised effective governments 'despite the constitutional 
illegitimacy of their coming power and the political antipathy with which they were regarded.' 103 
However, the problem of the recognition of Ghana's government in 1979 forced the British 
government to reconsider its policy of recognition of government 104 As it became clear that the 
Khmer Rouge government had embarked on a brutal reconstruction programme in which more 
than two million Cambodians were killed, the British government was criticised for its recognition 
of that government 105 Consequently, tl1e Britain abandoned the policy of recognition of 
governments in 1980. Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary of the Thatcher cabinet, annmmced: 
'Following the undertaking of my right honourable fiiend the Lord Privy Seal in another place on 18th June 
last we have conducted a re-examination of British policy and practice concerning the recognition of 
Governments. This has included a comparison with the practice of our partners and allies. On the basis of this 
review we have decided that we shall no longer accord recognition to Governments. The British Government 
recognise States in accordance with common international doctrine. 
Where an lU1constitutional change of regime takes place in a recognised State, Governments of other 
States must necessarily consider what dealings, if any, they should have with the new regime, and whether 
and to what extent it qualifies to be treated as the Government of the State concerned. Many of our partners 
and allies take the position that they do not recognise Governments and that that therefore no question of 
recognition arises in such cases. By contrast, the policy of successive British Governments has been that we 
should make and annolll1ce a decision formally "recognising" the new Government 
This practice has sometimes been misunderstood, and, despite explanations to the contrruy, our 
"recognition" interpreted as implying approval. For example, in circumstances where there might be 
legitimate public concern about the violation of human rights by the new regime, or the manner in which it 
achieved power, it has not sufficed to say that an annolll1cement of"recognition" is simply a neutral formality. 
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We have therefore concluded that there are practical advantages in following the policy of many other 
countries in not according recognition to Governments. Like them, we shall continue to decide the nature of 
our dealing with regime which come to power unconstitutionally in the light of our assessment of whether 
they are able of themselves to exercise effective control of the tenitory of the State concerned, and seem 
likely to continue to do so.' 106 
This change in the British policy of recognition of governments was inevitable, because the 
legalistic theory of recognition was too inflexible to adapt itself to the actual situation, which 
requires some considerations of international and domestic politics. The notion of the duty of the 
recognition of government forced Britain to consider that the recognition of government meant the 
automatic application of international law, and did not allow the British government to consider the 
political aspect of recognition, such as the political desirability of the recognised government from 
the viewpoint of British policy or the avoidance of criticism due to public misapprehension of the 
British recognition of an illegitimate government as political approval of the recognised 
government While there are other reasons for the British government to abandon the old policy of 
recognition of government, one of the reasons is definitively the inflexibility of the legalistic policy 
of recognition.107 
It seems undeniable that Lauterpacht was one of those responsible for the confusion of British 
policy on recognition, because his analysis of the opinions of the Law Officers of the Crown, which 
seems to be the main reason why the British government followed his opinion, was distorted, from 
the outset of his examination, by his adherence to Kelsenian normativism, especially in the 
decentralisation theory of the international community. As Riesenfeld pointed out that 'in defining 
the filed of inquiry of the student of international law, Professor Lauterpacht still wears the blinders 
106 Lordslvol.408/cols.1121-1122; Commons/vol.983/written-answer/cols.278-279; 
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of the Vienna school,' 108 Lautetpacht's adherence to Kelsenian nonnativism is observed in the 
following statement with regard to the lawyers' task: 
'The preceding examination of the practice of States and of pronouncements of governments showing the 
acknowledgement of the duty of recognition whenever there exist the requisite conditions of fact is open to the 
retort that in deducing a legal rule fium the practice of States we must not look to the professions of 
governments but to their motives. Any such retort is probably unsound. Official pronouncements of 
governments express what in their view are the correct legal rules and principles capable of general 
application. It is with these alone that the jurist is concerned.' 109 
Lautetpacht then warned other lawyers not to probe 'the motives which have induced governments 
to express their obligation to act upon a legal rule.' For him, it is the work of 'the historian and the 
sociologist.' In his view, lawyers should be concerned with 'the legal rule upon which governments 
profess to act.' 110 Thus, Lautetpacht' s studied removal of political elements from the opinions of the 
Law Officers of the Crown distorted somewhat the real meanings of the opinions. However, it was 
necessary to refer to 'a fuller statement of the facts and circumstances to which they [the opinions 
of the Law Officers] relate, coupled on occasion with an indication ofthe Foreign Office minutes or 
action taken on them' 111 for an understanding of the real meaning ofthe opinions. The words ofthe 
Law Officers taken out of context were moulded into the framework of Kelsenian nonnativism. 
The duty of recognition was 'found' in the practice ofthe United Kingdom and the United States 
by Lautetpacht from his own perspective of the decentralisation theory. Thus, the United States and 
the United Kingdom were regarded by Lautetpacht as organs of the international community. 
Although it is skilful in using the fiction that it represents the international community against its 
enemies, the United States rejects the role of the organ of the international community in the 
108 Risenfeld/1948/587. 
109 I..autetpacht/Recognition/25. 
110 Ibid. 
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context of recognition. 112 The British government, on the other hand, has conducted itself as the 
organ of the international community in the context of recognition. However, it also finally found 
that ' [ o ]ur criteria for recognition have placed us in considerable difficulties.' 113 
4.3.1.1.2. THE LEGITIMACY OF GoVERNMENTS IN RECOGNITION 
Lauterpacht did not find any qualification of recognised states other than 'external independence 
and effective internal government within a reasonably well-defined territory.' These conditions of 
statehood were definitive and exhaustive in his view. Therefore, he continued, 
'They [the conditions of statehood] have nothing to do with the degree of civilization of the new State, with 
the legitimacy of its origin, with its religion, or with its political system. Once considerations of that nature are 
introduced as condition of recognition, the clear path of law is abandoned and the door wide open to 
arbitrariness, to attempts at extortion, and to intervention at the very threshold of statehood.' 114 
From such a viewpoint, Lauterpacht denied the principle of dynastic legitimacy as a legal condition 
of the recognition of govemments. 115 However, it should be noted that the reason he rejected the 
principle of legitimacy (constitutionality) is because he felt that international law could not regulate 
the problem of revolution. It is only in this sense that Lauterpacht preferred the effectiveness of 
government to its constitutionality. The question of the constitutionality of government seemed to 
Lauterpacht to belong to the political sphere not to the legal one. However, this does not mean that 
he disregarded the question of the legitimacy of governance. Indeed, he expressed his hope as 
follows: 
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'International society would be entitled to discourage revolutions by wielding the weapon of non-recognition 
if at the same time it provided methods guaranteeing and ensuring individual rights and government by 
consent within the territories of all States. When that consummation comes to pass, revolutions will be subject 
to suppression as being subversive of the constitution of the international commonwealth. Until this happens, 
international law must be satisfied with a different function, namely that of ensuring a measure of continuity-
otherwise radically broken- between the revolutionary and the old order.' 116 
Moreover, Lauterpacht did not abandon the subsequent legitimatisation of the government by 
popular vote as the test of the effectiveness of government. It is true that he noticed that the 
subsequent legitimatisation of the government by popular consent often became a matter of mere 
form, because revolutionary governments often did not allow citizens to express their free will. 
Although he expected that the test of subsequent legitimation would remain deficient in its 
operation unless the freedom of popular vote was internationally supervised, Lauterpacht believed 
that subsequent legitimation was essentially correct. Indeed, he said that '[the test of subsequent 
legitimation's] re-emergence, when accompanied by appropriate international safeguards, must be 
regarded as a rational development deeply rooted in history.' 117 
In this sense, as Wllfred Jenks pointed out, there was a natural link between the question of 
recognition and the international protection of human rights in the problem of legitimacy of 
government.118 Indeed, Lauterpacht believed that the international community could not develop 
without the democratic legitimacy of governments. In his proposal of a confederation of states, 
Lauterpacht hoped that the member states of the new international organisation would be 
democratic and would protect human rights. The federation should be 'a world in which the 
fi..mdamental rights of the individual under the rule of law are protected by organized international 
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society' 119 Therefore, even if sovereign states are sustained in the international community, they 
should be democratic in that they protect human rights: 
'The principal reason why the League was contemplated as democratic was that neither peace nor 
international law, whose firm establishment was described as one of the principal objects of the League, can 
become a reality until we have recognized the individual human being as the ultimate beneficiary of the law 
and the ultimate unit of human progress, to be protected by international action, if necessary, from the power 
of the State.'120 
It is his concept of the international community as civitas maxima: the world where the individual is 
protected by law, which is governed by judges, from the arbitrary power of state sovereignty. It is 
very clear that he tried to transfer the ideal of legality and democracy in a domestic society to the 
international community. Lauterpacht, for example, agreed with Lowenstein that 'the right to 
government by consent [should] be elevated to the dignity of a ftmdamental human right fully 
guaranteed by internationallaw.' 121 Unfortunately, however, this domestic analogy of the legal 
school of international lawyers was a cause of trouble in international relations as a paradoxical 
problem ofKantian Republicanism. 
4.3.1.2. THE PARADOX OF KANTIAN REPUBLICANISM 
It was inevitable that Lauterpacht, who adopted Kelsenian normativism as the basis of his 
understanding of law, should have been influenced by Neo-Kantian epistemology which affected 
Kelsen's Pure Theory ofLaw. 122 Although the influence ofKant over Lauterpacht is not so clear in 
the writings of Lauterpacht, apart from the international protection of human rights, Lauterpacht 
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clearly expressed his sympathy with Kantian republicanism in his paper on the world federation. 
He said that ' [ w ]hen in 1795 Kant fonnulated the articles of a federation of peoples for the mutual 
guarantee of independence and the preservation of peace, he regarded it as essential that the 
member States should possess a democratic constitution.' 123 
Despite adopting Kant's project of perpetual peace, Lauterpacht seems not to have followed 
Kant's notion of republicanism and democracy. For Kant, whether a state is republican or despotic 
is a question relative to the fonn of government, while whether a state is autocratic, aristocratic or 
democratic is a question of sovereignty. Kant defined a republican state as follows: 
'A republican constituJion is founded upon three principles: firstly, the principle of freedom for all members 
of a society (as men); secondly, the principle of the dependence of everyone upon a single common 
legislation (as subjects); thirdly, the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens). It is the only 
constitution which can be derived from the idea of an original contract, upon which all rightful legislation of a 
people must be founded.' 124 
On the other hand, in the opinion ofKant, democracy necessarily becomes despotic, because there 
is no separation of powers in a democratic country: 
'We can therefore say that the smaller the number of ruling persons in a state and the greater their powers of 
representation, the more the constitution will approximate to its republican potentiality, which it may hope to 
realise eventually by gradual refonns. For this reason, it is more difficult in an aristocracy than in a monarchy 
to reach this one and only perfectly lawful kind of constitution, while it is possible in a democracy only by 
means of violent revolution.' 125 
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Therefore, it is more important for Kant that a state is republican rather than democratic in the sense 
that the executive power is separated from the legislative power. In Kant's view, there was no 
collision between enlightened autocracy and liberal republicanism. 
However, Lauterpacht clearly used the term 'democracy' in the meaning of'republicanism' in 
Perpetual Peace. Democracy for Lauterpacht was the republican form of governance whereby 
human rights are protected from the arbitrary power of sovereign states. In other words, he did not 
care about the question of who is sovereign in Kantian sense. The United Kingdom, though a 
monarchy, clearly seemed to him to be 'democratic.' The important question for him was not the 
form of sovereignty but the form of governance. Therefore, when he started to argue for the 
international protection of human rights, his claim that the states should be 'democratic' meant 
nothing but his adherence to the K.antian theory of republicanism. This point shows that his 'neo-
Grotian' concept of the international community includes K.antian republicanism. The 
confederation of democratic states which protects human rights is 'the idea of the civitas maxima of 
the federation of the world.' 126 
Thus, Lauterpacht incorporated Kantian republicanism into his international legal theory, 
which is clearly shown by his eighth principle of the new international organisation after the 
Second World War: 
'The international recognition and effective protection of fundamental human rights either through an 
International Bill of the Rights of Man forming part of the constitution of the society of nations or in some 
other manner, is an important condition of international peace, of social progress upon which peace depends, 
and ofthe moral authority of international organisation and law.' 127 
Considering that his first principle of the new international organisation is that '[a] universal 
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international organization is one which all States are compelled to join and from which no 
withdrawal is legally possible,' 128 there is no doubt that Lauterpacht implied that all states should 
accept his eighth principle of international organisation cited above. It follows that all member 
states of the new international organisation should become republican in the Kantian sense that 
'observance of human rights is a primary requirement to join the community of civilised nations 
under international law.' According to Teson, it is the crux ofKantian republicanism: 
'It follows that there cannot be federation or peace alliance with tyrannical state. If the international 
community constituted by the law of nations is going to preserve peace, it cannot accept tyrants among its 
members. Domestic freedom is a primary credential required from any state for it to become a legitimate 
member of the international community.' 129 
Even though critical of Teson's interpretation of Kant's international legal theory, Patrick Capps 
admitted that 'the best interpretation of the meaning of the term republicanism in Kant's work is by 
way of the notion of a constitutional democracy.' 130 
However, even apart from the question whether or not Kantian republicanism is 
metaphysically true, Kantian republicanism has some inherent problems in realising its own ideals. 
First, there is a question whether or not republicanism is really universally acceptable among 
nations. In reality, all nations are not necessarily republican or democratic. Indeed, the project of 
Kantian republicanism has been seriously challenged from the viewpoint of communism during 
the Cold War era, and from the viewpoint of multiculturalism in the Post Cold War era.131 Kantian 
republicanism seems to critics of liberalism to be the very expression of Western liberalism or, 
worse, Eurocentrism. In this sense, the universality of Kantian republicanism is not as self-evident 
as Lauterpacht thought it was. 
128 Ibid/467. 
129 Tes6n11998n. 
130 Capps/2001/1006. 
200 
Even ifKantian republicanism is politically acceptable as political ideology among all nations, 
the second problem still remains whether and how Kantian republicanism deals with non-liberal 
states which grossly and systematically violate human rights. It should be noted that, in Kant's view, 
there is no peace, but a hostile situation as potential war, between republican states and tyrannical 
ones. Although some international relations scholars contrast Kantian republicanism with a 
Hobbesian state of nature with regard to the understanding of international relations, 132 this contra-
position between them is rnisleading, 133 because Kant's conception of the state of nature is clearly 
influenced by Hobbes.134 In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant said that 'a state, as amoral person, is 
considered as living in relation to another state in the condition of natural freedom and therefore in a 
condition of war.' 135 The description of the state of war as the state of nature is also seen in The 
Perpetual Peace: 
'A state of peace among men living together is not the same as the state of nature, which is rather a state of war. 
For even if it does not involve active hostilities, it involves a constant threat of their breaking out Thus the 
state of peace must be formally instituted, for a suspension of hostilities is not in itself a guarantee of peace. 
And unless one neighbour gives a guarantee to the other at his request (which can happen only in a lawful 
state), the latter may treat him as an enemy.' 136 
If a federation of states consists only of republican states, non-republican states would be in a state 
of war, instead ofbeing allowed to enjoy 'perpetual peace' within the federation. The state ofwar 
between republican states and non-republican ones, of course, is not necessarily the real situation of 
war, but it is no wonder that actual hostilities take place any time between them, because states have 
a right to go to war in the sense that 'a state is permitted to prosecute its right against another state, 
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namely by its own force, when it believes it has been wronged by the other state.' 137 
Thirdly, Kant put forward the idea of an 'unjust enemy' which is 'an enemy whose publicly 
expressed will (whether by word or deed) reveals a maxim by which, if it were made a universal 
rule, any condition of peace among nations would be impossible, and instead, a state of nature 
[namely a state of war] would be perpetuated.' All republican nations whose freedom is threatened 
by an unjust enemy, which for example violates public contracts, are called to unite against the 
misconduct of the state as an unjust enemy in order to deprive it of the power to violate public 
contracts and to force the people of the unjust enemy to adopt a new constitution opposed to war, 
although even republican states are not allowed to make the llljust enemy disappear from the 
earth.138 This means that Kantian republicanism implicitly presupposes a state of war between 
republican states and non-republican states, even though it desires 'pe1petual peace' between 
republican states within an international federation. 139 
It should be noted, moreover, that the problem of Kantian republicanism is not only that it 
presupposes a state of war between republican states and non-liberal states, but also that in such a 
state of nature there is the possibility of 'a war of extermination, in which both parties and right 
itself might all be simultaneously annihilated.' Although it is true that he etlucally rejected war of 
annihilation, Kant noticed the possibility that war of annihilation could build 'perpetual peace' on 
'the vast graveyard of the human race.' 140 This point is more clearly explained by Carl Schrnitt who 
regarded the political as the ever-present possibility of war between :fiiends and enernies. Schmitt 
explained the possibility how the 'final' war of peace-lovers for 'perpetual peace' paradoxically 
becomes a crucial war of extemlination: 
'If pacifist hostility toward war were so strong as to drive pacifists into a war against nonpacifists, in a war 
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against war, that would prove the pacifism truly possesses political energy because it is sufficiently strong to 
group men according to friend and enemy. If, in fact, the will to abolish war is so strong that it no longer shlU1S 
war, then it has become a political motive, i.e., it affirms, even if only as an extreme possibility, war and even 
the reason for war. Presently this appears to be a peculiar way of justifYing wars. The war is then considered to 
constitute the absolute war of humanity. Such a war is necessarily unusually intense and inhuman because, by 
transcending the limits of the political framework, it simultaneously degrades the enemy into moral and other 
categories and is forced to make of him a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed.' 141 
Indeed, Schmitt noticed that Kant's idea of an tmjust enemy was more dangerous than its 
appearance. Schmitt said, 
'The intensity of a just war is increased even more, and the emphasis is shifted from the fact of the matter to 
the person of the unjust enemy. If St. Augustine says that the idea of war would be still more depressing if 
filtered through the idea of a just wru~ then the concept of an unjust enemy can increase this depression, 
because it does not have the act, but rather the perpetrator in view. If it is difficult for people to distinguish 
between a just enemy and a felon, how can they view an unjust enemy as anything other than the most 
grievous criminal? And in what sense does he remain an antagonist in a war circumscribed by international 
law? In the final analysis, identification of enemy ru1d criminal also must remove the limits Kant places on the 
just victor, since he does not allow for the disappearance of a state or for the fact that a people might be robbed 
of their constituent power.' 142 
Lauterpacht seems not to have paid great attention to these problems of Kantian republicanism. 
Indeed, he deleted the internal tension bet\veen power politics and liberal democracy from 
Oppenheim's international legal theory. The replacement of the first moral principle of international 
law from the principles of power politics with the principle of democracy means first of all that 
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142 Schmitt/2003/170-171. 
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Lauterpacht seems not to have cast any doubt on the universal acceptance of Kantian 
republicanism. It means, moreover, that Lauterpacht tried to eliminate the element of power politics 
from the international plane. However, the elimination of the element of power from international 
politics naturally fails, because of the inherent contradiction ofKantian republicanism that republic 
states need to prepare for the war against non-republic or totalitarian states, although the purpose of 
Kantian republicanism is perpetual peace within the world federation of republican states. In other 
words, the victory of liberal democracy expressed as Kantian republicanism does not necessarily 
mean that liberal states no longer need their military powers. In this sense, Lauterpacht held the 
inherent paradox ofKantian republicanism that confronts war in the name of perpetual peace. 
The destructive character ofLauterpacht's argwnent in favour of 'international peace' is seen 
in his statement with regard to the use of nuclear weapons. It is true that Lauterpacht thought that 
the use of nuclear weapons might be contrary to the principle of the protection of civilians and the 
principle of humanity. Nevertheless, he found it difficult to think that the use of nuclear weapons 
was absolutely prohibited. 'Thus, Lauterpacht said that '[i]n any case, so long as the production of 
the atomic bomb has not been prevented in practice by international agreement and supervision, 
there must be envisaged the possibility of its being resorted to in contingencies not amounting to a 
breach of International Law.' Then, he continued that the use of atomic bombs is justifiable not 
only as 'a reprisal for its actual prior use by the enemy or his allies,' but also as 'a deterrent 
instnunent of punishment' against 'an enemy who violates rules of the law of war on a scale so vast 
as to put himself altogether outside the orbit of considerations of humanity and compassion.' 143 
Moreover, he said in the footnote as follows: 
'[A]s laws are made not only for the protection ofhwnan life but also for the preservation of ultimate values of 
society, it is possible that should those values be imperilled by an aggressor intent upon dominating the world 
the nations thus threatened might consider themselves bound to asswne the responsibility of exercising the 
143 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht/1952/351. 
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supreme right of self-preservation in a manner which, while contnuy to a specific prohibition of International 
Law, they alone deem to be decisive for the ultimate vindication of the law of nations.' 144 
Thus, as Schmitt indicated, Lauterpacht had fallen into the trap of Kantian republicanism which 
makes a war against war cruel in the name of 'perpetual peace.' 
Lauterpacht may have had a chance to notice the inherent paradox ofKantian republicanism, 
when he said that 'so much power was required for asserting the triumph of justice and of the 
dignity of man that power has begun to be viewed not as an instrument to a greater end, but as an 
end itself in his lecture at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in March, 1950.145 However, he 
refused to admit the paradox of Kantian republicanism by attributing this problem to political 
realism: 
'With that feature of the post-war period has been connected the cognate tendency to a realism which 
confuses immediate success with the ultimate aim and which does not therefore seriously attempt to grapple 
with what it considers to be the irreducible fact in intemationallife, namely, the power of Great Powers. That 
realism has found expression in the main aspects of the new political organization of mankind as embodied in 
the Charter of the Untied Nations. It was responsible for that aspect of the Charter of the United Nations 
which is based on the assumption of permanent unanimity among the permanent Members ofthe Security 
Council- an assumption not justified either by experience or by a wise anticipation of probabilities or by an 
accurate assessment of the main political purpose of a geneml organization of States.' 146 
Thus, Lauterpacht criticised the vetoes of the Permanent Members of the Security Council by 
saying that 'the veneration of power has found expression in a form of shortcut which, by reducing 
the basic problem of the United Nations to the rigid requirement of the unanimity of the Great 
144 Jbid./351/n.2. 
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Powers, has tented, to a large extent, to make w1real both the political organization of mankind and 
the normal functioning of international law upon which it depends.' 147 However, what Lauterpacht 
wanted to disregard was the fact that the malfunction of the Security Cotmcil in the era of the Cold 
War was essentially not due to the legal system of the veto of the Permanent Members, but to the 
political antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union. Had the veto system not 
existed, there would have been a danger of the Security Cotmcil, which consisted of the United 
States and its Allies, transforming the Cold War into a Third World War in the name of the 
enforcement of international law against commtmist cotmtries. The top priority in the Cold War, 
especially from the late 1940s to the early 1950s, was the avoidance of a Third World War even at 
the cost of limited armed conflicts in some regions. Lauterpacht should have known the actual 
danger ofjiaJjumcia, pereal mundus which is inherent in Kantian republicanism. The modern era 
of nuclear weapons is different from the times when Kant optimistically said that '[t]he world will 
certainly not come to an end if there are fewer bad men.' 148 
Only one month after his lecture at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Korean War 
began. Lauterpacht appreciated the use of force by the United States and its Allies under Security 
Council resolution 83 as the enforcement of international law, saying, 
'Thus when in 1950 the forces of the United Nations were engaged, in pursuance of a decision of the Security 
Cmmcil, in repelling the invasion of South Korea by North Korea, there was no disposition on the part either 
of the United Nations as a whole or of the participating States to treat as war in the fonnal sense of the word 
what Chapter Vll of the Charter describes as enforcement action .... It is consonant with the dignity and the 
purpose of the collective enforcement of the basic instrument of organised international society that it should 
rank in a category different from war as traditionally understood in International Law. The object of the latter-
whether it be lawful or unlawful and whether it be aggressive or defensive- is to secure the interests of the 
individual State. The object of the fanner is comparable, in the municipal sphere, to the enforcement of the 
147 Ibid/163. 
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law against the law-breakers.' 149 
These remarks clearly show that what Lautetpacht was concerned with was not the abolition of war, 
but the justifiability of the use of force. However, whatever the armed conflict in the Korean 
peninsula was legally categorised as, it is clear that the Korean War was the clash between the two 
camps dividing the world at that time, after the United States and the Soviet Union had expelled the 
dominating influence of Japan from the Korean peninsula at the end of the Second World War. 150 
Thus, Lautetpaeht confronted the paradox of Kantian republicanism. It is somewhat curious that 
insofar as the use of force is legally justified as the enforcement of international law, Lautetpacht, 
who really wanted Peace through Law, was more bellicose than political realists he disliked, such 
as Kennan, who was later to come out against the use afforce by the United States in Vietnam and 
Cambodia in favour of national interest. 151 In other words, Lautetpacht hated illegal violence too 
much to notice the actual violence perfonned by the nations who claim that they have the right of 
punishment in their hands. It may be because he was too idealistic to be sensitive to the actual 
niceties of international politics. His unwillingness to admit the political aspect of international 
relations is also seen in the context of the international protection of human rights. 
4.3.2. THE INTERNATIONALPROTECfiON OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
From his early academic career, Lautetpacht adopted the view that the individual is the subject of 
international law. As noted above, the final passage in Analogies states that 'behind the personified 
institutions called States there are in every case individual human beings to whom the precepts of 
international law are addressed.' 152 This passage itself means that he followed the view ofWestlake 
that '[t]he duties and rights of states are only the duties and rights of the men who compose 
149 Oppenheim-Lautetpacht/1952/224. 
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them.' 153 Lauterpacht noted that the individual working for governments was the subject of 
international obligations, so it was not difficult for him to accept the view that the individual had an 
international legal capacity. However, mainstream international legal studies at that time did not 
accept the view that the individual is the subject of international law. Even Fisher Williams, who is 
sometimes thought to belong to the Neo-Grotian school,154 stated, 
'A new school of international lawyers claims that the individual also is a subject of international law, and that 
it is proper to speak of the relations of an alien to a State as being regulated by international law. If our object 
is to know what the province of international law is at the present time, not what may or might or ought to 
become the province in the future, the answer can hardly be doubtful. There is no general recognition of 
individuals, in their relations to States of which they are not nationals, and still less in their relations to States 
of which they are nationals, as being subjects of intemationallaw.' 155 
Consequently, Lauterpacht had to start his argumentation from denying the traditional view 
that only the sovereign state was tl1e subject of international law. In order to refute the traditional 
theory, he separated the question whether the individual is the subject of international law from the 
question of the procedural capacity of the individual: 
'The fuculty to enforce rights is not identical with the quality of a subject of law or of a beneficimy of its 
provisions. A person may be in a possession of a plenitude of rights without at the same time being able to 
enforce them in his own name.' 156 
He then discussed the possibility of giving the procedural capacity to the individual: 
152 Lauterpacht/ Analogies/306. 
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'[T]he rule preventing individuals from enforcing their rights before international tribunals is a piece of 
international machinery adopted for reasons of convenience. lt is not a fundamental principle. There is nothing 
to prevent Governments, if they so wish, from altering the rule.' 157 
However, the purpose of his argument was to deny the traditional view that only the state was the 
subject of international law; and less an exercise to prove the view that the individual is really the 
subject of international law. The international legal capacity of the individual is still dependent on 
the will of states. It is true that in the Jurisdiction '<fthe Courts of Danzig case, the Permanent Court 
declared that 'it cannot be disputed that the very object of an international agreement, according to 
the intention of the contracting Pruties, may be the adoption by the Parties of some definite rules 
creating individual rights and obligations and enforceable by the national courts.' 158 However, the 
Pennanent Court discussed the creation of the rights of individuals as the interpretation of 
international agreement. It did not declare the legal capacity of the individual under general 
international law. Furthennore, it is not the international enforceability but the domestic 
enforceability of the rights of individuals that was created by the Danzig-Polish Agreement as 
discussed by the Pennanent Court. Even Lauterpacht admitted that '[t]he case of the Danzig 
officials is not really an example of direct enforceability, in the international sphere, of individual 
rights.' 159 In this sense, there is no doubt that his view that the individual was the subject of 
international law was more lex.forenda than lex lata. 
However, if so, why did Lauterpacht adhere to the view that the individual is the subject of 
international law? It is because Lauterpacht deeply believed that the purpose of all law, including 
international law, is to protect the freedom and interest of individuals. In his lecture at The Hague, 
Lauterpacht said that 'whatever may be the theory about the subject of international law, there 
157 lbid!287. 
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ought to be no doubt that the individual human being must be the ultimate object of protection of 
all law, national or international.' 160 This conviction is expressed very coherently in his writings. In 
the context of the laws of war, he also said that '[t]he well-being of the individual is the ultimate 
object of all law, and whenever there is a chance of alleviating suffering by means of formulating 
and adopting legal rules, the law ought not to abdicate its function in deference to objections of 
apparent cogency and persuasiveness.' 161 In other words, law for him was norm for human activity. 
In this sense, there was no difference between law and morality. Nor was there a difference 
between international law and domestic law. Law and morality, whether international or domestic, 
regulate hwnan activity. Indeed, Lauterpacht said that 'it is scientifically wrong and practically 
undesirable to divorce International Law from the general principles of law and morality which 
underlie the main system of municipal jurisprudence regulating the conduct of human beings.' 162 
Lauterpacht endeavoured to re-construct the international legal system from a hwnan-orientated 
perspective. This human-orientated perspective of international law expresses itself as the proposal 
for the international protection ofhuman rights. 
When he delivered his address The Law of Nations, the Law of Nature and the Rights of 
Man163 at the meeting of the Grotius Society on 7 December 1942, his approach in proposing the 
international protection of human rights was to place the idea of human rights in the tradition of 
international law. Insofar as the majority of English international lawyers at that time felt unfamiliar 
with human rights in international law, Lauterpacht had to persuade his colleagues that the problem 
ofhuman rights was not a new question, but a traditional political one.164 Indeed, he discussed the 
idea of human rights from the Athena year. It should be noted, however, that Lauterpacht 
interpreted political history with a clear intention of justifying the protection ofhuman rights in the 
historical context. Even Socrates was discussed from the viewpoint of the social contract theory, 
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although there had clearly been no such a theory when Socrates lived: 
'When, in the Crito, Socrates, ... gives reason for his duty of obedience to the unjust sentence of the State, he 
bases that obligation not on the absolute claim of the State to obedience, but on an implicit contract - a 
contract which, in tum, presupposes the duty of the State to allow freedom of speech and the right to 
emigrate.' 165 
Such a teleological interpretation of history is also seen in his interpretation of Grotius. Lauterpacht, 
for example, insisted that fundamental human rights belong to the Grotian Tradition.166 However, 
such an interpretation is so purposive that it can be argued that it is far from the real intention of 
Grotius, since Grotius could be interpreted as a supporter for state sovereignty. Vmcent said as 
follows: 
'There are then difficulties for those who wish to uphold Grotius as a father of human rights as well as of 
intemational law, especially because of his attitude to the right of resistance. Acknowledging this, Hersch 
Lauterpacht fell back not on the hackneyed explanation based on Grotius' being a pensioner of the King of 
France ... , nor on the number of exceptions he ente1tained to the rule of non-resistance, but on the centrality of 
the individual human being in Grotius' system. Lauterpacht thus connected Grotius through Locke to the 
liberal revolutions of the eighteen cenhlry. But this nevertheless beg; the question of the weight which we are 
to give to the individual as against the state, and it is the ambiguity on this issue in Grotius' work which allows 
him to be called up in support of both the positivist doctrine of state sovereignty and the naturalist notion of the 
rights of individuals.' 167 
The teleological interpretation of history shows Lauterpacht intending to re-write political 
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history from the viewpoint of the legitimacy of sovereign states. Indeed, at the beginning of his 
address in Grotius Society, Lauterpacht claimed the idea that 'the State, however widely its object 
may be constructed, has no justification and no valid claim to obedience except as an instrument for 
securing the welfare of the individual human being.' 168 From such a viewpoint, it is the natural law 
theory and international law which legitimise state sovereignty. He said that '[t]he rights of man 
cannot, in the long run, be effectively secured except by the twin operation of the law of nature and 
the law of nations- both conceived as a power superior to the supreme power of the State.' 169 
However, Lauterpacht also noticed the limitation of natural law theory. Although one of the 
functions of natural law is to legitimise law and states, it was also clear to him that natural law itself 
cannot construct effective mechanisms for the protection of human rights. 170 In this sense, his 
proposal for the International Bill of Rights of Man prnported to render the idea of human rights 
more effective. He thus proposed the International Bill of Rights not as political declaration, but as 
legal document The main reason lies in his belief that respect for human rights is ineffective unless 
it becomes legally binding. On the other hand, he accepted the broad discretion of sovereign states 
to protect human rights, because states should primarily be responsible for the protection of human 
rights. The same approach is found in his theory that the Charter of the United Nations has a legal 
obligation to protect human rights under Articles 55 and 56. Lauterpacht interpreted these articles as 
leaving it to the discretion of member states as to how to promote the protection ofhuman rights. 171 
Therefore, he intentionally left the substance of human rights in general in his International Bill. By 
so doing, he postponed dealing with the problem of the substance ofhuman rights. 172 
From the viewpoint of effective protection, Lauterpacht proposed administrative supervision 
as the compliance procedure ofhuman rights. Article 21 of his Bill stipulates the establishment of 
the Human Rights Council, which should be 'entrusted with the international supervision and 
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implementation of the Bill of Rights.' 173 It is because questions on human rights are so politically 
sensitive that the judicial process cannot suitably propose a compromise between petitioners and 
the accused states, especially with regard to social and economic rights. 174 It does not mean, of 
course, that he denied the relevance of international courts in dealing with human rights. He 
proposed the power of the Human Rights Council to ask advisory opinions of the ICJ and, 
furthermore, the establishment of the International Court of Human Rights under Article 24 of the 
International Bill. 175 
It is true that the procedurnl aspects of human rights are essential for the international 
protection of human rights. However, without a consensus regarding the value of human rights, 
such a process itself becomes the forum for international politics. In other words, the limitation of 
Lauterpacht's project is that human rights became the topics of power politics shown by the 
controversy between the United States and the Soviet Union until the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. 
This problem existed not only in the Cold War era, but still exists even in the post-Cold War period. 
It is clearly the problem which typifies Kantian republicanism. The effective protection of human 
rights should be based on a multilateral treaty regime such as the European Convention of Human 
Rights. However, these member states had to reach a consensus as to what human rights were 
before establishing the treaty regime. It was politically appropriate, therefore, for member states to 
make the Universal Declaration not a legal document but a political one. In this sense, 
Lauterpacht's dissatisfaction with the Declaration is due to the fact that he was too idealistic to 
admit the sensitiveness of the issue itself. In other words, contrary to his expectation, the 
universality of the value of human rights was not self-evident Be that as it may, Lauterpacht 
sustained this point by adopting a progressive interpretation of political history. The problem 
concerning respect for human rights when no political consensus about human rights had been 
reached became the more sensitive political question touching upon the domestic regime of 
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member states. This point is clearly shown by the Interpretation qf Peace Treaties case, the crux of 
which is to show to what extent the United Nations could impose the ideal of Kantian 
republicanism on non-republican states. 176 
It should be noted, furthennore, that Lauterpacht's project, as seen in the International Bill, 
came to fiuition as the European Convention on Human Rights. 177 There is no need to mention that 
the Council of Europe system provides the most, and maybe the only, successful regime of 
protection of human rights anywhere in the world. Lauterpacht hoped that such a regional system 
would develop to the world-wide system and finally the World Federation. He said, 
'In so fur as regional experience is a stage in the evolution towards the more complex integration of 
international society, such recognition and protection of human rights may in itself become a significant 
contributory factor in the consummation of the 01ganised civitas maxima, with the individual human being in 
the vety centre of the constitution of the world.' 178 
However, we have not had the world-wide effective protection system of human rights which 
Lauterpacht hoped for, though the United Nations has successfully produced many human rights 
treaty systems from the viewpoint of functionalism. The reality of the world seems to indicate that 
his ideal in fact is European rather than universal.179 In this sense, the problem of his project on 
human rights may be to claim the universality of his ideal without knowing its Euro-character. 
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5o 1I'HE <CODl!FICATION PROCESS OF liNTERNATIONAL LAW FROM 
THE VIEWPOINT OF THE RULE OF LAW 
1bis chapter discusses how Lauterpacht contributed to the codification and progressive 
development of international law. Before commenting upon his works, it should be noted that this 
chapter essentially explicates his work with regard to the International Law Commission. 
Lauterpacht, of course, did not disregard the importance of the academic codification of 
international law, such as that practised by the International Law Association and the Institute of 
International Law. Indeed, he enthusiastically joined the academic associations of international 
codification, playing a leading role as rapporteur at the session of human rights at the Prague1 and 
the Brussels Conferences2 of the ILA. At the Institute, he also submitted the report as rapporteur on 
the interpretation of treaties/ and the report on the revision of the law of war with Coudert and 
Franyois.4 In addition to these reports, Lauterpacht wrote his observations on some reports of other 
members of the Institute.5 Nevertheless, he emphasised the inter-governmental codification work 
more than the private codification: 
'[T]he codification of international law can have but little justification and but slender chances of success, in 
terms of eventual acceptance by States, if it is confined to purely private effort, however scholarly and 
throughout. Mere academic restatement of the Jaw, however competent and impartial, cannot hope to answer 
the real need. '6 
1bis chapter, therefore, discusses his work with regard to the Commission due to the importance of 
1 Lauterpacht/1947d. 
2 Lauterpacht/1948a/and/1948b. 
3 Lauterpacht/1950a/1952d/and/1954c. 
4 Lauterpacht/1954d. 
5 Lauterpacht/1950d/1952d1954e/and/1954 £ 
6 Lauterpacht/1955/CP-ll/288. 
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the codification and progressive development of international law. 
5.1. THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE CODIFICATION AND PROGRESSIVE 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The codification process of international law is essential to the project of the legal school of 
internationallawyers,7 because judges are required to use discretionary power if international law is 
uncertain. However, judicial discretion tends to be accused of political choice rather than objective 
interpretation of law. Consequently, the effort to explicate customary law is required as a law-
making process. The codification process, thus, is recognised not only as desirable but also as 
indispensable to international relations from the viewpoint of tl1e legal school, which pursues the 
Rule of Law in international relations. In this sense, it is no coincidence that the Advisory 
Committee of Jurists, which prepared the PCU Statute, adopted a resolution8 calling for 'the 
methodical continuation of tl1e work commenced by the first Hague Conferences for the 
advancement of international law. '9 
Lauterpacht paid much attention to the codification of customary law even in the inter-war era. 
In his general course at the Hague Academy, for example, he said that ' [ c ]odi:fication of 
international law, conceived as the laying down of relatively detailed rules and principles in various 
branches of international law in general conventions binding upon a considerable number of States 
on the analogy of codes within States, is certainly useful.' 10 It is, however, after the Second World 
War that we see his principal contribution to tl1e codification and progressive development of 
international law. The Codification Division of the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations 
asked Lauterpacht to research the question as to how the International Law Commission should 
proceed to codifY international law. In 1948, Lauterpacht completed his Swvey of International 
7 Dhokalia/1970/3-143;AJilJSupplement/vol.4111947/29. 
8 Proces-Verbaux/747-748. 
9 Jbidns4. 
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Law in Relation to the Work of the International Commission, approved by the General Assembly 
in February 1949. This report formed the basis of the discussion at the first session of the ll.-C on 
its codification. 
The essential proposition of Swvey is that 'there are only very few branches of international 
law with regard to which it can be said that they exhibit such a pronmmced measure of agreement 
in the practice of States as to call for no more than what has been called consolidating 
codification.' 11 Consequently, Lauterpacht admitted the legislative effort of the ll.-C as its proper 
task. Indeed, he warned that ' [ a]n International Law Commission which limits its function to that of 
a research institute for the collection of material and for registering either existing agreement or, 
perhaps, more frequently, the absence of agreement, would not be fulfilling the purpose assigned to 
it by its Statute.' 12 Moreover he made the following statement: 
'If ... the absence of agreement and the existence of disagreement is [sic] a recommendation for codification, 
then the latter would approach a legislative process for the success of which there is no warrant in international 
society as at present constituted. For the more urgent the regulation of a subject appears to be having regard to 
the continued adherence of States to divergent pmctices, the more difficult it may be to remove effectively 
such divergencies by means of codification expressed in binding conventions and not falling within the 
purview of"development of international Jaw''.' 13 
Thus, he saw the work of the ll.-C as 'bringing about agreement where so far there exists only 
conflict of views and practice.' 14 
From this viewpoint of progressivism, Lauterpacht underlined the need for codification more 
than the ripeness of customary law, because the ripeness of customary law does not mean that it is 
10 I...auterpacht/1937-IV/CP-I/258. 
11 I..auterpacht/R6/1949/CP-I/455. 
12 lbid/459. 
13 lbid/462-463. 
14 l..auterpacht/1955/CP-II/278. 
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easy for the Commission to codifY the topic. He said that 'the a:ffumative criterion of"ripeness" as 
eventually acted upon seemed to have been not the ease with which the subject could be codified, 
but the difficulty, as expressed in existing divergences and in the need for regulation, of regulating it 
by way of codification.' 15 Therefore, Lauterpacht selected the topics not from the viewpoint of the 
ripeness of customary law, but from the viewpoint of what he thought necessary for the Rule of 
Law. It was natural for him to consider that the ultimate object of the ILC is 'the eventual 
codification of the entirety of international law.' 16 Lauterpacht chose general topics of international 
law such as the subject of international law, the source of international law, and the relation of 
international and municipal law, which are also seen in his articles. The selection of general 
problems of international law that he had dealt with before as topics for the work of the ILC, 
implies that he extended his academic interest to the codification process of customary law. 
However, Lauterpacht's scheme of the codification of international law was too academic and 
idealistic to answer the practical needs of codification. It is true that the ILC adopted fifteen topics 
among his twenty-two topics at its first session, and produced some results, including model rules 
or draft articles, in twelve topics. 17 It is also true, nevertheless, that some topics which Lauterpacht 
considered essential were not selected by the Commission. The topics which the Commission 
rejected are as follows: (1) the subject of intemationallaw,18 (2) sources of internationallaw,19 (3) 
the obligation of intemationallaw in relation to law of the state,20 ( 4) recognition of acts of foreign 
states,21 (5) obligations of territmial jurisdiction,22 (6) the territorial domain of states/3 and (7) 
15 Lauterpacht/R6/1949/CP-II460. 
16 JbidJ463. 
17 Anderson-Boyle-Lowe-Wickermasinghe/1998/Appendix3!Tablel/151-156. 
18 Members of the ILC who were against this topic were as follows: Spiropoulos, Brierly, 
Sandstrom, Fran90is, and Hus. Those supporting the topic were: Scelle, C6rdova and Alfaro. 
YBILC/1949/35-36. 
19 The members who were against tlus topic were: Brierly and Spiropoulos. Alfaro expressed his 
approval of this topic. Jbid/36. 
20 The members who were against this topic were: Hudson, Spiropoulos, Sandstrom and Brierly. 
Alfaro approved oftlus topic. Jbid/36-37. 
21 The members who were against this topic were: Spiropoulos and Aliaro. Sandstrom approved of 
this topic. Jbid/40. 
22 The members who disapproved of this topic were: Brierly, Spiropoulos, Sandstrom and Alfaro. 
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extraclition.24 In addition to them, there are three topics selected but not taken up by the ILC: (a) 
recognition of states, (b) jurisdiction with regard to crimes committed outside national territory, (c) 
the right of asylum. Therefore, it is appropriate for Sinclair to point out that the Commission 
favoured an empirical approach rather than a selection based upon Lauterpacht's general plan of 
codification.25 In this sense, Lauterpacht's project concerning the codification process was not so 
successful from the very early period of the ILC. This situation has not changed at all, even in the 
1990s. The British Study Group, which reviewed the work ofthe ILC, declares that 'its [Survey's] 
ambitious project to codifY the entire corpus of international law was no longer appropriate. '26 
Summing up, Lauterpacht seems to have overestimated the potential of international law 
scholars in the inter-governmental codification process of international law. There would have been 
no problem if his project had been applied to the private codification of international law such as 
the Harvard Research of International Law, the International Law Association or the Institute of 
International Law. Lawyers essentially concentrate on pure 'scientific research' in the private 
codification organisation without considering whether or not states accept the restatement of 
customary law. However, such an academic method which does not take the acceptability of states 
into consideration is not useful in the inter-governmental codification of international law, because 
as Brierly pointed out, the codification of international law was necessarily the law creation process 
'requiring first and foremost an agreement between the nations as to the substance of the rules that 
the code is to contain.' Brierly continued as follows: 
'We are tempted to think of codification as a cheap metl1od of establishing international order, as something 
that lawyers could easily do for the world if only they could be brought to see how badly it needs doing. But 
that is a complete delusion. The responsibility cannot be shifted in this light hearted way on the shoulders of 
lbid/41. 
23 The members who were against tllis topic were: Alfaro and Spiropoulos. Ibid/42. 
24 The members who disapproved of this topic were: Franyois and Brierly. Ibid/47. 
25 Sinclair/1987/21. 
26 Anderson-Boyle-Lowe-Wickermasinghe/1998/xvii/and/7 -8/para.l 0. 
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the lawyers. Lawyers can help; they can do the donkey work, but the responsibility belongs to all of us, and of 
COW'Se particularly to the leaders of our nations. For international law can only be codified if and so far as 
sovereign nations will agree among themselves on what the lawyers are to put into the code, and we have only 
too much evidence of the difficulty of getting agreements of that kind.' 27 
Although he avoided mentioning Brierly's view,28 Lautetpacht seems to have been opposed to it, 
because he emphasised the role oflawyers in the codification process of international law. 
It was well known that Cecil Hurst also expressed the same concern as Brierly. Inter-
governmental codification necessarily becomes legislative, because 'the moment the government 
delegates assemble and decide to conclude a Convention to render the rules so defined binding on 
States, their efforts are directed to laying down the law as it ought to be and not as it is. ' 29 
Consequently, the inter-governmental codification seemed to Hurst to be fated to fail, because '(t]he 
needs of the various States were too often in opposition for it to be possible to find a satisfactory 
compromise. '30 It is clear that, as McNair, who also preferred the restatement of customary law to 
conventions, pointed out, the kind of codification which Hurst supported was 'an unofficial 
Restatement'31 as '[t]he formulation and systematization of the existing nues of international law, 
with liberty to make recommendations (clearly stated as such) for the removal of uncertainties and 
the filling up of gaps. '32 
Charles de Visscher, whose textbook dismayed Lautetpacht,33 also held the opinion that the 
inter-governmental codification of international law was 'to replace divergent practices with some 
27 Brierly/1958/340. 
28 Lautetpacht/1955-1956/CP-111443. 
29 Hurst/1950/143. 
30 lbid/146. 
31 McNair/1974/272. 
32 lbidf265-266. 
33 
'Lautetpacht would sometimes summon me for an afternoon walk in the country round 
Cambridge. . .. At times he would want to talk about something that had upset him. One such 
occasion followed the publication of Charles de Visscher's Theories et realites en droit 
international public in 1953 .... It seems to Lautetpacht to be a mischievous and subversive work 
... , Jennings/1997 /302. 
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unity in the interpretation and application of the law.' It is not the task accomplished by lawyers 
who restate the existing rules of law with formal teclmique. It is essentially 'a political task which 
governments take up and support only when driven to it by practical and tangible interests.' Thus, 
the codification would necessarily fail if it were done from the viewpoint of academic interest 
without the conviction of governments that 'the task to be done was one of immediate interest.' The 
danger of this kind of codification of intemationallaw was clear for de Visscher: 
'The arguments that these provoke give currency among the delegates to the fatal notion that the obligatory 
force of the rules under discussion depends in the last analysis on nothing more than the decision of the 
governments which they represent and the instructions received from them. Thus there is danger of weakling 
and unsettling the law which codification was to clarity and consolidate. The risk is increased by the search for 
compromises that will win unanimity and that expose progressive States to the danger of aligning their 
positions with those of more conservative or less advanced States. '34 
Lauterpacht tired to refute those views opposed to the inter-governmental codi:fication.35 Indeed, he 
overestimated the authority of the Commission when he said, 
'Sir Cecil had suggested the setting up of a body of such high juridical standing as would confer on it decisive 
influence and enable it to do authoritative work, so that in due course the international community would not 
need to depend entirely on rules framed in conventional form. That was an important aspect, which must 
always be kept in mind, and was the reason why he deprecated the General Assembly's tendency to treat the 
International Law Commission as just another body of experts. The Commission, which indeed had been 
created by the General Assembly, was more than that It was a group of specialists of recognized standing 
whose decisions had weight in virtue of the personal authority of members. '36 
34 De/Visscher/1968/151. 
35 Lauterpacht/1955/CP-W288-292. 
36 YBILC/1953/vol.l/121-122. 
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However, the failure of the Draft Articles on Arbitral Procedure proved that the concern of the 
lawyers whom Lauterpacht was opposed to was correct. It was too optimistic to think that the 
Commission could persuade governments to accept draft articles which they considered 
inappropriate from the point of view of their national interest. This optimism of Lauterpacht was 
one of the reasons Julius Stone so severely criticised him with regard to his idea of the inter-
governmental codification of international law. 
'When he [Lauterpacht] insists that governments consist of human beings who can be influenced by the 
merits of codifiers' proposals, he is only able to make his position sound reasonable by directing a lecture (if 
not a sennon) at foreign offices concerning their need to mend their ways towards drafts submitted to them for 
comment and approval. It may indeed yield much moral satisfaction to draftsmen to assure a foreign office 
that to change its attitude will in no way impair the dignity, sovereignty, or vital interests of its State. Yet the 
question whether foreign offices will change their attitude in such circumstances remains separate. '37 
Although sending a letter to Stone that Lauterpacht thought that he and Stone 'did not disagree 
fundamentally, both favouring a widely conceived attempt at private codification, whether or not 
this was an end in itself,'38 Lauterpacht seems not to have understood Stone's view with regard to 
the codification of international law, because the crux of Stone's argrnnent was to reject 
Lauterpacht's theory of the inter-governmental codification of international law completely. What 
Stone condemned Lauterpacht for was his optimistic underestimation of the unwillingness of states 
to accept the draft articles prepared by the Commission from the viewpoint of legal idealism. 
Indeed, Stone's criticism seems correct if it is concerned with Lauterpacht's commitment to the 
work of the ILC, in particular the 1953 Draft Articles on Arbitral Procedure,39 and in the Draft 
37 JJStone/1957/42. 
38 Star/1992/149. 
39 Rosenne/1960/151. 
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Conventions on the Futtrre Statelessness.40 
5.2. LAUTERPACHT'S QUEST FOR THE RULE OF LAW AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW COMMISSION 
Although his general scheme of codification did not succeed so well even at the beginning of the 
Commission's work, Lauterpacht still had a chance to realise his ideal of the Rule of Law with 
regard to the codification process of international customary law. He joined the ILC from 1952 to 
1954 after Brierly resigned because of ill health. During his period of membership, the ILC 
produced the three main results of its work: (1) the Draft on Arbitral Procedure in 1953, (2) the 
Final Draft on the Regime of the High Seas in 1953, namely the eight draft articles on the 
continental shelf, the three articles on fisheries, and the one article on the contiguous zone, and (3) 
the two Draft Conventions on Statelessness in 1954. Lauterpacht clearly belonged to the legal 
school of international lawyers in the Commission, which was opposed to the diplomatic school 
represented by Kozhevnikov. In the discussion on the two draft conventions on statelessness, for 
example, Lauterpacht said that 'the Commission regarded it as of the greatest importance, and 
indeed as axiomatic, that the convention, like all conventions concluded under United Nations 
auspices, should contain a provision for the settlement by arbitration of any disputes arising out of 
it. '41 Lauterpacht also expressed his crusading spirit not only in discussions at the Commission but 
also in the 1953 Report of the ILC to the General Assembly prepared by himself as General 
Rapporteur. Kozhevnikov criticised Lauterpacht for obtruding 'his own point of view- which had 
not been discussed by the Commission' in the 1953 Commission's Report.42 Furthermore, 
Lauterpacht produced his two reports on the Law of Treaties, though not discussed at the ILC at 
that time. This section will examine the 1953 Final Draft on Arbitral Procedure, the Arbitral Clause 
40 Thirlway/1972124. 
41 YBILC/1953/vol.l/228/para.97. 
42 Jbid/383/para.76. 
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of the 1953 Final DraftAlticles on Continental Shelf, the 1954 Draft Conventions on Statelessness, 
and his two reports on the law of treaties. 
5.2.1. THE DRAFf ON ARBITRAL PROCEDURE 
Arbitral Procedure is one of the topics proposed in the Lauterpacht's Swvel3 and chosen by the 
ILC in the first session. T11e ILC elected Georges Scelle as Special Rapportelll' on this topic, who 
submitted to the ILC the First Report in 1950, the Second Report in 1951 and the Supplementary 
Note in 1952. It is therefore, Scelle who was essentially responsible for the Draft as a whole. 
However, Lauterpacht also contributed to the 1952 Drafts on Arbitral Procedure as a member of the 
Standing Drafting Committee, whose other members were Yepes and Hudson.44 It should be noted, 
furthermore, that Lautetpacht was responsible for the general comment of the 1953 Draft as 
General RapportelU'. 
The main characteristic of the 1952 Draft is the concept of judicial arbitration. In particular, 
Lauterpacht was responsible for Paragraph 24 of the 1952 Commission Report to the General 
Assembly, which describes the ILC adopting the concept of 'judicial arbitration' rather than 
'diplomatic arbitration.' This paragraph reads as follows: 
'Two currents of opinion were represented in the Commission. The first followed the conception of arbitration 
according to which the agreement of the parties is the essential condition not only of the original obligation to 
have recourse to arbitration, but also of the continuation and the effectiveness of arbitration proceedings at 
every stage. The second conception, which prevailed in the draft as adopted and which may be described as 
judicial arbitration, was based on the necessity of provision being made for safeguarding the efficacy of the 
obligation to arbitrate in all cases in which, after the conclusion of the arbitration agreement, the attitude of the 
43 Lauterpacht/R6/1949/CP-I/514-515. 
44 However, Hudson was opposed to the adoption of the 1952 Draft as a whole. 
YBILC/1952/vol.2/58/n. 3. 
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parties threatens to render nugatory the original unde1taking. '45 
However, compared to diplomatic arbitration, what characteristics does judicial arbitration have? 
There are two aspect of judicial arbitration: the intervention of the International Court of Justice to 
the arbitration process in the pre and post adjudicative phase, and the judicialisation of arbitration 
procedure. 
The first feature of judicial arbitration is that arbitration is connected to the International Court 
of Justice in any deadlock between parties. However, one of the problems of judicial arbitration is 
that the role of the ICJ is greatly increased, possibly in a completely revolutionary manner, in both 
the pre-adjudicative and the post-adjudicative phases. With regard to the pre-adjudicative phase, 
Articles 2 and 3 of the 1952 Draft of Arbitral Procedure allow the Court itself or a member of the 
Court to solve the deadlock of arbitration. Draft Article 2 allows parties to submit the unilateral 
application to the Court about the problem of the existence of the dispute and the extent of 
obligation. Furthermore, Paragraph 2 admits tl1e binding force of the provisional measure indicated 
by the Court with regard to the questions, though tl1e Court had not solved the question whether or 
not the provisional measures have binding force until recently.46 At the 156tl' meeting, Lauterpacht 
suggested the incorporation of the text that ' [ e ]ach party is under a duty to take the measures 
indicated to it' into Paragraph 2. Although Lauterpacht's suggestion was rejected, the Commission 
and Lauterpacht agreed to Scelle's suggestion to use the term 'prescribe,' the French term prescire 
indicating the obligatory nature of tl1e provisional measure.47 Consequently, Article 2, Paragraph 2, 
of the 1952 Draft stipulated that '[i]n its judgment on the question, the Court may prescribe the 
45YBILC/1952/vol.2/59-60. 
46 In the LaGrand case, the Court for the first time answered the question. 'Neither the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, nor tl1e present Court to date, has been called upon to determine the 
legal effects of orders made under Article 41 of the Statute. . . . [T]he Court is now called upon to 
rule expressly on this question.' (para 98). The LaGrand case, Judgment of27 June 2001, paras. 98-
116. http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/igus _ijudgment_ 2001 0625.htm 
Also see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda, paras.28-35. 
http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/igus _ijudgment_ dissenting_ oda _ 200106 
27.htm 
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provisional measures to be taken for the protection of the respective interests of the parties pending 
the constitution ofthe arbitral tribunal'48 with no comment on the binding force of the provisional 
measures indicated by the Court, although the comment of Article 17, which stipulates the power of 
the arbitral tribunal to prescribe the provisional measures, clearly admits that '[t]he word 
"prescribe" implies an obligation on the parties to take the measures prescribed. '49 Draft Article 3, 
Paragraph 4, admits the power of the President of the ICJ, the Vice-President in the case of the 
President having the nationality of the parties to dispute, or the senior Judge in the case ofboth the 
President and the Vice-President being the nationals of the parties, to appoint members of the 
arbitral tribunal, when parties fail to choose the members or to entrust a third state to make the 
necessary appointments. 
The Court is also expected to play a definitive role with regard to the post-adjudicative phase. 
Article 28 of the 1952 Draft describes the interpretation of the arbitral award. Its second paragraph 
stipulates the right of parties to submit the unilateral application to the Court for the interpretation of 
the award, if the tribunal which renders the award becomes ineffective. Draft Article 29 also 
permits one of the parties to submit the application of the revision of the award to the Court, when it 
is impossible for the tribwml to deal with the claim to revise the award. Furthermore, the Court has 
the compulsory jurisdiction concetning the annulment of award under Draft Article 31. These 
provisions are operative if the tribunal which has rendered the award would be unable to fimction 
for several reasons. However, even if this is the case, it is undoubtedly the progressive development 
of intemationallaw to provide the parties with the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court concerning 
the problems of international arbitration. 
The second aspect of judicial arbitration is the ILC adoption of the judicial procedure similar 
to the Statute ofthe ICJ. Draft Article 12, for example, refers to Article 38, Paragraph 1, of the 
Statute on the legal rules applicable to arbitration. Its Paragraph 2, furthermore, stipulates the 
47 YBILC/1952Jvol.l/193. 
48 Emphasis added. 
49 YBILC/1952Jvol.2J64. 
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obligation imposed on tribunals not to declare non-liquet. Even the lLC admits that 'this principle 
would mark a great advance in the development of judicial arbitration. '50 This kind of judicial 
procedure is also found in other Draft Articles. Draft Article 16 describes the admissibility of 
counterclaims without any conditions. Draft Article 17 allows the tribunal to prescribe the binding 
provisional measures. Even the non-appearance of one party before the tribunal was written lUlder 
Article 20, a phenomenon which seems to undermine the political foundation of arbitration. 
It should be remembered, however, that the concept of judicial arbitration caused divergence 
among Commission members. Some, namely Kozhevnikov and Zourek, were strongly opposed to 
judicial arbitration. Zourek, for exan1ple, criticised the Draft on Arbitral Procedure for being based 
on the new concept of judicial arbitration, though he thought the so-called diplomatic arbitration 
had been established. He described the three characteristics of diplomatic arbitration as follows: ( 1) 
the voluntary nature of arbitration, (2) the choice of arbitrators by the parties and (3) the 
determination by the parties of the rules of law to be applied. However, Lauterpacht's response was 
that the Draft on Arbitral Procedure was based on the three elements which Zourek had pointed out, 
and that in this sense, the three elements were characteristics of the concept of judicial arbitration. 
He then continued that '[t]he only innovation contained in the draft was that, in cases of deadlock 
between the parties, it provided machinery for rendering the existing obligation to arbitrate as 
efficacious as possible. ' 51 It is true that the 1952 Draft of Arbitral Procedure allows the parties to 
decide the applicable law, to appoint the arbitrators and to adopt the procedure freely. In this sense, 
Zourek's criticism was pointless. However, the crux of the problem of the 1952 Draft was the 
'machinery for rendering the existing obligation to arbitrate as efficacious as possible,' which 
Lauterpacht pointed out. It soon became clear that such machinery was not realistic in the sense that 
the majority of states did not welcome the compulsmy jurisdiction of the Court and the arbitral 
procedure which was more judicially developed than the ICJ Statute. 
Indeed, the lLC faced strong opposition from the governments which replied to the 1952 
50 !bid 
51 YBlLC/1952/vol.l/239. 
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Draft on Arbitral Procedure. Among eleven governments which returned comments on the 1952 
Draft, only the British government expressly welcomed the judicialisation of arbitration. 52 Other 
governments were more or less reluctant to accept the concept of judicial arbitration. The Belgian 
government, for example, severely criticised the ILC for the judicialisation of arbitration as follows: 
'In the Belgian Government's opinion the Commission appears to have gone outside its task of 
drawing up rules on arbitral procedure, since the proposed draft deals indiscriminately with 
concepts of arbitration and international justice.' Consequently, the Belgian government warned 
that '[t]he second conception [the concept of judicial arbitration] seems hardly acceptable if it is 
hoped to secure the support of the majority of States for the draft on arbitral procedure. '53 The same 
concern was also expressed by the Netherlands government, which thought that 'arbitration should 
retain definite characteristics of its own by which to distinguish itself from judicial settlement' It 
furthennore continued that '[t]his Government doubt whether a great number of States will not feel 
inclined to reject the draft because in their view it might restrict too much the lenient rules of arbitral 
procedure. '54 The United States also gave notification that 'there may be a wide reluctance on the 
part of States at this time to enter into a convention along the lines of the one drafted by the 
International Law Commission, intended to cover all types of case,' although it did not forget to 
pay lip service to the Commission, indicating that the 1952 Draft has 'positive value as a statement 
of desired goals in the field of arbitration. '55 
Nonetheless, the Commission disregarded the concerns of those governments which replied to 
the 1952 Draft at the fifth session in 1953. The majority of Commission members preferred the 
maintenance of the 1952 Draft with some technical changes to the fundamental amendment of the 
Draft. Lauterpacht also played a leading role in maintaining the 1952 Draft as a whole. In the 
discussion with regard to Draft Article 2, for example, he stated that 'the very purpose of the article 
- and, indeed, of the whole draft - was to give effect to the will of the parties and to ensure that, 
52 YBILC/1953/vol.21237-238. 
53 lbid/232. 
54 lbid/235. 
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once the parties had agreed to arbitrate, neither would be able to frustrate the process.' 'That was,' 
he continued, 'the central aspect of the draft now before the Commission. '56 Consequently, after 
amending some 1952 Draft Articles technically, without changing the fundamental feature of 
judicial arbitration, the Commission submitted the 1953 Draft as Final Draft to the General 
Assembly with the recommendation of 'the conclusion of a convention' under Article 23, 
paragraph 1, (c) of the ILC Statute. 
The Commission was soon forced to realise, however, that the 1953 Draft was not acceptable 
to the member states. The majority of the Sixth Committee disapproved of the 1953 Draft. 57 TI1e 
discussion on the Sixth Committee shows the mcYority of member states finding it difficult to 
accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court over difficulties of arbitration. Although some states 
accused the 1953 Draft of destroying the flexibility of arbitration and the principle of the autonomy 
of states, such an accusation would be pointless unless they were not linked to the problem of the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, because the undertaking of arbitration is the result of the free 
will of states, and the 1953 Draft would be by nature residual, so that parties could agree to opt out 
of the Draft in compromis or arbitration clause, whenever they wish. In this sense, the 1953 Draft 
guaranteed the flexibility of arbitration in the sense that the parties could choose the composition of 
a tribunal, arbitrators, applicable law and arbitral procedure itself. As Lauterpacht pointed out, the 
Draft clearly admits the autonomy of parties on the question of flexibility of arbitration. 58 The main 
reason, therefore, why the member states rejected the 1953 Draft is not because of the inflexibility 
of the Draft, but because dissenting states did not want arbitration compulsorily imposed on them 
by the Court in a situation in which they saw no hope in arbitration. In other words, the mcYOrity of 
the Sixth Committee preferred to retain the right to waive arbitration unless they positively wished 
to use it. Consequently the General Assembly passed Resolution 989 (X) on 14 December 1955, 
55 Ibid/238. 
56 YBILC/1953/vol.l/ll/para97. 
57 See the 46JS1-464d1 and the 466d1-47211d sessions in the tenth session in the General Assembly. 
Sixth-Committee/1955/83-1 03/and/1 09-144. 
58 Lauterpacht/1955/CP-W286-287. 
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which '[i]nvited the Connnission to consider the conunents of Governments and the discussions in 
the Sixth Connnittee in so far as they may contribute further to the value of the draft on arbitral 
procedure, and to report to the General Assembly.' It is not necessary, here, to examine the 
subsequent discussion on the ILC on the Draft on Arbitral Procedure after 1955, because it was 
after Lauterpacht resigned the ILC to become the Judge of the International Court of Justice that the 
ILC started to reconsider the Draft on Arbitral Procedure in 1957. It is sufficient to note that the 
Connnission gave up hope of the Draft becoming a convention insofar as the Commission 
maintained the fundamental structure of the 1953 Draft, including the concept of judicial 
arbitration.59 The ILC's only hope at this stage was that the General Assembly would adopt the 
1958 Model Rules the resolution, which might be followed by states subsequently putting it into 
practice.60 However, the General Assembly did not adopt the 1958 Model Rules by resolution, 
simply taking note of the Report and bringing the 1958 Model Rules to the attention of the member 
states.61 Despite the Commission's hope, furthem1ore, it should be noted that 'the Model Rules 
have not yet been adopted as such as the basis for an international arbitration. '62 
What was the real problem for the m~ority in the Sixth Committee with regard to the 1953 
Draft? It is often said that one of the problems brought to light by the 1953 Draft was that the 
m~ority of the ILC, including Lauterpacht, were too idealistic to be practical. This point is 
indicated by Arnado, who was an ILC member but also joined the Sixth Committee as the 
Brazilian representative. He said that the members 'had, in a spirit of academic research, built up an 
entire judicial system of the most rigid kind to replace an institution which by its flexibility and 
optional character was adapted to the needs of a still imperfect legal order.' 'In that way,' he 
continued, 'they had prepared a draft which was far removed from reality and from the practice of 
States, and which in the, fortunately very unlikely, event that it was adopted, would involve the 
59 YBILC/1958/vol.2/81/para.14. 
60 lbid/82Jpara.17. 
61 G.A./Res./1262/(Xlll). 
62 Watts/1999/vol.3/1775. 
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abandonment of an extremely valuable method of settling disputes. '63 
However, the crux of the episode of the 1953 Final Draft lies in the fact of a conflict of 
different perspectives between the majority of the ILC and the majority of the Sixth Committee 
with regard to the role of adjudication in international relations. The majority of the ILC considered 
the role of adjudication from a legalistic viewpoint. From such a viewpoint oflaw, it is appropriate 
to think that legal obligation should be as effective as possible; law cannot allow one party to 
breach its legal obligation unless the breach itself is legally justified.64 Consequently, the m~ority of 
the ILC were of the belief that the mal:fi.mction of adjudication is of necessity undesirable once the 
parties have the undertaking of arbitration. On the other hand, the m~ority of the Sixth Committee 
considered adjudication in the context of politics, namely the maximisation of national interest to as 
great a degree as possible. From this political point of view, the maximum effectiveness of legal 
obligation is undesirable if tl1e legal obligation is contrary to national interests considered important 
to governments. In order to avoid any situation which would jeopardise national interest, member 
states had hoped to have a free hand to decide whether or not they would use arbitration. From this 
standpoint, the malfunction of arbitration would be desirable to a government concerned that 
arbitration might danlage its interests. 
In brief, the majority of the ILC, including Lauterpacht, considered the role of arbitration 
legalistically, although the Sixth Connnittee essentially viewed it politically. It follows that what the 
rn~ority of the Sixth Committee could not accept witl1 regard to tl1e 1953 Draft was ILC's 
legalistic policy of maximising the role of arbitration with the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, 
which consequently deprives states of the political choice intentionally to make the undertaking of 
arbitration ineffective. In this sense, the member states' rejection of the 1953 Final Draft means that 
they did not accept the image of the International Rule of Law proposed by the ILC. 
The policy of the Commission is clearly legalistic in terms of the application of the principle 
63 Sixth-Committee/1955/95/para.33. 
64 See, for example, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
Articles 20-25. Crawford/2002/163-186. 
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of effectiveness to the tu1dertaking of arbitration. The idea behind the policy of the ILC is the belief 
that law should control politics. However, the reality is that international law is one of many tools of 
international politics. Although this point does not deny that international law enjoys relative 
autonomy in the sphere of politics, it is also tu1deniable that the sociological precondition of 
international law is the political willingness of states. Neither is it possible for international 
arbitration to fimction without states agreeing politically that a matter should be settled by the 
application of international law. It is this tu1desirable but tu1deniable aspect of international 
arbitration that the m<Yority ofthe ILC disregarded In this sense, the episode ofthe 1953 Draft on 
Arbitral Procedure symbolises the failure of the legal school of international lawyers with regard to 
the codification of international law. 
5.2.2. THE 1953 DRAFT ARTICLE 8 ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 
Since the Truman Proclamations of 1945,65 the law of the sea has been in a state of flux. It was a 
matter of urgency to recover the balance between the extension of state jurisdiction over the high 
seas and the freedom of the high seas. It was only natural that Lauterpacht should propose this topic 
in SW'Vey,cx, and that the Commission gave priority to it at its first session. The Commission 
appointed Fran90is as the Special Rapporteur for the regime of the high seas in 1949, and for the 
regime of territorial waters in 1951. The Commission submitted to the General Assembly the 
provisional draft articles on the regime of the high seas on the basis ofFranc;:ois's second report in 
1951. After receiving comments from the member states, the Commission prepared the Final Draft 
Articles on the regime of the high seas at the fifth session in 1953. Among the topics, the 
compulsory arbitration clause of the 1953 Draft Article 8 on the continental shelf is important for 
any consideration of the legalistic attitude of the Commission at that time. Lauterpacht inserted 
Draft Article 8 on the continental shelf, which was not included in Fran90is's report. This section 
65 Whitman/vol.4/756-757. 
ex, Lauterpacht also published an article on continental shelf Lauterpacht/1950h/CP-III/143-203. 
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discusses the arbitration clause of the 1953 Final Draft Articles on the continental shelf, which 
clearly shows the controversy between the legal school and the diplomatic school with regard to the 
task of the Commission. 
Discussion on the arbitral clause of the 1953 Draft Articles on the continental shelf was 
initiated at the 202nd meeting by Scelle, who proposed an additional article relating to the 
establishment of a new permanent organ to investigate the exploitation of the continental shelf, and 
the compulsory arbitration of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.67 Some members, including 
Lauterpacht, supported Scelle's proposal for the compulsory judicial or arbitration clause with 
regard to the dispute on the continental shel£68 However, Fran9ois was reluctant to introduce an 
arbitration clause to the 1953 Draft Articles: 
'Its [the Commission's] task was the codification of international law, not its practical application. What the 
Commission had to do was to decide what should be the rule in any particular instance. To introduce a clause 
at every stage in the Commission's work on specific texts, concerning the obligatory submission of disputes to 
arbitration would be outside its competence and would diminish the possibility of acceptance by governments 
of the rules oflaw it was concerned to codifY. '69 
The same position was taken by Spiropoulos.7° Kozhevnikov also criticised the proposed 
arbitration clause as follows: 
'The criterion of the effectiveness of the Commission's work was the attitude of governments towards it. The 
Commission was not working in vacuo, and was not engaged on pure research. It was preparing standards for 
governments and endeavouring to secure the development of intemational law. The members of the 
67 YBILC/1953/vol.11113/para.27. 
68 Yepes/para.28; Alfaro/para.31; Hsu/para.35; Pal/para.36; C6rdovalpara.39; Lauterpacht/para.42. 
Jbid/113-115. 
69 Jbid/119/para.lO. 
70 Jbid/para.13. 
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Commission were not law-givers, but they must help to make international relations more nonnal. That was 
why it was necessary to avoid any action likely to fiustrate that aim. The Commission's texts must ultimately 
be applicable in practical life. If they were unacceptable, they would serve no purpose. He [Kozhevnikov] was 
convinced that compulsory arbitration would make it difficult for many governments to accept the draft on the 
continental shelf, with the result that all the work done on it would be wasted.' 71 
Summing up, they were concerned about the willingness of states to accept compulsory arbitration, 
Spiropoulos saying that 'the inclusion of such a provision would increase the reluctance of 
governments to ratify.' 72 Members opposed to the compromissmy clause saw the task of the 
Commission as formulating legal principles which states would accept. 
On the other hand, the majority view was expressed thus by C6rdova 
'He [C6rdova] ... felt that great progress would be made if the Commission now decided that all disputes 
concerning the continental shelf should be submitted to arbitration. The more so since the Commission was 
legislating rather than codifYing, and could not, therefore, precisely foresee how the rules cold be applied. In 
the absence of a provision on compulsory arbitration, it was doubtful whether disputes would ever be settled 
If the Commission were properly to discharge its tasks of developing international law, it must not only state 
what the rules were in any particular case, but also indicate the means by which they were to be applied.' 73 
Lauterpacht also said, 
'The Commission would never at any time be able to fonnulate rules which would not be debatable. But if 
that premise were made the starting point for codification, provision for arbitral procedure would have to be 
71 Jbid/122/para46. 
72 Jbid/120/para25. 
73 Jbid/121/para28. 
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ad . b' ,74 m e m evel)' su ~ect 
In other words, the majority of the Commission preferred the legal desirability of the draft to the 
acceptability of states. Finally, the Commission adopted Scelle's proposal referring to arbitration 
rather than that of the Pennanent Court of Arbitration by 7 votes to 4 with 1 abstention.75 
Lauterpacht as General Rapporteur thought that the Commission should recommend that the 
General Assembly 'take no action, the report having already been published' under Article 23, 
Paragraph (a), of the ILC Statute. In other words, he considered that 'the present final draft is not 
such as to call, for the time being, for the conclusion of a Convention' because of the lack of state 
practice, and that the 1953 Final Draft would 'exert the influence to which they are entitled by 
virtue of their intrinsic merit and authority. ' 76 However, the Commission finally adopted Yepes's 
proposal,77 recommending in the 1953 Final Draft to the General Assembly 'the adoption by 
resolution of this part of the present report and the draft articles on the continental shelf '78 
The General Assembly decided to defer action until all the problems pertaining to maritime 
law had been studied by the Commission and reported on to the General Assembly.79 The 
Commission then restarted tl1e discussion on the law of sea as a whole from 1955. Once again, it is 
not necessary to describe the detail of the discussion within the Commission with regard to tl1e 
judicial clause relating to tl1e continental shelf, namely Article 73 of the 1956 Final Draft Articles, 
because Lauterpacht had already left the Commission. Suffice it to note that Article 73 of the 1956 
Final Draft Articles becan1e the 1958 Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory 
Settlement of Disputes. 
74 Ibid./122Jpara39. 
15 Ibid./124/paras. 71-79. 
76 Ibid/358-359/n. 7. 
77 Ibid/36l/paras.84-85. 
78 YBILC/1953/vol.2/217/para91. 
79 GA./Res.n98/(VIII). 
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5.2.3. THE 'fwo DRAFT CONVENTIONS ON FUTURE STATELESSNESS 
The problem of nationality, including statelessness, is also a topic proposed by Lauterpacht in 
SW1ley. He was particularly concerned about the problem of statelessness.80 He was understandably 
enthusiastic in his approach to this problem due to the experience of the Second World War.81 Partly 
due to the lack of agreement on the settlement of the problem of statelessness, partly due to the 
development of the consciousness of human rights from the end of the war, Lauterpacht believed 
that the problem of statelessness should be solved not by the codification of customary law but by 
the progressive development of intemationallaw. 82 
This topic was subsequently selected by the ILC at the first session, although this topic had not 
been given priority until the Economic and Social Council requested the Commission to 'prepare at 
the earliest possible date the necessary draft international convention or conventions for the 
elimination of statelessness' in 1950.83 The Commission elected Hudson as Special Rapporteur in 
1951. However, he resigned the post because of health problems after submitting his first report. 
The Commission then appointed C6rdova as the second Special Rapporteur, and Kerno, Assistant 
Secretary-General for Legal Affairs at that time, as assistant to C6rdova in 1952. At the fifth session 
in 1953, C6rdova submitted the two draft conventions on the problem of statelessness, namely the 
Draft Convention on the Elimination of Future Statelessness and the Draft Convention on the 
Reduction of Future Statelessness in accordance with the instruction of the Commission, though 
C6rdova himself thought that in order to solve the problem of future statelessness, the Commission 
should adopt the Draft Convention on the Elimination of Future Statelessness.84 The Commission 
discussed and submitted these two Draft Conventions as the Final Draft in 1954. In that work of the 
ILC, Lauterpacht contributed to the two Draft Conventions as General Rapporteur in 1953, as a 
80 Lauterpacht/R611949/CP-I/500. 
81 Also see Lauterpacht/1949a/CP-IW383-404. 
82 Lauterpacht/R6/1949/CP-I/500. 
83 ECOSOC/Res./319/B-ITI/(XI). 
84 C6rdova!YBILC/1953/vol.2/169/para.19. 
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member of the special sub-committee for the final clauses which was composed of Franyois and 
C6rdova, 85 and as member of the Drafting Committee for the Draft Conventions,of which other 
members were Scelle and Franyois in 1954.86 
The Draft Conventions show the legalistic approach of the Commission during the early 
1950s. They provide the implementation mechanism, such as the establishment of 'an agency to 
act on behalf of stateless persons', and a tribunal 'which shall be competent to decide upon 
complaints presented by the agency' within the framework of the United Nations tu1der the 
common Article 10, Paragraphs land 2. Furthermore, the common Article 10, Paragraph 3, 
proposed by Lauterpacht,87 grants the parties 'the right to request the General Assembly to set up 
such agency and tribunal,' if the parties fail to establish them within two years of the entry into 
force of either Convention. Paragraph 4 stipulates the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court relating 
to disputes concerning the interpretation of the Draft Conventions. 
It should be noted, however, that there was again a serious divergence between the majority 
and the minority of the Commission on this legalistic aspect of the Draft Conventions. Article 10 in 
particular was acceptable neither to Kozhevnikov nor Zourek, who saw the question of nationality 
as essentially a matter falling within the domestic jurisdiction of states. They rejected the proposed 
texts for Article 10 with regard to compulsory arbitration and the status of individuals under 
internationallaw.88 Their opposition to the Draft Conventions is clearly based on the diplomatic 
approach of international law. However, the m<:Yority of the Commission disagreed with them, and 
adopted Article I 0. 
Fifteen nations filed their comments on the 1953 Draft Conventions on Statelessness. Five 
nations approved of, or at least had no objection to Article 10.89 However, four states were opposed 
85 YBILC/1954/vol.l/15/para.12. 
86 Jbid/45/para61. 
87 YBILC/1953/vol.1/260/para 19. 
88 Kozhevnikov/YBILC/1953/vol.l/259/para 7; Zourek!YBILC/1953/vol.l/260-261/paras.22-23. 
89 Australia/YBILC/1954/vol.2/164; Costa/Ricalibid/165; Demnark/ibid/166; Honduras/ibid/168; 
Netherlands/ibid/170. 
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to Article 10.90 India was also opposed to the two Draft Conventions as a whole. 91 The main reason 
for five nations, including India, being opposed to Article I 0 of the I953 Draft Conventions was 
their belief that the question of nationality was essentially a matter of domestic jurisdiction. The 
United States, for example, said simply that ' [ s ]ince this Government considers that the question of 
detennining who are American nationals is one of purely domestic concern, it would not be willing 
to delegate to an international tribunal the power to over-rule a decision made by it that a particular 
individual did not have American nationality. '92 
However, the majority of the Commission rejected the objection raised to Article I 0 by these 
countries. At the 244d' meeting, C6rdova, for example, said that these objections were groundless 
since 'the Commission had taken good care not to encroach upon matters essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of States. '93 Lauterpacht agreed with C6rdova, and then proposed the 
'appellate jurisdiction' of the ICJ which reviews the award of the tribunal proposed by Article 10.94 
However, at that time a m~ority on the Commission were reluctant to accept his proposal, and 
decided to delete Article I 0, Paragraph 4, in order to confer exclusive jurisdiction of interpretation 
of the Conventions to the tribunal proposed by paragraph 2.95 After the Drafting Committee, of 
which Lauterpacht was a member, submitted the new articles of the Draft Conventions, he again 
proposed to restore Paragraph 4 on the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, which was adopted by 
the Commission. 96 The Commission adopted the implementation mechanism as Article I1 of the 
I954 two Draft Conventions on Future Statelessness. 
Although some members of the Sixth Committee argued that the question of nationality is 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the states, the General Assembly decided to convene 
the international conference for the two Conventions when twenty nations communicated to the 
90 Belgium/ibid/164; Egyptlibid /I67; U.KJibid/172; U.S.A.Iibid/I73. 
91 Ibid/I68. 
92 Ibid/I73. 
93 YBILC/I954/vol.l/I2/para.I3. 
94 lbidlpara.14. 
95 Ibid/I2-14. 
96 Ibid/168/paras.56-58. 
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Secretary-General of the United Nations their willingness to co-operate in the conference. 
Consequently, the conference was held in Geneva in 1959. However, at that time, the conference 
failed to reach agreement. When the second conference took place in New York in 1961, it 
produced the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.97 The 1961 Convention came 
into force in 1975 in accordance with Article 18 which requires 'two years after the date of the 
deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification.' In 2003, twenty-six nations are parties, and :five 
nations are signatories. 
However, the 1961 Convention 'departed substantially from the Commission's draft as the 
result of substantial amendment at the conference. '98 Insofar as the implementation mechanism is 
concerned, the 1961 Convention does not mention the tribunal prescribed by Article 11, Paragraph 
2, of the 1954 Draft Conventions. It is true that the 1961 Convention stipulates 'a body to which a 
person claiming the benefit of this Convention may apply for the examination ofhis claim and for 
assistance in presenting it to the appropriate authority' under Article 11, and that the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court was admitted under Article 14. However, Article 11 of the 1961 
Convention simply describes the promotion of the establishment of the body, which is far from any 
obligation to establish it. Furthermore, both Articles 11 and 14 are subject to reservations permitted 
by Article 17. It is so even while only three nations, France, Niger and Tunisia, declared their 
reservations to Articles 11 and 14.99 It is reasonable, therefore, for Sinclair to mention that 'the 
Commission's work on statelessness cannot be counted among its more successful endeavours.' 100 
5.2.4. THE Two RE PO IUS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 
In 1952, Lauterpacht was elected Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties after the resignation of 
Brierly. Lauterpacht submitted his :first report on the Law of Treaties to tl1e Convention in 1952, and 
97 See Weis/1962. 
911 Watts/1999/vol.l/140-141. 
99 http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/parti/chapterV /treaty4.asp 
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his second in 1953, although the ILC had no tin1e to discuss the reports neither at the fifth nor sixth 
sessions. Nevertheless, it is appropriate here to discuss his two reports from the viewpoint of the 
Rule of Law in international relations. There are two important topics in his two reports concerning 
the Rule of Law. The first topic is the question of reservation. The second topic is the problem of 
the invalidity of treaties. Both topics are related to the question oflegal indetenninacy. 
5.2.4.1. THE QUESTION OF REsERVATIONS TO MULTILATERAL TREATIES 
In the 1950s, rules on reservations to multilateral conventions were w1certain. It was thought at that 
time that a general rule applicable to multilateral conventions was the unanilnity rule, which does 
not allow a reserving state to become a party to the treaty w11ess all contracting parties agree to the 
reservation. However, on the other hand, there was another system on reservations to multilateral 
conventions, the so-called Pan-American system, which allows a reserving state to become a party 
to the treaty only in relation to other states which accept the reservation. The W1animity rule was 
W1Suitable, because one contracting party could prevent the reserving state from becoming a party 
to the conventions. Insofar as multilateral treaties are concerned, a result allowing a contracting 
party a de facto veto despite the fact that the convention purpo1ts to be Wliversal is undesirable. Nor 
is the Pan-American system desirable for multilateral treaties, because the integrity of a multilateral 
treaty is severely danmged by the fragmentation of the legal relationship between the contracting 
parties. This problem of reservation occun·ed with regard to the Genocide Convention. The 
reservation made by certain states such as the Soviet Union and Poland to the Genocide 
Convention produced a controversy on the legal effects of the reservations to the Convention by the 
member states. As a result, the General Assembly requested the International Court of Justice to 
give an Advisory Opinion about the question of reservations, and invited the ILC 'to study the 
question of reservations to multilateral conventions from the point of view of codification and from 
100 Sinclair/1987/51. 
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that of the progressive development of international law' by Resolution 4 78 (V) adopted on 16 
November 1950. 
In the Advisory Opinion in Reservations to the Genocide Convention, the Cotut rejected the 
unanimity rule, and adopted the compatibility test in favour of the Pan-American system: 
'The object and purpose of the Convention thus limit both the freedom of making reservations and that of 
objecting to them. It follows that it is the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the 
Convention that must furnish the criterion for the attitude of a State in making the reservation on accession as 
well as for the appraisal by a State in objecting to the reservation.' 101 
Furthermore, the Cotut admitted that 'each State which is a party to the Convention is entitled to 
appraise the validity of the reservation, and it exercises this right individually and from its own 
stand' 102 Consequently, the Cotut concluded as follows: 
'(a) that if a party to the Convention objects to a reservation which it considers to be incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider that the reserving State is not a party to the 
Convention; (b) that if, on the other hand, a party accepts the reservation as being compatible with the object 
and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider that the reserving State is a party to the Convention.' 103 
The ILC, on the other hand, provisionally adopted the unanimity rule on the question of the 
reservations to multilateral conventions in 1951. The reason the ILC adopted a position different 
from the Cotut's at that time was that the Conunission regarded its own work different from the 
task of the Cotut on the question of reservation. The ILC adopted the position whereby the 
Conunission was invited to study the question of reservations to multilateral conventions in general 
101 ICJReps/1951/24. 
102 Ibid./26. 
103 Ibid/29-30. 
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from the viewpoint of codification and progressive development of international law, while the 
Court dealt with the question of the reseiVations to the Genocide Convention only from the 
viewpoint of existing law. Therefore, despite the Advisory Opinion of the Court with regard to the 
reservations to the Genocide Convention, the Commission 'feels that it is at liberty to suggest the 
practice which it considers the most convenient for States to adopt for future.' 104 
The Commission in 1951 rejected the Pan-American system, since the system tends to 'spilt 
up a multilateral convention into a series of bilateral conventions, and thus reduce the effectiveness 
of the former.' 105 Neither was the compatibility test adopted by the Court acceptable to the 
Commission in 1951. Firstly, the compatibility of the object and purpose of a multilateral 
convention seemed to the majority of the ILC to involve 'a classification of the provisions of a 
convention into two categories, those which do and tl1ose which do not form part of its object and 
purpose.' Furthermore, even if the distinction is logically possible, the ILC also thought that such a 
distinction is impossible without the subjective appreciation of parties to the convention. Therefore, 
the Commission concluded, with regard to the compatibility test, ' [ s ]o long as the application of the 
criterion of compatibility remains a matter of subjective discretion, some of the parties being 
willing to accept a reservation and others not, the status of a reseiVing State in relation to the 
convention must remain uncertain.' 106 
Thus the Commission devoted attention to the question of reseiVations to a multilateral 
convention from the viewpoint of the Secretary-General oftl1e United Nations as the depositary. In 
other words, the ILC reaffirmed tl1e practice of tl1e United Nations on multilateral conventions, 
namely the unanimity rule linked to the fi.mction of the Secretary-General as the depositary. The 
ILC provisionally formulated the rules about reseiVations to a multilateral convention as follows. 107 
Firstly, the depositary of a multilateral convention should communicate each reseiVation to all states 
which are entitled to accept or reject the reseiVations to a multilateral convention. Then, the states 
104 YBILC/195llvol.21126/para.l7. 
105 Jbidl128/para.22. 
106 Jbidl128/para.24. 
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are required to decide their position, whether affirmative or negative, to the reservations within a 
certain period. However, if the states fail to express their objections to the reservations within the 
fixed period, the states should be lillderstood as having acquiesced in these reservations. In either 
case that a convention enters into force with signature only, or that the convention enters into force 
with ratification, reserving states will become parties to the convention as far as there is no 
objection by any other states to the reservation. 
The m£!iority of the Commission in 1951 was so confident in the rules above mentioned that 
when Lauterpacht succeeded Brierly as Special Rapporteur on the law of treaties, the Commission 
required him to 'take into accolll1t the work that had been done by the Commission' 108 with respect 
to reservations to multilateral treaties. Lauterpacht accordingly submitted the unanimity rule under 
Draft Article 9 that ' [a] signature, ratification, accession, or any other method of accepting a 
multilateral treaty is void if accompanied by a reservation or reservations not agreed to by all other 
parties to the treaty.' He admitted that, in the view of the Commission, this text 'must be regarded 
as probably still representing the existing law.' 109 However, at the same time, he regarded the 
unanimity rule as unsatisfactory on the question of reservation to multilateral conventions, since the 
rule was no longer supported by the majority of states after the Cowt had impaired the authority of 
the rule. 110 Neither was the compatibility test acceptable to him, because 'unless jurisdiction is 
vested in some international organ to determine, with an effect binding all parties, whether a 
reservation is compatible with the object of a treaty, the test laid down by the Court is probably 
unworkable in practice.' 111 He also, therefore, proposed four alternatives, which are also seen in his 
speech to the Grotius Society, 112 with regard to the admissibility of reservations to a convention 
decided by: (a) a two-thirds m£!iority of the pru.ties to the convention, (b) two-thirds majority of the 
interested parties qualified to offer objection, (c) the committee established by the parties to the 
107 lbid/130-131/para.34. 
108 YBILC/1952/vo.2/69/para.51. 
109 Lauterpacht/Rl O/YBILC/1953/vol.2/123. 
110 lbid/124-125. 
111 Oppenheirn-Lauterpacht/1955/915/n.2. 
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convention, and (d) the advisory opinion of the Chamber of Sunumuy Procedure of the Court. 113 
The spirit of his alternative texts is also seen in his edition of Oppenheim 's: 
'A more rational solution would seem to be to confer the power to decide on the admissibility of a reseiVation 
either upon some international judicial or administrative authority or upon the contracting parties themselves. 
These could act either through an organ created by them or by arriving at a decision themselves in the sense 
that a reseiVation should be regarded as admissible unless rejected by a substantial majority of the contracting 
part!. ,114 es. 
Lauterpacht clearly admitted that the alternatives were completely lex ferenda. 
It is not necessary here to consider whether or not his alternative proposals could have been 
acceptable to the member states. 115 It is enough to point out that Humphrey Waldock, the fourth 
Special Rapporteur on the law of treaties, rejected Lauterpacht' s alternative proposals. 
'Admirable as were Sir Hersch Lauterpacht's idea, they were inapplicable: the Commission had to face the 
realities of international life, one of which was that it was often not possible to include in treaties a 
jurisdictional clause for the handling of disputes, including disputes as to reseiVations.' 116 
Consequently, the 1969 Vienna Convention adopts the compatibility test under Article 19, 
Paragraph (c), without saying who is ultimately competent to decide the admissibility of reservation. 
It is so even though each party to a convention decides the admissibility of reservations to the 
convention, which simply means that the admissibility of reservation is bilaterally and relatively 
decided. The silence of the 1969 Vienna Convention on this point, therefore, inevitably causes the 
112 Lauterpacht/1954all 08-118. 
113 Lauterpacht/R1 O/YBILC/1953/vol.2/123-136. 
114 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht/1955/916. 
115 On the problems ofLauterpacht's alternative proposals, see D.IRJ Anderson/1964/465-468. 
116 YBILC/1962/vol.l/143/para61. Also see also Waldock!YBILC/1962/vo.2/78/para8. 
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indetenninacy of reservations. In particular, the question of the indetenninacy of reservations 
appears as the controversy between the 'permissible' school, whose doctrine is that 'the nullity of a 
reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty could be invoked before an 
international or even a national tribunal even if the State clain1ing the nullity of the reservation had 
not itself made any objection to it,' and the 'opposability' school which claims that 'a State could 
not avail itself of a reservation contrruy to the object and purpose of the treaty even if the other 
contracting State had accepted it.' 117 Although the ILC has once more returned to this topic in 
1993,118 it is still uncertain how this problem would be solved without the organ which determines 
the validity of reservations. In this sense, Lautetpacht' s answer to the question of the indetenninacy 
of reservations seems to be theoretically correct, even if not practically acceptable, because the 
indetenninacy of reservation is avoidable when the third organ can decide the admissibility of 
reservation. 
5.2.4.2. THE INVALIDITY OF TREATIES 
Lautetpacht examined the cause of the invalidity of treaties in his two reports on the law of treaties. 
His draft articles on the invalidity of treaties possess two characteristics. First, he drafted the two 
types of rules with regard to the invalidity of treaties: the articles stipulating the nullity of a treaty 
such as Articles 10 (the capacity of the parties under international limitations), 12 (duress), 15 (the 
consistency with international law) and 16 (the consistency with prior treaty obligation), and those 
articles describing the voidableness of treaties such as Articles 11 (the constitutional limitations upon 
the treaty-making power), 13 (fraud), and 14 (error). This distinction between nullity and 
voidableness is adopted by the 1969 Vienna Convention. While the possibility of states invoking 
the invalidity of a treaty is stipulated in Articles 46 (provisions of internal law regarding 
competence to conclude treaties), 48 (error), 49 (fraud), the 1969 Vienna Convention admits the 
117 YBILC/1995/vol.2/pt.2/1 OO/para.418. 
118 YBILC/1993/vol.2/pt.2/97 /para440. 
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nullity of treaties under Articles 51 (coercion of a representative of a state), 52 (coercion of a state 
by the threat or use of force), 53 (treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general 
international law). 
The second feature ofLauterpacht's drafts on the invalidity of treaties is that the invalidity of a 
treaty should be decided by either the International Court of Justice or an international tribunal. He 
said as follows: 
'[I]t must, de lege ferenda, be regarded as fundamental that any allegation of the invalidity of a treaty on 
account either of compulsion or of any other reason of invalidity as laid down in articles 12-16 [the articles on 
the invalidity of a treaty] of this chapter may properly be made with legal effect only: (a) if accompanied by 
the willingness of the State making such allegation to obtain a finding of an international tribunal on the matter, 
and (b) if followed by an actual finding of the tribunal to the effect. ' 119 
Consequently, he admitted that either the Court or an international tribunal, if parties agreed so, 
would have the compulsory jurisdiction to declare the invalidity of a treaty. This point is clearer 
compared to Article 66 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, stipulating the judicial clauses only with 
regard to jus cogens under Paragraph (a) of Article 66, while other relevant articles on the invalidity 
of a treaty are subject to Paragraph (b) of the same Article, whose process the Annex provides as 
the Conciliation Commission whose report has no binding force. In this sense, his two reports on 
the law of treaties, especially the 1953 report, clearly shows that Lauterpacht's theory of 
international law is based on the centrality of international adjudication in the international 
community. From such a viewpoint of the Rule ofLaw, the drafts ofLauterpacht concerning duress 
and 'overriding principles of international law' are more important than others. It is because both 
Article 13 (duress) and Article 15 (the consistency with international law) are deeply related to tl1e 
function of the Court to decide the normative authority of international law. 
119 Lauterpacht/Rl OIYBILC/1953/vo1.2/150-151/para 11. 
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5.2.4.2.1. DURESS 
Lauterpacht studied the problem of duress even in his early academic career. The problem of 
duress seemed to him to symbolise the imperfect nature of international law as 'law,' when war 
was admissible. In Analogies, he wrote, 
'It is believed that the lack of analogy of treaties and contracts so far as it is occasioned by the admissibility of 
duress cannot survive in an organised community of nations. The development of international law towards a 
true system oflaw is to a considerable degree co-extensive with the restoration of the missing link of analogy 
of contracts and treaties, i.e. of the freedom of will as a requirement for the validity of treaties, and with the 
relegation of force to the category of sanctions. The Covenant of the League of Nations, which, in its Article 
10, safeguards the political independence and territorial integrity ofthe Members of the League from acts of 
external aggression, may be regarded as containing, in gennio, the elements of this development' 120 
However, the situation certainly began to change as a result of the outlawry of war. In his 
lecture at The Hague, Lauterpacht clearly admitted the change of international law with regard to 
the problem of duress. 
'Customary international law has in this respect tmdergone a fundamental change as the result of the limitation 
of the right ofwar in the Covenant ofthe League and of its total elimination in the General Treaty for the 
Renunciation of War as an instrument of national policy, i.e. as an instrument for enforcing and changing 
rights. A State which has resorted to war in violation of its obligations under these instruments is not applying 
force in a process authorized by law. In such cases duress renders the treaty invalid. The victor must, if he can, 
seek other means ofregulatizing the fiuits ofunlawfbl resort to force. The defeated State, confronted with the 
120 Lauterpacht! Analogies/166-167. 
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threat of occupation or annihilation by the victo1~ cannot validly give its consent to the treaty tenninating the 
war.' 121 
Thus, he emphasised the change in traditional theory concerning duress. The same logic is seen in 
his 1953 Report on the law of treaties. In his 1953 Report, Lauterpacht declared, 
'[A] treaty imposed by or as the result of force or threats of force resorted to in violation of the principles of 
these instruments of a fundamental character is invalid by virtue of the operation of the general principle of 
law which postulates freedom of consent as an essential condition of the validity of consensual undertakings. 
The reasons which in the past rendered that principle inoperative in the international sphere have now 
disappeared.' 122 
It was, therefore, necessary and imperative that 'a codification of the law of treaties under the 
auspices of the United Nations should elevate to the dignity of a clear rule of international law a 
general principle of law recognized by all civilised States, namely, that freedom of consent - i.e. 
absence of constraint exercised otherwise than by law - is an essential condition of the validity of 
treaties conceived as contractual agreements.' 123 
His adherence to the ideal of the Rule of Law is seen not only in his argument on the analogy 
of contract, but also in his opinion that it should be the Court which decides the invalidity of treaties 
concluded under duress, because 'its conclusion and continuation are contrary to international 
public policy.' 124 In Lauterpacht's view, the nature of the prohibition of duress as international 
public policy does not allow the consent of the defeated states to cure the original illegality of the 
treaty concluded under duress. Furthermore, he claimed that actio popularis should be allowed due 
to the character of international public policy: '[T]he present Article gives to every Member of the 
121 Lauterpacht/1937-IV/CP-V354. 
122 Lauterpacht!YBILC/1953/vol.2/148/para.3. 
123 JbidJ149/para.6. 
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United Nations- whether it has become a party to the Code of the Law ofTreaties or not- the right 
to ask the Court to declare, in contentious proceedings, the invalidity of a treaty imposed by 
force.' 125 This result would have been revolutionary, had his drafts been adopted by the 
Commission. It should be noted, however, that his conception of international public order is not 
clear in this context. It is therefore necessary to refer to the article directly dealing with international 
public policy in his repott 
5.2.4.2.2. THE CONCEPTUAL ORIGIN OF JUS COGENS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 
As some lawyers in the inter-war era already argued the norm of the higher authority which 
invalidates treaties, 126 Lauterpacht also discussed the possibility of the invalidity of immoral treaties. 
In his general lecture at The Hague, however, Lauterpacht was cautious of the invalidity of immoral 
treaties. 
'Taken literally, it amounts to a re-introduction into the system of international law of natural law pure and 
simple; it signifies that law has no validity unless it can justifY itself and be approved by the tribunal of 
morality. From the practical point of view, so long as there is no authorative body emdowed with obligatoty 
jurisdiction to detennine the morality or otherwise of a treaty obligation, the supposed invalidty of immoral 
treaties is a standing invitation to the law-breaker to diengage himself unilaterally - in a heroic manner- from 
. . d ,127 an mconvement uty. 
However, it was Lautetpacht who introduced the conceptual origin of jus cogens into the 
124 /bid/151-152/para.11. 
125 /bid 
126 Verd.ross/1937. According to Ragazzi, Anzilotti distinguished between peremptory norms artd 
dispositive norms in international law without using the term 'jus cogens' in his Italiart article in 
1914. Ragazzi/1997/44-45/nJ. 
127 Lauterpacht/1937-IV /CP-I/358. 
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codification on the law oftreaties. 128 Article 15 in his First Report on the Law of Treaties discusses 
the legality of the object of a treaty in the context of international public order. Article 15 says as 
follows: 
'A treaty, or any of its provisions, is void if its perfonnance involves an act which is illegal under international 
law and if it is declared so to be by the International Court of Justice.' 
Article 16, Paragprah 1, of his two reports also basically adoped this idea in the context of treaties: 
'A bilateral or multilateral treaty, or any provision of a treaty, is void if its perfonnance involves a breach of a 
treaty obligation, previously undertaken by one or more of the contracting parties.' 129 
The main feature of both Articles is that any treaty inconsistent with intemational law becomes 
invalid due to its illegality. The idea that the inconsistency of a treaty with the prior treaty 
invalidates that treaty stems from his articles on the Oscar Chinn Case/lO the Covenant of the 
League131 and the law ofcontrad32 from 1935 to 1936. The essence ofthis idea is to establish the 
hierarchical order of international law by appling the law of state responsibility, while avoiding the 
so-called problem of relative normativity. 133 
It is true that Lauterpacht did not use the term 'relative nmmativity', but he would have 
acknowledged the problem of the relative normativity of intemationallaw. Indeed, it is difficult to 
explain how he int:mduced the conceptual origin of jus cogens into international law without using 
128 Schwelb/1967/949. 
129 Lauterpacht/R11/YBILC/1954/vol.2/133. Emphasis original. Italicised means the words added 
to the text in First Report. 
130 Lauterpacht/1935/CP-IV/337-340. 
131 Lauterpacht/1936b/CP-IV /326-336. 
132 Lauterpacht/1936c/CP-IV /340-375. 
133 On the problem of relative normativity, see Weil/1983; Tasioulas/1996; Fastenrath/1993; J.AJ 
Beckett/200 1; Shelton/2003/14 5-172. 
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the term 'relative normativity.' On this point, it should be noted that Lauterpacht used the term 
'hierarchy' as the dynamic sense of the gradual concretization of law from the viewpoint of 
Kelsenian normativism.134 In his draft for the 9th edition of Oppenheim 's, Lauterpacht found the 
hierarchical relationship of the sources of international law in Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the 
Court. 135 It is because Kelsenian normativism conceived the applicability of legal rule as the sphere 
of validity of legal rule. Consequently, the hierarchy of the source of international law meant to 
Lauterpacht just the application of lex specialis derogat generali. A treaty can override custom, 
because the former provides more concrete right and obligation of the parties than the latter. For the 
same reason, customary law is more applicable than general principles of law. However, as 
Akehurst pointed out, 'lex specialis derogat generali is no more than a rule of interpretation.' 136 If 
the maxim lex speciali derogat generali is applicable to the relation between two sources, the two 
legal sources should be regarded as of the same authority. Akehurst said that 'there is a presumption 
that the authority laying down a general rule intended to leave room for the application of more 
specific rules which already existed or which might be created in the future, even though the 
specific rules might be derived form an inferior source.' 137 If there is a difference of normativity 
between two sources, the norm oflower authority cannot override the norm of higher authority. In 
this sense, when he dissolved the problem of the hierarchy of the validity of law into the 
interpretation of law, Lauterpacht presupposed that there was no difference between the sources 
with regard to the nonnative autl1ority. 
It should be noted, moreover, that Lauterpacht did not admit the relative normativity of law 
between legislative convention and contractual treaty from his early academic career, because with 
Kelsen he believed that there was no difference between private law and public law. With regard to 
the view that a treaty is an act of legislation in the sphere of international law, Lauterpacht 
134 See above 1.2.1.2. 
135 The same usage of the term 'hierachy' is seen in Akehurst's argument on the sources of 
intematonallaw, although Akehurst discussed the conflict betweenjus dispositivum and jus cage m 
at tl1e same time. Akehurst/19'/4-1 975b/and/1987 /39-42. 
136 Akehurst/1974-1975b/273. 
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emphasised the relative difference of nom1ativity between a law-making treaty and contractual one: 
'This view is compatible with the current division of international treaties in law-making and other treaties, so 
long as it remains clear that that distinction, useful as it may be for the purpose of convenience and 
classification, dose not entail any consequences so far as the juridical value of both kinds of treaties as source 
of international law is concerned. Evety treaty contains rules governing the international conduct of the 
signatol)' States, and eve!)' treaty, law-making or not law-making, is a source of international law for the 
contracting parties - and for no one else. The above-mentioned distinction is useful if meant to emphasise the 
fact that some treaties are of more pennanent and general application than others, and that they resemble 
therefore an act of legislation. Apart from this, however, it is obvious that its value is a relative one.' 138 
It is true that Lauterpacht referred to the Covenant of the League as 'higher law,' which sometimes 
gives the impression that he admitted the relative nom1ativity of international law. However, the 
reason he called the Covenant 'higher law' was not because the Covenant had higher normative 
authority than other conventions, but because it was more general and comprehensive than others. 
He referred to the invalidity or unenforceability of treaties inconsistent with the Covenant as 
follows: 
'They follow not because there is any hierarchical superiority about the Covenant as a legislative instrument-
for there is none. Neither do they ensue for the mere reason that the Members of the League, not content to 
rely on general international law in the matter of inconsistency of treaties, have expressly endowed the 
Covenant with comprehensive overriding powers -for such caution is merely declarntol)' of existing principle. 
The grave consequences in the shape of possible incompatibility are the direct result of the comprehensiveness 
of the Covenant, which not only limits the right of resort to war but also imposes most far-reaching obligations 
137 Ibid. 
138 Lauterpacht/Analogies/157. 
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for the enforcement of the Covenant' 139 
This passage indicates his intention of estalishing the hierarchical order of international law, while 
he tried to maintain the view that there is no difference of nonnativity between a law-making treaty 
and a contractual treaty. In other words, Lauterpacht attempted to hannonise two conflicting 
propositions. 
However, it was difficult to estabilish the hierarchical order without introducing relative 
nonnativity. In his draft article about jus cogens, Waldock pointed out that 
'Unless the concept of what is "illegal under international law" is narrowed by reference to the concept of jus 
cogens, it may be too wide .... The phrase "illegal under international law" would also seem open to the 
interpretation that any treaty infringing the prior rights of another State is ipso facto void. T11is does, indeed, 
appear to have been the view of Sir H. Lauterpacht; but the evidence hardly seems to bear it out, especially 
with regard to treaties which conflict with the rights of other State under prior treaties.' 140 
Indeed, Lauterpacht found it difficult to distinguish between the case where the inconsistency of a 
treaty with prior obligations invalidiates the later treaty and the case that it does not do so. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that he introduced in his two reports on the law of treaties the difference of the 
nonnative authority oflaw between the nonn which invalidates the subsequent treaty and the nonn 
which does not 
Draft Article 15 of Lauterpacht' s 1953 Report indicated that the object of a treaty might be 
contrary to international customary law. However, even in this case, the treaty which is inconsistent 
with customary law is not invalid, because states are allowed to modifY their legal relations by 
concluding a treaty. It is rather the violation of 'such overriding principles of international law 
which may be regarded as constituting principles of international public policy' that makes a treaty 
------- ----
139 Lauterpacht/1936/CP-IV/331. 
140 WaldockiYBlLC/1963/vol.2/53/para.2. 
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invalid. Lauterpacht wrote. 
'It would thus appear that the test whether the object of the treaty is illegal and whether the treaty is void for 
that reason is not inconsistency with customary intemationallaw pure and simple, but inconsistency with such 
oveniding principles of intemational law which may be regarded as constituting principles of international 
public order (ordre international public). These principles need not necessarily have crystallized in a clearly 
accepted rule of law such as prohibition of piracy or of aggressive war. They may be expressive of rules of 
international morality so cogent that an international tribunal would consider them as forming part of those 
principles oflaw generally recognized by civilized nations which the International Court of Justice is bound to 
apply by virture of Articles 38 (i) (c) of its Statute.' 141 
Thus, he introduced the conceptual origin of jus cogens to the codification of the law of treaties. 
Unlike the 1969 Vienna Convention which introduced the consensual concept of peremptory 
nonns into its Article 53 rather than the concept of international public order, 142 Lauterpacht thought 
that the overriding principle of intemationallaw was independent of the will of states. 143 Rather, the 
question whether or not a customary norm overrides principles of inernationallaw is decided by the 
consideration of morality in Lautetpacht's view. This point is more explicit, compared to 
Fitzrnaurice's Draft Articles on jus cogens and intemational morality. In his third report, 
Fitzrnaurice divided Lautetpacht's concept of 'overriding principles of intemationallaw' into two 
articles. Article 17 in the third report explains the concept ofjus cogens. Article 17 reads, 
'It being always open, prima facie, to any two or more States to agree, for application inter se UJX>n rule or 
regime varying or depruting from the mles of customary international law in the nature of jus dis[XJsitivwn, a 
treaty embodying such an agreement cannot be invalid on that ground. Here it is only if the treaty involves a 
141 Lautcrpacht!Rl OIYBILC/1953/vol.2/155/para.4. 
142 Akehurst/1974-1975b/283; Alexidze/1981/254-255; Komori/1987/15-27; Danilenko/1991/55. 
143 Sztucki/1974/97-98. 
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departure from or conflict with absolute and imperative of jus cogens that a cause of invalidity can arise. Since 
the treaty is in any event res inter alios acta, and without force as against non-parties, the invalidity as such of 
the treaty only affects directly the relations between the parties to it, and means that neither or none of the 
parties can claim compliance with it on the part of the other or others.' 144 
On the other hand, Article 20 in the same report deals with the ethics of the object of international 
treaties: 
'The unethical character of a treaty which is not actually illegal by virtue of the provisions of articles 16 to 19 
... cannot per se be a ground of invalidity as between the parties which have concluded it (and has in any case 
no force as against non-parties). Nevertheless an international tribunal may refuse to take cognisance of or 
apply it (even as between the parties, and even if its invalidity has not been claimed) in those cases in which 
the treaty is clearly contrary to humanity, good morals, or to international good order or the recognized ethics 
of international behaviour.' 145 
In other words, Fitzmaurice idendi:fiedjus cogens as legal rules which reflect 'considemtions of 
momls and of international good order,' 146 while he accepted the view that international tribunals 
should refuse to apply 'a treaty that has an immoml or unethical (but not illegal) object.' 147 
Lauterpacht's concept of 'oveniding principles of international law' had both aspects of 
Fitzmaurice's idea. Although he 'does not refer in a sepamte Article to consistency with 
international morality as a condition of validity of treaties,' Lauterpacht satisfied himself by saying 
'[i]n so far as considemtions of morality - such as conduct in accordance with canons of good faith 
- form a constituent part of geneml principles oflaw and of the requirements of international public 
144 Fitzmaurice/YBILC/1958/vo1.2127. 
145 !bid 
146 Ibid/41 
147 Ibid/45. 
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policy they are provided for in the present article.' 148 This remark shows that considerations of 
morality decide the normative difference between international public order which invalidate a 
treaty inconsistent with it, and normal customary norms which parties can depart from. 
Lauterpacht also discussed the problem of relative normativity in the context of multilateral 
conventions. Draft Article 16, Paragraph 4, of his two reports modified his claim that the 
subsequent treaty inconsistent with the prior convention should be invalid: 
'The rule fonnulated above [under paragraphs land 2] does not apply to subesequent mulilateral treaties, 
[such as the Charter of the United Nations], partaking of a degree of generality which imparts to them the 
character of legislative enactments properly affecting all members of the international community or which 
must be deemed to have been concluded in the international interest. Neither does it apply to treaties revising 
mulitlateral conventions in accordance with their provisions or. in the absence of some provisions, by a 
suhstm1tial mqjority of the parties to the revised convention.' 149 
In the Second Report, Lauterpacht frankly confessed that Paragraph 4 of Article 16 is a kind of 
introduction oflegislation to the international community: 
'In so far as that principle sanctions and treats as valid depature from the tenns of a binding treaty as the result 
of the conclusion of a multilateral treaty of a sufficient degree of significance and generality, it amounts to an 
intereference with the legal rights of States without their consent To that extent it amounts to a produced 
measure of international legislation in the literal sense. That consequence is probably unavoidable in a 
progressive and developing international socieity. However, it is of importance to realize the implications of 
that aspect of the codification of the law of treaties.' 150 
148 Lauterpacht!Rl ONBIT ,C/1953/vol.2/155-156/para.2. 
149 Words added in the Second Report to Article 16 in the First Report are italicised. The words in 
square brackets are those deleted in the Second Report. 
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In other words, the subsequent multilateral convention can override the prior convention due to the 
higher normativity of the subsequent multilateral convention, expressed as 'legislative character,' 
even if the former is contrary to the latter. Later, Lauterpacht clearly admited 1hat legislative treaties 
may have different normativity from the normative character of contractual treaties in his separate 
opinion in the Petioners case.151 
The same consideration is also applicable to customary law. Lauterpacht claimed 1hat 
international public policy can also be exchanged for international treaty regime which has the 
normativity of international public policy: '[I]f ... international courts are to be judges of the validity 
of treaties in the light of overriding principles of international custom and international public 
policy as hitherto recognized, a situation may be created in which international society may be 
deprived of the necessary means of development through process'. 'De lege forenda', he continued, 
'there may be room for the consideration of a principle affirming that a multilateral treaty 
concluded in the general international interest is valid even if departing from or contrary to what 
has been considered in the past to be an overriding rule of customary international law.' 152 
However, Lauterpacht knew that the introduction of relative normativity clearly causes the 
indeterminacy of law without the authority to decide it. Therefore, according to him, the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court was indispensable to the hierarchical order of the 
norrnativity of international law. In the Hague Academy, Lauterpacht said as follows: 
'The general principle oflaw invalidating immoral treaties is a necessary and salutary corrective when applied 
by an impa1tial agency. It may become an abuse and a negation of law when detennined unilaterally by 
Governments supported by writers anxious to supply a cloak of juridical decency for cynical breaches of the 
law.'l53 
150 Lauterpach1/R11NBILC/1954/vol.2/138-139. 
151 Lauterpacht/ PetionersllCJReps/1956/48-49. Also see Fitzmaurice/1986/684-685/and/81 0-812. 
152 Lauterpach1/RllNBILC/1954/vol.2/155. 
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It is not surprising, therefore, that in Draft Article 15 of the 1953 Report, Lauterpacht proposed the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court: 'It is the Court, and not the interested party, 
which is finally entitled to declare the treaty, or part thereof, to be void on accoill1t of illegality.' 
Furthermore, he continued, 'the operation of the principle involved [the nullity of treaties] must be 
dependent upon the willingness of the party invoking it to abide by the decision of an international 
tribunal upholding the allegation of invalidity or making, proprio motu, a finding to that effect.' 154 
Although he did not forget the unwillingness of states to confer compulsory jurisdiction to the 
ICJ,155 it is clear that, in the view ofLauterpacht, the Court would have very broad discretion under 
his Draft Article 15, because international public policy cannot be determined without moral 
considerations or values. Thus, his Draft Alticle 15 was one of the examples of Lauterpacht 
attempting to reconstruct the international community from the lawyer's perspective of 
international law. He wished to give international judges the right to decide the normativity of 
international law which invalidates treaties on grounds of moral and policy considerations. 156 In this 
sense, Draft Article 15 symbolises his legalistic ideal of the international community. 
153 Lauterpacht/1937-IV/CP-11358-359. 
154 Lauterpacht!R1 OIYBILC/1953/vol.2/155. 
155 !bid 
156 On the role of international judges with regard to the indeterminacy of international law, 
Tasioulas/1996. But J .I A./Beckett/200 1. 
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6. THE RESPONSilliLITY OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGES 
When Lord McNair retired from the International Cotut of Justice, Lauterpacht was elected as his 
successor in October, 1954. He became a judge ofthe International Cotut of Justice on 6 February 
1955. In the same year, he was given knighthood. Although he had limited practical experience of 
international litigation, no-one doubted his ability as a judge due to his encyclopaedic knowledge of 
international law and his theoretical insights into international judicial functions. 1 Lauterpacht 
discussed many topics relating to international judicial functions from the point of view of the Rule 
of Law in the international community. As Scobbie points out, Lauterpacht 'found himself in the 
happy position of being able to practise his theory as a judge of the International Cotut of Justice. '2 
Lauterpacht took his seat as Judge when the Cotut gave one order on Provisional Measure,3 
six judgements4 on jurisdiction or merits and three advisory opinions,5 although he had to recuse 
himself from the Nottebohm case since he had advised Liechtenstein Govemment on that particular 
incident.6 In these cases, he appended one declaration,7 five separate opinions8 and two dissenting 
opinions.9 Apart from his individual opinions, Lauterpacht wrote 'the Provisional Report on the 
Revision of the Statute of the Cotut' for the General Conference for the Revision of the Charter, 
which was supposed to be held at the Tenth Annual Session of the General Assembly, while he 
recessed from the second phase of the Nottebohm case. Although this paper was an intemal paper 
1 Rosenne/1961/826. 
2 Scobbie/1997/264. 
3 Interhandell Interim-Measures/ICJReps/195911 05. 
4 Norwegian/Loans/ICJReps/195719; Right/of/ Passage/ICJReps/1957 /125; 
Guardianship/ICJReps/1958155; lnterhandel/ICJReps/1959/6; 
lsraellv./ Bulgaria /ICJReps/19591127; Frontier/ Land/ICJReps/19591209. 
5 Voting/Procedure/ICJReps/1955167; Petitioners/ICJReps/1956123; 
ILO/Administrative/Tribunal/ICJReps/1956177. 
6 Lauterpacht/R-811950/CP-IV/5~20. 
7 Lauterpacht/F}ontier/Land'/ICJ-Reprots/1959/230-232. 
8 Lauterpacht/Voting/ Procedure//ICJReps/1955/90-123; Lauterpacht/ Petitioners/ICJReps/195613 5-
59; Lauterpacht/Norwegian/ Loans/ICJReps/1957 /34-66; Lauterpachtllnterhandel/ lnterim-
Mearures/ICJReps/19571117-120; Lauterpacht/Guardianship/ICJReps/1958/79-101. 
9 Lauterpacht/Interhandel/ICJReps/1959195-122; Lauterpacht-Koo-Spender/Jsrae//v./ Bulgaria 
/ICJReps/1959/156-194. 
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of the Court, and was not published until 2002,10 Wllfred Jenks, Elihu Lauterpacht and Scobbie 
discussed it11 According to Elihu Lauterpacht, this report was circulated on 1 September 1955. 
Judge Lauterpacht purported to submit a final report on or before 15 January 1956 after hearing the 
comments of the judges of the Court. However, the final report seems not to have been prepared. 
This report expresses the general scheme of Hersch Lauterpacht on the International Court of 
Justice. Its basis is his belief in the Rule of Law in international relations. For example, it discusses 
questions of the 'automatic' reservation and the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and proposed 
a wide amendment of the Statute, including the abolition of judges ad hoc and the grant of locus 
standi to individuals and international organisations. Although his proposal seems too bold even 
now for states to accept, the report is worth reading as a statement ofLauterpacht' s ideals. 
These individual opinions and the Provisional Report show how Lauterpacht legitimised and 
protected the authority of the Court in order to accomplish his ideal of the Rule of Law in the 
international community. This chapter discusses the question ofhow international judges should be 
responsible for the authority of the Court from the viewpoint of the legitimacy of judicial decision 
rather than legal validity. It is appropriate to explain the concept of legitimacy of judicial decisions 
before discussing the problem of the responsibility of judges. It would be easier to understand the 
notion of the legitimacy ofjudicial decisions by comparing it with the concept oflegal validity. The 
legitimacy of judicial decisions is different from the legal validity of decisions. The former is the 
authority of decision as a declaration of law, while the latter is the legal status of a judicial decision 
within the legal order. The problem of reasoning in judicial decision-making is a good example to 
understand the difference between them. The absence of reasons is conceived as the cause of the 
nullity of the decision. However, its absence does not automatically nullify the decision. With 
regard to the problem of exces de pouvoir, Kaiyan Kaikobad says, 
'[A] judicial or arbitral decision is to be regarded as valid and binding upon the states parties to the dispute, 
10 Lauterpacht/R-12/1955. 
11 Wilfred/Jenks/1960/97-98; Elihu!Lauterpacht/199114-5; Scobbie/1997/265-266. 
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even if either of them considers the decision null and void ... In such circumstances, the legally correct course 
of action is for the litigating states to conclude an agreement to refer the matter for impartial consideration by a 
tribunal or the International Court. Thus it is for the latter to decide whether or not the decision is without legal 
effect it follows that until it is it is declared void, if at all, the previous decision must be considered as 
standing.' 12 
This point explains the fonnal nature of legal validity. The legal validity of a judicial decision is 
reached by the fact of the Court deciding the case under Article 59 of the Statute. The decision 
binds parties even if one of the parties is unsatisfied with the reasoning behind the decision. 
On the other hand, the reasoning behind judicial decision-making takes on a different aspect 
when looked at from the point of view of legitimacy. The importance of legal reasoning is due to 
the problem of the objectivity of a judicial decision in the sense that the decision should not be 
arbitrary. If a decision were regarded as arbitrary or politically biased, the legitimacy of the decision 
would be damaged, even though the decision is legally valid. This problem arose in the SouJh-West 
Africa case. There were too many criticisms of the 1966 judgement for its political bias. Ram 
Anand described the harsh political criticism of this judgement as follows: 'It [the 1966 judgement] 
was variously decried as incredible, regrettable, "scandalous," "opaque as to law, justice, equity and 
morality," "grotesque," "disgrace" to the UN, the most unfortunate and unjust pronouncement ever 
made by the International Court, and an atrocious miscarriage of justice.' 13 However, the real 
problem concerning the legitimacy of the 1966 judgement was neither its political bias nor its legal 
conservatism, but the fact that it breached the principle of res judicata in its reasoning. Hugh 
Thirlway points out that 
'The fact that it deprived the Parties, and the waiting world, of a judgement on the merits which had 
confidently expected (and had been confidently expected to be a condemnation of South Afiica's policies) is 
12 Kailcobad/1999/321. 
13 Anand/1969/144. 
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not in itself a legitimate ground of criticism ... The way in which it was done, and in particular the violation, 
real or apparent, of the principle of res judicata, however place the matter in a different perspective. The sin 
committed was however not one of over-conservatism: to scrap the procedural structure which protect the 
principle of consent as basis of jurisdiction would be a seriously retrograde step, however justified it might 
seem in the short term for the purposes of a particular case.' 14 
Thus, even though the judgement binds Ethiopia and Liberia, on the one hand, and South Africa, 
on the other hand, the judgement, which is contrary to the principle of res judicata, was regarded as 
arbitrary by many member states of the United Nations. Consequently, the 1966 judgement 
considerably damaged the authority of the Court. 
The crisis of the 1966 judgement shows the two elements being necessary to the legitimacy of 
the Court: the political impartiality of judges and the conformity of decisions with legal principles. 
If the judges were regarded as politically biased, the decision would be also necessarily disregarded 
as arbitrary. The impartiality of judges, therefore, is one ofthe important elements of the legitimacy 
of a decision. On the other hand, with regard to the conformity of a decision with law, it is 
axiomatic that judicial decisions should be based on law. However, this assumption easily falls 
apart, because it is commonplace even for lawyers to disagree as to which rule of international law 
is applicable to the subject matter. This problem so often appears as judicial discretion in hard cases. 
The political impartiality of judges is discussed first, followed by an examination of the conformity 
of decisions with law. 
6.1. THE IMPARTIALITY OF JUDGES 
Even before becoming a judge of the Court, Lauterpacht fully recognised the problem of the 
impartiality of judges from the point of view of legitimacy of decision. He thought the reason why 
14 Thirlway/1995a/143. Emphasis original. 
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states do not fully rely on a judicial settlement lay judges not enjoying the complete trust of states: 
'[T]he real difficulty lies not in the inability of international law to protect important interests of 
States, but in the apprehension that it would be dangerous to expose such interests to the risks of a 
decision by judges whose impartiality is regarded as problematical.' 15 The distrust of international 
judges is more obvious in the context of hard cases: 'If States refuse to treat disputes as justiciable 
on account of alleged lack of legal rules, it is because they distrust the impartiality of international 
judges in the unavoidable exercise of their creative function of filling the gaps in an undeveloped 
legal system.' 16 Therefore, the impartiality of international judges is 'the Cape Horn of international 
judicial settlements' 17 for Lauterpacht. 
Lauterpacht discussed two problems in the context of the impartiality of judges: the personal 
integrity of judges and their political impartiality. The former concerns the probity of judges, for 
example, the possibility of corruption. 18 The latter is more important and difficult; it is the problem 
of the impartiality of international judges between parties, in other words, 'a problem ofloyalty to 
the judicial oath of impartiality.' 19 This problem is especially apparent in the context of national 
judges and judges ad hoc. Lauterpacht was critical ofboth these types of judges, because the two 
types of judges seemed to him to reflect the notion that judges are representative of their own states 
and interests which was the greatest danger to their impartiality: 
'[T]hat process ought not to be impeded by the continuance of formal institutions perpetuating the idea of 
representation of national interests. National judges are such an institution. The very presence of a national 
judge changes the character of the deliberations of the Court. They cease to be a contest between the various 
aspects of the impersonal claims of justice; they tend to degenerate into a contention between the conflicting 
claims of the parties. The fme scales of justice are loaded with the crude and incongruous element of partisan 
15 Lauterpacht/Function/202. 
16 !bid 
17 Jbid!203. 
18 Jbid/211-215. 
19 Jbid/215. 
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interest '20 
Indeed, the history of the Court shows that it is difficult for national judges and judges ad hoc to go 
contrary to the opinions of their own governments or of the governments that appoint them. 
Although there are some cases where national judges were opposed to the opinions of their own 
governments,21 there is only one case where a judge ad hoc took an opposite position to the 
government that appointed them.22 
Elihu Lauterpacht, however, justifies the institution of judge ad hoc in the Application of 
Genocide Convention case by saying that '[ajudge ad hoc] has, I believe, the special obligation to 
endeavour to ensure that, so far as is reasonable, every relevant argument in favour of the party that 
has appointed him has been fully appreciated in the course of collegial consideration and, 
ultimately, is reflected- though not necessarily accepted- in any separate or dissenting opinion 
that he my write. '23 Some lawyers support the opinion ofElihu Lauterpacht. Geoffrey Palmer, who 
is a judge ad hoc in the Request for an Examination of the Situation case, agrees with Elihu 
Lauterpacht.24 Shabtai Rosenne also says that 'the inclusion of the individual opinion of the judge 
ad hoc alongside the text of the judgement may be no less of an assurance to a government than his 
20 Lauterpacht included both regular national judges and judges ad hoc in the term 'national 
judges.' Ibid/233. 
21 See, for example, McNair/ICJReps/1952/116-123; Basdevant/ICJReps/1953/74-84 
22 Judge ad hoc Bastid supported the judgement which rejected the claim of Tunisia that appointed 
her in the Application for Revision and Interpretation case. Bastid/ICJReps/1985/247-252. In 
addition to the case of Judge ad hoc Bastid, somebody might argue that Judge ad hoc Valticos also 
was opposed to Bahrain which appointed him, because in the Judgement of 1 July 1994 in the 
Qatar v. Bahrain case, he agreed with the majority of the Court that 1990 Minute is an legal 
instrument, though Bahrain claimed that it is just a political instrument. However the 1994 
Judgement is a kind of 'interim' decision in which the Court avoided to decide the question of 
jurisdiction by giving the parties 'an opportunity to submit to the Court the whole of the dispute.' 
See Schwebel/ICJReps/1994/130-131; Elihu!Lauterpacht/1996b. Indeed, Judge ad hoc Valticos 
was opposed to the majority of the Court in the Judgement of 15 February 1995 by supporting for 
the contention of Bahrain. Vatlicos/ICJReps/1995/74-78. Therefore, it cannot be said that he wa'\ 
opposed to the Bahrain government which appointed him. 
23 Elihu!Lauterpacht/ICJReps/1993/409/para.6. Also see Peck-Lee/1997/371-378. 
24 Palmer/ICJReps/1995/420/para.118. 
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presence on the Bench. '25 Merrills has the same view that 'the vote of the ad hoc judge, like that of 
the "national" member of a court of arbitration, is never likely to change the result of a case, but his 
presence provides an important link between the parties and the Court. ' 26 Collier and Lowe agree 
with them that it [the institution of judge ad hoc] increases the confidence of States in the Court, 
particularly when the other party has a judge of its nationality on the Court, in that the presence of 
an ad hoc judge may reassure the party which has appointed him that the nuances of its pleadings 
have been understood by at least one member of the Court. '27 They presuppose that the institution 
of judge ad hoc is harmless to the judicial decision of the Court, and rather useful to appease the 
governments reluctant to use the Court. 
It is true that there has been no case where a judge ad hoc has had definitive influence over the 
judgement of the Court. Even in the Lotus case, which was decided by the casting vote of the 
President, the vote of ad hoc Judge Fei'zi-DaYm Bey was counterbalanced by the dissenting vote of 
French judge, Vice-President Weiss. The South West Africa (Second Phase) case is another 
example where the votes of judges ad hoc cancelled each other out, though the absence of Judge 
Zafiullah Kahn was decisive to the 1966 judgement.28 Insofar as judges ad hoc have less influence 
over the decision of the Court, the institution of judge ad hoc (and regular national judges) is 
harmless from the pragmatic viewpoint. 
However, the partiality of judge ad hoc is still problematical from the point of view of the 
legitimacy of a judicial decision. TI1e opinion of a judge ad hoc is clearly less objective in the sense 
that he is clearly in favour of the government that appoints him. It is true that lawyers who defend 
the institution of judge ad hoc deny the view that a judge ad hoc is the representative of the state 
that appoints him in the bench. Elihu Lauterpacht, for example, mentions that 
'This has led many to assume that an ad hoc judge must be regarded as a representative of the State that 
25 Rosennt>J1997/vol.3/1128. 
26 Merrills/1998/139. 
27 Collier-Lowe/1999/131. 
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appoints him and, therefore, as necessarily pre-committed to the position that that State may adopt That 
assumption is, in my opinion, contraiy to principle and cannot be accepted. '29 
Nevertheless, it seems difficult to spot the difference between the opinion ofElihu Lauterpacht and 
the view that a judge ad hoc is the representative of the state which appoints him, because a judge 
ad hoc would play a role of avocat supplementaire30 insofar as he tries 'to ensure that, so far as is 
reasonable, every relevant argument in favour of the party that has appointed him has been fully 
appreciated in the course of collegial consideration. '31 Although it seems true, as Abi-Saab pointed 
out, that if a judge ad hoc acts as 'a disguised advocate,' 'he will be completely isolated and will 
exercise no influence whatsoever, '32 it is still arguable whether the role of judge ad hoc is similar to 
the role of advocate in the sense that judge ad hoc is in favour of the government which appointed 
him/her, considering the fact that there is only one example that judge ad hoc voted against the 
government which appointed her. Indeed, Elihu Lauterpacht himself admitted that 
'[U]nderlying the whole of this discussion is an lll1<Uticulated premise (though we have actually expressed it) 
that a person appointed by a colll1tly as an ad hoc judge or a person sitting as a titular judge with a particular 
nationality, is inevitably going to favour that COlll11I)' or is W1der strong emotional pressure to do so. If that 
premise is correct (and I fear it is), then there is really nothing you [Professor Brown Weiss] can do to change 
the situation by mere statutory provision, except in the other direction - by diminishing his or her 
independence. You cannot enhance his or her independence, because the limitation on that independence is 
not statutory, but emotional, whereas you can limit independence by statutory provision or by some 
appropriate practice'33 
28 McWhinney/1991117-20. 
29 Elihu/Lauterpacht!ICJReps/1993/409/paras.S-6. 
30 Dubisson/1964/65. 
31 ICJReps/1993/409/para6. 
32 Peck-Lee/1997/394. 
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Such a role of judge ad hoc was 1he concern ofHersch Lauterpacht. For him, 1he interests of parties 
'must be represented and defended by advocates and counsels - not by judges pledged by their 
oath to the duty of impartiality' under Article 20 of1he Statute.34 
Furthermore, the fact that 1he votes of national judges and judges ad hoc have the same value 
as the votes of other judges necessitates the impartiality of national judges and judges ad hoc 
between parties, because even 1heir votes contribute to judicial decisions regarded as the declaration 
of law. In oilier words, even national judges and judges ad hoc are responsible for the legitimacy of 
judicial decisions. Lauterpacht confessed his concern that 'al1hough in this case the vote of the 
Turkish judge had no decisive effect wi1h regard to the actual decision of the Court, it did have the 
effect of giving to the world, with the authority of a formal rn~ority of the Permanent Court, 
approval of a doctrine of great importance which some believe to be mistaken. '35 
Lauterpacht, of course, knew the actual difficulty of abolishing 1he institution of judge ad hoc 
and its political or pragmatic usefulness. However, he criticised the institution from the point of 
view of the legitimacy of the judicial decision. In this context, it should be noted that the problem of 
the impartiality of international judges is turned into the question of legal reasoning. In 
Development-If, Lauterpacht offered a general discussion of1he relation between the impartiality of 
judges and legal reasoning: 
'[I]t [the problem of judicial impartiality] can be considerably alleviated by the fullest possible completeness 
of judicial reasoning which renders it practicable for everybody to know and to assess the value of the grounds 
of the decision given by an international tribunal. Even if there existed no other inducement prompting the full 
elaboration and exhaustiveness of judicial pronouncements, this aspect of the matter must in itself constitute a 
factor of compelling cogency in discouraging any semblance of deliberate brevity. It is not without 
significance that in the history of international arbitration allegations of improper exercise of the arbitral 
33 Jbid./388. 
34 l.auterpacht/1954£'534. 
35 Lauterpacht/1930b/184/n.lland/Function/235/n.l. 
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fimction have been mostly made in cases in which the award was not accompanied by reasons. '36 
This point is also seen by his approval of the right of national judges to append individual opinions, 
because the individual opinions of judges are indispensable for checking their impartiality: 
'[T]he dissenting opinions may have the advantage of checking manifestly partisan dissent by at least 
compelling the national judge to produce the reasons for dissent and by exposing the dissenter to the criticism 
consequent upon the weakness or fiivolity of any such dissent. ... [T]here devolves upon international lawyers 
a distinct duty to examine the dissenting opinions, with due respect and without any implication of motives, 
but with a determination to call attention, if and when occasion mises, to any improper use of this right '37 
It is not enough, therefore, to discuss the problem of impartiality. It is necessary to pay attention to 
the problem oflegal reasoning in order to discuss the legitimacy of judicial decision. 
6.2. THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL REASONING 
Lauterpacht adhered to the problem of legal reasoning from his early academic career. Indeed, as 
discussed in chapter 2, private law analogy is nothing but 'the role of "reason" in the treatment of 
the positive material'38 from the viewpoint of the development of international law. As Rosenne 
correctly points out, thus, in Lauterpacht's view, 'tl1e Comt, and that ultimately means its individual 
members, has a role to play, amounting to a duty, in the development of the law, which he regarded 
as one of the most important conditions of the continued successful functioning and jurisdiction of 
international tribunals.' This duty of judge is 'the exhaustiveness of judicial reasoning. '39 
Lauterpacht did not change his adherence to the problem of legal reasoning after he was elected as 
36 Lauterpacht/Development-II/40. 
37 Lauterpacht!Function/234. 
38 Nussbaum/1947/275. 
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a Judge of the ICJ. Indeed, In the voting Procedure case, Lauterpacht said as follows: 
'Clearly, in order to reply to that question, the Court is botmd in the course of its reasoning to consider and to 
answer a variety of legal questions. TI1is is of the vel)' essence of its judicial function which makes it possible 
for it to render Judgments and Opinions which Cafl)' conviction and clarity the law. '40 
Thus, the problem of legal reasoning was for Lauterpacht the question of responsibility of 
international judges. This section discusses the questions of legal reasoning as the responsibility of 
judges. 
6.2.1. JUDICIALDISCRETION 
Lauterpacht tried to show how the international courts and tribmals interpret international law. His 
interest in the interpretation of international law is seen not only in his trilogy of international 
judicial functions, namely Analogies, Function and Development-!!, but also in his articles on the 
interpretation of international treaties, because the interpretation of treaties is one of the essential 
tasks of the Court. The interpretation of law is the judicial process of discovering the real meaning 
oflaw, whether international treaties, customary law or general principles oflaw. 
However, the problem is that the interpretation of law is not automatic. Judicial discretion is 
more or less necessary in the interpretation oflaw. This is so especially in hard cases where a ready-
made answer does not seem to exist at first sight. However, insofar as judicial discretion is allowed, 
judges can always find one correct answer in the interpretation of international law. It is the 
proposition of Lauterpacht' s theory of the completeness of international law. In this sense, the 
theory of the completeness of international law is the corollary of the theory of judicial discretion. 
Thus, there are three features in Lauterpacht' s theory of the completeness of international law: (1) 
39 Rosenne/1961/833. 
40 Laute:rpacht/ICJReps/1955/92-93. 
269 
the viewpoint of judge, (2) the frequent occurrence of hard cases, (3) the affirmation of judicial 
discretion governed by legal principles. These points are now discussed below. 
First, the completeness of international law cannot be discussed without the viewpoint of 
international judges. This point is clearly seen in the remark that 'once the parties have submitted a 
dispute for judicial detennination, the principle of the completeness of the legal order fully applies, 
with the result that all disputes thus submitted are capable of a legal solution. '41 If we ignore the 
centrality of international judges in Lauterpacht's theory, it would be easy to misunderstand the 
meaning of the completeness of international law. Teruo Komori, for example, is of the opinion that 
Lauterpacht should have discussed the completeness of international law as the substantial problem 
of the source of law, distinct from the procedural problem of the competence of international 
judges.42 What Komori fails to understand is that the substantial problem of the source oflaw in the 
view of Lauterpacht could not be separated from the procedural competence of international judges. 
Lauterpacht did not distinguish between them from the point of view of the gradual concretization 
of law. It was only possible for him to think that it was unavoidable for international judges to 
exercise law-making :fi.mction from the perspective ofKelsenian normativism. It is the reason why 
Lauterpacht linked the completeness of international law to the prohibition of the declaration of non 
liquet, which is essentially a problem for international judges. 
Secondly, Lauterpacht believed that hard cases were more usual than occasional on the 
international plane. He said, for example, that 'in the mcyority of cases international tribunals have 
been confronted with novel situations for which international law has had no ready-made solutions 
at hand. '43 Lauterpacht called such a phenomenon of hard cases 'the novelty of action.' The novelty 
of action occurs mainly because of the relative scarcity of judicial precedent, the absence of clear 
and ascertained rules, and the imbalance between the cause of action and the many cases of 
41 Lauterpacht/Development-II/5. 
42 Komori /2001/117-118. 
43 Lauterpacht/Function/1 05. 
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international problems.44 This situation does not change in the case of treaty interpretation: 'The 
treaty must be taken to have been made within the frame [sic] of international law, in relation to 
which the facts of the case may present an entirely novel situation. '45 Consequently, international 
judges necessarily use judicial discretion. Indeed, they have many occasions to use it. It is so even if 
treaty interpretation is the subject-matter of the dispute. Although he recognised the usefulness of 
the doctrine of plain meaning,46 the doctrine of plain meaning seemed to Lauterpacht to be enough 
to allow international judges to discover exactly what state parties agree. It is because the parties 
dispute the real meaning of the text in most cases, which means that the text is not clear at all, 
although the Court tends to say that the text is sufficiently clear.47 On the contrary, Lauterpacht 
emphasised the judicial discretion of judges to evaluate the evidence of the will of states. It is the 
reason Lauterpacht accentuated the preparatory work in the interpretation of treaties: 
'In the case of treaties the preparatory work is as a rule recorded, fonnal, authoritative, explicit, and continuous. 
If thoroughly studied, it permits the tracing of the development of a clause, in an illuminating chain of 
continuity, from the first instiuction to the delegate or from the first note initiating the correspondence to the 
final provision as adopted in the treaty. '48 
The will of states, furthermore, should be found in the background of general international law. It is 
because international treaties are embodied not only as the expression of the will of states but also 
as the will of the international community: 
44 Ibid/1 05-107. 
45 Ibid/1 09. 
46 Lauterpacht/1950fi'CP-IV/400-401. 
47 Ibid/397. However, William Beckett pointed out the political intention of a state to dispute the 
meaning of a treaty. 'It certainly happens that the meaning of a treaty provision is perfectly clear but 
that one or another party to the treaty has for one reason or another found provision inconvenient. 
The political position of the State concerned may be such that it can only give way on the basis of 
an international legal decision.' W./Beckett/1950/440. On the discussion between Lauterpacht and 
Beckett with regard to the interpretation of treaties, see Fitzrnaurice/1986/42-48. 
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'[I]t would be a mistake to asswne that the function of interpretation of treaties, consisting as it does in 
ascertaining what was the intention of the parties, is a process divorced from the application and development 
of customary international Jaw. The eliciting of the intention of the parties is not nonnally a task which can be 
perfonned exclusively by means oflogical or grammatical interpretation. As a rule, the established cannons of 
construction - which themselves partake of the nature of customary law - must be supplemented by the 
principle that when the intention of the parties is not clear it must be assumed that they intended a result which 
is in confonnity with general international Jaw. '49 
Therefore, Lauterpacht allowed judges to take the preparatory work into consideration as the use of 
judicial discretion in the interpretation of international law. In order to find the will of state parties, 
judges have to choose which general rules and principles of international law should be applicable 
to the case. Thus, they cannot help but use their discretionary power. Lauterpacht said that 'the 
selection of any particular rule, one of a nwnber of competing and occasionally mutually 
inconsistent rules, is necessarily a matter of discretion. '50 Judicial discretion always accompanies 
the interpretation oflaw: 
'When the Jaw is clear and non-controversial, judicial discretion is correspondingly circwnscribed within 
narrow limits. Even then it is fur from being wholly eliminated. '51 
This passage shows that Lauterpacht considered the judicial discretion to be essential to the 
interpretation of intemationallaw. Furthermore, judges are often asked to co-ordinate opposing 
values: 
'[E]ven in the absence of difficulties of that character, the Judge is often confronted with a choice between 
48 Lauterpacht/1935/576. 
49 Lauterpacht/Development-II/27-28. 
50 Lauterpacht/1949cJCP-IV/411. 
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conflicting and equally legitimate principles of interpretation. lt is his duty to give effect to the intention of the 
parties. But he is bound to interpret that intention in accordance with the paramount principle of good faith 
which demands that, again within the limits detennined by circumstances, the maximum of effect must be 
given to the instrument in which the parties have purported to create legal obligations. At the same time he 
must take into account the fuct that, especially in the international sphere, their intention may have been to 
create only a limited or even a nominal obligation. '52 
The Court frequently encounters situations where legal values are in conflict. As a result, 
Lauterpacht concluded that 'the International Court of Justice is not, as a rule, faced with situations 
which, upon examination, reveal a clear and obvious preponderance of the legal merits of the claim 
of one party as against that of the other. '53 
The third problem is whether or not judicial discretion is arbitrary. In other words, it is the 
question whether judicial discretion is free from law. The answer of Lauterpacht to the question is 
that judicial discretion is always regulated by law. 
'While all these considerations bring into relief the element of judicial discretion, they must not be allowed to 
obscure the fact- which is ultimately of oveniding importance -that such discretion is circwnscribed by the 
duty to apply the existing law and that it moves within the orbit of the tendencies, enshrined in precedent ' 54 
In this sense, Lauterpacht's conception of judicial discretion, if Dworkin's expression is used, is 
judicial discretion in the weak sense that 'for some reason the standards an official must apply 
cannot be applied mechanically but demand the use of judgement. '55 Judicial discretion in the weak 
sense has four implications. First, it presupposes that law is not only composed of rules but also 
51 Lauterpacht/Development-II/394. 
52 Ibid/396. 
53 !bid 
54 Ibid/399. 
55 Dworkin/1977/31. 
273 
------------·--------------
principles. Indeed, Lauterpacht's trilogy of judicial f1lllctions discusses how international judges 
apply legal principles to the case. Second, the exercise of judicial discretion is the application of 
legal norms, especially general principles, because law always governs judges. llird, there is 
always one right answer to a legal question. Fourthly, the judges are logically and legally prohibited 
to declare non liquet. We now discuss the first and second questions in the context of judicial 
legislation. 
6.2.2. THE APPLICATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES AS JUDICIAL LEGISLATION 
Although Lauterpacht regarded the exercise of judicial discretion as an application of legal 
principles, this exercise of judicial discretion for filling gaps in law is 'judicial legislation.' On this 
point, it should be noted that there are two views. The first view is, as some positivists claim, that 
judges create law as 'legislators' where they cannot find any applicable rules. There are two 
presuppositions for this view. First, it is assumed that international law is composed only of legal 
rules made by states. Secondly, this view distinguishes law-creation from law-application. 
According to this view, there are many gaps in the international legal order, and international judges 
must either declare non liquet or make law as legislators do in hard cases. Ryoichi Taoka, for 
example, said that 'if international judges are not allowed to have the competence to make 
judgements based on other than the existing law, and are imposed the strict limitation upon by 
arbitration treaties or compromises, or by the Statute in the case of the Permanent Court, they 
cannot help but declare their incompetence and abandon the settlement of the dispute. '56 However, 
this view tends to criticise judicial legislation, because the creation of law is not the task of 
international judges, but essentially the task of sovereign states as legislators. It is so even if judges 
prima facie apply legal principles to the disputes, because this view holds that the choice of 
principles is political rather than judicial. Law-creation, therefore, is exceptional to the judicial 
56 Taoka/1938/713. 
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courts apart form the case where the parties expressly authorise judges to do so. 
The second view is that judges do not act like legislators, although they in fact make law in 
their own way. According to the second view, judicial legislation is very normal as a judicial 
process. This view presupposes that international law is composed not only of the rules made by 
the states but also legal principles such as general principles of law or legal maxims, and that the 
task of the judges is not to legislate as legislators do, but to discover and apply law. Even when 
judges find it difficult to detect any applicable rule, they are always regulated by law, namely legal 
principles, and they have to exercise their discretion regarding the application of principles. The 
application of general principles, however, necessarily results in law-creation especially in hard 
cases. Therefore, law-creation by judges should be regarded as a proper judicial process. 
Lauterpacht held this second view. He admitted that judges have the competence to create 
individual norms. It is because he adopted Kelsenian normativism, especially the concept of the 
gradual concretization of law. For Kelsenian normativism, the application of general norms is the 
creation of individual norms at the same time: 
'A nonn regulating the creation of another nonn is "applied" in the creation of the other nonn. Creation of law 
is always application oflaw. These two concepts are by no means, as the traditional theory presumes, absolute 
opposites. . .. The creation of a legal nonn is - nonnally - an application of the higher nonn, regulating its 
creation, and the application of a higher nonn is- nonnally- the creation of a lower nonn detennined by the 
higher nonn. A judicial decision, e.g., is an act by which a general nonn, a statute, is applied but at the same 
time an individual nonn is created obligating one or both parties to the conflict. '57 
Lauterpacht also said that 'any apparent innovation [of law] is the result of nothing more daring 
than the application of a general principle of law or of a general legal maxim. '58 He continued that 
'[j]udiciallegislation, so long as it does not assume the form of a deliberate disregard of the existing 
57 Kelsen/1945/133. 
58 Lauterpacht/Development-II/15 5. 
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law, is a phenomenon ooth healthy and lillavoidable. '59 
The crux of the difference between the first view and the second view is whether or not the 
application of principles should be regarded as a proper judicial process. Both views recognise that 
the Court cannot act as a legislature. However, the first view sees even the application of principles 
as belonging to legislative activity. Prosper Weil, for example, recognises the application of general 
principles as judicial legislation. However, he denied it as proper judicial activity. For him, even 
judicial legislation as the result of the application of principles needs to be authorised by parties: 
'[W]henever states decide, by way of a special agreement, a compromissary clause, or otherwise, to ask for 
the judicial settlement of a dispute, they impose on the judge or arbitrator an obligation to settle the dispute. 
Therefore, ipso jwe they confer on. the tribunal the nonnative and quasi-legislative power necessary to 
produce that result. '60 
Judge Vereshchetin agrees with him as follows: 
'The Judgement of the Court in a contentious case is aimed at the settlement of a concrete dispute dividing 
concrete pruties. By its nature, it requires a ruling between "the right and the wrong." In this situation, proper 
administration of justice prompts the Court to seek eve1y possible way to overcome inconclusiveness which 
may exist in the legal regulation of the matter under consideration. '61 
However, the views of Weil and Vereschetin are contnuy to the experience of international 
adjudication. The Eastern Extension, Australasia and China Telegraph Company case between the 
United Kingdom and the United States in 1923 shows this point. The case was aoout whether the 
United States should compensate for the cutting of submarine telegraph cable during the American-
59 Ibid/156. 
60 Weil/1997/115. 
61 Vereshchetin/1999/540. 
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Spanish war. The problem is that even the British government accepted that there was no treaty nor 
customary law imposing on the United States the legal obligation to pay compensation for the 
cutting of these cable at that time. The tribunal, however, concluded as follows: 
'International law, as well as domestic law, may not contain, and generally does not contain, express rules 
decisive of particular cases; but the fi.mction of jurisprudence is to resolve the conflict of opposing rights and 
interests by applying, in default of any specific provision oflaw, the corollaries of general principles, and so to 
find - exactly as in the mathematical sciences - the solution of the problem. This is the method of 
jurisprudence; it is the method by which the law has been gradually evolved in every count!)' resulting in the 
definition and settlement oflegal relations as well between States as between private individuals.'62 
Consequently, the Tribunal rejected the claim ofthe British government that 'in the absence of any 
rule governing the matter of cable cutting, it is the duty of this Tribunal to frame a new rule.' The 
Tribunal declared as follows: 
'[T]he duty of the Tribunal, in our opinion, under article 7 of the Special Agreement, is not to lay down new 
rules. Such rules could not have retroactive effect, nor could they be considered as being anything more than a 
personal expression of opinion by members of a particular Tribunal, deriving its authority from only two 
Governments. '63 
The same attitude is seen in the case law of the Court as well. The Court recognises the 
application of principles as the proper judicial activity. In the Fisheries case, the Court declared that 
'[i]t does not at all follow that, in the absence of rules having the technically precise character 
alleged by the United Kingdom Government, the delimitation undertaken by the Norwegian 
Government in 1935 is not subject to certain principles which make it possible to judge as to its 
62 RIAA/vol.6/114-115. 
63 Ibid/118. 
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validity under international law.'64 In the North Sea Continental Shelf case, 'in which the 
International Court was faced with a situation of potential non liquet, '65 the Court said as follows: 
'[T]he legal situation ... is that the Parties are under no obligation to apply either the 1958 Convention, which 
is not opposable to the Federal Republic, or the equidistance method as a mandatory rule of customary law, 
which it is not But as between States face with an issue concerning the lateral delimitation of adjacent 
continental shelves, there are still rules and principles oflaw to be applied; and in the present case it is not the 
fact either that rules are lacking, or that the situation is one for the unfettered appreciation of the Parties. '66 
In the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, although it recognised that the law governing maritime 
delimitation was changing at that time, it was still possible for the Court to judge the legality of the 
unilateral extension of the fishery zone by Iceland without judicial legislation in the first sense. 
Indeed, the Court said that '[i]n the circumstances, the Court, as a court of law, cannot render 
judgement sub specie legis ferendae, or anticipate the law before the legislator has laid it down. '67 
International judges, therefore, clearly have regarded the application of principles as a proper 
judicial process. However, there are still some problems on the application of principles as judicial 
legislation. The first problem is the application of formal principles such as the adversary principle 
and the residual negative principle. It is generally said that the formal principles guarantee the 
completeness oflaw. Joseph Raz, for example, says that in the case that law is silent, 'closure rules 
[that whatever is not legally prohibited is legally permitted and vice versa], which are analytic truths 
rather than positive rules, come into operation and prevent the occurrence of gaps. '68 However, the 
application of fonnal principles does not justifY judicial discretion, because it means nothing but the 
defocto declaration of non liquet. Secondly, even if the formal completeness oflaw is inappropriate, 
64 ICJReps/1951/132. 
65 Fitzmaurice/1974a/107. 
66 ICJReps/1969/46/para.83. 
67 ICJReps/1974/23-24. 
68 Raz/1979/77. 
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the question still remains about how the material completeness of law is possible. The third 
problem is about the legal nature of the choice of principles; if judges choose the applicable 
principle without any standard, how is the choice of principle regarded as the proper judicial 
process? These are discussed regarding the application of these principles below. 
6.2.2.1. THEMAITEROFPRINCIPLES 
The conformity of judicial decision with legal principles is an important element in the matter of 
the legitimacy of judicial decision. Even a positivist like Neil MacCormick admits this point as the 
requirement of coherence: 'When problems of relevancy or of interpretation or of classification 
arise within the system, the requirement of coherence is satisfied only to the extent that novel 
rulings given can be brought within the ambit of the existing body of general legal principles. '69 
However, what types of legal principles are necessary to justifY judicial decision? There are two 
types oflegal principles applicable to hard cases: formal principles and material principles. 
Formal principles are technical and rather automatic principles for judges to decide the case. 
There are two types of formal principles: the adversary principle of judicial procedure and the 
residual negative principle. The adversary principle of judicial procedure is that 'unless the court 
finds that there is a rule of law supporting the Applicant's claim, judgement must be for the 
Respondent.'70 This method is logically very simple, and it is impossible for international judges to 
declare non liquet in a formal sense. The residual negative principle that sovereign states have 
freedom of action unless international law restricts such a freedom produces the same result as the 
adversary principle ofjudicial procedure. The residual negative principle is also sometimes used as 
justification of the formal completeness of international law, because if judges cannot find any 
restrictive rules, they can always declare that the activity of the defendant is lawful under 
international law. Hans Kelsen indicated that the application of fmmal principles is enough to 
69 MacCormick/1978/107. 
70 Stone/1959/134. 
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justi:fY a judicial decision: 
'lllat there is no rule referring to a case can only mean that there is no rule imposing upon a state (or another 
subject ofintemational law) the obligation to behave in this case in a certain way. He who assumes that in such 
a case the existing law cannot be applied ignores the fundamental principle that what is not legally forbidden 
to the subjects of the law is legally pennitted to them.'71 
Georg Schwarzenberger also held the same view that '[i]n the absence of any other applicable rule, 
it is always possible to decide a case in favour of the defendant, that is to say, on the presumption in 
favour of the freedom of States under intemationallaw. '72 
Although there is an opinion that it is irrelevant to distinguish between these two principles,73 
the difference between them is still theoretically useful with regard to legal justification. The 
difference between them is that while the adversary principle does not recognise the legality of the 
act or omission of the respondent, the residual negative principle presumes it. As Julius Stone 
explained, 
'A court's decision for a Respondent in a contentious proceeding on the ground that there is no rule of 
international law supporting the Applicant's claim (international law being completely silent on the particular 
matter) does not necessarily imply that the Respondent's behaviour was legally pennitted by international law. 
It could equally mean merely that it was legally neutral in relation to the law in question .... On the other hand, 
when the "residual negative principle" is invoked, that principle itself has the effect of rendering the 
Respondent's behaviour legally pennitted, for this principle is so far as it is adopted equivocates legal 
neutrality to legal permission.' 74 
71 Kelse:n/1966/439-440. 
72 Schwarzcnbt:rg~r/1960/234. 
73 Sugihara/1985/205. 
280 
Fitzmaurice also recognised this difference, though he observed the difference between the two 
principles were 'too subtle to have much practical importance in many situations. '75 
The adversary principle of judicial procedure was applied in the Savarkar case. In 1910, the 
British government sent, by steamship, a Btitish-Indian named Savarkar from England to India to 
be prosecuted for abetting a murder. The ship arrived at Marseilles on 7 July, and an authority of the 
French Police placed himself at the disposal of the Commander in respect of the watch to be kept 
However, next morning, Savarkar escaped from the ship and swam ashore, but was arrested by a 
brigadier ofthe French maritime gendarmerie who was not aware ofthe identity ofSavarkar. The 
French officer, who could not understand English, returned Savarkar to the British agents. On 9 
July, the ship left Marseilles with him on board. However, the French government did not approve 
of the manner in which these agents returned at Marseilles, and demanded the restitution of 
Savarkar to France, thougl1 the British government refused to do so. As a result, the governments 
agreed to submit this dispute to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. After examining the fact, the 
Tribunal quite simply said that '[w]hereas, while admitting that an irregularity was committed by 
the arrest of Savarkar, and by his being handed over to the British Police, there is no rule of 
International Law imposing, in circU111stances such as those which have been set out above, any 
obligation on the Power which has in its custody a prisoner, to restore him because of a mistake 
committed by the foreign agent who delivered him up to tlmt Power. '76 Therefore, the Tribunal 
decided the case in favour of the British government 
On the other hand, the residual negative principle was applied by the Petmanent Court in the 
Lotus case. In 1926, the French mail steamer Lotus collided with a Turkish collier on tl1e high seas. 
The Turkish ship sank, and eight Turkish nationals died. After tins collision, the Lotus arrived at 
Constantinople, and Turkish authority prosecuted the French officer of the Lotus on a charge of 
manslaughter. The Turkish crinllnal court sentenced him to eighty days' imprisonment and a fine. 
74 Stone/1959/136. Emphasis original. 
75 Fitzmaurice/1974al1 08. 
76 HAC/236. 
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However, the French govenunent protested against the arrest of the French officer and the 
jurisdiction of the Turkish criminal court. As the result of negotiations between two govenunents, 
they decided to submit to the Permanent Court of International Justice the question of which 
government had jurisdiction to prosecute the officer for the collision on the high seas. After stating 
that restrictions on the independence of states cannot be presumed because international law 
emanates from the free will of states, the Permanent Court continued, 
'[T]he first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that- failing the existence of 
a pennissive rule to the contrary - it may not exercise its power in any fonn in the territory of another State. In 
this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by 
virtue of a pennissive rule derived from a convention. It does not, howeve1~ follow that international law 
prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts 
which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some pennissive rule of international law. . .. 
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the application of their 
laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in 
certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which 
it regards as best and most suitable.'77 
Therefore, the question was whether there was a legal rule which restricted such a wide discretion 
of states. However, the French government failed to prove that such a prohibitive rule exists. 
Therefore, the Permanent Court concluded that Turkey had not acted contrary to international law. 
'No rugument has come to the knowledge of the Court from which it could be deduced that States recognize 
themselves to be under an obligation towards each other only to have regard to the place where the author of 
the offence happens to be at the time of the offence. On the contrary, ... the courts of many countries, ... , 
77 PCU/A/No.l0/18-19. 
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inte1pret criminal law in the sense that offences, the authors of which at the moment of commission are in the 
territory of another State, are nevertheless to be regarded as having been committed in the national tenitoty, if 
one of the constituent elements of the offence, and more especially its effects, have taken place there .... [T]he 
Court does not know of any cases in which governments have protested against the fact that the criminal law 
of some country contained a rule to this effect or that the courts of a country construed their criminal law in 
this sense. Consequently, once it is admitted that the effects of the offence were produced on the Turkish vessel, 
it becomes impossible to hold that there is a rule of international law which prohibits Turkey from prosecuting 
Lieutenant Demons because of the fuct that the author of the offence was on board the French ship. . .. [T]here 
is no reason preventing the Court from confining itself to observing that, in this case, a prosecution may also 
be justified from the point of view of the so-called tenitorial principles.' 78 
The application of fonnal principles may seem correct at first sight. However, there is a 
serious problem with reference to the application of fonnal principles. Gerald Fitzmamice pointed 
out that '[t]he truth is that the whole fonnal position turns in a circle, because it involves that since 
the absence, or seeming absence, of applicable substantive rules or principles cannot be allowed to 
prevent a decision being given, that the very absence must if necessary itself become the basis of 
the decision. '79 In other words, even if the international judges avoid the pronouncement of non 
liquet by using these fonnal principles, the application of these fonnal principles essentially 
amounts to the declaration of non liquet. 
This point does not change at all even if the residual negative principle allows judges to 
recognise the legal right of a respondent state. The residual negative principle is based on the 
assumption that the situation that international law does not prohibit an activity necessarily means 
that the activity is legal. However, this presumption is simply wrong, because 'being not prohibited' 
is not the same as 'being legal.' The fanner covers the two situations whereby the activity confonns 
to law, and the activity is not regulated by law. In both cases, the Court can declare that the activity 
78 PCU/A/No.I0/23. 
79 Fitzmamice/1974alll 0. 
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is not legally prohibited. On the other hand, 'being legal' means that the activity is justified by right 
or that the activity is justified by the conformity with legal obligations. However, 'being legal' 
excludes the case where there is neither a legal right nor a obligation, because the non-existence of 
law simply means that we cannot grasp a matter in legal terms. In this sense, the residual negative 
principle is a result of the confusion between 'being not prohibited' and 'being legal.' 
It is argued that freedom of action is justified by the principle of state sovereignty in the case 
where there is no positive international law. However, this view is also logically wrong. State 
sovereignty simply means 'legal authority which is not in law dependent on any .other earthly 
authority. '80 It is true that state sovereignty is the basis of some important principles, including the 
legal equality of sovereign states and the principle of non-intervention. However, the principle of 
state sovereignty does not necessarily allow all kinds of activity justified on the basis of freedom of 
action. Take the case of the exercise of domestic jurisdiction, which is the most typical case of 
freedom of action as state sovereignty. It is true that, as the Permanent Court said in the Lotus case, 
the principle of state sovereignty justifies a wide discretion to exercise jurisdiction in its own 
territory. In this context, the function of the principle of state sovereignty is to permit states to 
exercise domestic jurisdiction on their own territory. However, the question whether the exercise of 
jurisdiction is opposable to other states in the international plane, namely the principle of state 
sovereignty as the power-conferring norm for states to produce the obligations of other states, is 
quite another matter. The exercise of state jurisdiction does not automatically mean that it has 
international legal validity at the same time. Indeed, in its jurisprudence, the Court clearly 
distinguishes between these two questions. In the Fisheries case, the Court said: 
'The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the will 
of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true that the act of delimitation is 
necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the 
80 Oppenheim-Jennings/Watts/122. 
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delimitation with regard to other States depends upon international law. '81 
In the Nottebohm case, the Court also concluded as follows: 
'International practice provides many examples of acts performed by States in the exercise of their domestic 
jurisdiction which do not necessarily or automatically have international effect, which are not necessarily and 
automatically binding on other States or which are binding on them only subject to certain conditions: this is 
the case, for instance, of a judgement given by the competent court of a State which it is sought to invoke in 
another State. '82 
These statements show that the principle of state sovereignty does not function as the power-
conferring rule which gives a state the power to obligate other states. In other words, the principle 
of state sovereignty is not enough legal justification to other states insofar as the opposability of 
domestic law is concerned. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the Lotus judgement has less authority to justifY the 
residual negative principle. The judgement was given by the casting vote of the President in the 
situation that votes of judges were divided between 6 and 6. As already noted, the Court itself does 
not follow the Lotus judgement as far as the problem of the opposability of the exercise of domestic 
jurisdiction is concerned. It is only in the Lotus case that the Court said that the exercise of the 
domestic jurisdiction 'necessarily and automatically' has international effect, which obligates other 
states to recognise such an exercise of the domestic jurisdiction. Finally, the international 
community adopted the contrary rule to the judgement in the multilateral treaties such as the 1952 
Brussels Convention, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the 1982 UNCLOS. 
Nevertheless, some lawyers, including Judge Guillaume, argue that the Court admits the 
--------------
81 ICJReps/1951/132. 
82 ICJReps/1955/21. 
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residual negative principle in the Nicaragua case.83 It is true that in the context of the annaments of 
the Nicaraguan government, the Court says that 'in international law there are no rules, other than 
such rules as may be accepted by the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of 
armaments of a sovereign State can be limited, and this principle is valid for all States without 
exception. '84 However, it is also clear that this statement neither recognises the legal right of 
Nicaragua to procure its armament, nor the legal obligation of the United States to recognise the 
armed position ofNicaragua. What the Court says is simply that '[i]t is irrelevant and inappropriate, 
in the Court's opinion, to pass upon this allegation of the United States [that the militarisation of 
Nicaragua proves its aggressive intent]. '85 In other words, the Court declines to examine the claim 
of the United States with regard to the legal meaning of the armament ofNicaragua In this sense, 
this statement is not the expression that the Court accepts the residual negative principle. 
The formal principles, therefore, are not appropriate to justifY a judicial discretion. In 
Lauterpacht' s words, 
'[A] rigid application of tests based on these fonnal principles [the adversary principle and the residual 
negative principle] may, by reducing the activity of the judge to a merely automatic function, defeat the very 
end of law. Undoubtedly it secures what may be called the fonnal justiciability of disputes, inasmuch as it 
produces a judicial pronouncement on the legal merits of any claim whatsoever submitted to a Court. But at 
the same time it may make us forget that the necessary aim of any legal system is also material completeness. 
In order to achieve that material completeness the judge must consider not only the letter of the law, but also its 
spirit and purpose. '86 
83 Guillaume/ICJReps/1996-I/291-292/paralO. Also see Thirlway/1989/77; Akande/1997/212-
215. 
&I ICJReps/1986/135/para269. 
85 !bid 
86 Lauterpacht/Function/85-86. 
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In this sense, Lauterpacht was reluctant to admit the formal completeness of intemationallaw,87 
although some lawyers mistook his conception of the completeness of international law for the 
formal one. Taoka, for example, misunderstood the meaning of the completeness of international 
law. He criticised Lauterpacht on the grounds that that the completeness of international law was 
simply the formal one, so that international tribunals could not effectively settle international 
disputes.88 However, if his conception of the completeness of international law is simply formal, 
Lauterpacht could not insist on the role of international judges to develop international law. 
Fitzmaurice pointed out as follows: 
'Lauterpacht believed that an international legal tribunal could always resolve a dispute positively, so far as its 
legal aspects were concerned, and not merely by the negative process of rejecting a claim or complaint on the 
ground of the supposed absence oflegal rules. He believed tlus could be done by the application of general 
principles oflaw, if necessary of private law. '89 
Lauterpacht was reluctant to accede to Kelsen's position with regard to the formal completeness of 
law, although he accepted Kelsenian normativism. It is because Lauterpacht disagreed with Kelsen 
with regard to the separation thesis between law and morality. For Kelsen, who is a formalist par 
excellence, a legal system is closed to morality. Even in hard cases, judges have to apply nothing 
but existing legal nonns. Therefore, Kelsen denied the judicial transformation of morality into law: 
'The assumption that the law-applying organs are authorized to fill such gaps, by applying to the particular 
case norms other than those of existing conventional or customary international law, implies that the law-
applying organs have the power to create new law for a concrete case if tl1ey consider the application of 
existing law as unsatisfactol)'. From the point of view of legal positivism, such a law-creating power must be 
87 Also see Lauterpacht/1955/CP-W275. 
88 Taoka/1938/705-706. 
89 Fitzmaurice/1986/649. 
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based on a rule of positive international law. Whether there exits such a rule of general international law is 
doubtful, although many writers take it for granted 1hat there are gaps in existing international law, and that 1he 
states or international agencies competent to apply international law are au1horized to fill these gaps. '90 
For Lauterpacht, on the other hand, a legal system is open to morality. It is the reason for 
Lauterpacht's emphasis on the imJX>rtance of general principles of law, which is 'an expression of 
what has been described as socially realisable morality, ' 91 in the completeness of international law, 
though he admitted that 'the main function of "general principles of law'' has been that of a safety 
valve to be kept in reserve rather than a source of law of frequent application. '92 
The notion of the material completeness of law may be explained by the English tradition of 
international law. John Fisher Williams, for example, explained the completeness of international 
law in the context of English legal history: 
'The law of our ancestors, in the time, Jet us say, ofEdward I, seems to a modem reader of legal history so 
imperfect that one of the questions which he is constantly asking himself is how it ever was possible for 
reasonable men to be content with such a system. But no one ever suggested that the judges of that day could 
not decide the cases submitted to 1hem, 1here being perhaps then a lively sense even in domestic matters of the 
paramount importance of the King's Peace. And it would be a mistake to exaggerate the importance of the 
gaps, even in this sense, in international law. '93 
James Brierly also affirmed that 'no system of law consists only of formulated rules, for these can 
never be sufficiently detailed or sufficiently foreseeing to provide for every situation that may call 
for a legal decision; those who administer law must meet new situations not precisely covered by a 
formulated rule by resorting to the principle which medieval writers would have called natural law, 
90 Kelsen/1966/439. 
91 Lauterpacht/Development-II/172. 
92 Ibid/166. 
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and which we generally call reason. '94 TI1erefore, Brierly also denied the admissibility of the 
declaration of non liquet: 
'It [the pronouncement of non liquet] does not arise, because international law, like any other system oflaw, is, 
in a formal, though of course not in any other, sense a "petfecf' system; it can provide a solution for any issue 
submitted to a court, and it can do this because it accepts the practice by which the judge is required to ''find" a 
rule oflaw which is applicable to the case before him. '95 
Their agreement on the material completeness of law is not coincidental; they were inspired by the 
common law tradition, one feature of which is faith in judges. Roscoe Pound proclaimed the 
superiority of the common law tradition as follows: 
'Where such a doctrine obtains, not merely the interpretation and application of legal rules but in large 
measure the ascertainment of them must be left to the disciplined reason of the judges, and we must find in the 
criticism of the reported decision by bench and bar in other cases our assurance that they will be governed by 
reason and that the personal equation of the individual judge will be suppressed. The vitality of the common 
law and the steady increase in the value attributed to judicial decisions in the rest of the world attest the 
soundness of this expectation. We have, then, the means of progress in our law to begin with, where the rest of 
the world is struggling to attain it '96 
In this sense, Lauterpacht's concept of material completeness of law comes from the English 
school of international law. 
It is still undeniable, however, that Lauterpacht's conception of the completeness oflaw was 
influenced by Kelsenian normativism. This point is evident in his discussion on the decision ex 
93 Fisher/Williams/1929/51. 
'14 Brierly/1963/66. 
95 Ibid/68. 
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aequo et bono. The decision based on ex aequo et bono for Lauterpacht was a part of the judicial 
function, since the common will of state parties should be regarded as law, even though the 
international judges cannot decide a case ex aequo et bono without the common will of state 
parties: 
'So long as the Court does not arrogate for itself the right of deciding ex aeqWJ et bono, but acts in this capacity 
at the express wish of the parties, that envisaged in the opening paragraph of Article 3 8 of the Statute in which 
the Court is authorized to apply "international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting States." Given such an agreement, the decision rendered will, it is 
submitted without diffidence, be a strictly legal one. It will be a decision given in accordance with rules agreed 
upon by the parties. ,m 
This remark clearly shows that Lauterpacht adopted Kelsenian normativism, especially the 
gradual concretization of law. The gradual concretization of law explains the legal validity of 
individual norm derived from general norm from the point of view of competence. The validity of 
the individual norm which somebody creates is deduced from the higher norm that gives him the 
competence to create the norm. Therefore, according to Kelsenian normativism, the validity of the 
decision ex aequo et bono can be explained by the authorisation of parties to give the Court the 
competence to do so. 
However, Lauterpacht failed to make more accurate the decision ex aequo et bono. He 
confused the validity of the decision ex aequo et bono with the problem oflegitimacy. Although the 
Permanent Court said that 'even assuming that it were not incompatible with the Court's Statute for 
the Parties to give the Court power to prescribe a settlement disregarding rights recognized by it 
and taking into account considerations of pure expediency only, such power, which would be of an 
absolutely exceptional character, could only be derived from a clear and explicit Special 
----·---- -------------------------
96 Pound/1922/183. 
97 Lauterpacht!Function/317. 
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Agreement' in the Free Zone case,98 the Court does not intetpret the will of states as considerations 
which the Court should take into accmmt for the decision ex aequo et bono. The authorisation of 
parties to ask judges to decide ex aequo et bono belongs to the matter of the procedure which the 
Court should act in accordance with as the condition of the validity of the decision. It is not a matter 
of the substantial questions to which the Court should reply as the condition of the objectivity of the 
decision. The following passage clearly demonstrates Lautetpacht's view: 
'Upon, analysis, it is not accurate to say that, in cases of a decision ex aequo et bono rendered in pursuance of 
the wish of the parties, the Court creates new contractual rights and duties as distinguished from a regulation 
of already existing rights and duties. These rights and duties are already contained in nuce in the very 
agreement conferring upon the Court jurisdiction ex aequo et bono. The Court gives flesh and bones to this 
agreement'99 
However, the authorisation of parties to confer upon the Court the power to decide ex aequo et 
bono is different from the indication of considerations as the basis of decision ex aequo et bono. 
This problem is serious in the context of judicial discretion, because it shows that Lautetpacht 
failed to explain why the use of judicial discretion, at least insofar as the decision ex aequo et bono 
is concerned, is a part of the proper judicial ftmction. What the Court is given by the parties is the 
competence to decide ex aequo et bono, not the practical considerations which the Court should 
rely on, although the patiies can separately indicate the considerations which the Court should take 
into account Consequently, since there would be no substantial criteria for the Court, discretion in 
the case of the decision ex aequo et bono necessarily becomes wider than judicial discretion in the 
intetpretation of international law. It is true that Lauterpacht accepted this point, writing that 
' [A ]n authorization to decide ex aequo et bono imposes upon the Court a heavier and more responsible task 
98 PCDIA/No.24/10. 
99 Lautetpacht/Function/318. 
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than that involved in the interpretation or application of a single rule of conventional or customary 
international Jaw. It obligates the Court to have regard to a variety of factors which it would not have to 
consider otherwise.' 100 
However, he continued as follows: 
'Even in interpreting and applying concrete legal rules the Court does not act as automatic slot-machine, 
tota!Iy divorced from the social and political realties of the international community. It exercises in each case a 
creative activity, having as its background the entirety of international law and the necessities of the 
international law. The distinction between the making of the Jaw by judges and by the legislature is upon 
analysis one ofdegree.' 101 
This remark shows that Lauterpacht misapprehended the difference between the decision based 
on law and the decision ex aequo et bono. For him, even the decision ex aequo et bono is the 
application of law: 'An international tribunal asked to act as a legislator is in effect asked to apply, 
not rules of arbitrary discretion, but the higher law of international justice and solidarity.' 102 
However, it is utterly unclear what 'the higher law of international justice and solidarity' is. In this 
sense, Lauterpacht obscured the difference between the decision under Article 38 (1) of the Statute 
and the decision ex aequo et bono under Article 38 (2) by describing even the latter as the 
application of law. 103 It is so even though he disagreed with Judge Kellogg who denied the 
competence of the Court under Article 38 (2).104 
100 Lauterpacht/Function/319. 
101 !bid 
102 lbid/325. 
103 Kelsen also could not distinguish between the application of general principles of law under 
Article 38 (1) of the Statute and a decision ex aequo et bono under Article 38 (2). Kelsen/1943/406. 
104 Judge Kellogg said that 'it is not, in my opinion, possible to hold that the provision contained in 
Article 36 of the Statute of the Court to the effect thatthe Court;s jurisdiction "comprises all cases 
which the Parties refer to it" authorizes this Court to take jurisdiction of purely political questions 
and decide them upon considerations of political and economic expediency as an amiable 
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Thus, Lauterpacht did not distinguish the nature of the decision ex aequo et bono in the two 
senses. First, he did not explain the legal nature of the decision ex aequo et bono by confusing 
between the validity of decision (the problem of the competence of the Court) and the legitimacy of 
decision (the problem of the reasoning in the decision). Second, even if it is assumed that he 
succeeded in proving that the decision ex aequo et bono is a part of the judicial function in the sense 
that the Court should apply 'the higher law of the international justice and solidarity' as judicial 
discretion, it would be more difficult for him to distinguish between the decision based on law and 
the decision ex aequo et bono. If the decision ex aequo et bono is justified as a judicial process, it 
would be meaningless that Article 38 (2) of the Statute requires the state parties to give the Court 
their special consent for the decision ex aequo et bono. In this sense, the decision ex aequo et bono 
should not be regarded as a nonnal judicial process. The crux of Article 38 (2) is that the Court 
could decide a case with equity contra legem or equity praeter legem, subject to the common 
consent of parties. Indeed, the Chamber in Frontier Dispute case identifies the decision ex aequo et 
bono as the application of equity contra legem and equity praeter legem: 
'Since the Parties have not entmsted it with the task of canying out an adjustment of their respective interests, 
it must also dismiss any possibility of resorting to equity contra legem. Nor will the Chamber apply equity 
1 ,105 praeter tegem. 
In other words, Article 38 (2) allows the Court to refer to political considerations which are different 
from the legal considerations under Article 38 (1 ). However, why did Lauterpacht fail to conceive 
the difference between two types of argumentation? 
This point is again explained by the gradual concretization oflaw. For Kelsenian nonnativism, 
legislation is not different from judicial process in the sense that the creation of an individual nonn 
is the result of the application of general nonn. The difference between legislation and judiciary is 
----------- ·------------------------
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just a matter of degree. This presupposes that even legislators apply legal principles for the creation 
oflaw: 
'Legislation is creation oflaw, but taking into account the constitution, we fmd that it is also application oflaw. 
In any act oflegislation, where the provisions of the constitution are observed, the constitution is applied.' ICK> 
This statement shows a blurring of the distinction between legislature and judiciary with regard to 
the application of principles. In other words, Kelsenian normativism concentrates too much on 
'law.' However, even if Lauterpacht thought that whatever judges do is 'legal,' the doubt about the 
objectivity of legal reasoning still remains especially in the context of the choice of principles, 
because principles can conflict with each other. Consequently, the problem occurs whether or not 
the choice of principles is objective. Lauterpacht admitted that 'even in the absence of difficulties of 
that character, the judge is often confronted with a choice between conflicting and equally 
legitimate principles of interpretation.' 107 However, if judges choose a principle applicable to the 
subject matter, among conflicting principles without any standard, can such a choice of a principle 
be seen as free from arbitrariness? Indeed, it is the reason Stone criticised Lauterpacht for the choice 
of principle as law-creation: 
'[I]t is a juristic commonplace that the main judicial problem springs from the fact that opposed decisions can 
usually be attached to different principles; and, indeed, often to the same principle by reason of its ambiguity, 
circuitry or indeterminacy. Nothing in these competing starting-points themselves can direct the court which of 
them is the correct one, that is, the correct principle or version of a principle to choose for the instant case. That 
choice finally is the court's choice, a law-creating choice, however much it be concealed by the form of logical 
deduction from the prindple finally chosen.' 108 
106 Kelsen/1945/133. 
107 Lauterpacht/Development-W395. 
108 Stone/1959/133. 
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On this point, Lauterpacht answered as follows: 
'That choice [of principles] can be made only after conscientious and exhaustive scrutiny; even then the 
decision, when made, is not invariably accompanied by any feeling of inevitability. The only sentiment that 
can be registered with confidence is that the decision is accompanied by a consciousness of duty 
performed.' 109 
When do we feel that the duty is performed? According to Lauterpacht, it is performed insofar as 
judges 'balance the conflicting or competing legal considerations - all of which are relevant to the 
case and all of which, though in different degrees, are worthy of consideration.' 110 However, judges 
have to accomplish their responsibility 'within the orbit of the tendencies, enshrined in precedent.' 
Therefore, he said that '[s]ubject to that overriding primacy of the existing law, they [the tendencies 
in precedent] bring to mind the fact that the necessity of a choice between conflicting legal claims is 
of the very essence of the judicial function, whether within the State or in the international 
sphere.' Ill 
Drencho Georgiev tries to defend this position from the point of view of legitimacy, though he 
admits that the choice of principles is 'politics within law': 
'Legitimacy, understood as conformity with the general principles a/law, is a concept which- I claim-
addresses issues within law. If the general principles of international law are recognized as valid, albeit in some 
cases indeterminate, rules of law and not merely of justice or politics, their inten-elations and their relations 
with other rules of international law are entirely in its own sphere and not somewhere outside it ... Answering 
the question about the legitimacy of a rule or of behaviour will involve, however, making choices and 
109 Lauterpacht/Development -li/396. 
110 !bid 
Ill Jbid/399. 
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constructing solutions which have to confmm with contradicting and indetenninate principle. Therefore, these 
choices and solution could be called "political." Even so, this would be politics within law, politics which 
would not be sheer unrestrained arbitnuy power. It would not be "subjective" politics destroying the 
"objectivity" of international law but a process of "politicisation" of law (and pemaps of "legalisation" of 
politics) which aims at solving the contradictions within international law and enhancing its pertinence for an 
international rule of law.' 112 
The similarity between Lauterpacht and Georgiev is apparent. It is true that Georgiev emphasises 
that the choice of principles is 'political' in the sense that it involves a value judgement, though 
Lauterpacht, on the other hand, accentuated the judicial responsibility for taking all legal elements 
into consideration. However, both consider that the choice of principles is legitimate as judicial 
process insofar as the decision confonns with principles. For them, the choice of principles is not an 
arbitrary process at all. 
It is clear, nevertheless, that judicial responsibility or 'politics within law' is not a sufficient 
answer to the question proposed by Stone, because Stone's view is based on the assumption that 
there is no correct answer in hard cases: 'Nothing in these competing starting-points themselves can 
direct the court which of them is the con-ect one, that is, the correct principle or version of a 
principle to choose for the instant case.' 113 Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to the problem 
of the One Right Answer thesis in order to answer the question whether or not the choice of 
principles is arbitrary. 
6.2.2.2. THE ONE RIGHT ANSWER THESIS 
l11e One Right Answer thesis means that there is always a correct answer to a legal question even 
in a hard case where there seems to be no applicable rule at first sight. The doctrine of the 
112 Georgiev/1993/13-14. Emphasis original. 
113 Stone/1959/133. 
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completeness of international law presupposes the One Right Answer thesis. The completeness of 
international law would be impossible, if there is no correct answer to a legal question in a hard 
case. The completeness of international law would be also meaningless, if there are some legally 
correct answers at the same time. Lauterpacht talked about the One Right Answer thesis in the 
context of the interpretation of international treaties: 
'[A]Ithough there are many possible interpretations of a disputed provision there is in theory- in what is 
believed to be the accurate legal theory- only one correct interpretation of the law. The balance in favour of 
that correct interpretation may be indeed slight and the merits of alternative interpretation may be considerable, 
but to say that in every case there are a number of equally correct legal interpretations and that the choice 
between them is -legitimately, avowedly, and consciously - the result of a political decision and of political 
predilections of the judge is to put forward an assertion which denies the very essence of the judicial function 
in a society under the rule oflaw.' 114 
However, there is one question about the One Right Answer thesis. If there were some equally 
persuasive answers at the same time, how could we find the right answer to the question? There 
may be two criteria for measuring the correctness of the answer: (1) the extra-legal or political 
correctness of judicial decisions, and (2) the intra-legal or moral correctness of judicial decision. 
The extra-legal or political coiTectness of judicial decisions, including advisory opinions, is 
essentially a problem of the post-adjudicative phase. If the answer of judges to a legal question does 
not settle the dispute between states, in other words, the dispute still continues regardless of the 
judicial decision, the answer itself seems not to be legally correct. On the other hand, the intra-legal 
or moral correctness of judicial decision is somewhat obscure in the sense of the conformity of the 
legal answer with the sense of justice. 
The political correctness of judicial decisions is essentially a problem in the post-adjudicative 
114 Lauterpacht/1949c/CP-N/443. 
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phase. The non-compliance of the decisions shows that the state parties are not satisfied with the 
legal answer given by the Court. Consequently, the legal answer would be ineffective in the 
situation that the enforcement mechanism of the judicial decisions is very limited. In other words, 
the effectiveness of judicial decision is dependent on the degree of the satisfaction of the state 
parties, which itself is not a legal question, but a political one. Insofar as the decision has binding 
force between the state parties, the non-compliance of a state party with the decision legally 
constitutes the breach of the obligation imposed on the state parties to comply with the decision. 
There is legally no room for the state parties to disregard the decision apart from the case that a 
party challenges the legal validity of the decision. In this sense, the effectiveness of a legal answer is 
essentially political insofar as the non-compliance with judgement is dependent on the satisfaction 
of the state parties. 
However, non-compliance of the state with a judicial decision at the same time involves the 
legal aspect of the correctness of the answer. According to the view that affirms the political 
correctness of the judicial decision, the purpose of intemationallaw is to regulate the activity of the 
sovereign states. However, the effectiveness of international law is very dependent on the voluntru.y 
compliance of the states in the international community. Therefore, according to this view, the 
answer which does not satisfY states is also legally incorrect With regard to the Legality ofNuclem' 
Jteapons case, Judge Vereshchetin expresses this view, when he says that 'the Court must be 
concerned about the authority and effectiveness of the "deduced" general rule with respect to the 
matter on which the States are so fi.mdamentally divided.' 115 Judge Vereshchetin clearly thinks that 
there is a legal lacuna with regard to the problem of nuclear weapons, and that tl1e judicial decision 
to fulfil gaps would be legally wrong, because states with nuclear weapons are highly likely not to 
respect the Court's answer, even if the Court answers that the use of the nuclear weapons is not 
generally but absolutely illegal. Daniel Bodansky also stallds this position: 
115 VereshchetiniiCJReps/1996/281. 
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'In contrast to the domestic sphere, international society lacks the common culttrre and traditions that help 
instil confidence in international judges and their ruling. As a result, the persuasiveness and legitimacy of 
international tribunals depend to a greater extent on the degree to which their decisions simply give effect to 
existing nonns, which the parties themselves have accepted.' 
He :further continues that '[g]iven the lack of enforcement mechanisms, an international rule is 
likely to be durable only if it successfully accommodates the competing interests involved.' 116 
Lauterpacht clearly denied the effectiveness of legal decisions as the criterion for the 
correctness of the answer: 
'It is tempting to judge the notion of completeness of the law by its capacity to remove political "tensions" 
between States. The latter test has all the attractions of the recurrent tendencies to what has been described as 
realism. However, it is not the fimction of courts to elinlinate any particular cause of fiiction between the 
parties to a dispute- except in so far as tension can be removed, or reduced, by the realization that legal justice 
has been done and that a decision has been reached by a method more objective than the ipse dixit of an 
interested party. The question whether the existing law is satisfactory from the point of view of taking into 
account political or economic interests in accordance with justice and reason has nothing to do with its 
completeness.' 117 
It was correct for Lauterpacht not to consider 'its capacity to remove political ''tensions" 
between States' when he discussed the completeness of international law, because the view that the 
correctness of the legal answer is measured by the effectiveness of judicial decisions is harmful to 
the legitimacy of international courts. First, if the legal correctness of the answer is subject to the 
political satisfaction of the states, the impartiality of judges will be damaged, because if they pay 
much attention to the degree of the satisfaction of state parties, they become mere conciliators in the 
116 Bodansky/1999/169. 
117 Lauterpacht/1958/CP-ll/217. 
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best case, or flatterers in the worst case. Although it is true that the judges can play a role of 
conciliators with the authorisation of the state parties under Article 38 (2) of the Statute, however, 
such a role is exceptional in the interpretation oflaw as the crux of judicial fimction. 
Secondly, the effectiveness of the legal answer given by judges is the problem of the 
willingness of states to abide by the decision. In a sense, the question whether or not the state will in 
fact comply with the decision is the political matter decided by governments, as the United States 
did in the Nicaragua case, even if judges claim that the governments should legally respect the 
judicial decision. In such a case, what the judges can do is to treat non-compliance as a breach of 
the obligation imposed on states. In this sense, it is illogical and irrelevant to say that judges should 
be more concerned about the actual effectiveness of the decision. Judges cannot help but act on the 
assumption that states will comply with their decision. As it is inappropriate for legalism to try to 
invade the sphere of politics, it is also inappropriate for judges to introduce politics into legal 
matters. 
The case law of the International Courts affirms this point The Permanent Court said in the 
Wimbledon case: 
'TI1e Court does not award interim interest at a higher rate in the event of the judgement not being complied 
with at the expiration of the tinle fixed for compliance. The Court neither can nor should contemplate such a 
contingency.' 118 
The Permanent Court restated, in the Chorz6w Factory case, that '[t]he Court must also draw 
attention in this connection to what it has already said in Judgement No. I to the effect that it neither 
can nor should contemplate the contingency of the judgement not being complied with at the 
expiration of the time fixed for compliance.' 119 The Court also kept the same position in the 
118 PCU/ A/No.l/32. 
119 PCIJ/ A/No.l7 /63. 
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Nicaragua (JW"isdiction and Admissibility) case. 120 
It could be argued that the advisory opinions are very different from the judgements with 
regard to binding force, and that the Court should be conscious of the effectiveness of the opinion 
even if the Court 'neither can nor should contemplate the contingency of the judgement not being 
complied with' in contentious cases. However, this view completely misses the point that advisory 
opinion is simply 'advisory.' It is purported not to restrict the activity of the international 
organisation which asks the Court about legal matters~ the international organisation is legally 
allowed to decide whether or not it accepts the advisory opinion.121 If the Court needs to take 
compliance with advisory opinion into consideration, the Court should be more concerned with the 
legitimacy of advisory opinion, because compliance with the advisory opinion can be expected 
only in the situation that the member states regard it as the authoritative declaration of international 
law. As Judge Wmiarski said in the Peace Treaties case: 
'Opinions are not fonnally binding on States nor on the organ which requests them, they do not have the 
authority of res judicata, but the Court must, in view of its high mission, attribute to them great legal value and 
a moral authority. This being the case and if tatwn vlavet quatwn valvet ratio, the Court, as a judicial organ, 
will stnround itself with every guarantee to ensure thorough and impartial examination of the question.' 122 
1bis is actually the case in the Court's experience. The intra-legal or moral correctness of a legal 
answer is indispensable to the balancing process of the relative nonnativity of principles. Even if 
principles conflict with each other, judges can choose an applicable principle, and finally find an 
answer, by appreciating the normativity of competing principles. Patrick Capps explains this 
weighing process of principles in the context ofK.ant's conception of the conflict of duties: 
120 ICJReps/1984/437-438/para.lOI. 
121 Hambro/1954117. 
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'Each moral obligation has a no!Tilative force which provides a justification for a particular rule. By weighing 
and balancing the relative no!Tilative force of the competing moral principles, it can be ascertained which rules 
should be applied and followed.' 123 
In other words, the norrnativity of law is nothing but the moral justifiability of legal norms. The 
balancing process of normativity of principles accompanies the ascertainment which principle is 
more consistent with morality than others. 
Lauterpacht clearly adopted the moral justifiability of legal norms. Equity for him is a legal 
concept and a source of law. He said that ' [ e ]quity, in its wider sense as connoting ideas of fairness, 
good faith and moral justice, is a source of international law to the not inconsiderable extent to 
which it may be regarded as forming part of general principles of law recognized by civilized 
States.' 124 In other words, equity is a relevant legal consideration for deciding one correct answer. In 
the context of the One Right Answer thesis in the interpretation of treaties, Lauterpacht said, 
'Undoubtedly, the judicial choice of the standard of interpretation may be influenced by a variety of factors 
seemingly extraneous to the text. But these factors - such as considerations of justice, canons of fairness and 
good faith, and, in proper cases, an equitable reconciliation of the interests at stake - are of legitimate legal 
relevance. They do not obliterate the borderline between the function of the judge and the powers of the 
Indeed, the Court weighs the normativity of competing principles in terms of equity. The following 
statement ofthe Court in the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case clearly shows this point: 
'Equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the idea of justice. The Court whose task is by definition to 
123 Capps/200111024. 
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adnllnister justice is botmd to apply it.. .. Moreover, when applying positive intemational law, a cowt may 
choose among several possible intetpretations of the law the one which appears, in the light of the 
circumstances of the case, to be closest to the requirements of justice.' 126 
Equity in this sense is called equity infra legem in the Frontier Dispute case. The Chamber says that 
'it will have regard to equity il?fra lege m, that is, that form of equity which constitutes a method of 
interpretation of the law in force and is one of its attributes.' 127 These statements of the Court show 
that even if there are competing principles, the Court can find the one correct answer to a legal 
question with equity il?fra legem. 
Lauterpacht and the Court apparently presumed that the conformity of legal answer with 
equity or good faith legitimates the decision. There is, nevertheless, a problem about recourse to 
equity il?fra legem within legal interpretation. Martti Koskenniemi, for example, criticises recourse 
to equity as follows: 
'[R ]ecourse to equity (in its different forms) was, it seemed, in contradiction with the ideal of the Rule of Law. 
What was equitable seemed to depend on evaluative choices which were defined as subjective and arbitrruy 
by the law's self-constitutive assumptions. Equity challenged the formality, generality and neutrality of the 
legal process. Recourse to it re-emerged the problem of uncertainty and the rear of political abuse which it was 
the nlltno'lP. nfthP RJIIP nfl <>wt" rli"tv\"P "f' 128 
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1bis statement presupposes that law is objective in the sense that it is independent of the subjective 
sense of judges, and that recourse to equity is subjective as the personal sense of justice. 1bis 
assumption is simply wrong, because legal practice, including recourse to equity, is a human 
126 ICJReps/1982/60/para. 71. 
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activity, which illlavoidably involves the subjective views of lawyers. 129 However, this point does 
not mean that recourse to equity is arbitrary. As far as equity, especially equity i'?fra legem, is 
applied in accordance with the requirement of coherence, it should be regarded as legitimate and 
objective. There may be a divergence among jurists, especially judges, with regard to what the 
correct answer is, because 'lawyers who hold different types of moral theory will assess these 
differently.' 130 However, even if this is so, it does not mean that the One Right Answer thesis is 
incorrect. Although their opinions sometimes diverge, judges still have responsibility to 'choose 
between eligible interpretations by asking which shows the community's structure of institutions 
and decisions - its public standard as a whole - in a better light from the standpoint of political 
morality.' 131 This point is directly related to the prohibition of the declaration of non liquet. 
6.2.3. THE PROHIBffiON OF THE DECLARATION OF NON LIQUET 
If the exercise of judicial discretion is normal as part of the judicial process, and there is always one 
right answer, there would logically be no room for judges to be 'at liberty to refuse to give a 
decision on the grounds of the supposed absence of a rule of law applicable to the individual 
case.' 132 It is the reason why Lauterpacht considered the prohibition of the declaration of non liquet 
to be a corollary of the completeness of international law. Furthermore, he empirically tried to show 
that judges have a legal obligation not to declare non liquet. The history of international 
adjudication shows that there has been no case of a declaration of non liquet. The ILO 
Administrative Tribunal declared that ' [ o ]ne of the fundamental tenets of all legal systems is that no 
court may refrain from giving judgement on the grounds that the law is silent or obscure' in 
Desgranges v. International Labour Organization case. 133 Therefore, Lauterpacht thought that the 
129 Milllerson/2000/47. 
130 Dworkin/19851143. 
JJ1 Dworkin/1986/256. 
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prohibition of the declaration of non liquet is 'one of the most indisputably established rules of 
positive international law as evidenced by an uninterrupted continuity of international arbitral and 
judicial practice. ' 134 
However, does the practice of international tribunals really show the legal obligation of judges 
not to declare non liquet? Stone criticised this point as follows: 
'It seems not to follow from the fact that past tribunals have chosen in many cases to devise new rules for the 
case rather than declare a non liquet, that therefore there is a rule prohibiting future tribunals from ever 
declaring a non liquet. The course of declaring a non liquet may still be open under a legal system, even 
though it has as yet not been resorted to. The distinction may seem a fine one between the question whether in 
the absence or obscurity of the law the court is bowuito declare a non liquet, and the question whether in such 
circumstances the court is permitted to declare a non liquet. Yet the distinction is critical. For obviously even 
the mere permissibility of a non liquet would refute the view that there is a prohibition of non liquet in 
intemationallaw. And, conversely, the cases cited may merely show that tribunals have not chosen to declare a 
non liquet, rather than any view of the tribunals that they could not do so.' 
Therefore, Stone concluded, the cases show that 'the arbitrator is not bound to declare a non liquet, 
not that he was prohibited by international law from doing so.' 135 
The concern of Stone was realised in the Legality of Nuclear Weapons case. The Court 
declared as follows: 
'It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally 
be contnuy to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and 
rules of humanitarian law; 
However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the 
134 Lauterpacht/1958/CP-II/217. 
135 Stone/1959/139-140. 
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Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear We8JX>I1S would be lawful or unlawful 
in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the vel)' survival of a State would be at stake.' 136 
Some judges clearly think that the latter part of statement is the declaration of non liquet. Judge 
Higgins, for example, says that 'at paragraph 97 of its Opinion, and in paragraph 2 E of its dispositif, 
the Court effectively pronounces a non liquet on the key issue on the grounds of uncertainty in the 
present state of the law, and of facts.' 137 Some international lawyers also agree with her. Dapo 
Akande, for example, says that 'this is the first decision where the Court has pronounced a non 
liquet.' 138 Thus, the problem here is whether or not this case proves that the Court is permitted to 
declare non liquet. 
It should be noted that the lawyers who support the declaration of non liquet in the Legality of 
Nuclear Weapons case emphasise the nature and purpose of the advisory procedure. Judge 
Vereshchetin, for example, expresses that the declaration of non liquet is admissible in the advisory 
procedure. There are two reasons: (1) the discretionary power of the Court which is given under 
Article 65 (1) of the Statute, and (2) the advisory function of the Court. These reasons are tangled 
up with each other, but they are also different reasons from each other. 
With regard to the discretioruuy power of the Court, Judge Vereshchetin says as follows: 
'The Court would never fully enumerate or spell out the "compelling reasons" which might lead to the refusal 
to deliver an opinion .... One cannot exclude that among such "compelling reasons" there may be those 
relating to the state of the law (in particular, to the so-called "social insufficiencies" in the law alluded to 
earlier).'l39 
Hugh Thirlway agrees with him that the declaration of non liquet is justified by the Court's 
136 ICJReps/1996-I/266/para.1 05/2-E. See also its reasoning, 261-163/paras.90-97. 
137 Higgins/lCJReps/l996-V583/para.2. Also see Schwebel/ICJReps/1996-I/322-323. 
138 Akande/1997/212; Dekker-Wemer/1999; Dinstein/2001/145. But see Verzijl/1966/206. 
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discretion that 'the matter [the sub-paragraph E] is seen as one of exercise of the Court's discretion 
to refuse to given an opinion.' 140 
It is true that, in the advisory procedure, the Court is given the discretionary power to decide 
whether or not it should answer the questions under Article 65 (1) of the Statute. From the point of 
view of Judge Vereshchetin, the difference between the advisory opinion procedure and the 
contentious case procedure enables the Court to justifY the declaration of non liquet. However, we 
need to be cautious about accepting their opinions. First, the question of non liquet is not the 
procedural questions of jurisdiction of the Court and of the admissibility of the request. The 
question of non liquet is the problem of merit whether or not judges are allowed to pronounce so in 
the case where there is a lacuna in international law. Judge Vereshchetin and his supporters seem to 
forget this point. As Marcelo Kohen points out, once the Court recognises that the question 
submitted is a legal one, it cannot thereafter back down on the ground that the law was insufficient 
or irnperfect. 141 Second, it is the case law of the Court that in the exercise of the discretionary power, 
the Court needs 'compelling reasons.' Even in the Legality of Nuclear Tfeapons case, the Court 
declared: 
'When considering each request, it is mindful that it should no~ in principle, refuse to give an advisoty opinion. 
In accordance with the consistent jurisprudence of the Co~ only "compelling reasons" could lead it to such a 
refusal.' 142 
If so, the Sub-paragraph 2 E cannot be justified as the exercise of judicial discretion, because even if 
the declaration of non liquet is the exercise of judicial discretion, the declaration of non liquet has to 
be justified by a compelling reason, not by the fact that the Court has the judicial discretion in the 
advisory procedure. What is the 'compelling reason' justifYing the declaration of non liquet? This 
139 Vereshchet:in/1999/541. 
140 
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question returns once more to the problem of non liquet. The question is whether or not the 
indeterminacy of international law is regarded as one of 'compelling reasons' justifying the 
exercise of judicial discretion. 
This question may be answered by the advisory function of the Court. According to a view, 
the advisory function of the Court is to state the law as such; if the law is insufficient, the Court has 
to declare the insufficient situation of the law. Judge Vereshchetin again expresses this view in his 
declaration: 
'In advisory procedure, where the Court finds a lacuna in the law or finds the law to be imperfect, it ought 
merely to state this without trying to fill the lacuna or improve the law by way of judicial legislation. The 
Court cannot be blamed for indecisiveness or evasiveness where the law, upon which it is called to pronounce, 
is itself inconclusive.' 143 
Prosper Weil agrees with Judge Vereshchetin: 
'The duty to answer a request for an advisory opinion ... does not imply the duty to resolve the question 
referred to it. An appropriate answer may be that at the present stage of the evolution of the law there is no 
answer to the question, or no complete answer.' 
Then, Weil continues as follows; 
'The I.C.J. certainly is not prohibited fium "developing" the law in advisory proceeding:;. Tilis is hardly 
uncommon. Indeed, some of the most conspicuous examples of progressive development of intemationallaw 
may be found in advisory opinions. But the Court may also choose to limit itself in advisory opinions to 
stating the law as it is, with its prescriptive, prohibitive, or permissive rules, but also with its gaps and 
142 ICJReps11996-I/235/para.l4. 
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incompleteness. In contentious proceedings, non liquet may well be a scandal. In advisol)' proceedings, it is 
Rosenne also says: 
'[I]n the present case [the Legality ofNuclear Weapons case] the Court- doing what national courts frequently 
do- has stated quite clearly that the law is not in a satisfactol)' state. This is guidance. Article 38 of the Statute 
is commonly understood as preventing the Court from refusing to decide a contentious case on the ground of 
non liquet. The approach expressed by Judge Vereshchetin is appropriate when the Court is giving guidance to 
another organ or institution.' 145 
However, is it really true that the advisory function of the Court is so different that the declaration of 
non liquet is pennissible in the advisory procedure, though inadmissible in the contentious case 
procedure? 
It is theoretically possible to distinguish between the declaration of law as the purpose of the 
advisory procedure and the settlement of disputes by applying law as the purpose of the contentious 
case procedure. However, there is less difference between the two proceedings with regard to the 
essential nature of judicial function. There are many contentious cases in which the Court could not 
contribute to the post-judicial settlement of international disputes. In these cases, the Court confined 
itself simply to the solution of legal questions of the disputes by making the applicable law clear 
rather than settling the disputes as a whole. In the Hostage case, the Court clearly took this position 
when it said that 'legal disputes between sovereign States by their very nature are likely to occur in 
political contexts, and often form only one element in a wider and longstanding political dispute 
between the States concerned.' 146 Consequently, the Court devoted itself not to the settlement of 
144 Weil/1997/117. 
145 Rosenne/1998/304. 
146 ICJReps/1980/20/para.37. 
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'overall problems' between the United States and Iran, but to the settlement of legal questions 
between them. On the other hand, there are the advisory opinion cases in which the Cotut tried to 
settle the dispute between a state and an international organisation. In the Headquarters Agreement 
case, the Court recognised the existence of legal disputes between the United Nations and the 
United States,147 and solved the problem on the applicability of section 21 of the Headquarters 
Agreement. 
It is also true that advisory opinion does not have res judicata. However, as discussed above, 
the advisory opinion has the almost same persuasive authority as the judgement enjoys. If, as Judge 
Vereshchetin says, 'the Court must be concerned about the authority and effectiveness of the 
"deduced" general rule with respect to the matter on which the States are so fundamentally 
divided' 148 in the advisory opinion, the Court should also be cautious about the judgement in the 
contentious case insofar as the enforceability of judgement is very limited even under Article 94 of 
the Charter of the United Nations. There have been no cases in which the Security Council 
enforced the Judgement of the Court. The Court cannot but expect the voluntary compliance of 
State parties with its judgement. 
Despite the relative difference between the two procedures, the very emphasis on the 
difference is misleading the supporters into suggesting that the Court is allowed to legislate the 
applicable law in the contentious case procedure. Prosper Weil says: 
'Whenever States decide, by way of a special agreement, a compromissmy clause, or otherwise, to ask for the 
judicial obligation to settle the dispute. TI1erefore, ipso jure they confer on the tribunal the normative and 
quasi-legislative power necessmy to produce that result' 149 
However, it is such a claim that the international tribunals have again and again denied in the 
14"~ ICJReps/1988/27-30/paras.34-44. 
148 Vereshchetin/ICJReps/1996-I/281. 
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history of the judicial settlement of international disputes, as mentioned alx:>Ve. In the Eastern 
Extension, Australasia and China Telegraph Company case, the Tribunal clearly denied the so-
called judiciallegislation.150 So did the Court. In the 1966 judgement in the South-West Africa case, 
the Court says as follows: 
'As implied by the opening phrase of Article 38, paragraph 1, of its Statute, the Court is not a legislative body. 
Its duty is to apply the law as it finds it, not to make it.' 151 
Therefore, there is no reason why the difference between the two proceedings justifies the 
declaration of non liquet in the advisory opinion. 
It is certainly true that Lauterpacht recognised that the difference between two procedures may 
cause different problems with regard to the problem of non liquet: 'In advisory proceedings the 
problem assumes a different complexion.' However, he continued that 'the prohibition of non 
liquet applies here to the full extent in the sense that, as a rule, every question forming the subject-
matter of a request for an Opinion may be couched in the form of a claim, for instance, in 
proceedings for a declaratory judgement.' 152 If so, Sub-paragraph E would be clearly unjustifiable 
from the point of view ofLauterpacht. However, Judge Vereshchetin tries to justifY Sub-paragraph 
E in the Legality of Nuclear Weapons case as the declaration of non liquet by citing the following 
statement ofLauterpacht: 
' [A ]pparent indecision, which leaves room for discretion on the part of the organ which requested the Opinion, 
may- both as a matter of development of the law and as a guide to action - be preferable to a deceptive clarity 
which fails to give an indication of the inherent complexities of the issue. In so far as the decisions of the Court 
are an expression of existing international law - whether customary or conventional - they cannot but reflect 
150 RIAA/vol.6/118. 
151 ICJReps/1966/48/para89. 
152 Lauterpacht/1958/CP-II/216/n.2. 
311 
the occasional obscurity or inconclusiveness of a defective legal system.' 153 
Therefore, Judge Vereshchetin concludes that 'Judge Lauterpacht went much fiuther in 
distinguishing and apparently took a more liberal position with regard to the admissibility of non 
liquet, or something very close to it, in advisory cases. ' 154 
However, the above statement ofl.auterpacht is not related to the problem of non liquet at all. 
Lauterpacht mentioned this statement in the context of the flexibility of the advisory opinion in the 
Conditions of Admission case. The crux of the above statements lies not in the denial of 'deceptive 
clarity' but in the affirmation of the 'discretion on the part of the organ which requested the 
Opinion.' This point would be understood, if we pay attention to the sentence just before the above 
passages quoted by Judge Vereshchetin: 
'[llhe Opinions of both the majority and the minority of the Court in that case reveal a determination to lift the 
issue from its political background to the level of a pronouncement based on legal principles capable of 
general application.' 155 
In other words, Lauterpacht appreciated that the Court could, in all appropriate circumstances, 
legally regulated the discretion of the organs of the United Nations to interpret the Charter, though 
the discretion may be very broad but still within legal principles. In this sense, the above statement 
ofl.auterpacht simply means that the Court should allow the organs of the United Nations to excise 
their discretionary powers regulated by international law. This point is nothing to do with the 
problem of non liquet. It is clear, therefore, that Judge Vereshchetin misreads the statement of 
Lauterpacht. 
Far from justifYing Sub-paragraph E as a declaration of non liquet, moreover, the close 
153 Lauterpacht!Development-III152. 
154 Vereshchetin/1999/538. 
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examination of the individual opinions in the Legality of Nuclear Weapom case shows that the 
latter sentence of Sub-paragraph E expresses the problems in the functioning of the Court as the 
collective body of judges. In the majority composed of seven judges, only three judges justifY the 
second sentence of Sub-paragraph E as the declaration of non liquet. President Bedjaoui says, 
'[T]he Court could obviously not go beyond what the law says. It could not say what the law does not say. 
Accordingly, at the end of its Opinion, the Court confined itself to stating the situation, finding itself unable to 
do any more than this.' 156 
As noted above, Judge Vereshchetin also tries to justifY the declaration of non liquet as the exercise 
of discretionary power. Since he admits that there is no rule to solve the conflict between 
international humanitarian law and the right of self -defence, Judge Fleischhauer also says that ' [ t]he 
present state of international law does not pennit a more precise drawing of the border-line between 
unlawfulness and lawfulness of recourse to nuclear weapons.' 157 
However, other four judges voted for Sub-paragraph E for different reasons. Judge Shi, who is 
thought to have voted positively for the second sentence of Sub-paragraph E, adopts a different 
kind of justification from the declaration of non liquet. He thinks that the question of the nuclear 
deterrence is non-justiciable.158 The remaining three judges admit that they voted for the first part of 
Sub-paragraph E rather than the second sentence. Judge Herczegh says that 'to have voted against 
this paragraph [Sub-paragraph E] would have meant adopting a negative stance on certain essential 
conclusions - also set forth in this Opinion and alluded to in Paragraph 2 E - which I fully 
endorse.' 159 Judge Ferrari Bravo, who thinks that nuclear weapons are illegal, implies that he voted 
for the second part of the Sub-paragraph E with reluctance, by admitting 'the difficulty of obtaining 
156 Bedjaoui!ICJReps/1996-I/270. 
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consistent mcgorities with respect to certain components of the Advisory Opinion.' 160 Judge 
Ranjeva clearly states his reluctance to admit the second clause of Paragraph 2 E: 
'I voted for the whole of the operative part, in particular the first clause of paragraph 2 E, since this Opinion 
confinns the principle of the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, although I consider that the 
second clause of paragraph 2 E raises problems of interpretation which may impair the clarity of the rule of 
law.'161 
The fact that their opinions are very different, even among the majority, shows that, as Thirlway 
correctly points out, 'reasoning had not in fact obtained the support of a mcgority at all.' 162 
Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that all judges append their individual opinions. This 
fact clearly shows that there are certainly legal answers, in any form, with regard to the use of 
nuclear weapons even 'in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a 
State would be at stake.' If all judges have their own legal answers, the second part of Sub-
paragraph E is not the situation of non liquet in a genuine sense. The problem is not that there is no 
legal answer to the question. As Pierre-Marie Dupuy points out, 'there was no gap in the applicable 
law, but, on the contrary, that there were too many applicable rules, some of which were 
inconsistent as between themselves.' 163 All judges found their own legal answer. Each of them no 
doubt believes that his/her interpretation oflaw is correct. This means that One Right Answer thesis 
is still valid on the normative phase. It is still theoretically possible that the Court could have 
avoided the declaration of non liquet. 
The problem of the Court in the Legality of Nuclear Weapons case, rather, is that judges fail to 
produce the legal opinion of the Court as the collective body of judges. This failure certainly comes 
from the divergence of the political ideal and the sense of reality among them with regard to the 
160 Ferrari-Bravo/ICJReps/1996-1/283. 
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deterrent policy of nuclear weapons. In this sense, Sub-paragraph E is the result of the malfunction 
of the Court. The malfunction of the Court expressed in Sub-paragraph E shows that hard cases 
happen from the divergence of political morality in the international community. Dworkin points 
out that '[i]fthere is no right answer in a hard case, this must be in virtue of some more problematic 
type of indeterminacy or incommensurability in moral theory.' 164 Indeed, in the Legality of Nuclear 
Weapons case, Judge Herczegh honestly confesses the divergence between judges with regard to 
the conception of international law: 
'The preparation of an advisory opinion on the highly complex question put by the General Assembly 
concerning the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons "in any circumstance" has highlighted the 
different conceptions of international law within the Court. The diversity of these conceptions prevented the 
Court from finding a more complete solution and therefore a more satisfuctory result TI1e wording of the 
reasons and the conclusions of the Advisory Opinion reflects these divergences.' 165 
Thus, the problem of Sub-paragraph E is now whether or not the divergence of political morality 
among judges allows them to pronounce non liquet. Koskenniemi tries to justifY this 'silence of 
law' as follows: 
'The Court felt both the law and its own authority to be insufficient for determining the status of the massive 
killing of the innocent In so doing, it effectively suspend the liberal Utopia of a single and complete system of 
general (legal) rules and principles and a public procedure for giving effect to them. But this is a tragedy only 
if we assume that the validity of moral norms depends on everyone being able to reach the same conclusion 
about them. If that (Kantian) assumption is discarded, however, and focus is on the singularity of situations 
163 Dupuy/1999/459. 
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and the incommensurability of the values at stake in them, no angst need be felt' 166 
However, Koskenniemi's claim of 'the incommensurability of the values' spoils the raison d'etre 
of international judges, because it is usual that there are different political opinions among people 
due to their situationality. The conceptual incommensurability is not rare at al; it is simply normal 
that judges find it difficult to reach the same conclusion because of the divergence of legal and 
political opinions among themselves. Nevertheless, once the Court is seized of a case, international 
judges have the duty to unify their opinions as the Court, because they are assumed to work 
collectively. They have to find the legally correct answer to a question as much as possible, because 
it is the raison d'etre of the Court to answer legal questions. The declaration of non liquet clearly 
falls short of such a duty of judges to produce a legal opinion of the Court. If the prohibition of the 
pronouncement of non liquet is 'not so much whether or not international law is a "complete 
system," but whether we can trust the lawyers who manage it always to do the right thing,' 167 the 
declaration of non liquet would be nothing but the betrayal of the trust in the judges once the Court 
is seized of the case. In this sense, the malfunction of the Court cannot be excused even if there is 
divergence of political sensibility between judges with regard to the right answer. 
It is certainly undeniable that such a responsibility to find a correct answer was too heavy for 
the judges in the Legality of Nuclear Weapons case. However, this heavy responsibility on judges is 
not the problem of the incompleteness of international law which may allow them to declare non 
liquet, but the problem of the non-justiciability of political questions. Vaughan Lowe explains the 
distinction between non liquet and non-justiciability as follows: 
'Non liquet is an acknowledgement that the matter should be regulated by the law, but that there is no 
identifiable rule that can be applied to the fact before the tribunal. Non-justiciability is an acknowledgement 
that the matter may be regulated by law but that it is inappropriate for the tribunal to apply the relevant rule. 
166 Koskenniemi/1999/508-509. 
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Non liquet is a declaration of incompetence; non-justiciability is a posture of abstention.' 168 
Sub-paragraph E is clearly not 'a declaration of incompetence' but 'a posture of abstention,' 
because it came from the inability of judges to fonn the unified opinion as the Court. Pierre-Marie 
Dupuy also says as follows: 
'The problem lies primarily with the organ, not with the nonns. The true reason why the Court refused to go 
any further than it did in the direction of the illegality of the use of nuclear weapons is not essentially to be 
found in its rules, but in the position of the Court itself. Confronted with the inconsistency of an international 
legal order which includes potentially contradictory norms, and requested to rule out the types of potentially 
contradictory nonns, and requested to rule out the type of weapons which effectively demonstrate its ability to 
preserve peace from the threat of massive destruction, the Court was returned to its real condition: a judiciary 
neither vested with international political legitimacy nor with any law-making competence.' 169 
The Court, thus, should have admitted the serious political tension between states on the question of 
the legality of nuclear weapons, which forces it to malfi.mction in the sense that judges could not 
reach a conclusion, because misleading lawyers into believing that Sub-paragraph E is the 
declaration of non liquet was avoidable. Thus, the second clause of Paragraph 2 E should not be 
regarded as the precedent to the pronouncement of non liquet. It is rather the 'malfunction' of the 
Court due to highly political tension on the problem of nuclear weapons. In this sense, 
Lauterpacht's theory of the prohibition ofthe declaration of non liquet is still valid and persuasive. 
International judges still have responsibility of answering legal questions without declaring non-
liquet even in hard cases. 
168 Lowe/2000/210. 
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6.3. THE COMPATIBlliTY OF AUTOMATIC REsERVATIONS WITH ARTICLE 36 
(6) OFTHE§TATUTE 
During the period of his judgeship from 1955 to 1960, Lauterpacht faced the crisis of the 
responsibility of international judge with regard to the so-called 'automatic reservation.' The 
problem of automatic reservation or subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction itself is a 
problem of the authority of the Court. Indeed, Lauterpacht said that 'the "automatic reservation" 
has tended to impair the legal- and moral- authority and reality of the Optional Clause.' 170 
It should be noted, however, that Lauterpacht had discussed this problem in 1930. When the 
British government accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court, Arthur 
Henderson, British Foreign Secretary at that time, explained the reservation of the disputes 'with 
regard to questions which by international law fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the United 
Kingdom' in the British Declaration of the Acceptance of the Optional Clause of the Statute of the 
Permanent Court. 
'On certain matters, international Jaw recognises that the authority of the State is supreme. When once it is 
detennined that the subject matter of the dispute falls within the categol)' of cases where this is so, there is no 
scope for the exercise of the jurisdiction of an international tribunal.' 171 
Lauterpacht enquired into the meaning of the term ' [ w ]hen once it is determined.' In the discussion 
in Parliament, Commander Bellairs asked Henderson whether they were the judges of the matter 
on the domestic jurisdiction.172 This question was not answered by Henderson. It should be noted, 
however, that according to The Times, the United Kingdom and its Dominions agreed that 'cases 
170 Lauterpacht/ICJReps/195'//64. 
171 AJITJSupplement/vol.25/1931186. 
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judged by the signatories to be of domestic interest will be excluded from the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Hague Court.'173 Taking these elements into consideration, Lauterpacht 
concluded that 'unless it was meant to have the effect of preventing the Court from deciding on the 
question of its jurisdiction in these matters, it is difficult to see what is the object of this 
reservation.' 174 Therefore he assumed that the reservation of the domestic jurisdiction is purported 
to give the United Kingdom 'the right to determine unilaterally whether the matter of dispute is by 
international law within its exclusive jurisdiction.' 175 
Concerning this interpretation of the British reservation, Lauterpacht argued about the claims 
that the reservation gives the British government the unilateral right to decide whether the dispute is 
the matter of domestic jurisdiction as follows: 
'In the writer's opinion, the Court would ovenule them on the ground that the last paragraph of Article 36 [of 
the Statute of the Permanent Court on the competence de la competence] is an essential part, not only of that 
Article, but of every scheme of truly obligatory jurisdiction; that to deprive the Court of the power to 
determine its scope of competence, and to leave that right to the interested parties, is to deny the essence of the 
obligation to arbitrate; that a party signing the Optional Clause runs, apart from other risks, the risk that another 
State may bring before the Court any disputes on the ground that it falls within one of the four categories 
enumerated therein; and that the idea of a highest international tribunal implies, as an essential condition of its 
proper fimctioning, the confidence on the part of the State that it will not become guilty either of a usurpation 
of powers or of a disregard of international law.' 176 
In conclusion, Lauterpacht wrote, 
'Possibly it might be argued that sweeping and indefinite reservations might be regarded as contrary to the 
173 Tnnes/19/September/1929/14. Emphasis added. 
174 Lauterpacht/1930c/149. 
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very purpose of the Optional Clause and as such invalidating its signature. As such, for instance, might be 
regarded a reservation offending against the fundamental principle of the Statute of the Court with regard to its 
right to detennine its own jurisdiction.' 177 
This view in 1930 shows that Lauterpacht did not distinguish between the so-called objective 
reservation of domestic jurisdiction and the subjective resetvation of domestic jurisdiction, which 
Rosenne discusses. 178 It was because it seemed to Lauterpacht that the question whether a matter 
was within the domestic jurisdiction of a state was decided not by objective standards but by the 
subjective will of the state, although he was opposed to the resetvation of domestic jurisdiction. In 
other words, Lauterpacht categorised the reservation of domestic jurisdiction as the problem of the 
subjective justiciability of international disputes. Indeed, he said, 
'It was of the essence of the usual reservations of vital interests, honour, or independence that the 
detennination of their applicability should be left to the free decision of the parties and, in view of their highly 
subjective character, it is doubtful whether any court actingjudicially would be in the position to pronounce on 
this matter. The reservation as to matters of domestic jurisdiction belongs to the same category of indefinite 
reservation.' 179 
It is important to understand why Lauterpacht consistently claimed the invalidity of the declaration 
attached with the reservation of domestic jurisdiction; the unilateral determination by one state 
party clearly seems to him to be the problem whether law prevails over politics or not, which is the 
proposition of tl1e legal school. If even the objective resetvation seems to him to challenge to the 
ideal of the Rule of Law, it is no wonder that the so-called subjective resetvation seemed to him to 
be a more serious challenge to the ideal of the Rule of Law. 
176 Ibid/154. 
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This view was confirmed in the Provisional Repmt of the Revision of the Statute of the Court. 
It states that 
' [A ]ny acceptance of the Optional Clause of Article 36 (2) which leaves to a State the right to detennine the 
extent of its obligation, voluntarily undertaken, in relation to the jurisdiction of the Court is contraiy to the 
Statute - in addition to being obnoxious to a general principle of Jaw which denies the character of a legal 
obligation to an undertaking in which the promising party determines for itself the extent of the obligation 
which it has undertaken.' 180 
Lauterpacht did not address this issue in his discussion on the Revision of the Statue. However, he 
proposed the amendment of Article 36 ( 6) of the Statute by adding the sentence that ' [a] disposition, 
in the declaration referred to in paragraph 2 above or in any other instnnnent, shall be of no effect to 
the extent to which it putpOrts to reserve the question of the jurisdiction of the Court for the 
unilateral determination of a party to the dispute.' 181 
While avoiding answering a question on automatic reservation in his Provisional Report, 
Lauterpacht expressed his opinion in the NoJWegian Loans case and the Jnterhandel case. In his 
dissenting opinion in the Interhandel case, he summarised his reasoning as follows: 
'(a) the reservation in question, while constituting an essential part of the Declaration of Acceptance, is 
contrary to paragraph 6 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court; it cannot, accordingly, be acted upon by the 
Court; which means that it is invalid; (b) that, irrespective ofits inconsistency with the Statute, that reservation 
by effectively conferring upon the Government of the United States the right to detennine with finality 
whether in any particular case it is under an obligation to accept the jurisdiction of the Court, deprives the 
Declaration of Acceptance of the character of a legal instrument, cognizable before a judicial tribunal, 
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expressing legal rights and obligations; (c) that reservation, being an essential part of the Declaration of 
Acceptance, cannot be separated from it so as to remove from the Declaration the vitiating element of 
inconsistency with the Statute and of the absence of a legal obligation. The Government of the United States, 
not having in law become a party, through the system of the Optional Clause of Article 36 (2) of the Statute, 
cannot invoke it as an applicant; neither can it be cited before the Court as defendant by reference to its 
Declaration of Acceptance. Accordingly, there being before the Court no valid Declaration of Acceptance, the 
Court cannot act upon it in any way - even to the extent of examining objections to admissibility and 
jurisdiction other than that expressed in the automatic reservation.' 182 
The crux of his argument is that the reserving state has the right to determine its own domestic 
jurisdiction. Lauterpacht clearly preslUTied that if a state party unilaterally determines whether the 
subject-matter of the dispute is within its domestic jurisdiction, the decision produces the legal 
effect to obligate other states or the Court to accept the decision of the state invoking the subjective 
reservation. Otherwise, the term 'right' would be meaningless, if the exercise of the right does not 
have a legal effect on others. This point explains his conclusion that insofar as the Court is 
concerned, on the one hand, the legal effect of the unilateral determination is to deprive the Court of 
the competence de la competence under Article 36 (6) of the Statute, and that, on the other hand, the 
instrlUTient which gives such a right to one party is not a genuine legal bond to other states. 183 
However, is his proposition legally correct? It is here necessruy to examine his proposition whether 
the unilateral determination by a reserving state has legal effect to oblige other states or the Court to 
accept the determination. 
The question whether the unilateral determination of the reserving state about the matter of 
domestic jurisdiction obliges the Court to accept the determination is usually discussed in the 
context of the compatibility of the subjective reservation with Article 36 (6) of the Statute. There are 
two views on the compatibility of the self-:iudgement reservation with Article 36 (6). One view is 
182 l..auterpacht/ICJReps/1959/1 01-102. 
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the incompatibility argwnent; another one is called 'good faith argwnent.' 184 
Although some of them did not consider the declaration of the acceptance of the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction to be invalid, four judges supported the incompatibility argument of Judge 
Lauterpacht. In the Norwegian Loans case, Judge Guerrero adopted this view.185 In the Interhandel 
case, Judges Spender, Klaestad and Arrnand-Ugon also agreed with Judge Lauterpacht about the 
incompatibility of the reservation with the Statute.186 It should be noted, furthermore, that some 
lawyers also advocate the incompatibility argwnent.187 
However, two judges adopted the good faith argument. In the Norwegian Loans case, Judges 
Basdevant and Read expressed this view in their individual opinions. Judge Basdevant considered 
the French self-judgement reservation to be subject to the review of the Court. It is true that he 
discussed the Norwegian position regarding the French reservation. However, the interpretation of 
the reservation is applicable if France would claim the reservation: 
'She [Norway] relied on it, and could only rely on it, in the sense that this reservation has in relations between 
France and NoJWay, that is to say, not as a reservation the application of which depends on the discretionruy 
judgement of the State which relies on it, but as a reservation the scope of which depends on what is 
recognized by international law as found by the Court. I cannot suppose that Norway intended to give the 
reservation a more absolute sense which would be in conflict with the law existing in this matter between the 
two countries .... In invoking the French reservation, its intention was that its bearing on the present case 
should be considered in the light of the elements of the case: the subject of the claim and the law applicable. It 
is on this footing that the appeal to the reservation must be judged and that the discussion between the Parties 
in fact developed.' 188 
184 Jennings/1998/411. 
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Although he was cautious about the notion of "good faith" or abus de droit in the interpretation of 
automatic reservation, Judge Read said, 
'[T)he wording of the reservation, must establish that there is a genuine understanding, i.e., that the 
circumstances are such that it would be reasonably possible to reach the understanding that the dispute was 
essentially national. Whether the circumstances are such is not a matter for decision by a respondent 
Government, but by the Court.' 189 
Some international lawyers also support this view.190 
Which interpretation of automatic reservation is right? It is true that Lauterpacht denied the 
interpretation that the reservation is compatible with Article 36 ( 6) of the Statute, because he 
interpreted the intention of the authors of automatic reservations as being to deprive the Court of the 
competence de la competence. 191 Judge Spender also expressed that the good faith argrnnent is to 
redraft the reservation and to give it 'an entirely different meaning to that which its words bear and 
which they clearly enough were intended to bear.' 192 However, two questions are predicated in the 
reasoning of Lauterpacht and Spender. The first question is whether one party is legally entitled to 
deprive the Court of the competence de la competence under Article 36 ( 6) of the Statute. The 
second question is how the Court should interpret the intention of the authors of automatic 
reservations. 
With regard to the first question, the competence de la competence is the evidence that the 
Court is a judicial organ. In the Award of the UNAT case, the Court referred to the fact that the 
United Nations Administrative Tribunal has the competence de la competence under Article 2 (3) 
of the Statute of the Tribunal in order to answer to the question whether it is a judicial organ or an 
188 Basdevant'ICJReps/1957 /76. 
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advisory organ.193 In the Nottebohm case (Preliminary Objection), furthermore, the Cowt declared 
the customary nature of the competence de la competence: 
'Paragraph 6 of Article 36 merely adopted, in respect of the Court, a rule consistently accepted by general 
international law in the matter of international arbitration. Since the Alabama case, it has been generally 
recognized, following the earlier precedents, that, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, an 
international tribtmal has the right to decide as to its own jurisdiction and has the power to interpret for this 
pwpose the instruments which govern that jurisdiction. . .. This principle, which is accepted by general 
international law in the matter of arbitration, assumes particular force when the international tribunal is no 
longer an arbitral tribtmal constituted by virtue of a special agreement between the parties for the purpose of 
adjudicating on a particular dispute, but is an institution which has been pre-established by an international 
instrument defining its jurisdiction and regulating its operation, and is, ... the principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations.' 194 
The reasoning in the above cases shows that the competence de la competence is indispensable to 
the Cowt as judicial organ llllder international law. 
Insofar as Article 36 (6) is concerned, furthermore, when the state becomes a party to the 
Statute of the Court, it gives its tacit consent to the competence de la competence of the Cowt. In 
other words, the competence de la competence is derived from 'the consent given by them, in 
becoming parties to the Cowt's Statute, to the Cowt's exercise of its powers conferred by the 
Statute,' 195 if it would be allowed to use the analogy of the incidental jurisdiction of intervention 
llllder Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute. Huge Thirlway expresses this view as follows: 
'Although it may be said that in principle an expressed intention of a State prevails over any implied or 
192 Spender/ICJReps/1959/59. 
193 ICJReps/1954/51-52. 
194 ICJReps/1953/119. 
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deemed intention, the implied grant of the competence de la competence effected by accession to the Statute 
could hardly be withdrawn or curtailed by a subsequent limitation of that competence contained in an 
Optional Clause declaration.' 196 
Therefore, it should be thought that it is legally impossible for one state party to deny the 
competence de la competence by the subjective reservation. 
If it were legally impossible for one party to deprive the Court of the competence de la 
competence, there would be no reason to think that the detennination of the reserving state has the 
legal effect to oblige the Court to accept its determination, even though the reserving state has such 
an intention. However, Lauterpacht over-emphasised the intention of the authors of the subjective 
reservation 197 He presumed that the intention of the declarant state should be as effective as 
possible. It is true that the Court has to consider the intention of the declarant state in the 
interpretation of the declaration under Optional Clause, because the declaration to accept the 
compulsmy jurisdiction is unilateral act. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case, the Court said 
that '[i]t must seek the interpretation which is in harmony with a natural and reasonable way of 
reading the text, having due regard to the intention of the Government of Iran at the time when it 
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.' 198 In principle, nevertheless, even the 
declaration of the acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction should be interpreted not only in 
accordance with the intention of the declarant state but also in conformity with the Statute as a 
whole. In the Right of Passage case (Preliminary Objection), the Court referred to the compatibility 
of the Portuguese reservation, which excludes any disputes 'by notifYing the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations with the effect from the moment of such notification,' with the Statute as 
follows: 'It is a rule of interpretation that a text emanating from a Government must, in principle, be 
interpreted as producing and as intended to produce effects in accordance with existing law and not 
195 ICJReps/1990/133/para96. 
196 Thirlway/1999a/6. 
197 Greig/1976/656. 
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in violation of it.' 199 There is no reason why this statement is inapplicable to the question of the 
compatibility of subjective reservation with Article 36 ( 6) of the Statute. The first proposition is that 
the reservation is compatible with Article 36 (6). In other words, the Court always has the 
competence de la competence, irrespective of the intention of the authors of the automatic 
reservations. Even if it wishes so, the reserving state has no right to oblige the Court to accept its 
determination, because as Shihata points out, '[i]n order to reach the conclusion that the reservation 
is valid or not, the Court necessarily exercises an aspect of this power which it cannot be deprived 
of.'200 
With regard to the second question on the intetpretation of the intention of the state submitting 
subjective reservation, the view of l..autetpacht is also doubtful. It is true that some writers 
intetpreted the intention of the authors of the subjective reservation is to deprive the Court of the 
competence de la competence.201 However, as James Crawford points out, '[n]o doubt the making 
of such a reservation demonstrates little faith in the Court, but enough, one would have thought, to 
leave to the Court the competence to determine whether an automatic reservation had in fact been 
invoked. '202 This point is shown by the argument of the United States in the Aerial Incident of 27 
July 1955 (the United States v. Bulgaria) case. 
In the United States v. Bulgaria case, the United States proposed the good faith argument that 
'the reservation in question (the subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction] does not pennit the 
Government of the United States, or any other government seeking to rely on this reservation 
reciprocally, arbitrarily to characterize the subject matter of a suit as "essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction".' Then, the United States continued as follows: 
'Where a subject matter is quite evidently one of international concern, and has so been treated by the parties 
198 ICJReps/1952/104. 
199 ICJReps/1957/142. 
200 Shihata/1965/295 
201 Preuss/1946; Wtlcox/1946; Hyde/1946; Briggs/1959. 
202 Crawford/1979b/73. 
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to the suit, it is not open to either of them to determine that the matter lies essentially within domestic 
jurisdiction. '203 
Furthermore, the United States affirmed the above interpretation: 
'The United States does not consider that reservation (b) authorizes or empowers this Government, or any 
other government on a basis of reciprocity, to make an arbitraJy determination that a particular matter is 
domestic, when it is evidently one of international concern and has been so treated by the parties.' 
Then the United States continued to cite the statement of the author of the reservation, namely 
Senator Connally, in the Senate in August 1946: 
'Several Senators have argued that by this amendment the United States would put itself in the position of 
cotruptly and improperly claiming that a question is domestic in nature when it is not, thereby taking 
advantage of an international dispute and saying that since the question is domestic, we will not abide by the 
decision of the Court. Mr. President, I have more faith in my Government than that. I do not believe tl1e 
United States would adopt a subterfuge, a pretext, or a pretense in order to block the judgement of the Court 
on any such grounds.' 
Consequently, the Observation of the United States says that '[i]t is the view of the United States 
that reservation (b) does not confer a power to nullify the jurisdiction of this Court through arbitrary 
determination that a particular subject matter of dispute is essentially domestic. '204 It is true that the 
United States later abandoned this interpretation, and insisted that '[a] determination w1der 
reservation (b) that a matter is essentially domestic constitutes an absolute bar to jurisdiction 
203 ICJPleads/United States/v./Bulgaria/305. 
204 lbid/323-324. 
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irrespective of the propriety or arbitrariness of the determination. '205 However, the fact remains that 
the United States showed another possible interpretation in which the determination of the United 
States about whether the subject matter of a dispute is within the domestic jurisdiction is subject to 
the judicial scrutiny of the Court. It should be noted, furthermore, that in the Nicaragua case, the 
United States did not claim the Connally amendment206 According to Gardner, it is 'because we 
were ashamed to argue that mining another country's harbors and supporting insurgents seeking to 
overthrow its government were matters within U.S. domestic jurisdiction. '207 Therefore, there is 
room for the good faith argument even in the interpretation of the will of the reserving state. 
Furthermore, the Court has chance to check procedurally whether the state party claims the 
subjective reservation in good or bad faith. It is true that even Judge Read, who supported the good 
faith argument in the Norvvegian Loam case, thought that 'it is impossible ... for an international 
tribunal to examine a dispute between two sovereign States on the basis of either good or bad faith 
or of abuse oflaw.'208 However, the Optional Clause system is a series ofbilateral engagements in 
which the principle of good faith plays an important role?l9 There is no reason why the principle of 
good faith is inapplicable to the interpretation of the subjective reservation as far as the Court has 
the competence de la competence. 
In this context, it is true that the problem still remains how the Court will interpret the words 
like 'as understood by the Government of French Republic' or 'as determined by the United States 
of America' However, if the object of these terms is interpreted simply to restate the expectation of 
the reserving states, the interpretation of these tenns would allow the Court to review the unilateral 
determination of the state invoking the subjective reservation. Indeed, in the N01wegian Loans case, 
the Norwegian government claimed that 'within these limits [of the good faith and the abuse of 
right] the declarant State, under this reservation, has the right to evaluate freely the nature of the 
205 Ibid/677. 
206 ICJReps/1984/422/para67. 
207 Gardner/1986/423. 
208 ICJReps/1957/94. 
209 See ICJReps/1984/418/para60. 
329 
matter at issue. '210 Insofar as the subjective reservation is invoked in good faith, the state party 
invoking the subjective reservation can expect that the Court would accept its unilateral 
determination of domestic jurisdiction. 
However, this does not mean that the unilateral determination is non-justiciable in the sense 
that it would not allow the Court to review the claim of the subjective reservation. Neither does it 
mean that the other party should accept the unilateral determination of the state invoking the 
subjective reservation, because it is possible for other states to dispute the applicability of the 
subjective reservation in the proceedings. If the automatic character of the determination of 
domestic jurisdiction by one party were admitted in the proceeding, it would not be necessary for 
the party invoking the subjective reservation to argue how its decision is appropriate and persuasive 
before the bench, because, as Elkind point out, the subjective reservation could justifY 'non-
appearance without default. '211 However, the practice shows that the principle of good faith works 
procedurally in the interpretation of the subjective reservation. The Norwegian government tried to 
show how the subject-matter of the dispute is the matter within its domestic jurisdiction in good 
faith. fu the Jnterhandel case, even the United States also tried to prove how the subject-matter of 
the dispute falls within its domestic jurisdiction. fu other words, the state invoking the subjective 
reservation has its own burden of proof Furthermore, the applicant states can dispute the 
applicability of the subjective reservation, as Switzerland in the Interhandel case and the United 
States in the United States v. Bulgaria case did. If so, the Court has chance to check the applicability 
of the subjective reservation. 
If the applicant state does not dispute but rather accepts the interpretation of the subjective 
reservation, as the United States finally admitted the interpretation of Bulgaria in the United States'~ 
Bulgaria case, what the Court needs to do is to confirm the agreement of the interpretation of the 
subjective reservation between parties. It is the crux of the reasoning of the Norwegian Loans case: 
210 ICJPleads!Norwegian/vol.l/138. Cited from Gross/1962/376/n. 73. 
211 See Elkind/1984/168. 
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'l11e validity of the reservation has not been questioned by the Parties. It is clear that France fully maintains its 
Declaration, including the reservation, and that N01way relies upon the reservation. In consequence the Court 
has before it a provision which both Parties to the dispute regard as constituting an expression of their 
common will relating to the competence of the Court. The Court does not therefore consider that it is called 
upon to enter into an exan1ination of the reservation in the light of considerations which are not presented by 
the issues in the proceedings. The Court, without prejudging the question, gives effect to the reservation as it 
stands and as the parties recognize it. '212 
There was no reason for the Court to reject the Norwegian interpretation of French reservation, 
insofar as both parties did not dispute the validity of French reservation, and the Norwegian 
government claimed the applicability of the subjective reservation in good faith. Clearly, the task of 
the Court in the Norwegian Loans case was not simply to register the unilateral determination of 
the state party invoking the subjective reservation. The Court confirmed that there was no dispute 
about the applicability of the subjective reservation between parties. This confirmation of non-
existence of the dispute about the applicability of the subjective reservation is nothing but the 
Court's exercise of the competence de la competence. The Court would be ready to accept the 
claim of the subjective reservation, if it had found that the respondent claims the subjective 
reservation of domestic jurisdiction in good faith or reasonably with the reference to the 
circumstances of the case and to international law. However if it were unsatisfied with the claim, 
the Court could reject the claim of the subjective reservation. In this sense, it is inappropriate to call 
the subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 'automatic' reservation.213 
The reasoning ofLauterpacht is based on the assumption that the state invoking the subjective 
reservation has the right to oblige the Court or other states to accept its unilateral determination. 
However, as discussed above, such a 'right' does not exist in the relation between a party and the 
Court. Neither did it exist between the parties. It should be concluded, therefore, that Judge 
212 ICJReps/1957127. 
213 Sugihara/1996/166. 
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Lauterpacht's argument that the declaration of the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Cmnt is invalid is not persuasive. Even if it did not declare the invalidity of the subjective 
reservation of domestic jurisdiction, the Court would not abandon its responsibility. The 
international judges would still have performed their duty of interpreting international law. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The shadow of death suddenly visited Lauterpacht during the period of his judgeship. He suffered a 
serious heart attack in the autwnn of 1959, fortunately recovering. However, he may have predicted 
his fate. He visited Israel after his recovery and is said to have spoken of his hope of building a 
house on a beautiful spot in Israel.' Although Lauterpacht returned to the Court in April 1960, his 
life came to the end at the age of 62 on 8 May 1960, following a second heart attack during an 
operation in London, in which doctors discovered that bowel cancer had spread to his liver. Many 
international lawyers lamented his fate. Indeed, the majority of the academic writings on 
Lauterpacht were published in the 1960s as a token of respect to his memory. 2 
The death of Lauterpacht symbolised the end of one era in international law. Lauterpacht 
himselfbelonged to the last generation for which international law effectively meant nothing other 
than the European law of nations. Ironically, perhaps, international law was dramatically modified 
by decolonisation in the year of Lauterpacht's death, which is often called 'the Year of Africa,' 
although many of European colonies in Asia had already achieved their independence in the 
aftermath of the Second World War.3 Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister after the British Empire 
had faced the Suez Crisis,4 addressed the South African parliament in February, 1960, saying that 
'the wind of change' blew throughout the African continent5 However, it was no wind, rather a 
typhoon. In September, seventeen newly independent states, including sixteen African nations, 
became members of the United Nations,6 a move which finally led the General Assembly to adopt 
1 Feinberg/1961/vii. 
2 See BYITJvol.35/1959/ix; Fitzmaurice/1960; Wtlfred/Jenks/1960; Feinberg/1961; Graveson-
Jennings/1961; Jessup-Baxter/1961; Guggenheim/1961-II; McNair/1961; Rosenne/1961; 
Fitzmaurice/1961 /1962/and/1963; Feinberg/1968. 
3 See Thorne/1985/144-210. 
4 On the story of the Suez Crisis, see Judd/1996/359-371. For the legal controversy of the Suez 
Crisis within the British government, see Marston/1988. 
5 Judd/1996/367-368; Thorn/2000/50. 
6 States gaining their independence from France in 1960 were: Cameroon, Togo, Madagascar, 
Benin, Niger, Burkina Faso, Cote d'lvoire, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Central Africa, Mali, Senegal. 
Cyprus and Nigeria became independent from Britain, Somalia from Italy, Zaire from Belgium. 
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the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Cmmtries and Peoples7 in December 
of the same year. This Declaration is significant in the sense that it morally and legally condemned 
the colonisation which had been legally permitted, at least, before the end of the Second World War. 
Although it is not certain whether colonisation became illegal only by this Declaration, it cannot be 
denied that subsequent resolutions to the Declaration, such as the General Assembly Resolution 
1541 (XV) or 2625 (XXV), provide evidence of the customary law which prohibits colonisation by 
affirming the right of the self-determination of peoples. As the Court made clear in the T#!stern 
Sahara Advisory Opinion, the Declaration provided 'the basis for the process of decoloniza.tion 
which has resulted since 1960 in the creation of many States which are today Members of the 
United Nations. '8 
It is now not Western nations, but Asian-African nations which hold the majority of seats at 
the United Nations as the consequence decolonisation. Asian-African nations, which dominate the 
General Assembly by the one-nation-one-vote principle, claimed that Eurocentric international law 
should be changed in their favour. In particular, they clamoured for the re-distribution of wealth in 
the international community through the United Nations. Thus the economic development of the 
Asian-African nations gradually appeared as one of main topics of international law. The General 
Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources is a good example of how 
Asian and African nations claimed the re-distribution of wealth through the General Assembly 
resolution.9 They wished to establish New Intemational Economic Order. This point partly explains 
why the so-called 'legislative' function of the General Assembly has been discussed among 
international lawyers from the 1960s to the 1970s.10 Although the revolutionary character ofNIEO 
had been rejected by the Western countries,11 it is undeniable that certain claims of developing 
countries, such as the Common Heritage of Mankind, became positive law. The increase of the role 
7 GA./Res./1514/(XV). 
8 TCJReps/1975/32/para57. 
9 See Gess/1964. 
10 See, for example, Fork/1970/174-184. 
11 See Texaco/Libya/ILR/vol.53/485-495. 
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of the Asian-African nations in the international law-making process means that Western nations 
lost the decisive role they had enjoyed in the international law-making process before the era of· 
decolonisation. 
The second result of the decolonisation process is seen in problems which arise as a result of 
the politically unstable situation between and within developing countries. One of the reasons 
European nations withdrew from their colonies in Asia and Africa was because their inability 
financially and militarily to solve the perplexities in their colonies in the awake of nationalism. TI1e 
confusion which occurred when European nations withdrew continued in some independent 
nations for a long period and certain problems have still not been resolved. Territorial disputes took 
place when some ethnic groups formerly under European domination separately acquired 
independence. The dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is a typical example of the 
confusion which accompanied decolonisation.12 Such difficulties are also encountered in Africa, 
where frontier disputes have occurred over the former administrative line established by the 
colonial government Although the principle of uti possidetis is declared as a general principle in 
the Frontier Dispute case,13 it is also undeniable that the artificial lines of the colonies' 
administrations are still unsatisfactory for some governments in Africa. Civil wars also broke out 
under ineffective governments during the decolonisation process. The Congo crisis in the early 
1960s was typical. 14 The politically unstable situations in former colonies were among the elements 
of political disturbance in the international community in and after the Cold War era. 
Although these difficulties had already occurred before he died, it is not certain if Lauterpacht 
fully appreciated the political and legal implications of decolonisation. The reason he did not notice 
it seems to be mainly because he was by nature essentially an European who perceived his 
conception of civilisation as being universal. He believed that hwnan beings have a universal 
nature, such as morality or rationality. His universalistic belief was no doubt influenced by his 
12 On the history of the dispute, see Hussain/2000/4-38. 
13 ICJReps/1986/554/para.20. 
14 See Legun111961. 
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personal experience, growing up in Lwow, being a student in Vienna before finally settling in 
England during the inter-war era It is true that Lauterpacht considered international law to be 
universal. However, the international law which he conceived as universal was nothing but the 
European law of nations. It is so, even though he contributed to the universalisation of international 
law by introducing liberalism into international legal theory without being aware of the European 
character of his theory. 
This point is shown by his last article International Law and Colonial Questions, 1870-1914, 
written with Robert Jennings. Lauterpacht and Jennings generally appreciated the contribution of 
the British government to the development of international law during the period, 15 including 
international arbitration or the law of wars. They discussed the regulation by international law of the 
relationship between European nations with regard to colonisation during the period of imperialism. 
They did not, however, discuss the problem of the legality of colonisation itself, although they 
touched upon the abolition of the slave trade and the acquisition and administration of colonies. 
Lautetpacht and Jennings, for example, extolled British policy not to recognise the annexation of 
the Congo to Belgium unless the British government was satisfied with the treatment of the 
Congo's native people. When the Congo Free State, where the inhuman abuse of indigenous 
people had been brought to the world's attention, was annexed to Belgium, France and Germany 
recognised the annexation. However, the British government did not In the view of Lauterpacht 
and Jennings, the reason the British government refused to recognise the annexation of the Congo 
to Belgium was because it needed to be satisfied that the abuses had ended. 
'This humane campaign of the British Government, acting for the most part in isolation, marks, therefore, an 
important step in the gradual transition of the native's rights, and indeed ultimately of human rights in general, 
from the sphere of the sovereign discretion of each separate government to the higher plane of general 
international law.' 16 
15 Lauterpacht-Jenningsi1959/CP-W96. 
16 Ibid/1 05. 
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However, their argumentation shows that what Lauterpacht and Jennings did not pay attention to 
was the legality and political legitimacy of colonisation which was the fi.mdamental cause of the 
inhuman treatment of native people and of the slave trade. It does not mean, of course, that 
Lauterpacht and Jennings were ethically insensitive to colonial questions. They criticised the crucial 
policy of the Belgian government in the Congo Basin from the viewpoint of civilisation and 
humanity. However, there is room to question whether they thought that colonisation would be 
morally justified if the colonial domination were civilised and humanistic. As Mears said, '[t]he 
lesson ... that the "native" peoples, at least, have learned by now is that projects for humanitarian 
reforms for native peoples- no matter how sincerely meant - are impractical when combined with 
a system of Big Power power-politics and "mother-country" commercial-financial preference.' 17 
The fi.mdamental question of colonisation is not whether or not colonial governments were 
humanitarian, but whether European nations universally could claim the predominance of 
European civilisation, including international law, over Asian-African nations. This is the question 
which Lauterpacht did not address in his last article. Neither had Jennings noticed it in 1958. 
Jennings ignored the fact that European powers imposed international law against Afro-Asian 
people in the 19th century without admitting the equality between the fonner and the latter as 
represented by capitulation or unequal treaties, when he discussed the universality of international 
law in his Whewell Lecture in 1958. 
'It was in the nineteenth century that international law first spread to include States of widely differing customs 
and civilizations. It was the beginning of a system oflaw actually universal instead of notionally universal.' 18 
However, Jennings re-examined Eurocentrism in international law in an address given at a 
commemorative colloquium celebrating four centenaries of the birth of Grotius in 1983. 
17 Mears/1948/304. 
18 Jennings/1998/vol.l./294. 
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'Looking back on development since the Second World War, it is possible now to appreciate that the moment 
when the international legal system first began to be challenged by some of the newly independent States as 
being too Eurocentric was also the moment when the international legal system was for the first becoming in 
fact, and not merely theoretically, universal.' 19 
Unfortunately, Lauterpacht was not given a chance to re-consider the implication of colonial 
questions and the decolonisation process in internationallaw.20 In this sense, it is reasonable for 
Rosenne, who recognises that the intemational community had already lost its homogeneity in the 
1960s, to doubt whether Lauterpacht noticed the change in the international community: 
'[W]hile ... he [Lauterpacht] was well aware of the institutional difference between the League of 
Nations and the United Nations, it is not so clear that he was fully reconciled to the sociological and 
psychological difference for which the institutional changes are merely a screen. '21 Indeed, 
Lauterpacht tried to establish the Rule of Law in the international community without considering 
the sociological and psychological change in the international community. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that Lauterpacht contributed to the contemporary paradigm of 
international legal studies; legalism is the basis of legal thought as lawyers' ethics.22 As 
MacCormick says, the juristic task is to take 'materials' or 'data' and put them back together, and to 
'reconstruct them in a way that makes them comprehensible because they are now shown as parts 
of a well ordered though complex whole. '23 Legalism plays an important role as lawyers' ethics in 
this context, because ' [ n]ormative order as order is not a natural datum of human society but a hard 
19 Ibid./348. 
20 Some may argue that Lauterpacht criticised the establishment of Manchukuo and the Italian 
rumexation of Abyssinian in the 1930s. However, the reason Lauterpacht criticised Japan and Italy 
was not because of the illegality of colonisation, but because he thought that the use of force by the 
Axis nations was contrary to the Covenant of the League. 
21 Rosenne/19611830. 
22 S.!fanaka/1993/211-214/and/1994/383. 
23 MacCormick/1990/556. Emphasis original. 
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won production of organizing intelligence. '24 It is true of international legal thought. The 
international legal materials are more scattered than domestic legal ones. To collect them, to put 
them together and to 'reconstruct' international legal order is the job of international lawyers. It is 
what Lauterpacht did by editing the International Law Reports. As McNair and Lauterpacht said, 
'The worl<, of which this book is the first fiuit, was prompted by the suspicion that there is more international 
law already in existence and daily accwnulating "than this world dreams of' and by the conviction that it is 
more international law that this world wants. As the wmk has progressed that suspicion has ripened into a 
certainty. ,25 
Thus, international legalism guarantees the autonomy of international legal thought. It is the reason 
why international legalism sUIVives even though it has been severely criticised What international 
law lacked in the destructive practices of states during two world wars was the conviction that 
international law is 'law.' Hedley Bull, who was of opinion that 'the view that international law is 
'law' properly so-called is one that has important practical consequences, and the debate that has 
raged about this question is no idle or sterile one,' well understood international legalism as 
lawyers' ethics. Bull went on, 
'International law as a practical activity does in fact have a great deal in common with municipal law. The 
language and procedure of the one are closely akin to those of the other. The modem legal profession is one 
that embraces international law as well as the municipal law of particular countries. The activity of those who 
are concerned with international law, public and private - statesmen and their legal advisers, national and 
international courts, and international assemblies - is carried on in terms of the asswnption that the rules with 
which they are dealing are rules of law. . .. The fact that these rules are believed to have the status of law, 
whatever theoretical difficulties it might involve, makes possible a corpus of international activity that plays an 
24 lbid/557. 
25 McNair-Lauterpacht/ AD/vol.3/1929/ix. 
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important part in the working of international society. '26 
In this sense, legalism is the basis of lawyers' projection of the image of law on to international 
order. 
It should be noted, moreover, that legalism as lawyers' ethics makes international law work as 
'a framework within which international relations can be conducted' and 'a system of rules 
facilitating international intercourse'27 not only in the Cold War period but also in the multicultural 
era It is so even though Grewe expressed his concern that '[i]f one adopted Huntington's view [of 
the clash of civilization], it would be impossible to rely on a future international community as the 
basis of new international law. '28 Indeed, the following statement by Bull who described the value 
of international law in the Cold War era seems to be still valid in the era of Huntington's 
nightrnare.29 
'In our times the area of consensus in international society has shrunk ... as a consequence of the expansion of 
international society beyond its originally European or Western base. The adherence of ... states both within 
and beyond the European cultural tradition, to some common terms of international law, ... has helped to 
maintain, in a period of inevitably con1Iacting consensus, some elements of a common framework. The 
international law to, which, in some measure, all states in the global international system give their formal 
assent still serves to carry out its traditional functions of identifying the idea of a society of states as the 
operational principle of world politics, stating the basic rules of coexistence and facilitating compliance with 
those and other rules.' 30 
Thus, legalism is the basis of the universal law of nations. Without this belief in law, people who 
26 Bull/1995/130. 
27 W./Beckett/1939/265. 
28 Grewe/2000/705. 
29 Huntington/1993/and/1996. 
30 Bull/1995/154-155. 
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have different cultures cannot make a common framework of international life. It is difficult to 
believe that Hall or Lorimer who strongly claimed the European character of international law, 
even if they had lived in the late 20a1 century, could have constructed the universal concept of 
international law in the era of multiculturalism. It was necessary for lawyers in the late 20d1 century 
to construct the normative theory of international law with a legalistic ideology for the sake of the 
universality of international law. 
International lawyers, then, face the dilemma oflegalism in international relations. On the one 
hand, international lawyers who claim the Rule of Law in international relations tend to 'build 
castles in the air' by disregarding international politics. The more they claim the International Rule 
of Law, the less convincing their theories become. FurthelUlore, legalism often becomes dangerous 
to international relations. As Kennan points out, legalism, if applied to serious political antagonism 
such as war, 'makes violence more enduring, more terrible, and more destructive to political 
stability than did the older motives of national interest '31 However, some international lawyers who 
think that international legalism is not only inappropriate but also dangerous to international 
relations claim that international lawyers should overcome legalism.32 They deny the domestic 
analogy of international law by proving how international law is different from domestic laws. 
They try to establish international legal theories which are appropriate to international anarchy.33 
One consequence of their efforts is the politicisation of international legal thought. Bull correctly 
pointed out the seriousness of the politicisation of international legal thought by saying that 'if 
international lawyers become so preoccupied with the sociology, the ethics or the politics of 
international relations that they lose sight of what has been in the past their essential business, that is 
the interpretation of existing legal rules, the only result must be a decline in the role of international 
law in international relations. '34 In other words, the denial of legalism is directly connected to the 
irrelevancy of international law as 'law' by losing international legal thought. It is because legalism 
31 Kennan/1951/101. 
32 Kasai/1981afand/1981b. 
33 McDougal/1953-I/and/1960; McDougal-Lasswell-Reisman/1968; Higgins/1994. 
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is the attitude of lawyers to respect the autonomy of the 'legal' from the 'political.' It should be 
noted that it is no coincidence for Lauterpacht, who had too great a desire for the Rule of Law in the 
international community, to have fostered international legal thought by editing International Law 
Reports from the inter-war period. 
How should international lawyers solve this dilemma oflegalism? The answer may be seen in 
Morgenthau' s words. 
'This realist defense of the autonomy of the political sphere against its subversion by other modes of thought 
does not imply disregard for the existence and importance of these other modes of thought. It rather implies 
that each should be assigned its proper sphere and fimction. '35 
International lawyers should act in the same way as political realists do, in other words they should 
distinguish between, however difficult, between the sphere of law and the sphere of politics, if they 
wish to protect the 'legal' of international law. It is true that this dichotomy of law/politics has been 
severely criticised. Many anti-legalists such as policy-orientated approach lawyers or critical legal 
scholars criticised the dichotomy of law/politics by arguing that law is nothing but politics due to 
the false neutrality of law or the indeterminacy of law. Nevertheless, if the spheres of disciplines 
come from the difference of modes of thought, 36 it is still possible for lawyers to maintain the 'legal' 
of international law by distinguishing their own legal thought from political thought International 
lawyers can construct international law in the same way as domestic law by the belief in legality. 
However, at the same time, they have to abandon the political agenda that international law should 
prevail over international politics in order to defend the 'legal' of international law. 
In this context, it is necessary to reconsider a question which was the starting point of tllis 
thesis. Did legalism overcome power politics in international relations? It seems too optimistic to 
34 Bull/19951153. 
35 Morgenthau/1993115. 
36 See Morgenthau/1993/13-16; Shklar/1964/123. 
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think so. Lauterpacht lUldoubtedly tried to realise his ideal of the International Rule of Law. It 
cannot be denied that his ideal was superb. Nor is difficult it to disaffirm that he had the will and 
ability enough to realise his ideal. However, Lauterpacht's legalistic theory of international law 
sometimes became llllpractical, when he theorised the international legal regulation of state 
sovereignty, because he intentionally disregarded the willingness of states to abide by international 
law. In this sense, it is difficult for him to escape from the criticism of being 'utopian.' On the other 
hand, it is not easy to deny that his 'liberal' theory was used by the m~or powers to conceal their 
national interests in the name of the international community in particular concerning the legal 
problems of war, when Lauterpacht accentuated the fi.mction of states as the organ of the 
international community. In other words, his legalism became an 'apology' at the same time insofar 
as it provided a theory of legitimising the power of hegemonic nations against their enemies. In 
both cases, the root of his problem is the same: his disregard of the raison d 'etre of sovereign states 
which try to maximise their interests. 
Lauterpacht sometimes attributed such a post-war tendency of power politics to political 
realism. However, it is not the responsibility of political realists. 1l1e reason power politics has 
never been deleted from the international scene is not due to raison d'etat as a fimdamental notion 
of political realism but due to the raison d'etre of states in that they have to protect their national 
interests. Tills does not mean that the so-called Hobbesian view which 'describes international 
relations as a state of war of all against all, an arena of struggle in which each state is pitted against 
each other'37 is correct. States can co-operate insofar as their interests are hamlonised. The co-
operation of states may reflect the existence of the international community through creating 
international institutions. International lawyers can contribute to the co-operation of states by 
explicating rules and principles insofar as governments wish so. Provided that the governments can 
vollllltarily co-operate with each other, it may be possible to realise Oppenheim's prediction that 
'the progress of International Law depends to a great extent upon whether the legal school of 
37 Bull/1995/23. 
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International Jurists prevails over the diplomatic school. '38 However, once states folilld themselves 
in 'an arena of struggle,' there would be little room for international law to improve the situation, 
because although the normative folUldation of international law may be independent of the will of 
states, the actual application of international law is definitively dependent on the political 
willingness of states. In such a situation, the legal school of international lawyers who claim the 
Rule of Law in the international community easily becomes 'over-zealous friends who have 
claimed too much. '39 
Lauterpacht, nevertheless, deleted the internal tension between the 'political' and the 'legal' in 
favour ofthe 'legal' in the fifth edition of Oppenheim's, 40 no doubt from his conviction that the 
balance of power was immoral. However, there is room to ponder whether or not his deletion of the 
internal tension between power politics and liberal legalism in Oppenheim 's was appropriate to the 
development of international law and international legal studies. As Kissinger says, the balance of 
power is an artificial system in the sense that 'it works best when it keeps dissatisfaction below the 
level at which the aggrieved party will seek to overthrow the international order.' 
'Theorists of the balance of power often leave the impression that it is the natural fonn of international 
relations. In fact, balanctXlf-power systems have existed only rarely in human history .... For the greatest part 
of humanity, during the longest periods of history, empire has been the typical mode of government Empires 
have no interest in operating within an international system; they aspire to be the international system. Empires 
have no need for a balance of power. '41 
The next question occurs if the balance of power is denied; does an empire need to respect 
international law? This question was the concern of Oppenheim when he claimed that the balance 
of power was the first moral principle of international law: 'If the Powers cannot keep one another 
38 Oppenheim/1912al80. 
39 Wlid/1938/480. 
40 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht/1937 /80-82. 
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in check, no rules of law will have any force, since an over-powerful State will naturally try to act 
according to discretion and disobey the law. '42 The First World War strengthened his concern. 
Oppenheim continued to adhere to the balance of power even within the League ofNations. 
'[W]hen, as the World War, the Great Powers are divided into two camps which are at war, and the neutral 
States represent only a negligible body, there is no force which could restrain the belligerents, and compel 
them to conduct their warfare within the boundary lines of International Law. The existence of the League of 
Nations makes a balance of power not less, but all the more necessruy, because an omnipotent State could 
disregard the League ofNations. '43 
Did Lauterpacht notice this problem when he edited out the balance of power as the first principle 
of international law in Oppenheim 'sin the name of the Rule of Law? When he claimed the Rule of 
Law in the international community, did Lauterpacht, who personified international law, consider 
the meaning ofCarr's criticism of the personification of international law that '[t]here are men who 
govern, but there are no laws that govem''t' It is regrettable that the answers to these questions 
seem to be negative, taking all his works into consideration. With regard to this point, Bull's 
statement with regard to the comparison ofLauterpacht with Oppenheim seems to be correct 
'Lauterpacht also argues that the Grotian conception of international society is a sound one and a morally 
admirable one; . . . he contrasts it with the conception entertained by the nineteenth-century positivist 
international lawyers, particularly as their writings culminated in the writings of Oppenheim. Whereas I want 
to take unfavourable view ofGrotius, and to 1ly and rehabilitate the nineteenth-century positivists and the view 
particularly of Oppenheirn, who given that he had the limitations of a lawyer thinking about international 
politics, seems to me to have written more sensibility about international relations than certainly many other 
41 Kissinger/1995121. Emphasis original. 
42 Oppenheirrl/1912a/8o. 
43 Oppenheim-Roxburgh/1920/94. 
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international lawyers and many other thinkers. '45 
International law cannot replace diplomacy or international politics. What intemationallawyers can 
do is to help diplomats and politicians through their legal thought. As Warbrick indicates, 
intemationallawyers have to recognise that their role is 'to oil the wheels, not to build the engine. '46 
This point may seem to be a matter of course, but it is the matter that many lawyers who still desire 
the Rule of Law in the international commtmity tend to forget. Although Warbrick says that 
international lawyers in England 'have been chastened by the over-optimistic claims made in the 
past for the decisive influences of self-interest and accommodation,'47 we can see how 
Lauterpacht's ideal of the Rule of Law in the international commtmity still influences the 
contemporary paradigm of international legal studies in a letter by famous international lawyers to 
the British government that '[a] decision to undertake military action in Iraq without proper security 
council authorisation will seriously undermine the international rnle of law. '48 
The role of lawyers in international relations 'to oil the wheels' may be criticised from the 
viewpoint of idealism and progressivism. It may be described as 'the unobtrusive, almost feminine, 
function of the gentle civilizer of national self-interest in which they find their true value.'49 
Nevertheless, however unobtrusive and feminine, this role of law cannot be negligible, and in fact 
is supported by legal practitioners such as William Beckett, Legal Advisor to the Foreign Office in 
the crisis of 1939, who wrote: 
'While the success of any institution or system, set up to eliminate wars and settle intemational disputes 
peacefully, must be of the most vital interest to eve!)' thinking and conscientious citizen of the world, just as 
intemal constitutional reforms must interest the citizens of the State, nevertheless it is not primarily as a lawyer, 
44 Carr/1945a/165. 
45 Bull/2000/119. 
46 Warbrick/1991/52. 
47 Ibid. 
48 See Gardian/07/03/03/1/ancl/29. Emphasis added. 
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but as a citizen, that he is interested in these things. Though in the framing and operation of systems for the 
prevention of wars the lawyers may increase if they succeed, this is a sphere of politics and diplomatic 
relations, and only secondarily within the sphere of the lawyer. In truth the scientific study of international law 
has suffered gravely because of its popular identification with movements and schemes for the establishment 
of world peace, and international lawyers have not made sufficiently clear to the world, and perhaps not to 
their own minds, when they were speaking or writing as lawyers and when as citizens or experts on 
international relations or diplomacy. But the distinction is important International law as a scientific subject 
does not depend on the fortunes of the League ofNations, and the enthusiasm, which many of us have felt or 
still feel for the League, must proceed from a judgment made, not in our capacity as lawyers, but as citizens. '50 
From such a viewpoint, it is difficult to say that Lauterpacht was correct in theorising his 
international legal utopia In particular, he often overestimated the role of international lawyers 
from the progressive perspective of :future. In this sense, Lauterpacht may be regarded as 'citizen' 
rather than 'lawyer' from Beckett's viewpoint. 
It should be noted, however, that Lauterpacht was given a chance to realise his ideal as an 
academic authority, as a legal consultant to government officials and as an international judge. For 
better or worse, if we accept Martin Wight' s explanation, Lauterpacht, who desired the Rule of 
Law in the international community, should be remembered as a person of the period 'in which 
actual international practice is most marked by disorder'51 : 
'[I]ntemationallaw seems to follow an inverse movement to that of international politics. When diplomacy is 
violent and unscrupulous, international law soars into the regions of natural law; when diplomacy acquires a 
certain habit of co-operation, international law crawls in the mud oflegal positivism. '52 
49 Kennan/1951154. 
50 W./Beckett/1939/266. 
51 Bull/1995/145. 
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Just as Grotius wrote De Jw·e Belli ac Pacis as his ethical reaction to 'a lack of restraint in relation 
to war, such as even barbarous races should be ashamed of53 in the Thirty Years War, Lauterpacht's 
theory of international law is also his ethical reaction to two World Wars as the lack of humanity. In 
this sense, although he would have frowned upon a statement by a person he detested, there is no 
better expression for appreciating Lauterpacht than these words of Hegel, who wrote, 'The great 
man of the age is the one who can put into words the will ofhis age, tell his age what its will is, and 
accomplish it What he does is the heart and essence of his age; he actualises his age. '54 
52 Wight/1968a/29. 
53 Grotius/1925/20. 
54 Hegel/1952/295. 
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in CP 11, pp.385-403. 
- (1926)'The United States and the Pennanent Court of International Justice' (1926) Survey of 
International Affairs 80. 
- (1927a/CP-II) 'Spinoza and International Law'(1927) 8 BYIL 89. Reprinted in CP 11, pp.366-
384. 
- (1928a/CP-III) 'Sukcesja panstw w odiesienuinu do zobowiazan prywatnoprawnych' (1928) 5 
Glos Prawa 18. English translation as 'Succession of States with Respect to Private Law 
Obligations' byK. Skubiszweski inCP 111,pp.121-137. 
- (1928b/CP-IV) 'Revolutionary Activities by Private Persons against Foreign States' (1928) 22 
AJIL 105. Reprinted in CP 111, pp.251-278. 
- (1928cJCP-lll) 'Revolutionary Propaganda by Govenunents' (1928) 13 Grotius Society 143. 
Reprinted in CP 111, pp.279-296. 
- (1928d) 'Legal Remedy in Case of Excess of Jurisdiction' (1928) 9 BYIL 117. 
- (1928e) 'The Doctrine of Non-Justiciable Disputes in International Law' (1928) 8 Economica 
277. 
- (1929) 'Decisions of Municipal Courts as a Source of International Law' ( 1929) 10 B YIL 65. 
Reprinted in CP 11, pp.238-268. 
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- (1930a) 'Absence of an International Legislature and the Compulsory Jurisdiction of 
International Tribunals' (1930) 11 BYIL 134. 
- (1930b) 'Dissenting Opinions ofNational Judges and the Revision ofthe Statute of the Court' 
(1930) 11 BYIL 182. 
- (1930c) 'British ResetVations to the Optional Clause' (1930) 10 Econornica 137. 
- (1931a/ClP-ll) 'The So-called Anglo-American and the Continental Schools of Thought in 
International Law' (1931) 12 BYIL 31. Reprinted in CP 11, pp.452-483. 
- (1931b/CP-ll) 'The Nature of International Law and General Jurisprudence' (1932) 12 
Econornica 301. Reprinted in CP JJ,ppJ-21. 
- (1932) 'Japan and the Covenant' (1932) 3 Political Quarterly 174. 
- (1933a/CP-ID) 'Boycott in International Law' (1933) 14 BYIL 125. Reprinted in CP m, pp.297-
311. 
- (1933b/CP-ll) 'Kelsen's Pure Science of Law' in W. I. Jennings (ed.), Modern Theories of Law 
(London: 1933), pp.l 05-138. Reprinted in CP 11, pp.404-430. 
- (1934a) 'The Pact of Paris and the Budapest Articles oflnte1pretation' (1934) 20 Grotius Society 
178. 
- (1934b) ' "Resort to War' and the Covenant during the Manchwian Dispute' (1934) 28 AJIL 43. 
- (1934c) 'The Pennanent Courtoflntemational Justice as a Court of Appeal' (1934) 15 BYIL 141. 
- (1935) 'Some Observations on Preparatory Work in the lnte1pretation ofTreaties' (1935) 68 HLR 
549. 
- (1935/CP-IV) 'The Oscar Chinn Case' (1935) 16 BYIL 164. Reprinted in CP IV, pp.337-340. 
- (1936a) 'Neutrality and Collective Secwity' (1936) 2 Politica 133. 
- (1936b/CP-IV) 'The Covenant as the "Higher Law'" (1936) 17 BYIL 54. Reprinted in CP IV, 
pp.326-336. 
- (1936c/CP-IV) 'Contracts to Break a Contract' in (1936) 52 LQR 494. Reprinted in CP IV, 
pp.340-375. 
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- (1936di/CP-IJ[) 'International Law after the Covenant' in Problems of Peace, lOd! Series (1936), 
pp37-56. Reprinted in CP 11, pp.l45-158. 
- (193/a) 'The Legal Aspect' in CA.W. Manning (ed.), PeacefUl Change: An International 
Problem (London: Macmillan, 1937), pp.l35-168. 
-(193/b/CP-lll) 'CredentialsoftheAbyssinian Delegation' (1937) 18 BYIL 54. ReprintinCP m, 
pp.589-591. 
- (193/c) Memorandum on the International Problem of Peaceful Change: The Legal and 
Procedw-al Aspect [submitted to the General Study Conference on Peaceful Change held in Paris 
from 28 Jtme to 3 July, 193 7 by the British Co-ordinating Committee for International Studies] 
(Paris: 193 7). 
- (1938a) 'The Nyon Arrangement: Piracy by Treaty?' [anonymous note but ascertained that 
Lauterpacht wrote this note by his letter to Sir Stepl1an Gaselee of the Foreign Office] (1938) 19 
BYIL 198. 
- (1938b/CP-ITI) 'The Cristina' (1938) 52 LQR 339. Reprinted in CP Ill, pp.374-378. 
- (1938c/CP-DI) 'The League ofNations' [as an address to the Cambridge University League of 
Nations Union on 16th November 1938] in CP Ill, pp.575-588. 
- (1939a) 'The Form ofForeign Office Certificate' (1939) 20 BYIL 125. 
- (1939b) 'Insurrection etPiraterie' (1939) 20 RGDP/513. 
- (1939-1940) 'Recognition of Insurgents as a de facto Government' (1939-1940) 3 MLR 1. 
- (1940a/CP-III) 'Sovereignty and Federation in International Law' [probably written in the early 
spring of 1940] in CP Ill, pp.5-25. 
- (1940b/CP-ll) 'Is International Law Part of the Law ofEngland?' (1940) 25 Grotius Society 51. 
Reprinted in CP 11, pp.537-569. 
- (1941a/CP-ll)'The Reality of the Law ofNations' [as a lecture given at a meeting at the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs on 27th May 1941] in CP 11, pp.22-51. 
- (194110/CP-lli) 'Professor Carron International Morality' [probably written in the autumn of 
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1941] in CP 11, pp.67-92. 
- (1942) 'The Principle of Non-Recognition in International Law' in Q. Wright (ed.), Legal 
Problems in the Far Eastern Conflict (New York: 1942). 
- (1943/CP-ill) 'The Principles of International Organizations' [probably written in the second 
half of 1942 or sometime in 1943] in CP Ill, pp.461-503. 
- (1944a) 'The Law ofNations, the Law ofNature and the Rights of Man' (1944) 29 Grotius 
Society 1. 
- (1944b) 'The Law ofNations and the Punishment of War Crimes' (1944) 21 BYIL 58. 
- (1944c) 'Implied Recognition' (1944) 21 BYIL 123. 
- (1944d) 'Recognition of States in International Law' (1944) 53 YU385. 
- (1945a) 'De facto Recognition, Withdrawal ofRecognition and Conditional Recognition' (1945) 
22BYIL 164. 
- (1945) 'Recognition of Governments I' (1945) 45 CLR 815 
- (1946a) 'Recognition of Governments IT' (1946) 46 CLR 37. 
- (1946b/CP-ll) 'The Grotian Tradition in International Law' (1946) 23 BYIL 1. Reprinted in CP 
Il' pp.307-365. 
- (1947a/CP-Ill) 'Allegiance, Diplomatic Protection and Criminal Jurisdiction over Aliens' (1947) 
9 CU330. ReprintedinCP /IJ,pp.221-241. 
- (194ib/CP-Ill) 'An International Bill ofHtnnan Rights' The Times (26th July 1947). Reprinted 
CP Ill, pp.407-409. 
- (1947c/CP-ll) 'The Subjects of the Law ofNations I and IT' (1947) 63 LQR 438 and (1948) 64 
LQR 97. Reprinted in CP 11, pp.487-533. 
- (1947d) 'Opening Speech at the Session ofHtnnan Rights in the Prague Conference' (1947) 42 
RILA 13. 
- (1948a) 'Opening Speech at the Session ofHtnnan Rights in the Brussels Conference' (1948) 43 
RILA29. 
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- (1948b) 'Human Rights, the Charter of the United Nations, and the International Bill of the 
Rights of Man', (1948) 43 R1LA 74 [with the Preface by the HlU11an Rights Committee ofthe 
International Law Association]. 
- (1948c) 'The Universal Declaration ofHlli11an Rights' (1948) 25 BYIL 354. 
- (1949a/CP-ill) 'The Nationality of Denationalized Persons' (1949) 1 Jewish Yearbook of 
International Law 164. Reprint in CP Ill, pp.383-404. 
- (1949b/CP-Ill) 'Towards an International Bill ofRights' (1949) 42 The Listener 747. Reprinted 
inCP m,pp.410-415. 
- (1949c/CP-IV) 'Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation 
of Treaties' (1949) 26 BYIL 48. Reprinted in CP IV, pp.404-446. 
- (1950a) 'The Proposed European Court ofHlli11an Rights' (1950) 35 Grotius 25. 
- (1950b/CP-ll) 'International Law after the Second War' [as a lecture at the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem on 7th May 1950] in CP !!, pp.159-170. 
- (1950c/CP-ID) 'State Sovereignty and HlU11an Rights' [as a lecture at the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem on 8th May 1950] in CP Ill, pp.416-430. 
- (1950d/CP-IV) 'Observations on the Report of Professor de La Pradelle' [in regard to the 
international effect of nationalization] (1950-l) 43 Annuare 92. Reprint in CP IV, pp.90-92. 
- (1950e) 'De !'interpretation des traites: Rapport et projet de resolutions' (1950-l) 43 Annuare 366. 
English original text for the section II of this report (1950f/CP-IJI) as 'The Doctrine of Plain 
Meaning' in CP IV, pp.394-403. English original text for the section ill of this report (1950g/CP-
IV) as 'Preparatory Work in the Interpretation ofTreaties (1950)' in CP IV, pp.528-535. 
- (1950h/CP-Ill) 'Sovereignty over Submarine Areas' (1950) 27 BYIL 376. Reprinted in CP m, 
pp.l43-203. 
-(1950i) 'Angary and Requisition ofNeutral Property' (1950) 27 BYIL 455. 
- (1950j/CP-Ill) 'Recognition of China' The Times (6th January 1950). Reprinted as 'Recognition 
of Governments' in CP Ill, pp.l13-118. 
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- (1951/CP-ill) 'The Problem of Jurisdictional lmmunities of Foreign States' (1951) 28 BYIL 220. 
Reprinted in CP Ill, pp.315-373. 
- (1952a/CP-III) 'Implications of the Nmwegian Fisheries Case' The Tzmes (8th January 1952). 
Reprinted in CP Ill, pp.213-217. 
- (1952b/CP-ID) 'The Hague Judgment' The Times (30th and 31st July 1952). Reprinted as 
'Testing the Legality of Persian Policy' in CP Ill, pp.242-244. 
- (1952c) 'Observations on the Report ofProfessor Con:frere' [in regard to the immunity of foreign 
states] (1952-I) 44 Annuare 111. 
- (1952d) 'De !'interpretation des traites: Observations complementaires et projet definited de 
Resolutions' (1952-I) 44 Annuare 197. 
- (1952e) 'The Problem of the Revision of the Law ofWar' (1952) 29 BYIL 360. 
- (1953a) 'Rules of Warfare in an Unlawful War' in G A Lipsky (ed.), Law and Politics in the 
World Community: Essays on Hans Kelsen 's Pure Themy and Relaied Problems in International 
Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), pp.89-113. 
- (1953b) 'The Limits ofthe Operation of the Laws ofWar' (1953) 30 BYIL 206. 
- (1953c/CP-ll) 'On Realism, Especially in International Relations' [as a paper given at a meeting 
of the Carlyle Club on lOth October 1953] in CP 11, pp.52-66. 
- (1954a) 'Some Possible Solutions of the Problem of Reservations to Treaties' (1954) 39 Grotius 
97. 
-(1954b/CP-III) 'The Rose Mwy' (1954) 12 CU20. Reprinted in CP IJI,pp.245-247. 
- (1954c) 'De !'interpretation des traites: Nouveau projet detinited de Resolutions' (1954-I) 45 
Annuare 225. 
- (1954d) 'La revision du droit de la guerre' [with F. R Coudert and J. P. A Fran<yois] (1954-I) 45 
Annuare 555. 
- (1954e) 'Observations on the Report of Professor Max Huber dated on 18 July 1952' [in regard 
to the study of the amendment of the ICJ Statute] (1954-1) 45 Annuare 473. 
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- (1954l:i) 'Observations on the Provisional Report of Professor Max Huber dated on 30 December 
1952' [in regard to the study of the amendment of the ICJ Statute] (1954-D 45 Ann. Institut 529. 
- (1955/CP-ll) 'Codification and Development of International Law' (1955) 49 AJJL 16. 
Reprinted in CP IJ., pp.269-303. 
- (195§..1956/CP-II) 'Brierly's Contribution to International Law' (1955-1956) 32 BYIL 1. 
Reprinted in H. Lauterpacht and C. H. M. Waldock ( eds.), The Basis of Obligation in International 
Law and Other Papers (Oxford: 1958), pp.xv-xxxvi, and in CP II, pp.431-451. 
- (1958/CP-ll) 'Some Observations on the Prohibition of 'Non Liquet' and the Completeness of 
the Law' in F. M. VanAsbeck (ed.), Symbolae Verzijl (TI1e Hague: 1958), pp.196-211. Reprinted in 
CP IJ., pp.213-237. 
- Lauterpacht-Jennings (1959/CP-II) 'International Law and Colonial Questions, 1870-1914' 
[with R.Y Jennings] in Cambridge History of the British Empire, vo1.3 (Cambridge: 1959), pp.667-
707. Reprinted in CP IJ., pp.95-144. 
- (Generai-Part/CP-I) 'International Law- The General Part' [prepared for the 9th edition of 
Oppenheim 's International Law] in CP I, pp.1-178. 
- (Analogies-ll/CP-ll) 'Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law' [prepared for 
the new edition of Analogies] in CPU, pp.173-212. 
2.1.5. BOOKREVIEWS 
Note: Lauterpacht usually used his initials 'H. L.' for his book reviews in accordance with the 
usage of book reviews in Britain. It is not so difficult to find and identify his book reviews in some 
periodicals, such as British Yearbook of International Law or Cambridge Law Journal, which 
Lauterpacht was clearly related to. It is still uncertain, however, which periodicals Lauterpacht 
contributed his book reviews to.International Affairs and Journal of Society of Public Teachers of 
Law are ascertained as journals in which his book reviews are clearly identifiable. It is unavoidable, 
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therefore, that there may be some omissions of his book reviews in this bibliography, although I 
tried to make a comprehensive bibliography as much as possible. 
- (BRl/1928) 'Die Forbildung der internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit seit dem Weltrieg 
besonders durch den Locarno-Pakt by P. Kaufinann; Die Fortbildung der internationalen 
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit seit dem Weltla-ieg by H. W Thieme; Die volkerrechtliche Grantievertrag, 
insbesondere se it der Entstehug des Genfor Volkerbundes by 0. Bussmann' (1928) 9 BYIL 197. 
- (BR2/1928) 'Die volkerrechtliche Option by J. L. Ktmz' (1928) 9 BYIL 199. 
- (BR3/1928) 'Thiorie de la Societe des Nations by R Redslob' (1928) 9 BYIL 206. 
- (BR4/1928) 'Die volkerrechtliche Hqfung des Staates, insbesondere bei Handlungen Privater by 
K. Strupp' (1928) 9 BYIL 209. 
- (BRS/1928) 'Die Abanderung volkerrechtsgemdssen Landesrechts, grundstitzliche 
Untersuchungen zum Emglischen, Amerikanischen, Deutschen und Oesterreichischen Recht by G 
A. Walz' (1928) 9BYIL 210. 
- (BR6/1928) 'Transactions ofGrotius Society, vol12; Report oft he International Law 
Association, vo/.34' (1928) 7 The Journal ofthe Royal Institute ofinternationalA.ffairs 145. 
- (BR7/1929) 'Die elrus-lothringische Staatsangehorigkeitsregelung und das Volkerrecht by W 
Schatzel, Der Lausanner Vertrag und der griechisch-tiirkische Bevolkerungsaustausch by G Streit 
and Russland und Westeuropa by M. F. von Taube' (1929) 10 BYIL 284. 
- (BR8/1929) 'The Development of International Law by G Butler and S. Maccoby' (1929) 8 The 
Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs 269. 
- (BR9/1930) 'Dru Wesen des Volkerrechts und Kritik der Volkerrechtsleugner by G A. Walz' 
(1930) IIBYIL 262. 
- (BRl0/1931) 'Die zwangswise Durchsetzung im Volkerrecht by H. von Bardeleben' (1931) 12 
BYIL2I2. 
- (BlUl/1931) 'Lehrbuch des Volkerrechts. ErsterTeil. by A. Hold-Femeck' (1931) 12 BYIL 220. 
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- (HR12/1931) 'Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen by H. Morgenthau' 
(1931) 12BYIL229. 
- (BR13/1933) 'Lehrbuch des Volkerrechts (Second and last Part) by A. Hold-Femeck' (1933) 14 
BYIL211. 
- (BR141/1933) 'Das Verhaltnis der franzosischen Biindnisvertrage zum Volkerbundpakt wul zum 
Pakt con Locarno by F. Krfuner'(l933) 14 BYIL 221. 
- (BR15/1933) 'Einstwilige Veifi.igungen des Weltgerichtshofs, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen by H. 
G Nimeyer' (1933) 14 BYIL 222. 
- (BR16/1933) 'Die Voraussetzungenfiir die Anwndung von Volkerbund-zwangsmassnahmen by 
M. Rottger' (1933) 14 BYIL 222. 
- (BR17/1933) 'Vertrage in Gunsten und in Lasten Drifter im Volkerrecht by C. Heinz Wmkler' 
(1933) 14BYIL223. 
- (BR18/1934) 'Lectures in International Law by T. E. Holland' (1934) Journal of Society of 
Public Teachers of Law 49. 
- (BR19/1935) 'Die Internationale Richter by V. Bnms' (1935) 16 BYIL 217. 
- (BR20/1935) 'Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum by Ch. Wolff (Classics of 
International Law)' (1935) Journal of Society of Public Teachers of Law 69. 
- (BIUl/1935) 'British Yearbook of International Law (1934)' (1935) Journal of Society of Public 
Teachers of Law 71. 
- (BR22/1936) 'Kriegsrecht und Neutralitatsrecht by J. L. KllllZ' (1936) 17 BYIL 228. 
- (BR23/1937) 'La Rappresentanza ne! Diritto Internazionale by A. P. Sereni' (1937) 18 BYIL 
245. 
- (BR24/1937) 'Geschichte des Volkerrechts by A. Wegner' (1937) 18 BYIL 245. 
-(BR25/1938) 'Gebietshoheit iiberdie B undC Mandate by W. Gaupp' (1938) 19 BYIL272. 
- (BR26/1938) 'Volkerrecht by A. van Verdross' (1938) 19 BYIL 285. 
- (BR27/1938) 'Neutrality and Collective Security ed. by Q. Wright' (1938) 17 International 
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Affairs 710. 
- (BR28/1939) 'International Legislation, vol. 6, eel.' by M.O. Hudson' (1939) 20 BYIL 178. 
- (BR29/1939-1941) 'Diplomatic Correspondence ofthe United States, vol. 9 (Mexico), eel. by W. 
R Manning' (1939-1941) 7 CU181. 
- (BRJ0/1939-1941) 'Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, vol. 11 (Spain), eel. by W. 
R Manning' (1939-1941) 7 CU303. 
- (BR31/1939-1941) 'Control of Aliens in the British Commonwealth of Nations by C. F. Fraser' 
(1939-1941) 7 CU427. 
- (BR32/1939-1941) 'A Collection of Neutrality Law, 2 vols., eel. by F. Deak and P. C. Jessup' 
(1939-1941) 7 CU428. 
- (BR33/1939-1941) 'Law, the State and the International Community, by J. B. Scott' (1939-1941) 
7CU428. 
- (BR34/1939-1941) 'Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, vol. 12 (Texas and 
Venezuela), eel. by W. R Manning' (1939-1941) 7 CU429. 
-(BR35/1939-1941) 'The English Navigation Laws by L. A. Harper' (1939-1941) 7 CU 430. 
- (BR36/1939-1941) 'Le reglement conventionnel des consequences de remuniements territoriaux 
by G Kackenbeeck' (1939-1941) 7 CU 430. 
- (BR37/1940) 'International Boundaries by S. Whitternore Boggs' (1940) 19 International 
Affairs Review Supplement 120. 
- (BR38/1941/CP-Ill) 'Resurrection of the League' [as a review of Lord Cecil's The Great 
Experiment] (1941) 12 Political Quarterly 121. Reprinted in CP Ill, pp.592-60 I. 
- (BR39/1942) 'Law Without Force by G Nierneyer' (1942) 19 International Affairs Review 
Supplement 487. 
- (BR40/1942-1944) 'The Co'!forence of Ambassadors by G P. Pink' (1942-1944) 8 CU223. 
- (BR41/1942-1944) 'The International Law of the Sea by A. Pearce Higgins and C. John 
Colornbos' (1942-1944) 8 CL/334. 
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- (BR42/1942-19441) 'Plans for World Peace through Six Centw·ies by S. J. Hemleben' (1942-
1944) 8 CU343. 
- (BR43/1943) 'Law and Peace in International Relations by H. Kelsen' (1943) 19 International 
Affairs Review Supplement 662. 
- (BR44/1944) 'Trading with the Enemy in World War IJby M. Domke' (1944) 21 BYIL 237. 
- (BR45/1944) 'The British Commonwealth at War' (1944) 21 B YIL 23 7. 
- (BR46/1944) 'An Analytical Index to the American Journal of International Law and 
Supplements, Volumes I5 to 34 (I921-40); the Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law, 192I-40prepared by G A. Finch' (1944) 21 BYIL 239. 
- (BR47/1944) 'The International Law of the Sea by A. P. Higgins and C. J. Colombos' (1944) 21 
BYIL241. 
- (BR48/1944) 'Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Canadian Relations 1784-1860, 
3 vols. ed. byW. R. Manning' (1944) 21 BYIL245. 
-(BR49/1944) 'Legal E.ffoctsofWar 200 ed. by A. D. McNair' (1944) 21 BYIL253. 
- (BRS0/1944) 'T#!re the Minorities Treaties a Failwe? by J. Robinson and others' (1944) 21 
BYIL259. 
- (BRSl/1944) 'International Law and Totalitarian Lawlessness by G Schwarz.enberger' (1944) 
21 BYIL261. 
-(BR52/1944) 'A StudyofWar, 2 vols. by Q. Wright' (1944) 21 BY!L265. 
- (BR53/1945) 'L 'Organisation de la Societe lnternationale by P. Guggenheim' (1945) 22 BYIL 
307. 
- (BR54/1945) 'Digests of International Lm11 7 vols. and General Index by G H. Hackworth' 
(1945) 22 BYIL 310. 
- (BR55/1945) 'The Headquarters of International Institutions by C. Wilfred Jenks' (1945) 22 
BYIL 312. 
- (BR56/1945) 'Principles Generaux du Droit international public, vol.1 by Ch. Rousseau' (1945) 
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22BYIL319. 
- (BR57/1945-1947) 'Prisoners of War: A Study in Development of International Law by W. S. 
Flory' (1945-1947) 9 CU134. 
-(BR58/1945-1947) 'Axis Rule in Occupied Europe by R Lemkin' (1945-1947) 9 CU140. 
- (BR59/1945-1947) 'The Czechoslovak Cause by E. Taborsky' (1945-194 7) 9 CU 140. 
- (BR60/1945-1947) 'A Guide to the Practice of International Coriference by V. D. Pastuhov' 
(1945-1947) 9 CU255. 
- (BR61!1945-1947) 'Military Occupation and the Rule of Law by E. Fraenkel' (1945-1947) 9 
CU256. 
-(BR62/1945-1947) 'The Pure TheoryofLaw by W. Ebenstein' (1945-1947) 9 CU256. 
- (BR63/1945-1947) 'International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, vol.l 
byG Schwarz.enberger' (1945-1947) 9 CU258. 
- (BR64/1945-1947) 'League of Nations and National Minorities by P. dr Azcarate' (194 5-194 7) 9 
CU264. 
- (BR65/1945-1947) 'The International Secretariat by E. F. Ranshofen-Wertheimer' (1945-1947) 
9CU265. 
- (BR66/1945-1947) 'The Collected Papers of John Bassett Moore, 7 vols.' (1945-1947) 9 CU 
394. 
- (BR67/1946) '&sential Human Rights, ed. by W. D. Lewis and J. R Ellingston' (1946) 23 BYIL 
497. 
- (BR68/1946) 'Lehrbuch des Volkerrechts by P. Guggenheim' (1946) 23 BYIL 502. 
- (BR69/1946) 'International.Lmt~ Chiefly as Inte1preted and Applied by the United States by C. C. 
Hyde' (1946) 23 BYIL 505. 
-(BR70/1946) 'Political Reconstruction by K. Loewenstien' (1946) 23 BYIL 510. 
- (BR7111946) 'Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Charter of the United Nations 
by J. Robinson' (1946)23 BYIL 517. 
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- (BR/2/19416) 'Le Preambule de la Charte base ideologique de I 'ON U. by A. Salomon' (1946) 
23BYIL518. 
- (BR/3/1947) 'A Modern Law a/Nations by P. C. Jessup' (1947) 24 BYIL 502. 
- (BR/4/1948) 'Legal Eifocts ofWar 3rd ed. by A. D. MeN air' (1948) 25 BYIL 487. 
- (BR/5/19419) 'Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Justice, Ways and 
Means of Making the Evidence of Customary International Law More Readily Available; Survey of 
International Law in relation to the Work of Codification of the International Law Commission; 
Preparatory Study Concerning a Drqft Declaration of the Rights and Duties of States; The Charter 
and Judgment of the Niirnberg Tribunal; Report of the International Law Commission Covering its 
First Session .from 12 April to 9 June 1949 published by the United Nations' (1949) 26 BYIL 530. 
- (BR76/1949) 'International Law 3m ed. by C.G Fenwick' (1949) 26 BYIL 540. 
- (BR/7/1949) 'Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 3 vols.' (1949) 26 BYIL 543. 
- (BR/8/19419) 'La Technique et les principles du droit public: Etudes en l'honneur de Georges 
Scelle, 2 vols.' (1949) 26 BYIL 548. 
- (BR/9/19419) 'Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 
1928-1948 compiled by the Secretariat of the United Nations' (1949) 26 BYIL 551. 
- (BR80/1949) 'Yearbook of Human Rights for 1947' (1949) 26 BYIL 555. 
- (BR81/1949) 'Human Rights in the Modern World by A. N. Holcombe' (1949) 25 International 
Affairs 508. 
- (BR82/1949) 'The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its Predecessors (1679-1948), ed. 
by F. M. van As beck' (1949) 25 International Affairs 511. 
- (BR83/19419) 'Rediscovery of Justice by F. R Bienenfeld' (1949) 10 CU299. 
- (BR84/1949) 'Prisoners ofWar: A Symposium' (1949) 10 CU336. 
- (BR85/1949) 'Federal Protection of Civil Rights- Quest for a Sword by R K. Carr; A Study of 
Judicial Review in Virginia, 1789-1928byM. V. Nelson' (1949) 10 CU337. 
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- (BR88/1950) 'The Law of the United Nations by H. Kelsen' (1950) 27 BYIL 498. 
- (BR89/1950) 'Volkerrecht, 200 eel. by A. Verdross' (1950) 27 BYIL 512. 
- (BR90/1950) 'The American Mind by H. S. Commager' (1950) 11 CU 136. 
-(BR91/1951) 'The LawofNations, 200 ed. by H. W. Briggs' (1951) 28 BYIL419. 
- (BR92/1951) 'Law and Society in the Relations ofStates, by P. E. Corbett' (1951) 28 BYIL 424. 
- (BR93/1951) 'Power Politics by G Schwarzenberger' (1951) 28 BYIL 436. 
- (BR94/1951) 'Traite de droit international public, 2 vols. by M. Sibert'(l951) 28 BYIL438. 
- (BR95/1952) 'Jear Book ofthe United Nations 1951 and Jear Book of Human Rights 1951' 
(1952) 29 BYIL 489. 
- (BR%/1952) 'Principles of International Law by H. Kelsen' (1952) 29 BYIL 509. 
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- (R2a/1942) 'The Letter to Stephan Gaselee dated on 30th March 1942' F0371/30678 [PRO]. 
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Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, vol.2 (Cambridge: 1986), pp.634-704. 
- (1962) 'Hersch Lauterpacht- The Scholar as Judge. Part II' (1962) 38 BYIL 1. Reprinted in The 
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traites: Rapport et projet de resolutions] (1950-I) 43 Annuare 455. 
Wilfred Jenks, C. (1960) 'Hersch Lauterpacht: The Scholar as Prophet' (1960) 36 BYIL 1. 
Willlinms, G l (1948) 'The Correlation of Allegiance and Protection' (1948) 10 CU 54. [It 
criticises Lauterpacht' s article 'Allegiance, Diplomatic Protection and Criminal Jurisdiction over 
Aliens' in regard to the trial ofWilliam Joyce.] 
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